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Abstract
This thesis presents and critically assesses the aesthetic theory of the
contemporary German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch, in particular his ideas of
the intersection of philosophical aesthetics and contemporary culture. The three
aspects of his ideas which frame this discussion and which I present in the first
chapter are his project for reconfiguring aesthetics as a study of sensory
perception, his characterisation of postmodern culture as aestheticised, and his
conception of a new focus for aesthetics, the anaesthetic or imperceptible.
Welsch's ideas intersect with several key issues in philosophical aesthetics which
I outline in the second chapter, namely the status of the sensory and its
relationship to the quality of indeterminacy, the subjective and cognitive nature
of the aesthetic experience, the idea of the aesthetic as an epistemological ground
that is in some way distinct from rational or conceptual knowledge, and finally
the aesthetic characterised as an essentially modernist quality of
defamiliarisation. The interlocutors here are Alexander Baumgarten, Kant and
the Russian Formalists. This is followed in the third chapter by a more focussed
discussion of Welsch's ideas on the sublime, a crucial aesthetic category which
offers a theoretical background to his ideas on anaesthetics. Welsch reads the
sublime as pivotal to the aesthetics of Adorno and the aesthetic thinking of
Lyotard, and the main argument in this chapter compares the postmodern
fascination with diversity or heterogeneity as values in themselves with a more
ideologically informed conception of the cognitive and social function of modern
and postmodern art as challenging existing modes of perception. I also read the
limit experience of the sublime as a model for the modernist aesthetic of
defamiliarisation. A critical discussion of Welsch's own variant of the sublime,
the anaesthetic, follows in chapter four. The key issues here are the tensions
between Welsch's disparate uses of the term, the ideological implications of each
variant, and to what extent each allows a re-engagement of indeterminacy with
everyday culture, or tends towards a more autonomous aesthetic. The final two
chapters apply Welsch's ideas and the issues raised to examples of art,
specifically drama, that operates at the limits of perception. The aim here is to
assess whether Welsch's sensory terms offer the articulation of art and
contemporary culture, or whether with some modifications they might. An
overarching concern of the thesis is to distinguish between the transcendental
significance of the aesthetic and its more marginal validity as cultural
intervention.
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Introduction . Transcendental or Marginal Aesthetics
The impetus for this thesis is the contribution to aesthetic theory of the
contemporary German philosopher and aesthetic theorist, Wolfgang Welsch, and
the intersection his work articulates between certain strands of traditional
aesthetic theory and contemporary culture. Welsch is the author and editor of
some six books and numerous articles on aesthetics, in addition to his work on
theories of the postmodern and the nature of rationality. His corpus offers a
comprehensive discussion of the disparate concept of the 'aesthetic' in its
historical usages from Baumgarten to the present, and he argues convincingly for
its increased significance for contemporary culture, both in terms of everyday
experience and more philosophical issues of what constitutes knowledge. His
ideas are broad in scope, indeed the fact that they have been little treated in
secondary literature might in part be due their overly ambitious range, as well as
their sometimes cavalier, unsystematic and often repetitive approach. Claims are
sometimes made about the role of art and the status of aesthetics without much
theoretical argument or empirical support. Potentially crucial preceding debates
or ideas are barely referenced, and subtleties and complications are ignored for
the sake of broad argument. But in my view his contributions to aesthetics do
point to significant and under-thematised areas of aesthetics, such as the focus on
the (more or less complex) sensory aspect of the aesthetic, the essentially
dialectical nature of the (in my view essentially 'modernist') aesthetic, which is at
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the heart of his ideas on the sensory and non-sensory (in his terms, the' aesthetic'
and I anaesthetic'), the interesting area of the aesthetics of the imperceptible, the
cognitive significance of the aesthetic (what I mean by this will become clear in
what follows), as well as the general 'opening up' of aesthetics to accommodate a
theorization of the interaction between perception and cognition in art and in
their more everyday forms. I take this to provide the impetus, if not the tools, for
furthering discussion of the scope and significance of aesthetics in the context of
contemporary culture. The key aims of this thesis are therefore to present
Welsch's contribution to aesthetics in terms of its debt and continuity with
previous investments in the aesthetic, and to assess it in terms of its internal
consistency and general plausibility, its ideological investment and finally its
usefulness as a way of describing practical examples of art and their interaction
with everyday experience.
Broadly Welsch's project attempts to combine a renewal of certain historical
strands of philosophical aesthetics, most prominently the sensory nature of the
aesthetic experience, with a characterisation of contemporary, postmodern
society as essentially' aestheticised'. These two elements of his formulations are
interrelated, with Welsch's conception of the aesthetic as a 'Schlusselphanomen
unserer Kultur' [Welsch 19937], turning on a renewal of the understanding that
the terms of the aesthetics are broader than simply that which relates to art and
beauty. Of course, aesthetics has long been more than merely the philosophy of
9
art, evidenced in Plato's higher ideal or Kant's indeterminate Iaesthetic idea'. But
Welsch's ideas return to the understanding of aesthetics as the study of sense
perception, central to Kant's early estimation of aesthetics as bereft of any
transcendental value [see Kant 1913, Crawford 1974 19], but also to the earlier
formulations of Alexander Baumgarten, in whose Aesthetica (1750) the aesthetic is
seen to offer an alternative mode of knowledge to the rational, which he
paradoxically calls' sinnlich' or 'sensory'. The question of what this' sensory' can
imply will be a central one for this thesis. Of course the purely sensory nature of
the aesthetic on its own has not sustained interest in it for the last two hundred
and fifty years: Kant's' aesthetics of the sublime' thematises an experience whose
sensory nature is precisely problematic, and what he infers from the experience
is about that which transcends the merely sensory experience: the point is that
for Kant this indeterminacy is seen to be precisely a quality of the super-sensory,
rational mind. I will say more about this philosophical significance of the
aesthetic in chapter two. As far as art is concerned, the migration of the aesthetic
'contentless experience' or 'failure of representation' into the artwork has been
crucial to art's usefulness as a response to determinate thinking, whereby the
seemingly paradoxical nature of this 'aesthetic idea' or 'thought without concept'
is echoed in much of twentieth century writing about art as 'saying the
unsayable' or 'representing the unrepresentable'. Much has been made of this
repressive side to thought and understanding in twentieth century theory, most
prominently in Adorno's critique of 'identity-thinking'. The paradoxical or
10
'negative' nature of these claims to authenticity will be a crucial point of
discussion when I come to focus on the idea of the claim to authenticity in
Welsch's idea of 'anaesthetic' art - that which deploys the imperceptible - in
chapter four.
The aesthetic's 'unsayable' also has a more affirmative aspect, such as in early
Romantic thinking, which both echoes and crucially diverges from Kant's
philosophical project. For the early Romantics the aesthetic is seen to mark the
limits of discursive philosophy. In this respect the aesthetic experience is seen to
admit of an irreducible particularity, which cannot be broken down into laws or
rule-based categorisation. Like its more 'negative' variant above, this is opposed
to determinate conceptual thought, which is seen to entail, in Andrew Bowie's
words, 'a possible repression of my particular imaginative relationship to the
object'. [Bowie 2003a 34] The question for Welsch's ideas on the sensory will be,
if such determinacy characterizes the repressive aspect of thought might this
suggest a role for the sensory, traditionally the indeterminate precursor of
thought, in resurrecting a more critical kind of indeterminacy? Can the
conception of the aesthetic as sensory ever live up to the more sophisticated
accounts of the role of the aesthetic in grounding thought and conceptualizing
resistance to repressive models of thought?
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Welsch's interest in the sensory coincides with what I will identify as resurgence
in interest in the constitutive nature of the 'material' aspect of reality, which
begins with Aristotle and maintains a strong thread in modem social and
cultural theory. This more recent interest has many - not necessarily compatible
- aspects, ranging from Marx's materialist concerns that centre on the essentially
economic basis of social relations, through Nietzsche's vitalist calls that turn
against the legacy of the Enlightenment in toto, to phenomenology, which asserts
the primacy of the sensory in our experience of the word. The question for
Welsch, whose first book begins on the fairly philosophical terrain of Aristotle's
Sinneslehre, will be where his ideas are located in this disparate collection. An
underlying assumption for my discussions is that this question of the status of
the sensory goes to the heart of what is at stake in philosophical aesthetics and
what is specific to the Iaesthetic' experience. Rather than Kant's merely
discarded and forgotten husk of the experience, abandoned once the universal
kernel has been obtained, I will assess the critical value of the specifically sensory
nature of aesthetic experience as it is deployed in certain artworks.
Certainly much modern art, from Impressionism onwards, has focused our
attention on the building blocks of sensation and perception. This new interest
in sensation and perception may be seen as a response to the changing nature of
everyday sensory experience in the modern age, in which our relationship to
time and space has been crucially destabilised by such phenomena as television,
12
telephony and photography. [SeeFischer-Lichte 19951-3] Welsch's formulations
are on the same terrain when he characterises non-perception as in some respects
more characteristic of our experience of a reality that has been technologically
altered, underlying his conception of postmodern reality as characterised by a
bewildering oscillation between sensory excess and sensory absence.
This question of the relationship of art to our experience of everyday reality also
touches on a key issue for the specifically philosophical significance of art and
aesthetics, which is important for my treatment of Welsch's ideas. This is the
question of whether these qualities of the sensory or the indeterminate admit of
ideological analysis, or whether in fact the aesthetic describes that aspect of art
that precisely cannot be reduced to ideological terms. [See Bowie 2003b 78] The
implication of this latter position is, and Welsch will assert a version of this idea
himself, that ideological interrogations of the artwork can only be framed in
terms that are already ideologically informed, and any ideological critique
obscures the political import of a work of art. This Significance of the aesthetic
beyond any ideological position has been reasserted in recent years [see [oughin
& Malpas 2003], but does this exclusion of ideological questions convincingly
evade the criticism that this position is already ideologically loaded, not to say
ideologically flawed? In this respect Iwill refer in chapter four - in relation to
Welsch's anaesthetics - to Herbert Marcuse's sceptical view of such aestheticist
restrictions.
13
As far as Welsch's ideas are concerned the question for me is whether this
aestheticist position is compatible with his ideas of a broader conception of the
status and relevance of the aesthetic. Underlying the exclusion of ideological
questions seems to be the sense that the ideological interrogation is deleterious to
the indeterminacy that the aesthetic 'does best', or at least does harm to the
indeterminate nature of the aesthetic experience. This seems to involve a
balancing act, as Bowie points out. On the one hand 'there are dimensions of
cultural articulation which transcend what we can say about them'. [Bowie 2003b
78] On the other hand,
it should be remembered that the 'non-identical' of aesthetic experience,
its resistance to explanation, would be mere mystification without the
attempt to render it more generally accessible through critical dialogue
and the development of cultural communication. [Bowie 2003b 77]
This mysticism is something that Welsch's ideas on imperceptible art arguably
run the risk of, as I will discuss in relation to Marcuse's ideas on difficult art.
Emblematic of this is the essential reflexivity that is seen to be crucial to the
aesthetic and its usefulness in offering any insight into how we are able to speak
about meaning at all, but that might also curtail its usefulness for other spheres.
Of course, Bowie's point is that the philosophical nature of such artworks
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demands mediation by criticism - suggesting a quintessentially Romantic
openness to the external world, and a point that echoes Benjamin's sense in the
Kunstkritik essay that (good) art is that which opens itself to criticism. [See
Benjamin 1974 I 1 651 Nietzsche's remarks on the incomplete artwork imply
essentially the same point. [See Nietzsche 1973 V 21101 The balancing act in this
critical process is presumably to bring out the significance of the work without
reducing it to determinate concepts. A key question is whether this has to be a
philosophical significance or in what ways this indeterminacy is fruitful in terms
of a more everyday consciousness divested of its philosophical implications.
Whilst it is all very well to conclude that art is not best equipped to present
themes, what is the cost when we relinquish the presentation of objects and
issues to concepts, and only the highest principles to such indeterminate modes
of presentation? Might not such a restriction of aesthetics' field of influence
unwittingly reinforce the rationalisation of everyday life? As Bowie again puts
it,
[t]he notion of the unrepresentability of the most essential aspect of our
existence compels one to ask whether art can ultimately only sustain itself
at the expense of any substantial relationship to the empirical content of
social life' . [Bowie 2003a 45]
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John Joughin and Simon Malpas refer to the relegation of the specificity of the
aesthetic experience by those on the right and the left of the political divide [see
}oughin & Malpas 2003 5], but is it too glib to suggest that this annexing of
aesthetic experience to transcendental conclusions enacts a similar relegation of
the particularity of experience?
At the heart of these discussions of indeterminacy and ideology is of course the
crucial and vexed issue of aesthetic autonomy, which goes back to Kant's ideas on
the disinterested nature of judgment and the indeterminacy of the sublime
experience. I will discuss the significance of the sensory aspect of the aesthetic
for ideas of aesthetic autonomy in greater detail in chapter two, but it is worth
noting here that the conceptualisation of the aesthetic in sensory terms might
also be taken as signalling the intention of dismantling, if not autonomy, then
certainly the aesthetic mode's fundamental difference from other modes of
perception. The risk is that one thereby kills the golden goose, but there seems to
be a fine line between dismantling the difference between the special capacity of
the aesthetic and everyday experience and encouraging their interaction. The
restriction of aesthetics' importance to that which does not admit of ideological
questions might in this respect pander to the society of the specialist. This
characteristic of modern society is something that Habermas in his essay
'Modernity - an Incomplete Project' sees art as potentially militating against: his
notion of 'unconstrained interaction' between what he calls the 'aesthetic-
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expressive' sphere and 'reified everyday praxis' [Habermas 1985b 11-12]might
need a more nuanced discussion of the ways this interaction can happen, and
what effects art can hope to have, particularly if one of the aspects of this reified
life-world is its aestheticisation, but I second Habermas' assertion that the virtues
of the aesthetic sphere autonomous nature are best deployed where 'aesthetic
experience is drawn into an individual life history and is absorbed into ordinary
life'. [Habermas 1985b 12] A central issue for my thesis will be whether the
reconfiguration of aesthetics as a study of (albeit a special kind of) sense
perception allows an analysis of the way the experience of art interacts with
everyday experience. Whether Welsch's ideas on art fulfil this possibility, or
merely pave the way for its conceptualisation, will be discussed. Moreover,
Habermas' idea of the 'absorption' of the aesthetic experience into ordinary life
implies for me the significance of the moment of the reception of the work. I will
say more about the contested status of this point of the Iaesthetic event' in
chapter two, and the examples of art which I will analyse in the final chapters,
and in particular the dramas by Samuel Beckett, Peter Handke and Heiner
Muller, will be seen to demand and in some senses depend on active completion
by the audience.
The receiving audience is also crucial to my discussions of the role of the sensory
inasmuch as they are the point at which art is able to mediate with both the
habits and the cultural contents of everyday perception. A key issue for my
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thesis is to ask whether a more marginal reading of the aesthetic might not offer
aesthetic indeterminacy more scope for interaction with everyday habits and
norms of perception. In particular I will suggest that a more fruitful interaction
of the indeterminate and art might be sought in terms of the modernist aesthetic
of defamiliarisation. Such art might be seen to allow freedom from determinate
thought, deployed in the evident freedom of expression from the constraints of
conventional understanding and linguistic usage that has been the decisive
feature of modernist art.
The sense of the aesthetic as caught between its empirical cognitive effect and its
transcendental value, between perception and rational recuperation, might be
read as emblematic of the aesthetic's dialectical nature. This is certainly a
recurrent theme in Welsch's ideas, and an important continuity between
eighteenth century ideas and twentieth century modernist ideas of the
importance of the aesthetic, crucial to which is the sense of the aesthetic as a
meditation on limits, whether of sense perception, representation to mind or
within the artwork. Emblematic of this discussion of limits is the interest in the
sublime, which I will discuss in chapter three in the light of Welsch's reading of
Adorno's ideas on art in Asthetische Theorie as an aesthetics of the sublime. And
perhaps it is symptomatic of this dialectical instability that elements of the
transcendental and elements of marginal aesthetics are evident in Welsch's
formulations. I have already referred to his crucial category of the 'anaesthetic'
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in terms of a seemingly autonomous aesthetics of the imperceptible. But I will
show that his use of the concept is wide-ranging, in some of its variations add a
certain cognitive complexity, and moreover thematise the norms and habits of
perception that I have referred to above.
This will be the terrain of my thesis, on which I will seek to present and assess
Welsch's ideas on the intersection of philosophical aesthetics and contemporary
culture. In the first chapter I will begin with a more detailed presentation of the
main points of his theories of contemporary culture, his ideas on art, and his
ideas for the discipline of aesthetics. This will be followed in chapter two by a
fuller discussion of the issues sketched above, with reference to his historical
precursors in philosophical aesthetics, namely Baumgarten, Kant, and the
Russian Formalists. The concern there will be to trace the function and
significance of sense-perception - and indeed the absence of the sensory - in
philosophical aesthetics, as well as stating what I see as the pivotal role of the
cognitive faculties of the subject in the modern discipline of aesthetics. In
chapter three I will turn to Welsch's ideas on the sublime, with particular
reference to its historical treatment by Kant and Schiller, and to the two thinkers
whose ideas on the sublime Welsch appropriates, Adorno and [ean-Francois
Lyotard. In chapter four I will discuss in greater depth Welsch's own variant of
the sublime, and a pivotal idea for my thesis, the 'anaesthetic'. In the fifth
chapter I will attempt an application of Welsch's anaesthetics to examples of art,
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focussing in particular on recent drama as operating at the limits of perception
(and indeed representation). Finally, in chapter six I will depart from Welsch's
ideas for art, though not his terms, to ask whether the seemingly opposite idea of
excessive perception in art, again exemplified in recent drama, might not offer a
more fruitful and convincing alternative to addressing some of the issues which
motivate Welsch's turn to the anaesthetic, whilst remaining true to the re-
conceptualisation of the aesthetics in terms of sense perception.
20
Section 1 . Sensory
Chapter 1 . Aesthetics beyond aesthetics:
the theoretical contribution of Wolfgang Welsch
I have already noted the ambition and breadth of Wolfgang Welsch's work on
aesthetics, which ranges from the beginnings of modern aesthetics in the writings
of Alexander Baumgarten, whom he cites as a crucial antecedent for his proposal
of rewriting the discipline in terms of sensory perception, to what he sees as the
pivotal role of the aesthetic in postmodern thinking and everyday culture. These
elements are not as unrelated as they sound: for Welsch the thematisation of
sensory perception is not just of historical-philosophical interest, but makes the
aesthetic particularly relevant for describing phenomena in contemporary
everyday reality. He refers in particular to the widespread (and in Welsch's
formulations fairly disparate) effects of aestheticisation, such as the veneer-like
makeover of our built environment, the ramifications of allegedly 'aesthetic'
notions of truth (by which Welsch seems to mean anti-foundationalist and
'plural'), and the sensory excess that seems to be the inevitable mode of the
consumer world. The loosely connected nature of this collection of
characteristics reflects what Welsch sees as the many intersecting meanings of
the term aesthetic which must contribute to an 'erweitertes Verstandnis der
Diziplin'. [Welsch 1996141] These include the aesthetic as sensory, which refers
to both sensation and perception, as 'hedonism', as 'subjective', as 'versohnt', as
related to beauty, as in some way 'cosmetic', as artistic or related to art, as
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'aestheticist', and finally as 'virtual'. [SeeWelsch 1996 23ff] The domains that are
touched by this wide-ranging term extend from what he calls' epistemologische
Asthetisierung' (Welsch 1996 96] to the more experiential aspects, such as the
beautified, excessive and increasingly 'de-realised' world, and the persistent
significance of art as a still distinguishable sphere. In response to some of these
phenomena Welsch proposes a seemingly modernist idea of art as 'anaesthetic',
which among other things entails an arrest or problematisation of perception.
But as well as an art response the anaesthetic is seen by Welsch to be an
inevitable response to the excesses of modern life, as well as, at a significantly
different categorical level, a necessary precondition of perception at all. In this
respect Welsch cites Wittgenstein's idea of 'Famillenahnlichkeiten' [Welsch 1996
24, see also 101], and whilst this might provide the flexibility Welsch's use of the
term requires, a concern in my discussion is that this might not be enough to
resolve the sometimes direct contradictions between individual usages of the
term. In what follows I will introduce these three main elements of Wolfgang
Welsch's contribution to aesthetics, namely aesthesis, aestheticisation and the
anaesthetic, in greater detail. As well as indicating moments of particular
innovation, I will identify areas which Iconsider problematic, both of which will
provide the background for the subsequent elements of my thesis.
Aisthesis: the return to the sensory
23
Welsch's central concept of Aisthesis returns to the theoretical formulations of
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, the founder of modern aesthetics, whose
concept of aesthetics refers not to art, but to an epistemology that is limited to the
sensory realm, 'eine Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis'. [Baumgarten 1983
791 Whilst Baumgarten is a key antecedent for his rewriting of the discipline of
aesthetics, Welsch's revalorizing of the sensory as Iein generelles
Verstehensmedium fur Wirklichkeit' [Welsch 1990 7] actually goes back even
further, to Aristotle's challenge to the Platonic hierarchy which saw primary
truth as inhering in the Ideal, and only mere contingency in the sensory and
empirically experienced. In his first book, Aisthesis: Grundzuge und Perspektiven
der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre (1987), Welsch identifies Aristotle as the
'Schliisseldenker' of the sensory, the only thinker to refuse the' anti-aisthetischen
Kampagne' of classical philosophy. [Welsch 1987 26,61 Aristotle ascribed to the
sensory its own autonomy and Significance, such that the realm of the sensory
was no longer dismissed as contingent or a mere copy of an ideal realm. [Welsch
1987 27] But Welsch sees this historical attempt at a rehabilitation
('Nobilitierung') of the sensory as having been abandoned before its completion,
referring to a 'von der philosophischen Asthetik eroffneten, aber nicht
durchgefiihrten Aufgabe.' [Welsch 1987 24-51 For Welsch, the subordination of
sensory knowledge to rational knowledge occurs at the same moment as its
elevation to the status of knowledge: 'Die Wahrnehmung ist, indem sie als
Erkenntnisgestalt festgesetzt wird, zugleich nobilitiert und inferiorisiert.'
24
[Welsch 198735] This inferiority is ascribed to two characteristics of the sensory.
Firstly, Welsch cites the absence of any analytical faculty in the sensory: '5ie
vermag nur das DaB zu konstatieren, nicht aber uber das Warum.' [Welsch 1987
35] This derives in turn from the distinction made in classical philosophy, most
famously in Plato's realm of ideas, between the general and the particular.
Whereas sensory perception is suitable and necessary for immediate access to
particular sense impressions, it cannot make the leap from the particular to the
general necessary to organize those impressions into determinate experience.
For Welsch this capitulation of Aristotle's aisthetik ultimately reveals its
subordination to the rational mode of knowledge, and becomes an
'Aisthesiologie'. [Welsch 1987 29J And whilst this capitulation to the rational is
probably quite a reasonable position in everyday terms, the situation might not
be so clear cut for art and the aesthetic. I have made clear in my introductory
paragraphs the crucial role of the indeterminate experience that resists any
subsumption under general laws in aesthetics since Baumgarten and Kant. The
crucial issue for Baumgarten will be what it means to give the sensory a largely
independent position in relation to rational or intellectual knowledge, and to
what extent his conception of 'sensory knowledge' is not necessarily intended as
a challenge to rationalist philosophy, an issue that will be a recurrent theme in my
discussion of Welsch, the sensory and modernist aesthetics. If the specifically
sensory obtains at all in Kant's later work on aesthetics it is in terms of the
sensory representation of the absolute or sensory pleasure precipitated by
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beauty, which is seen to derive from the harmonious play between
understanding and imagination - imagination being that which mediates
between sensuousness and understanding. This focus on the pleasurable or
harmonized nature of the sensory-aesthetic experience, as much as the more
philosophical fruitful indeterminacy, is what Welsch's focus on the sensory
seems to depend on, as I will discuss below in terms of his conception of
'aestheticisation'. In view of Welsch's characterization of contemporary culture
in terms of this all but discredited tradition of aesthetics, the question will be
what are Welsch's intentions for the return to the concept of aesthesis and do they
promote or detract from art's critical potential? What is the benefit of
conceptualizing art and non-art experience in terms of the lowest, most basic
form of experience (if we are to accept that this merely sensory is plausible)?
One significant motivation of the focus on basic perception seems to be erasing
the dividing line between perception in art and non-art, such that aesthetics
might describe a spectrum of sensory experience which includes both. As
Welsch explains, the new aesthetics would still include art, but would also
encompass what Welsch refers to as the 'asthetische Auffassung der
Wirklichkeit'. [Welsch 1996 148] Hans-Rudolf Schweizer, in his discussion of
Alexander Baumgarten, already sees the turn to aesthetics as a study of sense-
perception, described as 'konkrete, sinnliche Wirklichkeitsedahrung' [Schweizer
1983vii], as offering a way out of art's isolation in the institution. [SeeSchweizer
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19739-10] If all phenomena are treated as different modes of a sense-perception,
there is no particular categorical difference between art and non-art. A key
question for Welsch's ideas in my thesis will be whether his ideas on aesthetics
and art support and sustain this interaction.
The idea of aesthetics as a philosophy of art which is departed from here is only a
relatively recent phenomenon. As I noted in the introduction art and the
aesthetic have only in the last two hundred years become so closely identified.
Plato for instance is famously disparaging about the painter's merely third-hand
representation of reality (after the ideal and material versions of the thing
respectively) whilst maintaining faith in the poetic-aesthetic as the highest ideal
of truth. [See Plato 421-35] Similarly, one of Kant's most influential discussions
of the aesthetic as a category, the' Analytik des Erhabenen' in the Kritik der
Urteilskraft (1790), excludes art as a means to achieving sublime effect (though
many of the features of the sublime migrate into the artwork in later theory, with
implications for the idea of culture that will be made in chapter three.) But of
course for Plato and Kant the aesthetic is understood in precisely the opposite
terms to Baumgarten's sensory perception; for both, albeit in markedly different
ways, the aesthetic is precisely that which allows access beyond indeterminate
and ungrounded knowledge, but crucially for my considerations taking us away
from what might crudely be called the 'content' of that knowledge. Certainly,
Welsch's suggestions for aesthetics seem to involve a less 'transcendental' role
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for the aesthetic, inasmuch as he pits the everyday experience of sensory excess
against different moments of non-perception, which he calls the anaesthetic. But
what are the costs and benefits of theorizing art and non-art perception together,
in dismantling the categorical differences between them? Clearly Welsch's idea
of dismantling the art/ non-art distinction goes to the heart of the crucial issue of
aesthetic autonomy. The different mode of the aesthetic experience when
compared to other types of experience and knowledge, and specifically its
indeterminacy, is seen by theorists from Kant to Adorno to safeguard its status as
free from merely contingent truth or, more recently, the manipulatory tendencies
of identity-thinking. So do his ideas on the aesthetic relinquish the philosophical
dimension of aesthetics offered by indeterminacy and freedom conceived in
super-sensory terms? Does this necessarily mean sacrificing the ability to
theorise art's autonomy and, again, its critical and oppositional critical capacity?
Then again, in spite of his comments regarding the sensory, like other theorists of
the aesthetic Welsch is only interested in certain kinds of perceptual experience.
Shklovsky's notion of the 'poetic' as a special mode of perception is characteristic
in this regard, and will be crucial for my discussions. This is why art and
autonomy slip back into his broader understanding of the aesthetic, in particular
in the notion of art as 'anaesthetic', which will be the main focus of my fourth
chapter and about which I will say a little more below.
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One aspect of the focus on the sense-perception that I mentioned in my
introduction, and that should not be overlooked in relation to Welsch's ideas, is
that it underlines the nature of aesthetics as essentially subject-oriented,
inasmuch as it focuses on the effects of the artwork on the mind of the recipient.
This general focus on reception raises important questions about individual
agency. Twentieth century theories which focus on aesthetic reception tend to
suggest that the recipient has a determining role as far as the meaning of a work
of art is concerned, as in Hans Robert Jaul5' s idea of a politicized reading of the
formal aspects of the modernist work of art in his Rezeptionsasthe tik. [See JauB
1970] But Welsch's focus on our reception of sense data has, as in Adorno's
formulations, a more pessimistic view of the recipient's role, inasmuch as he is
skeptical about the possibility of contemplation in the face of the pressures of
everyday life, which he conceives in terms of 'Desensibilisierung' and
,Anathetisierung'. [Welsch 1990 14] I will refer to this in greater detail in chapter
four, but the difficulty is that his suggestions for art might reinforce the passivity
which he perceives in aestheticisation, perhaps a result of the general focus on
reception in the first place. As Habermas points out, there might be other aspects
to be gained from Aristotle apart from his 'Sinneslehre', namely the praxis
paradigm, with its central idea of the individual as unfolding his essential
powers through his own productive activity. [See Habermas 1985 96-7] (That
said, in the same passage Habermas refers to man not only as productive, but
also as a 'gesellschaftliches Produkt'. [Habermas 1985 97]) Welsch's ideas on
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perception seem not to engage with any such (essentially early Romantic)
'reflectionist' ideas of the individual subject's self-constitution in and through the
'life-world', whereby the objectifications in which subjectivity takes on external
shape 'sind gleichzeitig der symbolische Ausdruck eines bewu1Sten
Schopfungsaktes und eines unbewu1Sten Bildungsprozesses'. [Habermas 1985 97]
The significant point for Welsch's theorization is that this theoretical tradition,
culminating in Husserl's concept of objectification, might allow for a critique of
reification which might assist an analysis or critique of aestheticisation. As
Berger and Luckmann put it, '[r]ationalisation is the apprehension of the
products of human activity as if they were something else than human products
- such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will.'
[Berger & Luckmann 1966 89] Berger and Luckmann's 'dehumanised world' is
paradoxical because we alone have created it.
Another curious omission is that Welsch's reception-focus and indeed his
emphasis on the sensory dimension of experience seems to share the terrain of
phenomenology, but makes barely any mention of the philosophical movement
in his formulations and lacks any engagement with its terms. In Der Krise der
europiiischen Wissenschaften Edmund Husser! cites the abstraction of modern
science - of which Galileo's 'Mathematisierung der Natur' is referred to is the
archetype, the 'Vorbild aller echten Erkenntnis'. [Husser11954 61] - as positing
an infinite rational universe which is accessible only to an infinite, rational and
30
systematic mind. [See Husser! 1954 19] Scientific measurement and analysis of
causal connections detracts for Husserl from the sensory aspect of our
relationship with the world around us:
Was wir im vorwissenschaftlichen Leben als Farben, Tone, Warme, als
Schwere an den Dingen selbst erfahren, kausal als Warmestrahlung eines
Korpers, der die umgebenden Korper warm macht und dergleichen, das
zeigt natiirlich ,physikalisch' an: Tonschwingungen,
Warmeschwingungen, also reine Vorkomnisse der Gestaltenwelt. [Husserl
195435]
In light of this Husserl's suggests a return to "'sinnlich" erfahrende Anschauung'
[Husser! 1954 108], to the empirically intuited world of bodies which make up
the Lebenswelt as the 'selbstverstandlich geltende Voraussetzung' [Hussed1954
105] of any description of how we can know anything. One question will be
whether Husserl's references to the 'Selbstverstandlichkeit' of this
'Korpererfahrung' [Husserl 1954 108-9] is a philosophical basis in itself, which
might suggest a return to a crude empiricism, or a corrective to scientific
knowledge. Certainly Husserl's idea of the 'life-world' as a meaning-giving
context might help to clarify certain elements of Welsch's formulations.
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Asthetisierungsprozesse: excess, surface or perfection
In Welsch's terms, of course, the sensory is particularly suitable for describing
the 'life-world' as we experience it today. For him a revolution is needed in
thinking about the aesthetic in order to describe a society which Fredric Jameson
summarises as 'consumer society, media society, information society, electronic
society'. [Iameson 1991 3] As Welsch puts it, 'asthetisches Denken [ist] heute in
besonderer Weise zum Begreifen unserer Wirklichkeit fahig,' [Welsch 1990 7]
and furthermore, '[sie ist] mittlerweile zu einem Schlusselphanomen unserer
Kultur geworden. Spricht man heute vom Asthetischen, so tut man es inmitten
seiner alltaglichen Prasenz.' [Welsch 1993 7] It is in this sense that he describes
his rehabilitation of Aristotles' 'Sinneslehre' as 'einen Beitrag zur
Gegenwartsverstandigung'. [Welsch 1987 6] Welsch's justification for our
interest in the aesthetic as divorced from the artistic centres on his concept of the
Asthetisierungsprozesse of modern reality. These are introduced in greatest detail
in Welsch's Grenzgiinge der Asthetik (1996), but had already been discussed in
Asthetisches Denken (1990) and are treated again in Unsere postmoderne Moderne
(1997).
The main characteristic of postmodernity as presented in Grenzgiinge der Asthetik
is its general aestheticisation. Welsch distinguishes between two levels of
aestheticisation, Oberfliichen- and Tiefenasihetisierung. [Welsch 1996 10-17] The
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former includes the cosmetic effects of the more or less facade-Iike renovation in
the built environment and the presentation of everyday events such as shopping
and eating as an 'experience'. The latter is concerned with two aspects; firstly,
the predominance of the aesthetic mode in the field of production, and secondly,
the constitution of reality through media rather than material. I will discuss each
in greater detail in what follows.
The veneer-oriented beautification and commodification of the life-world seems
to have two aspects, which might be categorized as quantitative and qualitative.
The first refers to the saturation of the life-world with images and information,
which Welsch characterizes as sensory excess. The consumer society depends on
saturation advertising, which invades many aspects of our lives, from petrol
pump handles to every spare inch of our computer screens - every space is
saleable, every event is sponsored. Similarly, the pervasive presence of TV in our
homes, almost permanently switched on, has the effect of switching us off,
inducing passivity, the implications of which might be deep-seated and as yet
inestimable. [See Linklater 2003] But as much as this quantitative sensory
overload which Welsch focuses on, which is seen to render our contemplative
faculties obsolete, this commodification operates by particular, qualitative
organization of our experience that might be characterised as a 'harmonization'
of our experience. Welsch sees this beautification as the exploitation only of art's
'vordergriindigste Momente' [Welsch 199612], but how does this 'most obvious
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moment' get translated into the everyday? This might be along the lines of the
so-called 'perfect ratio', that is to say the understanding that there is a universal
anatomical ratio which is seen to be most pleasing, governing much of our
perception, from musical intervals or geometric proportions. However it works,
this perfected quality generates its own kind of passivity by virtue of the object's
completeness. Of course, the idea of aestheticisation as a veneer-like perfecting
of our experience of the world returns to a traditional focal point of the
theorization of the sensory in art, namely the idea of beauty as sensory perfection
or sensory pleasure. Welsch's descriptions of reality as 'Erlebnisraum' and as an
'Unterhaltungsindustrie' are still on this terrain, his point being that the
traditional ideas of harmony and perfection associated with beauty as an end in
itself have precisely been hi-jacked as a pleasurable means to other (usually
commercial) ends, and certainly subverted as a means of truth. As a
consequence the unpleasant or at least unsettling experience of indeterminacy
has been more significant in the special qualities of the aesthetic, from Kant's
aesthetics of the sublime, Shklovsky's defamiliarising 'poetic' , to Adorno's
determinate negation of meaning, a shift I will trace in the next chapter, and
discuss further with specific reference to the changing theoretical investments in
the sublime in chapter three.
It would churlish to ignore the benefits that derive from the beautification of our
environment, but the meditation in terms of pleasure or displeasure seems to be
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quite separate from those aspects of Welsch's aestheticisation which describe the
changing nature of reality and our knowledge of it, such as those phenomena
which Welsch gathers under the idea of Tiefiisthetisierung, namely the
predominance of the aesthetic mode in the field of production and constitution of
contemporary reality by media rather than material. By the former Welsch
seems to be referring to the greater application of computer-aided design and
manufacture, which allows simulation, as well as to new scientific and
technological processes which are seen to permit influence over reality at deeper
levels, such as gene-technology: 'Durch intelligente Eingriffe in ihre
Mikrostruktur ist sie in jeder Faser veranderbar, Die Wirklichkeit ist - von
heutiger technologischer Warte aus gesehen - aus formbarstem, leichtestem
Stoff.' [Welsch 1996 15] For Welsch, the simulation has overtaken the original:
'Fur die meisten sind bereits jetzt die Originale gegenuber ihren Simulationen
blofi noch enttauschend' [Welsch199021],which he suggests might give rise to a
nostalgia for the real. [Welsch 1990 181-2] This is echoed by Todd Gitlin's
reference to the feeling of 'a perpetually vanishing present streaking by'. [Gitlin
2001 20] Below I will also read Welsch's own anaesthetic in these terms as an
idea of art as 'anti-fiction', but a key question will be whether these features can
be adequately analysed in terms of the sensory. Indeed, the very distinction
between Tiefe and Oberjliiche does seem to set limits to the validity of Welsch's
thesis about a shift in the nature of our perception of reality being analysed
simply as a sensory phenomenon. Moreover, it should be said that computer-
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assisted methods of design are still only design, and into that moment must be
imported the same constraints of reality as more traditional methods of design.
The very fact that such interventions in reality require such a high level of
technological mediation questions whether our experience of them, the
implications they have for the life-world, can be ascribed to the realm of the
sensory. One thinks of genetic engineering or nuclear physics, both of which
occur at levels far below the threshold of unmediated human perception.
Welsch's conception of the anaesthetic focuses precisely on the inaccessibility of
these phenomena to unmediated senses, a point I will return to in my
presentation below.
Above I have indicated that the focus on sensory perception might be identified
with the conception of the aesthetic as subjective. This is not to suggest that
Welsch identifies ideas of self-constitution and world-formation as key aspects of
'aesthetic' function. These issues of self-determination might be even more
crucial in view of the packaged and commodified life-world which is generally
understood by the term aestheticisation. But here Welsch seems to be moving
from a sense of the aesthetic as sensory to the aesthetic as constructed and
infinitely alterable ('modellierbar' [Welsch 199616]), which might suggest an idea
of the subject unfolding his essential powers through his own productive
activity. Welsch does discuss the implications of an aestheticised reality for the
individual subject, identifying the deleterious effects of a preoccupation with
36
image: IAllenthalben erleben wir ein Styling von Kerper, Seele und Geist - und
was die neuen Menschen sonst noch alles haben mogen (oder sich zulegen).'
[Welsch 199618] Welsch draws ethical implications from this, in what he sees as
a gradual supplanting of traditional social and ethical norms by a sense of an
aesthetic imperative, whereby life must be seen to be led according to a certain
standard of taste: 'In solchen Prozessen wird der homo aeetheteicus zur neuen
Leitfigur. Er ist sensibel, hedonistisch, gebildet und vor allem von erlesenem
Geschmack' [Welsch 1996 18] This concern with appearance and style does
seem to be a significant characteristic of the last couple of decades. Is it only
predominant in the Sunday colour supplements and style magazines, or is it in
some way characteristic of a postmodern era? There are more home-makeover
shows to 'choose' from, but are they in essence no different from the first of their
kind forty years ago? And can the aesthetic really be said to displace the ethical
as a consequence of this preoccupation with appearance and fashion, rather than,
say, reading aestheticisation as itself a consequence of the erosion of traditional
values, or viewing the two as only loosely related phenomena? It is probably
safe to say that any putative ethical breakdown in society does not tend to come
from the readership of the style magazines, and might be said for instance to
have more to do with the age-old issue of financial insecurity or the newer one of
drug dependency. That said, below I will discuss another aspect of Welsch's
ideas on our thoroughly mediated reality (which for him also falls under the
purview of aesthetics), namely the isolating effect which derives from the
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technological mediation of our experience, discussed below in the context of his
ideas on the anaesthetic, which might have significant practical implications for
ethics.
It does seem appropriate to measure any sense of the opportunities for self-
determination in the increasingly aestheticised world against the deleterious
implications of an experience which impinges on evaluative thought.
Aestheticisation for Welsch manifests itself in an over-stimulation of the senses,
which Welsch traces back to Romantic-Idealist views on the human subject and
its need for sensory gratification and intellectual exercise:
Friiher hatte soIche Anregung kontemplationsfordernden Zweck. Kant
beispielweise schrieb, die Einbildungskraft werde beim Anblick
veranderlicher Gestalten - 'eines Kaminfeuers, oder eines rieselnden
Baches' - in ein 'freies Spiel' der Phantasie versetzt und zu autonomen
Bildungen angeregt. [Welsch199014]
Contemplation for Welsch has been replaced by an empty euphoria and
subsequent apathy. What was once beautiful in an engaging way now comes
across as an empty perfection and veneer, exploited in a widespread process of
commodification, which Welsch refers to as aestheticisation. But this failure of
contemplation and its relation to processes of commodification suggest a
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problem that is more than merely sensory, a complexity that is supported by
Welsch's insistence on the 'dialectical' relationship between the aesthetic and
anaesthetic. The cognitive nature of the anaesthetic, over and above its sensory
aspect, will be central to my discussions below.
Moreover, Welsch's idea that we are not afforded the mental time and space for
(presumably evaluative) contemplation might be less significant than the fact
that we are not always given the full information to come to a complete
judgment, As such, besides the implications for our capacity for reflection, the
increasing de-realization that Welsch identifies [see Welsch 1990 16] might well
be an aspect of the economic media complex. This might suggest that Welsch
makes the mistake of focusing on the individual capacity, rather than setting his
sights on the societal mechanisms which frustrate that capacity before it is given
a chance. An analogous mistake is at the heart of Daniel Bell's criticism of
modern culture. For Bell, the modern aestheticised realm is Ide-realised'
precisely as a consequence of the demand for authentic self-experience and, in a
parallel with Welsch's theoretical concerns, the subjectivism of a hyperstimulated
sensitivity. [See Bell 1976 145] Bell blames the (modernist) aesthetic realm, with
its characteristics of hedonism, its hatred of convention, and the notion of reality
as an arena for unlimited self-realization, for the demise in standards, values and
the work ethic in particular. But as [urgen Habermas points out, this ignores the
more mundane economic, social and political factors which might be more
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plausible sources of alienation and disenfranchisement. [See Habermas 1985 6]
My point is that Welsch's focus on the failure of the capacity of the individual
distracts from such economic or political factors, as well as leaving little room for
change in the future. (Incidentally, Bell may perpetuate the problem with his
proposed solution: for him cultural modernism ethical bankruptcy is exposed
when general society Iadopts as its norm the life-style of a cultural mass that
wants to be "emancipated" or "liberated," yet lacks any sure moral or cultural
guides as to what worthwhile experiences might be.' [Bell 1976 145] But who is
to act as guide in this respect? Bell's conservatism here seems to suggest a
patrician attitude, though a more nuanced assessment of the balance of cost and
benefit of aestheticisation might turn on the question of who is doing the
stimulating and to what end.)
In Welsch's other characterisation of aestheticisation as the constitution of reality
through media rather than material he does seem to acknowledge that this
constitution of reality goes on behind our backs. Examples of this abound, from
the overstatement that is an expected part of the consumer world to the infamous
headline-grabbing 'spin' of public relations by which the government is seen to
present policies as other than they are. The recent war against Iraq is an obvious
case in point. Truth has always proverbially been the first casualty of war, but
the blanket media coverage, with journalists' embedded' in battalions of troops
and the 24-hour news channels demanding a constant flow of information, has
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led to an ever greater disjunction between the quantity and quality of
information. One might have thought that the unprecedented centralised
briefing arrangements would have guaranteed the reliability of information, but
the concocted rescue mission of Private JessicaLynch made it clear how close the
regulation of media information came to propaganda. Some journalists were
barred from the centralised briefings after asking difficult questions and
comparing the arrangements to propaganda. More generally, in view of the
uncritical response by the US media in particular, serious soul-searching has
taken place afterwards about the independence of the media. Implications for
the 'status of the real' are in limited respects hard to deny: the blurred line
between news and speculation contributes to a situation in which events and
people's perception of events lose their traditional priorities. For instance,
without verification local uprisings were reported to have happened, and may
have affected events. A similar mutual interpenetration of event and perception
obtains in the stock market, with equally serious and real consequences. This
confusion of the real and the perceived is perhaps only appropriate in a culture
where the status of the real is played with daily, with 'reality TV' competing on
the schedules with mock documentaries.
But is the distinction between the 'bad' and excessive signs against which we
inoculate ourselves and the 'good' signs upon which we depend and which we
might at the same time be attracted to so clear-cut? In his book Media Unlimited:
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how the Torrent of Images and Sounds overwhelms our Lives, Todd Gitlin emphasises
that the products of the mass media are not only an imposition, but also a source
of pleasure, and that we are actually drawn into a 'never-ending quest for
stimulus and sensation'. [Gitlin 200151 What implications does this have for our
sense of identity; can we retain a sense of self that is prior to this experience?
Gitlin also cites Raymond Williams' idea of contemporary man as 'actor', and
that 'we have never as a society acted so much'. Drama, for Williams, has
become a 'habitual experience'. [Cited in Gitlin 200110] What Burger might call
a 'falsche Aufhebung' of the difference between art and life, this notion of
modern man as actor suggests that man is disconnected from natural patterns of
behaviour, playing a role in which he is resigned to second-guess his actions. As
well as this artificial quality, acting suggests an excessive, demonstrative quality,
which might be taken as the active version of Welsch's seemingly passive notion
of excessive perception, against which all we can do is close ourselves off. But
how are we to know where acting starts and stops? What would be left if we all
stopped 'acting'? Similarly, the difficulty of distinguishing between 'bad',
excessive signs and those 'good' signs that are constitutive of the life-world
around us means that it is problematic, as Gitlin points out, to relegate this
aestheticisation to a mere' accompaniment' to life that we can switch off. Rather
this' acting' and these' stimuli' have become a 'central experience of life'. [Gitlin
200117] The conception of this kind of experience as central to life also suggests
an alternative to Welsch's conception of the anaesthetic as an instance of
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individual isolation. Gitlin sees mass media as a locus of social transaction and
shared experience [see Gitlin 2001 'lO], presumably in the space left by the
disintegration of local community in the process of urbanisation. This reiterates
my point that new technologies can actually improve our ability to communicate.
The difficulty of differentiating the bad effects of mass media and technological
change from its good points underlines the fact that, far from being limited to a
phenomenon of sensation, this plethora of signs has deep-seated implications for
what we consider to be 'reality'. Jean Baudrillard has famously conceptualised
this destabilising of the status of the real in terms of the simulacrum. [See
BaudrilIard 1994] Perhaps a more mundane consequence of pervasive mass
media is that perception and reality are so interwoven that the reality of events
does not entirely precede their mediation by newspapers and television
companies. A case in point is the recent war in Iraq, which was said to be as
much a war of perception as much as military superiority, a war 'of hearts and
minds' as much as of territory, flesh and bones. The US army drops radios along
with bombs, and employs psychological divisions as well as local media outlets
to convey particular messages about their motivations for engaging in conflict.
Of course, it is not the first time that propaganda and perception has played a
pivotal role in the unfolding of historical events. Broadcast media was important
already in the Second World War, but the intensity of media coverage has
certainly increased with 24 hour news and commercial pressures to achieve ever
43
higher ratings. In some cases this has led to a new kind of confusion in the
causal priorities between events and perceptions, with reports of events, later
understood never to have taken place, have been catalysts for real uprisings.
And akin to the surfeit of signs that constitute reality, and the difficulty of
picking and choosing between those that are excessive and those that are
necessary, fictionality might in some senses be something we cannot do without.
Dieter Wellershoff, for instance, reminds us that even in allegedly factual
accounts, fictionality has a role: 'Fast immer war das reale Geschehen stark
uberformt durch Klischees, Vorurteile, Mythen und Jargon.' [Wellershoff 1975
529-30] This is clearly not limited to visual or sensory 'perception': at very least
language is also implicated in these pre-judgements and predeterminations. This
reiterates the idea, contra Welsch's analytical framework, that whether we judge
it as real or unreal, reality does not occur and cannot be tested at a merely
sensory level, but in the varied ways that we constitute reality.
Welsch's Aniisthetik
'Inmitten der Kommunikation bleibt er allein zustandig fur das Unvermittelte,
den Einschlag, den unterbrochenen Kontakt, die Dunkelphase, die Pause.'
[Straug 1999 28 (originally 1989), cited in Welsch 1990 40] With this citation from
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Botho StrauB's 'Dankrede zum Georg-Buchner-Preis' Wolfgang Welsch closes his
discussion of what he sees as a new category and a 'neuer Fokus' [Welsch 1990 7]
for the discipline of aesthetics, and one that will be the central term for this
thesis: the anaesthetic. In the essay 'Asthetik und Anasthetik', published in the
collection Asthetisches Denken in 1990, he characterises the anaesthetic as a
negation of sensory perception:
"Anasthetik" verwende ich als Gegenbegriff zu "Asthetik". "Anasthetik"
meint jeden Zustand, wo die Elementarbedingung des Asthetischen - die
Empfindungsfahigkeit - aufgehoben ist. Wahrend die Asthetik das
Empfinden stark macht, thematisiert Anasthetik die Empfindungslosigkeit
- im Sinn eines Verlusts, einer Unterbindung oder der Unmoglichkeit von
Sensibilitat, und auch dies auf allen Niveaus: von der physischen
Stumpfheit bis zur geistigen Blindheit. Anasthetik hat es, kurz gesagt, mit
der Kehrseite der Asthetik zu tun. [Welsch 1990 10]
Contemporary references to the anaesthetic
Beyond Welsch's essay, theoretical interest in the 'anaesthetic' as a component of
philosophical aesthetics has gathered pace in the last fifteen years, and with each
application, the concept of the anaesthetic goes through a different permutation.
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In ado Marquard's Aesthetica und Anaesthetica the anaesthetic demarcates that
which is not art, 'jene Wirklichkeit, die nicht Kunst ist' [Marquard 198911], at the
same time as forewarning us, in a way that anticipates Welsch's concerns, of the
increasing difficulty of distinguishing art from not-art ('warnt vor der Gefahr des
Umschlags des Asthetischen in das Anasthetische: vor der Verwandlung von
Sensibilitat in Unempfindlichkeit, von Kunst in Betaubung' [Marquard 1989 12]).
For Marquard, as for Welsch and many other theorists of the postmodern, this is
a particular danger in an increasingly aestheticised reality: 'Vor allem dann,
wenn die asthetische Kunst - kunstgrenzvergessen - die ganze Wirklichkeit in
den Traum und Rausch der Kunst hineinzieht und gewissermaBen die
Wirklichkeit durch Kunst ersetzt.' [Marquard 1989 12] For Donna Kerr, the
anaesthetic is an obstacle to aesthetic utopia, an obstacle which arises from either
'routines and understandings which are psychologically too comfortable' or
'abrasive environmental conditions - conditions that can psychologically deafen
and blind or psychologically numb or disable.' [Kerr 1978 13] The former are
classified as 'conceptual' anaesthesia, whereas the latter are 'perceptual', a
distinction which will be pertinent for our later discussion. Moreover, both these
ideas of habits of perception and excessive sensory input will be central issues in
what follows. Guy Sircello and Neil Leach employ the concept of anaesthetics
with even more polemic force. The object of Sircello's invective is the 'negative'
trend in the general discipline of aesthetics away from objects and experience of
beauty in particular, and the 'aesthetic attitude' in general. This is supplanted by
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an 'anaesthetic' preoccupation with philosophical issues and a consideration of
the modulations of the arts as an institution. [Sircello 1991 39] Neil Leach's
polemic is directed against the 'intoxicating world of the image' which he sees as
characterising contemporary architectural and general cultural practice. [Leach
1999 viii] This cultural veneer is seen to erode critical awareness and precipitate
mindless consumption and a defensive indifference in the face of over-
stimulation. In opposition to this involuntary response, Monica Sassatelli refers
to the anaesthetic as a strategy whereby art reacts against this 'banalization of the
aesthetic.' [Sassatelli 1998] The parallels between these positions and Welsch's
(various) investments in the anaesthetic will become apparent in what follows.
Aside from Sircello's reactionary call for aesthetics to absolve itself of its
conceptual and institutional complexity and to return to a consideration of
beauty.! it is possible to distinguish a key split between two conceptions of the
anaesthetic in this brief review: firstly, the anaesthetic as involuntary response to
the excess of aesthetic and aestheticised experience; secondly, the anaesthetic as
art's strategic response to or thematisation of this state of affairs. This split is also
evident in Welsch's work, and my central argument will be that this causes a
1 Sircello's desire to close off the discipline of aesthetics from its meditations on
philosophical issues is implausible, as these have been its inevitable destination
as soon as it became a discussion of limits and universals in Kant's writings on
the sublime and the beautiful.
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problematic tension within his formulations on the anaesthetic. But Sircello's
reactionary idea of aesthetics' return to the theorisation of the beautiful, and
Kerr's aesthetic utopia, also plays an essential part in Welsch's theorisation of the
anaesthetic. Welsch also makes a connection between classical art's
preoccupation with the beautiful and harmonious - which he associates with a
claim to be able to present everything [see Welsch 1990 40] - with the
characteristically postmodern aestheticisation effects, against which the
anaesthetic is a reaction. This issue of total presentation might be said to return
to the discussion of the sublime as a meditation on the limits of human control.
But in contrast to the idea of the anaesthetic artwork as a sublime-type
exploration of the limits of human control, there is a reading of this kind of
imperceptibility as a Kantian return to the self.
For Welsch the anaesthetic occurs where conditions of the aesthetic, that is the
predominance or pre-eminence of the sensory, have been overturned: 'die
Empfindungslosigkeit - im Sinn eines Verlusts, einer Unterbindung oder der
Unm5glichkeit von Sensibilitat'. [Welsch 1990 10] This includes various and
quite disparate instances where sensory experience is absent: 'Anasthetik meint
jeden Zustand, wo die Elementarbedingung des Asthetischen die
Empfindungsfahigkeit - aufgehoben ist.' [Welsch 1990 10, my emphasis] As
such this notion of art as non-perception is only one of several ideas that are
referred to by the term, which causes problems for Welsch's ideas, but is also
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crucial to the idea of the dialectical and cognitive nature of the aesthetic which I
find so fruitful. In Welsch's view, the relationship between the aesthetic and the
anaesthetic cannot be understood in terms of simple opposition, as Welsch
explains in the essay in which he sets out his conception of the anaesthetic,
,Asthetik und Anasthetik', published in the collection Asthetisches Denken (1990):
Anasthetik hat es, kurz gesagt, mit der Kehrseite der Asthetik zu tun. [... ]
Daher ist Anasthetik von drei anderen, benachbarten Positionen zu
unterscheiden. Sie ist erstens keine Anti-Asthetik: Sie verwirft die
Dimension des A.sthetischen nicht pauschal. Zweitens geht es ihr auch
nicht urn das Un-Asthetische - also das nach asthetischen Kriterien als
negativ Qualifizierte. Und drittens hat sie es auch nicht einfachhin mit
Nicht-Asthetischem zu tun, also mit so1chem, was keinerlei Bezug zu
asthetischen Fragen hatte. Unter dem Titel des Anasthetischen geht es
vielmehr urn das grenzgangerische Doppel der Asthetik selbst. [Welsch
199010-11]
The idea of this 'grenzgangerische Doppel' is opaque, but derives from two
crucial features of Welsch's anaesthetic: firstly, that the anaesthetic is in several
ways dialectically related to the aesthetic; secondly, that he uses the term in a
number of different and possibly conflicting ways. Welsch asserts that the
anaesthetic comes from within the aesthetic: 'Meine Hauptthese ist, dal5 die
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Anasthetik der Asthetik nicht von aufsen zustofst, sondern aus ihrem Inneren
kommt.' [Welsch 1990 31] This dialectic is central to Welsch's claim as to the
particular contemporary relevance of this dialectic of aesthetic and anaesthetic.
Welsch distinguishes between three epochs during last millennium (or so),
Metaphysik, Moderne and Postmoderne, each of which has its own characteristic
relation to the aesthetic: 'Metaphysik setzt auf Anasthetik, die Moderne auf
Asthetik, die Gegenwart sucht nach einer komplexeren Figur, eben der von
Asthetik und Anasthetik.' [Welsch 1990 24] Welsch sees the postmodern era as
characterised by 'die Verkoppelung, auf das Wechselspiel, auf die Verflechtung
von Asthetik und Anasthetik', [Welsch 1990 30] Such a generalising demarcation
of epochal tendencies is of course a little crude, but it is interesting to draw the
parallel between a pre-modern (and largely religious) fascination with the
imperceptible and an imperceptibility that is allegedly characteristic for the
technologically altered postmodern era. Is unquestioning belief really the same
as technological incomprehension? Any differences are somewhat glossed over
in Welsch's formulations; firstly, insofar as he treats (or wants to treat) everything
at the level of the sensory; and secondly, by virtue of the fact that, in line with his
conviction of the flexible nature of his terms, Welsch does not always explain
exactly what he means with each particular application of anaesthetic or
aesthetic. As with his treatment of aesthetics, at the outset of his essay' Asthetik
und Anasthenk' Welsch precisely rejects a unitary idea of anaesthetics with one
central meaning:
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Ich meine dies auch als Entschuldigung oder Warnung. Ich werde nicht
einen Begriff von Asthetik und einen von Anasthetik aufstellen, sondern
ich werde in der Folge zeigen, mit welch unterschiedlichen Facetten und
Anwendungsflachen man in diesem Phanomenfeld rechnen muf - wenn
man sachgerecht operieren will. [Welsch 19909]
Broadly I think one can discern four main uses of the anaesthetic: firstly, it is
understood as an inevitable response to an aestheticised reality saturated with
sounds and images; secondly, and at a slightly different categorical level, non-
perception is understood to be a necessary precondition to perception at all;
thirdly, the imperceptible is understood as a characteristic aspect of our
technologically altered (and alterable) reality; and fourthly, it is conceptualised
as a possible response to or representation of these phenomena in art. I will
present each of these ideas in greater detail, before suggesting strengths and
weaknesses in Welsch's formulations.
Anaesthetics as individual isolation and inoculation
Welsch characterises contemporary reality as one in which new technologies,
and mass media in particular, mediate the individual's relationship to the
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[Baudrillard 1983 2], where the status of the 'real' has become fraught with
;\
t1
~
II
"II
!
r
external world through images, generating a 'mediale Bildwelt'. [Welsch 1990 15]
In one sense this is akin to Jean Baudrillard's simulated world of the 'hyperreal'
questions of simulation and fictionality. For Welsch, this is a further aspect of
the aestheticisation of reality which results in the 'Ununterscheidbarwerden von
Realitat und Fiktion' [Welsch 1994 28], though the slippage from the idea of the
aesthetic as sensory to the idea of the aesthetic as somehow fictional is apparent
again here. This aestheticisation through a world of images precipites an
experience of the anaesthetic, insofar as the technologically mediated world
results in a 'telekommunikative Totalausrustung', whereby the individual is
isolated from real contact with other people, precipitating the 'Umformung des
Menschen zur Monade im Sinn eines sowohl bildervollen wie fensterlosen
Individuums'. [Welsch 1990 16] Anticipated in the passage called 'Isolierung
durch Verkehr' in Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialektik der Aufkliirung
[Horkheimer & Adorno 1969 233], this is seen to have 'drastische
Anasthetisierungspotentiale' [Welsch 1990 151, such as the effect of 'soziale
Desensibilisierung' [Welsch 1990 16], as well as a reduction of such categories as
empathy and solidarity, ethics and politics, to illusions fostered by the television
screen. On the other hand, the benefits of such a technologically mediated world
are seen to include individual self-sufficiency and the idea, updated from 1950s
science fiction, that tele-tourism might fulfil our desire to experience new vistas
whilst preventing damage to the environment. [Welsch 1990 20-21] As far as the
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former 'soziale Desensibilierung' is concerned, recent experience has indicated
that the implications of modern technology for social action is far from
exclusively negative. The world-wide-web and mobile phone technology have
fostered, at least in some respects, better, not worse, communication, and have
certainly had an impact on the functioning of the public sphere, if one thinks of
recent political protests that have been mobilised in part at least through new
technology. This indicates the need to differentiate between the technology and
how it is used. That said this kind of technological mediation does seem to bring
about a centralisation of communication, the shaping of our world according to
the editorial decisions of CNN or the BBC, which necessarily homogenises our
experience of the world. This raises ideological considerations, which I have
suggested Welsch's ideas on the sensory are at difficulties to accommodate,
though this process seems to be being implicitly referred to when Welsch talks
about a mediation of reality by images.
Some ideological concern is arguably also implicit in the idea of aestheticisation
as beautification and veneer. Once again, the consequence for Welsch, as for
Donna Kerr above [see Kerr 1978 13], is one of anaesthesia. In his view,
aestheticisation '[schlagt] in eine gigantische Anasthetisierung urn' [Welsch 1990
13], because we are desensitized by the over-designedness of everything. This
motivates Welsch's assertion that 'Asthetisierung [oo.J erfolgt als
An~sthetisierung/. [Welsch 1990 14J The excess or overload of sensory
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experience has the double effect of a narcotic, which dulls our senses as it
stimulates them: 'Berauschung' and 'Betaubung' [Welsch 1990 14] In this wayan
excess of sensory experience is seen to precipitate an absence of the same:
"Anasthetik reicht vom Nullphanomen bis zu einem Hyperphanomen des
Asthetischen.' [Welsch 1990 11] The parallel is apparent between this interplay
of extremes and Weiskel's comments on the sublime, which he notes to have
both a sublime as excess and sublime as lack, which he labels 'metonymical' and a
'metaphorical' respectively. [SeeWeiskel1976 28-31] It is in this inoculation that
the dialectical relationship between the aesthetic and anaesthetic is most
apparent, as Welsch notes: 'Je mehr Asthetik desto mehr Anasthetik.' [Welsch
199016] (So does Welsch think that we are anaesthetised by good design as well
as bad?)
Anaesthetics as cognitive or cultural necessity
At a significantly different categorical level, a further understanding of the
anaesthetic in Welsch's formulations suggests the opposite priority, namely that
aesthesis (perception) does not precipitate, but is itself dependent on anaesthesis:
Das bedeutet freilich, daiS dem Wahrnehmen selbst eine Art Anasthetik
eingeschrieben ist. [... ] Und diese interne Anasthetik ist eine notwendige
Bedingung der extemen Effizienz des Wahrnehmens. [Welsch 199034]
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Welsch makes clear this different order of priority, stating that there is '[klein
aisthesis ohne anaisthesis'. [Welsch 1990 32] This version of the anaesthetic
understood as a precondition of perception - which I will refer to it as the
cognitive anaesthetic - will be important for my argument in what follows, where
I will highlight the role of expectation and habit in a more contextualised
understanding of the dialectic of aesthetic and anaesthetic. It could equally be
called perceptual anaesthetics, but inmy view the idea of cognition implies a more
complex and conscious process than perception, although of course, the point is
that perception itself is a complex process, involving unconscious exclusion as
well as conscious inclusion. This idea of more or less complex preconditions to
and interconnections between perception and cognition is not new. The same
idea was already at the heart of Spinoza's dictum 'omnis determinatio est
negatio'2 and Schlegel's' eine "Lucke im Dasein", die - selbst unsichtbar - dem
Sichtbaren seine Bestimmtheit widerfahren lasse.' [Bothcited in Frank 198047] It
is at the heart of hermeneutical tradition, and inhabits Hans Georg Gadamer's
ideas of 'Vorverstandnls' and 'Vormeinung' [Gadamer 1990 273), and his
rehabilitation of the idea of 'Vorurteil', which in his view had been systematically
discredited by the Aufklarung. [Gadamer 1990276] These concepts are central to
his critique of Kant's 'Lehre von der reinen Wahrnehmung', in which Gadamer
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exposes the idea of 'interesseloses Anschauen' by introducing the concept of
intention into perception; 'Verweilendes Schauen und Vernehmen ist nicht
einfach Sehen des reinen Anblicks, sondern bleibt selbst ein Auffassen als ... '
[Gadamer 1990 96, my italics] This returns again to the struggle between
Aristotle's sensitivity towards the 'konkrete und besondere Situation' and Plato's
'leere Allgemeinheit' [Gadamer 1990317], the philosophical tension at the heart
of Welsch's reclamation of the original terrain of the aesthetic. The suspicion
remains however, in view of Welsch's characterisation of the postmodern as
plural and of the sublime aesthetic as a moment of immanence, that Welsch's
formulations are marked by hermeneutical insensitivity. After all, rather than
the drastic concept of 'negation' is it not more sensible to talk about 'selection', a
moreover selection which takes place in the context not of sheer indeterminacy
but of all sorts of intersecting cultural norms and expectation, as Hans Robert
JauBpoints out:
Was Niklas Luhmann tiber die Funktion der Negativitat im
sinnkonstituierenden Systemen dargelegt hat erweckt den Anschein, als
ob alles Erleben oder Handlen seine unumgangliche Selektivitat
gegentiber einer Weltkomplexitat von unstrukturierter, noch ganz
unbestimmter Offenheit zu bewahren habe. 0aufS1975506]
2 Though this sentence is only ascribed to Spinoza, for example by Hegel in his
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This complexity exposes the binary simplicity of any treatment of the
ani aesthetic in terms of perception as switched on or off. The point is that
sensory perception already includes what Welsch calls 'hoherstufige, inhaltlich
aufgeladene Wahrnehmungsformen' [Welsch 1990 34], the social and cultural
conditioning which precedes even the most basic perception:
Bilder von Mann und Frau, von Geschlechtichkeit und idealem
Zusammenleben, die uns in der familiaren und sozialen Kindheit
eingesenkt wurden, unser Wahrnehmen und Verhalten fortan
impragnieren und bestimmen.' [Welsch199034]
These cultural predispositions of perception, now called anaesthetic, seem to be
related to the slippage in Welsch's focus from the aesthetic as sensory to the
aesthetic as somehow fictional, insofar as the aestheticised reality understood as
fictional and constructed depends on excluding certain versions of reality. But
presumably the recognition of these pervasive 'kulturelle Grundbilder' casts
doubt on any claims that something is objectively and positively true beyond its
cultural reception. As such, this 'fictional' element of reality is scarcely
avoidable, as indicated by my references to WeIIershoffabove. (This should not
Wissenschaft der Logik. [See Hubener 1975 500]
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distract from the fact that some departures from the truth are more problematic
than others.)
Moreover, for Welsch this identification of the anaesthetic, a necessary blindness,
as a basis of cultural conditioning means that the anaesthetic becomes not only a
prerequisite of perception at all, but also acquires a potentially hegemonic status:
'So werden Anasthetik und Absolutismus zum Paar.' [Welsch 1990 34] This
,Absolutismus' seems to refer to the idea that cultural norms can become so rigid
that they preclude any alternative view. But the tension is apparent between the
conception of the anaesthetic as a hermeneutical corrective to objectivism and the
anaesthetic as a possible source of 'closedness' to other viewpoints. The two
ideas in themselves are perfectly valid, but the question is whether it is
problematic that one term ends up referring to two seemingly diametrically
opposed ideas. This contradiction is perhaps resolved if one considers that these
positions are not diametrically opposed, but merely points on a spectrum: in
absolutism context becomes absolutely determining, and blind to the
contextualised and limited nature of its own perception. At the outset I likened
this idea of the anaesthetic as unthematised cultural or cognitive preconditions to
perception to Donna Kerr's idea of 'routines and understandings which are
psychologically too comfortable'. [Kerr 78 13] This might provide a link between
the anaesthetic and Shklovsky's idea of modernist art as operating through a
disturbing of comfortable reception. But these more complex 'inhaltlich
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aufgeladene [... ] kulturelle Grundbilder' [Welsch 1990 34] do not belong to the
same category of sine qua non precondition as the non-perception discussed
above. Rather they seem to mark the point at which Welsch's theorisation moves
from basic perception to more complex issues of ideology. The idea of the
anaesthetic as unconscious selection causes obvious problems for Welsch's
notion of art as an experience of the imperceptible. Quite apart from the
question of capacity of critique of such minimalist art, it raises the question of
whether it is plausible to speak of such non-perception at all. This cognitive
anaesthetic, as well as indicating the dependence of any perception on
unthematised or unconscious - that is to say, deeper - components of the
cognitive process which accompanies perception, suggests that sheer non-
perception is impossible. To paraphrase Welsch, 'Kein Anaisthesis ohne
aisthesis'. This is aside from the fact that art which is said to defy perception, in
order to register at all, must involve some kind of perception and arguably a
moment of cognitive processing. It is doubly problematic that these latent
elements of perception are also central to alternative type of art that Welsch
proposes, in which they are the problem, or at least the material, that is to be
exposed. In chapter four I will ask whether this awareness of the anaesthetic as
cognitive or cultural norms and expectations comes back to haunt Welsch's idea
of art-anaesthetics as an arrest of perception.
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Anaesthetics as the imperceptible
The anaesthetic refers not only to the latent preconditions of cognitive and
cultural perception, but also those situations in which sensory perception is
arrested. "' Anasthetik" meint jeden Zustand, wo die Elementarbedingung des
Asthetischen - die Empfindungsfahigkeit - aufgehoben ist.' [Welsch 1990 10]
There seem to be two aspects of this phenomenon. Firstly, there simply are
aspects of reality which are beyond our naked perception, such as Welsch's
example of the radiation from the fall-out of the nuclear reactor disaster at
Chemobyl in 1986. [Welsch 199018] Writing in the 1960s,Robert Martin Adams
identifies a similar preoccupation with the imperceptible; 'Experiments which
have captured the imagination of the time deal with weightlessness, silence,
interruption of the sense-continuum.' [Adams 19663]3 The only example Welsch
gives is cancer-inducing radiation, but there are significant recent scientific
developments that support Welsch's ideas of a reality beyond the limits of
sensation. Another example might be the invisible or non-luminous 'dark
matter' that has challenged the so-called 'Standard Model' of physics since its
existence was inferred some twenty five years ago [seeBaugh & Frenck 1999],and
3 It is worth noting that Adams, like Welsch, identifies the 19th century as one
preoccupied with the physical (in Welsch's terms, 'aesthetic'). They differ,
however, insofar as Adams also locates the interest in the anaesthetic (in his
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of which a significant proportion of the universe (circa 90%) has recently
proposed to comprise of. The presence of these imperceptible particles is as yet
only inferred, on the basis that conventional, known sources of matter cannot
account for the ways in which stars and gasses move. As far as technological
change is concerned, arguably the limits of representation are reached some time
before the splitting of the atom, for instance in the scientific discoveries which
lead to germ warfare in the First World War. Indeed, the limits of the imaginable
may already have been reached in the scale of death in trench warfare in the First
World War, to say nothing of the epoch-changing Holocaust which sets the
Second World War apart. And global complexity and the feeling that events are
out of human control had already been experienced in the financial crises of the
twenties, and is also attested (and sometimes celebrated) in modernist ideas and
literature of the time, for instance in Futurism or Expressionism. The point is
that the technological changes which Welsch sees as bringing about the
imperceptibility (and non-representability) of contemporary events and existence
might equally be classified as a quintessentially modern phenomenon, begging
the perennial question of when exactly the postmodern era may be said to have
begun. It might in fact be argued that, in some respects, the centralisation of
global capital into a relatively small number of conglomerates makes the flows of
wealth and the concentration of power more transparent. Of course, it is
terms the void or the infinite) in the literature of that century, whereas Welsch
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questionable whether the awareness of this' imperceptible' level at which reality
or experience might be said to be determined makes any difference to that reality.
After all, gravity has always been 'invisible', but this characteristic does not
undermine our experience of it as a crucial element in reality in anyway. A key
distinction here might be whether we are talking about imperceptible
'interventions' in a technologically altered reality, which splitting the atom might
certainly be said to be, rather than merely those imperceptible categories or
forces, like gravity, which we are used to and indeed depend on. Precisely such
intervention is proposed by the new pursuit of nanotechnology, whereby matter
is engineered at a level far below the range of an optical microscope, let alone the
naked eye. This might indeed be seen to have far-going implications for the
relationship between sensory experience and reality, and it is with such
phenomena in mind that Welsch dismisses our sensory faculties as 'Agenten des
Falschen'. [Welsch 199019]
Anaesthetics and the return to art: three concepts of art
The second aspect of the anaesthetic is the conscious strategy of problematising
the possibility of perception, which marks the point at which art returns to centre
stage in Welsch's formulations. [Welsch 1990 36] This return to art as intentional
resistance to perception may be contextualised in terms of Welsch's conception of
sees the anaesthetic as a specifically recent, postmodern, phenomenon.
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two directions in art. On the one hand there is the' idealistische und romantische
Tradition' which privileges the 'Asthetischwerden' as 'Vollendung des
Menschen und der Gesellschaft'. [Welsch 1990 201 The world has become
increasingly aestheticised, in the sense of both beautification and sensory
overload, in what Welsch describes as a 'moderner Programm asthetischer
Akkumulation' [Welsch 1990381and a 'moderne Utopie einer total-asthetischen
Kultur'. [Welsch 1990381 On the other hand, art in twentieth century has been
characterised by a suspicion of the aesthetic, and has aimed to defy and cut
through this cultural accumulation:
Am Ende ist eine anasthetische Grundhaltung - gegen all die schonen und
etablierten Angebote des Asthetischen - die Methode der Wahl zur
Aufdeckung der Anasthetik alles Asthetischen. Deshalb hat die Kunst
dieses Jahrhunderts, der das Asthetische als solches suspekt geworden
war und die den asthetischen Gewohnheiten - den alltaglichen der Sinne
wie den durch Kunsttradition eingeubten - milltraute, radikale Schnitte
gesetzt. [Welsch199037]
Welsch's account of the anaesthetic as a mode of art, as a consequence of his
multiple and intersecting conceptions of the aesthetic and anaesthetic, seems to
contain several distinct ideas of art, which I will categorise in what follows as the
sublime, cognitive and pragmatic modes of the anaesthetic. Characterizing the
63
contemporary accumulation of the aesthetic as sensory excess allows Welsch to
conceive of art's oppositional force in terms of an arrest of sensory perception:
[Kunstler] haben "unsichtbare Objekte" geschaffen, Werke der
Unbemachtigbarkeit, Ich denke etwa an Walter de Marias Vertikalen
Erdkilometer - ein exemplarisches Werk des Entzugs; oder an Werke der
Minimal art - an diese Maxima von Anasthetik bei minimalem
asthetischen Aufwand. [Welsch 199040]
Walter de Maria's 'Vertical Earth Kilometer' is the only example Welsch gives,
but since the 60s art has toyed with the evacuation of content from works of art,
such as John Baldessari's 'no ideas have entered this work' (1966-8), a 'blank'
canvas on which is written 'EVERYTHINGISPURGEDFROMTHISPAINTINGBUTART,
NO IDEASHAVEENTEREDTHISWORK'[see Lynton 1989 332], or Joseph Kosuth's
'Mounted Definitions of Nothing' (1966). [See Lynton 1989 327] But Welsch's
'minimaler asthetischer Aufwand', which I have labeled the sublime anaesthetic,
suggests itself as a version of minimalist art which has gone one step beyond the
evacuation of meaning from behind art leaving just a surface, to the absence (or
at least problematisation) even of surface. Other examples in the sphere of
sculpture might include Michelangelo Pistoletto's 'Cube' (1966, 'Zero to Infinity:
Arte Povera, 1962-1972' exhibition, Tate Modern, London, 31st May -19th August,
2001), whose composition from six inward-facing mirrors makes the artwork at
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once infinite and inaccessible, or Paul Ramirez Jonas' more recent 'Man on the
Moon' (1991, 'Speed - Visions of an Accelerated Age' exhibition, Whitechapel
Gallery, London, 11th September - 22nd November, 1998), in which the artist has
transferred a recording of the moon landing via phonograph onto a number of
wax cylinders. To attempt to access the sound from their now three-dimensional
physical and visual form would gouge an obliterating groove into the wax. The
works of James Turrell, the pioneering installation artist, operate similarly at the
limits of perception. His' space division constructions' and the' ganzfeld' pieces,
on which he has worked since the late 1960s, explore the qualities of light and the
limits of visual perception. Both present undifferentiated fields of light whose
dimensions and qualities are hard to assess, seemingly with the aim of
promoting uncertainty and reflection. There has also been considerable recent
interest in questions of the representation of the invisible or imperceptible, as
exemplified by three exhibitions in the UK in 2001.4 The imperceptible has also
been deployed in the field of music, as in John Cage's infamous '4'33"', which, in
a notable parallel with Welsch's idea of art as a resistance to everyday
aestheticisation, Cage saw as a response to canned 'musak'. [See Solomon 1998]
(With respect to both Turrell and Cage it is worth noting the parallel between art
4 'Signatures of the Invisible', Atlantis Gallery, London, 2-29 March 2001,
'Exhibition to be Reconstructed in your Head', Custard Gallery, Birmingham,
April2001, 'Nothing', Northern Gallery of Contemporary Art, Sunderland, April
2001.
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and science: both Turrell and Cage have used anechoic - or sensory deprivation -
chambers in their research, and the 'ganzfelds' were originally used as
experimental tools in perceptual psychology in the 1930s.} Silence had already
been seen as defying what George Steiner in his 'Language and Silence' essay
calls 'the clamour of verbal inflation' [Steiner 1969 67], akin to Welsch's
aestheticisation. And far from being a brief flowering of minimalist abstraction
which began and ended in the 1950s, there is considerable current interest in
Cage's work. A rendition of his even more extreme 'Organ 2/ ASLSP', a 639-
year-long piece of music for the organ with spans of months and years between
chords, was begun in September 2001 in Halberstadt, Germany, with the first
note only to be heard after 18 months. [SeeConnolly 2001] A more recent variant
of this 'silent' music is 'Ellipsis', by Matt Rogalsky, in which he has collected the
silences removed from radio after new technology was introduced to strip out
the silences between presenters words, compacting talk time and leaving more
space for ad breaks. [See Poole 2001] Reminiscent of Heinrich Boll's Dr. Murke,
the common ground between this conception of silence as a refuge from auditory
excess and Welsch's formulations on the anaesthetic is apparent. Most recently,
visitors to the Edinburgh Festival 2003were invited to pay £3 for the privilege of
seeing a piece with 'no actors or script, no set and no sound, where absolutely
nothing happens'. [Guardian 12.6.03] This show, by the Theatre of Relativity,
was described as 'complete nothingness, the antidote to the noisiest festival on
Earth'. This somewhat cavalier treatment of such diverse types of art in different
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media might be problematic, but I think there are good reasons for drawing
parallels in the way they explore the nature of the imperceptible. Moreover, if
this approach can be both comparative and aware of the differences between
these media it might be preferable to the tendency in art theory to privilege for
instance 'auditive' culture as a means of overturning the hegemony of visual
culture. [See Welsch 1996 231ff] (When I come to treat in greater detail actual
instances of art which might be said to explore this limit of perception my focus
will be on one type of art, namely drama.)
As well as this idea of an arrest of perception, Welsch's references to 'etablierte
Angebote des Asthetischen' [Welsch 1990 37] and the processes of' Aufdeckung
der Anasthetik alles Asthetischen' [Welsch 1990 37] indicate that Welsch is not
just talking about an absence of perception here, nor about the surface effects of
the sensory. Rather there is a slippage to an understanding of the aesthetic as
referring to conventions, whether in terms of the form or perception, that which
is somehow latent and established. It is this latent cultural accumulation, which
coincides with what I have labelled the cultural anaesthetic above, that certain
examples of twentieth century art are understood to expose or break open: 'Am
ehesten wohl fiber Bilderfahrung und Bildarbeit, die sich daran macht, diese
vorgangigen Pragungen zu exponieren und ihre Anasthetik zu durchbrechen.'
[Welsch 1990 35] I have designated this concept of art the cognitive anaesthetic,
not in the normal sense of a generation of judgments and propositions, but in
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view of its capacity for exposing the hitherto unnoticed and uncognized elements
of perception. In this respect it is notable that John Cage, whose '4'33'" I have
mentioned above as an instance of the sublime anaesthetic, is not interested in
silence per se, but precisely the impossibility of silence: 'try as we may to make a
silence, we cannot.' [Cage 1961 8] Silence is always disturbed by ambient noise,
such as a heart beat or a cough, on which our attention is focussed. [See Cage
196122-3]5 This brings out the defamiliarising effect of silence, as Cage says, 'we
had to conceive of silence in order to open our ears'. [Quoted in Revil11992 164]
Welsch perceives this function of art in 'alternative Wahrnehmungsformen - von
Primitiven, Kindem, psychisch Kranken'. [Welsch 1990 36] With this, Welsch
reverts to a (paradoxically) conventional idea of modernist transgressive art,
examples of which might include Artaud's 'Theatre of the Cruelty', absurd
theatre or the painting of the Fauves. Such art, it must be said, tends more
towards an ecstatic mode, and thus seems hard to square with Welsch essentially
minimalist anaesthetic. Indeed, in contrast to the everyday experience of veneer
and excess, the use of the term 'aestheticisation' to refer to accumulation within art
5The common ground is apparent between Cage's focus on ambient, ostensibly
non-artistic sounds and Welsch's project of dismantling, via the focus on
perception, aesthetic's exclusive focus on the institution of art. For Cage, as
David Revill notes, the silent piece, as the limit of representation, represents' the
ultimate elision of art and life'. [Revi111992165]
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seems to be at variance with the idea of aestheticisation as a transferring of art to
non-art phenomena.
Thirdly, anaesthetic art seems to make a claim to truth or authenticity, and
moreover one that seems to have two distinct variants. Welsch is not explicit
about this truth-function and the implications of his ideas are not entirely clear,
but I have already noted the idea of the anaesthetic's particular suitability for
conveying the essence of contemporary technologically altered reality,
characterised for Welsch by the pervasive imperceptibility which has rendered our
sensory faculties as 'Agenten des Falschen'. [Welsch 1990 19] Simple
correspondence has been rendered anachronistic by contemporary industrial and
technological phenomena, along with any faith in our ability to represent reality
in all its facets: '''Wir konnen alles zeigen, alles vergegenwartigen." - so lautete
die implizite Botschaft. Dieses Macht-Phantasma aber zerstiebt heute angesichts
der Realitat der Industriegesellschaft.' [Welsch 1990 40] The echo of Brecht's
concerns about the representability of the modern world is apparent, namely that
the simple reproduction of the surface of reality - Ieinfache "Wiedergabe der
Realitar'" [Brecht 1967 171] - has ceased to be informative about what matters.
But Welsch's response could scarcely be more different to Brecht's: in Welsch's
view the imperceptible elements in art seem to function as a preparation for the
'real' world, a kind of neo-impressionism that suggests a 'pragmatic' rather than
Icritical' function for art, as much a reflection on our mode of perception as an
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attempt to dismantle it. Of course, the imperceptible reality whose effect this art
allegedly replicates is not the same as the aestheticised reality which this kind of
silent art might be said to resist.
The second idea of truth implicit in Welsch's formulations returns to this issue of
aestheticised reality, which as well as sensory and beautified, is characterised by
its 'fiktionale Natur'. [Welsch 1990 7] This fictionality of the aestheticised -
'aesthetic' not only by virtue of its sensory appeal but also its' constructed ness' -
implies, by antithesis, a second truth-claim for anaesthetic art. Welsch refers to a
'Kritik der Asthetisierung im Namen der Wahrheit' [Welsch 1996 44], and indeed
the 'unsichtbare Objekte' [Welsch 1990 40] of his sublime anaesthetic seem to
promise a kind of truth by virtue of their inaccessibility and their moment of
resistance to the veneer, excess and fictionality of aestheticisation in the same
vein as Adorno's reference to art as an 'Negation des Unwahren'. [Adorno 1978
167] This idea of a seemingly 'negative' art resisting the excessive experience of
life is not new, as Hans Robert Jaug notes: 'Asketische Kunst und Asthetik der
Negativitat gewinnen in diesem Kontext das einsame Pathos ihrer Legitimation
aus dem Gegensatz zur Konsumentenkunst der modernen Massenmedien.' [Jaug
1975273]
The effaced - not to say compromised - status of the real has been a recurrent
concern for art in the twentieth century, which has also attempted to recoup the
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'real' and the 'present' in some way. The alleged de-realisation of reality, in a
world where information is often generated according to vested interest and
where impact has largely supplanted any other scale of reality, has motivated
many conceptions of art as the refuge of the real. [See for example Zizek 1989 3]
This 'real' is seen to inhere particularly in phenomena or experiences that defy
perception, cognition, or representation (to mind or in art), and more specifically
in that which defies the conventional symbolic structures and patterns of reality.
But is it paradoxical, in view of Daniel Bell's misgivings about the aesthetic realm
in general, to propose that this kind of art can do anything about this eliding of
fact and fiction, of truth and interpretation? And the idea that the 'real' is
generated simply by defying the conventional symbolic structures of reality
arguably reinforces the conventionality of modernist art, but if defying
convention becomes the only criterion of art's 'reality' the question arises as to
whether art's authenticity is thereby reduced what Richard Sheppard refers to as
a 'series of exercises in ingenuity'. [Sheppard 2000 102] More prosaically there is
a sense in which the 'institution' of art, with its relative autonomy to present
things in different lights, might be valued by virtue of its capacity for avoiding
the pressures of vested interest and method that determine the outcomes of other
modes of information. In this respect theatrical presentation of such episodes in
public life as the enquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the Hutton
Report, or the legalities of Guantanamo Bay by Nicolas Kent at the Tricycle
Theatre in London offer a new and interesting departure for drama.
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Moreover the meditation on the real and fictional seems also to be another point
at which Welsch's ideas are at variance with his proposal to read aesthetics in
terms of the sensory. (That said I have already referred to Welsch's idea of the
invasion of knowledge by the aesthetic, which he calls the Iaesthetic-fictional'
aspect of the aesthetic, which is seen to introduce an anti-foundationalist or in his
terms 'horizontal' model of truth. [See for instance Welsch 1996 81-2] But this is
hardly likely to offer a critique of fictionality, rather raise it to the status of the
only truth that is available.) I have referred above to the difficulty, in Welsch's
fairly disparate terms, of picking and choosing between those elements of the
aestheticised world that are excessive or in some way injurious and those that are
necessary. A more critically viable way of distinguishing between good and bad
might start with the recognition that sensory excess in and of itself is not the
main problem, but rather the deployment of such phenomena as instances of
rationalisation and ideological control or homogenisation of experience. The
intentional organization of our experience, referred above in terms of a passivity-
engendering 'harmonization', whether by politicians or marketing executives,
suggests that more than mere sensory excess, there are certain ideologies
working at the heart of aestheticisation. Heidegger's remarks on the controlled
nature of scientific experiment, in which results are always known in advance [see
Heidegger 1950 78], might expand Welsch's ideas on aestheticisation here.
(Heidegger's ideas might be traced back to Kant's notion of practical knowledge
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as 'teleological' or aim-oriented.) Control is implicit in Welsch's ideas on
aesthetics, for instance in his understanding of Adorno's aesthetics as a sublime
aesthetics which precipitates a communion with nature beyond a relationship of
exploitation and control. I will discuss this in detail in chapter three. Related to
this is Welsch's conception of art's turn against its traditional claim of being able
to present everything and control its material, characteristics might be identified
with the classical veneration the artwork's formal unity or harmony between the
elements of the aesthetic object which are central to ideas of the beautiful. In
light of these preoccupations it is interesting that Welsch does not conceptualise
aestheticisation in similar terms, such as the removal of uncertainty from our
experience. In chapter five I will suggest a reading of art that operates at the
limits of perception in these terms of intentionality and control.
Finally, a more sophisticated theorisation of aestheticisation might also
accommodate an element of critique which seems to be lacking from Welsch's
formulations. In my view this might exploit Welsch's reflections on the more
complex processes of perception, a point I will take up in greater detail in
chapter four. Whilst I will suggest that the negation of perception and the refusal
of representation deploy art as a kind of consolatory guarantee in the face of a
devalued aesthetic, a more critical response to this issue of control is offered in
the use of extremes of perception to generate space and scope for freedom from
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habits and expectations, in an attempt to unpick the processes of cultural
accumulation and control.
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Chapter 2· The sensory and the self: Wolfgang Welsch's precursors
in philosophical aesthetics from Baumgarten to Shklovsky
Wolfgang Welsch's characterisation of late twentieth century reality as
aestheticised depicts reality as invaded by characteristics traditionally associated
with the aesthetic realm, such as harmony and beauty, a focus on the surface or
appearance of things, and an emphasis on the sensory or sensual aspect of
experience. Welsch is not only interested in describing contemporary society,
but in rehabilitating this traditional terrain of pre-Kantian aesthetics, namely the
study of sense perception - defined as an analogue to rational, concept-oriented
knowledge - as particularly suitable for describing how we experience and
understand the world today. In doing so, he opposes himself to a strong
philosophical tradition which has often relegated the sensory-aesthetic to a
philosophically uninteresting codicil to the realm of the rational as the means of
explaining the possibility of knowledge of the world. In classical philosophy the
'merely subjective' appearance is contrasted with 'objective' reality - even if this
latter is possibly unobtainable or only attainable as an 'idea'. At the threshold of
modern philosophy, Leibniz and Wolff would dismiss the sensible as passive,
inferior, and even as deceptive and in some way deleterious to rationally and
logically established knowledge. In Kant's early work the limited and dependent
nature of sensory experience - that which is given to the mind as distinct from
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that which can be known - is compared unfavourably with the self-active and
potentially free and infinite capacity of rationality and understanding.
By the same token, aesthetics itself - understood as a science of taste, a study of
the way we judge what is beautiful - was also relegated to a subsidiary role in
serious philosophy, at least according to Kant writing before the Kritik der
Urteilskraft. In his Beobachtungen uber das Gefohl des Schonen und Erhabenen [see
Kant 1913, Crawford 1974 19], and even in his first Kritik Kant famously asserted
the futility of ascribing any transcendental value to judgments of taste, due to the
subjective and empirical nature of such judgments. [See Hoffe 1983 70] (Even if
the depreciatory assessment by Welsch and others of the postmodern world as
'aestheticised' is not measured against such a transcendental philosophical index,
their residue is felt in such notions as the cynical 'veneer' at the expense of
substance, and the excess of perceptual stimuli which is seen to deny space or
time for contemplation.)
As such, as well as broadening aesthetics from its restricted status as theorising
about art, this turn to the sensory is a philosophical manoeuvre that returns to
one of philosophy's fundamental debates, the tension between the idealist or
rationalist position that says that meaning is imposed on matter from the mind
or some other pre-existing, over-arching and necessary schema, and the
materialist or empiricist position, which asserts the qualities of matter as in some
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way preceding or exceeding this organization. Aristotle initiates this discussion
by asserting the determining force of the individuated sensory experience in the
face of the otherwise dominant Platonic notion of the real as inhering in a
meaning-giving but ultimately abstracted world of forms. Below I will trace how
this articulation of the sensory or sensible as somehow distinct and significant in
various ways is taken up again at the outset of thinking of Iaesthetics' as a
science in its own right.
The underlying questions raised by this rehabilitation of aesthetics as a science of
the sensory are whether it makes sense to speak of an experience that is in some
way 'only sensory'. Of course, this depends on what counts as sensory? Are we
talking about J.L Austin's 'material things' and 'moderate-sized specimens of dry
goods' here, or does the sensory inevitably open the door to broader questions of
consciousness? Is it possible to register sense data without already ordering
them in some way? Does this not encounter a paradox akin to the problem of
'particularity'? On the one hand, the particular seems to be constituted by its
ability to generate an individual experience in the face of general rules and
norms; on the other hand, this individual experience must at some point depend
on an instant of comparison within a general schema. Does this type of sensory
experience somehow evade rational organization, and if so in what way and for
how long? The idea of the sensory particular evading rational organization gives
rise to a more modern sense in which the purely sensory experience is thought to
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be ideologically immune, that is to say offering a kind of ideological 'free-space',
somehow evading habitual associations and political investments. Alternatively
this valorisation of the sensory might rest on the notion of the mind as somehow
invaded and overrun by alien qualities rationality and logic. In the same vein,
the sensory has been linked to the experience of the 'indeterminate', though a
crucial distinction in what follows will be between the idea of this indeterminacy
as somehow constitutive of other, determinate experience and alternatively as in
some way destabilizing such experience.
Alexander Baumgarten
Aesthetics and the sensory: confusion and perfection
A crucial figure in the rehabilitation of the sensory and the recasting of aesthetics
is of course Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, sometimes referred to as the namer
if not the founder of the modern discipline of aesthetics. [See Schweizer 1983 vii]
In the second edition of his Metaphysica (1742), before the publication of the
Aesthetica (1750), Baumgarten conceptualises 'aesthetic science' as a study of
sensory knowledge, 'sinnliche Erkenntnis'. This idea of an alternative type of
knowledge is far from homogeneous, and in the Aesthetica in 1750 Baumgarten
famously refers to aesthetics as a 'Theorie der freien Kunste, als untere
Erkenntnislehre, als Kunst des schonen Denkens und als Kunst des der Vernunft
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analogen Denkens'. [Baumgarten 1983 79] This composite character of this
definition of aesthetics, with its references to thinking, knowledge and the
inferiority of the senses, indicates that Baumgarten still has a foot firmly in the
rationalist camp. Indeed the same elements of his formulations might lie behind
the many criticisms of Baumgarten as having in fact distracted from a separate
and inclusive study of sense-perception, evidence by subsequent aesthetics'
focus on beauty, taste and art. [See Dixon 1995, Wesse111972, Croce 1922] This
long-standing debate about the merit of Baumgarten's legacy probably motivates
Eugenio de Caro's reference to Francesco Piselli as the Irightful rediscoverer of
Baumgarten' [see de Caro 1996], in an article which aims to rehabilitate
Baumgarten's legacy. This does indicate that Welsch is not alone in returning to
Baumgarten's contribution to aesthetics, as de Caro cites the plethora of articles
and books on Baumgarten in Italian in the last fifteen years. But of course
Baumgarten was never really lost, as Ernst Bergmann's Die Begrundung der
deutschen Asthetik durch Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten und Georg Friedrich Meier (1911),
Ernst Cassirer's Philosophie der Aufkliirung (1932) and even Leonard Wessell's
more recent essay IAlexander Baumgarten's Contribution to the Development of
Aesthetics' (1972) attest. And as far as the issues in the debate about his
contribution to a separate and coherent science of aesthetics are concerned,
whilst his introduction of questions of thinking, knowledge and perfection to the
aesthetic ensures Baumgarten's vilification, it also guarantees the longevity of his
contribution, as will become clear below.
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In my introduction I drew attention to the central significance within Kant's
aesthetics of the so-called indeterminate or 'aesthetic' idea, whereby phenomena
which challenge the cognitive faculties are seen as a means of accessing the
infinite and super-sensory. This indeterminacy had already been identified by
Baumgarten as the key characteristic of the sub-discipline of aesthetics some
forty years before Kant's third Kritik, in his distinction between representations
to the mind that are distinct and lead to logical knowledge and those that are
confused and lead to aesthetic knowledge. This distinction between confused
and distinct representation comes from Leibniz, but what is new is the
valorisation of the latter, as Hans Rudolf Schweizer emphasises:
Vor allem aber gewinnt der Begriff der 'Dunkelheit' und 'der dunklen
Vorstellungen' (perceptiones obscurae) - in Obereinstimmung mit der
Lehre von den 'petites perceptions' bei Leibniz - ausdrucklich eine
positive Bedeutung. [Schweizer 1983 xiii]
But more significant than mere 'preference' for confused representations,
whereas for Leibniz these are on a continuum with logical knowledge and need
clarification by logical categories in order to attain the status of knowledge, for
Baumgarten, confused representations are of a different order to their conceptual
cousins, and are not reducible by logical analysis to conceptual knowledge. It is
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in this sense that Leonard Wessell asserts that for its object the aesthetic does not
look to abstract conceptual categories but the 'individual in its immediacy as it is
grasped in sensate experience'. [SeeWessell 1972 339] But does this immediacy
make sense? I have asked above how plausible it is to ask how plausible such a
treatment of our sheerly sensory experience is. Can it plausibly be said to remain
at a sensory level, without being immediately taken up by cognitive, rational
processes?
There are (at least) two ways of looking at the significance of Baumgarten's
sensory in this respect. On the one hand, Baumgarten's focus on the sensory is
less problematic if one takes his formulations on aisthesis as an attempt to
complete the rationalist project by investigating what he classifies as the lower
cognitive faculties of feeling, taste and imagination [see Berghahn 1988 44-45], as
such not necessarily incompatible with the ultimately rational basis to
knowledge. [See Schweizer 1983 xi] Andrew Bowie asserts that the suggestion
that the sensuous image might be primary before being subsumed into
generalized abstractions comes only with J. G. Hamann. [See Bowie 1990 6] For
Ursula Franke, Baumgarten's hierarchy of knowledge places sensory knowledge
in an inferior and complementary position to that of conceptual and rational
knowledge:
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Die asthetische Wahrheit ist eine Wahrheit des Analogons der Vernunft
und als solche dem Verstand unzuganglich, so daB Baumgarten die
asthetische Wahrheit als Wahrheit der Kunst in der Bedeutung eines
Komplementes der intellektuellen Erkenntnis auffassen kann. [Franke
197287]
According to this reading the aims and concerns of Baumgarten's philosophical
project are crucially different to Kant's later transcendental philosophy. The
latter is concerned to achieve a self-legitimating basis for knowledge. For
Baumgarten, any legitimacy is still divinely guaranteed, and it is within the
security of that legitimate order Baumgarten is able to valorise sensuous
particularity. [See Bowie 2003a 5-6] It is in this sense that Schweizer associates
Baumgarten's framework with Leibniz's conception of a universal rational order
as the stable basis of knowledge. [See Schweizer 1983 xii] I have already referred
to the idea of these references to knowledge and logic as a throwback to the
rationalism in which he was schooled. In this respect the fact that his
formulations seem to subscribe to a notion of logic, what Schweizer calls 'logisch
im weiteren Sinne' [Schweizer 1983 xvi], might be taken to suggest that any
resistance the sensory might offer to the unifying logic of rational organisation
must be at best a fleeting, pre-rational moment.
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On the other hand, Baumgarten's ideas are in several respects clearly about more
than the rudimentary nature of pre-rational sensory of experience. Firstly, his
meditations are not about any old sensory experience or pleasure but focus on
the perfection of sensory cognition. Paul Guyer distinguishes between Wolff's
interest in Isensitive cognition of perfection' and Baumgarten's focus on the
'perfection of sensitive cognition'. For Guyer this separates Baumgarten's
account of the potential pleasures in the use of our perceptual powers from
Leibniz's metaphysics of perfection. [See Guyer 2003] This also underlines the
danger of Schweizer's focus on confusion, noted above, insofar as it neglects
perhaps the crucial step that Baumgarten takes towards what Howard Caygill
calls Ian integrated doctrine of sensibility'. [Caygill 2003 168] This is better
understood via this idea of sensory perfection, which reintroduces a notion of
organisation into the aesthetic faculties. This allows Kant to conceptualise the
aesthetic representation as distinct and not simply pre-logical, with crucial
consequences for his notion of synthetic a priori judgment. [SeeCaygill2003167]
Secondly, the fact that this sensory ideal is exemplified in the main by poetry in
Baumgarten raises the question of how something as verbal as poetry offers
specifically sensory knowledge already suggests that Baumgarten is referring to
something more complex than the merely sensory. (This is also an internal
problem in Baumgarten's formulations, but might indicate that his formulations
anticipate, albeit obscurely the modernist renewal of language some century and
a half later. Along these lines I will discuss Viktor Shklovsky's idea of language
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as in some respects 'sensory' below.) Thirdly, the very fact that Baumgarten
refers to sensory knowledge, and the paradoxical nature of this formulation, points
to Baumgarten's understanding of the aesthetic as the 'Kunst des der Vernunft
analogen Denkens', (originally 'ars analogi rationis') [Baumgarten 1983 79] - an
analogue to rational knowledge. This begs the difficult question of where so-
called sensory knowledge ends and where the rational, logical knowledge
begins, and exactly what their relationship is.
Welsch himself insists that the sensory already contains an inherent reflexivity:
Schon von der einfachsten sinnlichen Wahrnehmung gilt, da15 reflexive
Strukturen in sie eingebaut sind, und zumal bei emphatischer
Wahrnehmung ist offenkundig, dafi sie von sich aus Reflexionen ausstofsen
und einer solchen Fortsetzung auch bedurfen. [Welsch 1990 54]
This reflexivity makes room for the (albeit unconscious) complexity of perception
whereby we are predisposed. to notice certain things and not others. (It seems
appropriate to refer to this complexity as 'reflexivity' in view of the fact that
there is a certain circularity in so far as what we perceive is inevitably to some
extent dependent on what we are already familiar with.) Welsch's own remarks
on aisihesis do indeed hint at this more than merely physical-sensory element in
perception: 'Ich mochte Asthetik genereller als "Aisthetik" verstehen: als
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Thematisierung von Wahrnehmung "alIer Art", sinnhaften ebenso une geistigen,
alltaglichen wie sublimen, lebensweltlichen wie kilnstlerischen.' [Welsch 1990 9-
ID, my emphasis] This returns to the unconscious cultural factors discussed in
chapter one under the concept of the cognitive anaesthetic. But once we have
introduced the idea of an inherent reflexivity and hidden depth to sensory
perception it becomes a moot point whether we are talking about physical
sensation or the more cerebral processes of cognition. The insertion of this latter
might detract from certain aspects of Welsch's aisthesis-project, such as its
philosophical preference for the sensory over the rational, or the identification of
the sensory moment as somehow Iimmanent'. In other words, this idea that
there is no such thing as simple or unmediated sensation highlights the difficulty
of attributing an essentially political force to the sensory or the corporeal. Indeed
the very idea that the sensory is invested with political force indicates that it is
already ideologically invested. (Of course, as far as Welsch is concerned, there is
a crucial sense in which his understanding of the sensory departs from
Baumgarten's valorisation of the sensory. At least as much as it is a point of
resistance, in Welsch's formulations it seems that the sensory is a crucial weak
point in our faculties, and one which needs to be protected both by our cognitive
facility for blocking out excessive experience and by recourse to a special mode
of art.)
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Baumgarten's anti-modern aesthetic
Perhaps most crucially divergent from the rationalist framework is the sense in
which Welsch's ideas on the sensory mount a specific challenge to the rational
and logical order. This is evident in Baumgarten's concern to rescue the
specificity of sensory experience from the abstraction of conceptual thought, as
indicated in the famous question: 'Was bedeutet Abstraktion anderes als einen
Verlust?' (Originally 'Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est'). [Baumgarten
cited in Schweizer 1983 xi] And whilst the alleged absence of an ultimate quest
for legitimation and grounding in Baumgarten's work might suggest it belongs
to an earlier generation, the fact that the indeterminacy in Baumgarten's work
has none of the transcendental implications that Kant will later draw also
inadvertently makes his formulations in other ways more modern than Kant's
(or perhaps more accurately more anti-modern). He makes clear, for instance,
what is at stake in the repressive intellectual process. Elements in Baumgarten's
formulations are as sharply anti-rationalist as anything offered by the Romantics,
such as his focus on the characteristically indeterminate 'confused' perceptual
experience, which inspires what Andrew Bowie refers to as 'the attention to art
as the counterpart of modern forms of rationalisation'. [Bowie200310]
In its more extreme variants this precipitates a valorisation of the sensory
motivated by an idea of the invasion of the mind by logic and rationality.
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Baumgarten's disciple Georg-Friedrich Meier, for instance, preferred to see the
different nature of sensible knowledge as a reason for rejecting rather than
expanding logic, relegating rational thought to mere rhetoric, and elevating
aesthetics to the sensible figuration of the abstract. [SeeCaygill 2003172] This is
a crucial trajectory for aesthetics after Baumgarten, of course, followed by
Adorno and others, in which logic is seen as restrictive and predetermined, with
the aesthetic preferred as the best way past its constraints. More than mere
compensation, the aesthetic becomes the domain in which is addressed, in
Bowie's words, the 'failure of the rationalist traditions [...] to do justice to the
immediacy of the individual's sensuous relationship to the world'. [Bowie 2003
5]
The idea of aesthetics as a response to the perceived failure of the rationalist
explanation of the world has a clear epistemological aspect. I have referred
already to Husserl's idea of the self-evidence of the individual's
'Korpererfahrung', and the epistemological questions concerning the
determination of knowledge in toto are given critical impetus by Baumgarten's
valorisation of the sensory and particular. Nietzsche in turn refers to thoughts as
always emptier and simpler than sensations: 'Gedanken. - Gedanken sind die
Schatten unserer Empfindungen, - immer dunkler, Jeerer, einfacher, als diese.'
[Nietzsche 1973 V 2 180] This is not the empiricism which for the essayist
William Hazlitt was a particular trait of the English imagination, which
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'constantly clings to the concrete, and has a purchase upon matter' [See Paulin
1998 3D],but reflects Nietzsche's understanding of metaphysical questions about
ultimate meaning as an invented second order, as something Iadded on'. [See
Nietzsche 1973 V 245, 75] Husserl's return to sensory experience is somewhat
less cynical, seemingly aiming to mend the thread broken in our abstract
scientific mode of knowledge. [See Husserl 1954 49] Martin Heidegger hovers
between the two, calling for a return to the materiality of the world, and it is
specifically in art's sensory nature that we can access a kind of grounding
beyond metaphysical fabrications:
In dem, was der Gesicht-, Gehor- und Tastsinn beibringen, in den
Empfindungen des Farbigen, Tonenden, Rauhen, Harten rucken uns die
Dinge, ganz wortlich genommen, auf den Leib. Das Ding ist das aistheton,
das in den Sinnen der Sinnlichkeit durch Empfindungen Vernehmbare.
[Heidegger 197710]
But this is not a valorisation of the world as alien object, for such a positivist
separation of subject and object is precisely Heidegger's notion of 'Verstehen'
aims to militate against: 'Welt ist nie ein Gegenstand, der vor uns steht und
angeschaut werden kann.' [Heidegger 195030] For Heidegger the artwork is a
crucial locus of what he calls the 'unvermittelte Begegnenlassen der Dinge'.
[Heidegger 1950 59] As well as refuting positivism or crude empiricism,
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Heidegger's concern here is that the instrumentalising subject must also be
resisted as that which enacts the process of abstraction. And if culture is also
implicated in this abstraction, at least some art can exist in the space between the
material 'Erde' and the cultural 'Welt'. This is couched in essentially Kantian
terms of autonomy from any specific purpose: whereas material normally
'verschwindet in der Dienstlichkeit', art 'lafSt,indem es eine Welt aufstellt, den
Stoff nicht verschwinden, sondern allererst hervorkommen und zwar im Offenen
der Welt des Werkes'. [Heidegger 1977 32] In comparable terms Adorno
valorises the 'Sinnliche' as a locus of non-identity: 'das Verpsrechen einer
Wirklichkeit des Gehalts, die zum Wahrheitsgehalt ihn macht, haftet am
Sinnlichen' [Adorno 1970 412], albeit that he also characterises art's sensory
element as the inevitably material or sensuous manifestation of the 'Idea'.
Likewise, for Susan Buck-Morss, in her discussion of Walter Benjamin's
formulations on phantasmagoria in the Passagentoerk, the valorisation of sensory
knowledge suggests determination by the object, in view of the fact that the
sensory is located in the world as much as in the individual subject: 'The circuit
from sense-perception to motor response begins in the world.' [Buck-Morss1992
12] In this way the pre-psychological nature of sensory experience is seen
precisely to remove its determination from a constitutive subject. Buck-Morss
even uses the same terminology as Welsch, reading the 'anaesthetic' as a similar
return to the etymological beginnings ofmodern aesthetics.
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But the disparate nature of these valorisations of a somehow sensory mode of
knowledge - containing elements of empiricism, radical critiques of rationalism
and metaphysics as well as notions of the sensory as enigmatic real or
manifestation of the 'Idea' - return to the tension identified in my introductory
paragraphs between the aesthetic as a point at which reason, in its interaction
with the sensible, might be seen to ground itself and the idea of the aesthetic as a
marginal counterweight to an overly rational view of our knowledge of the
world. In my view, and importantly for my thesis, this valorisation of the
particular and indistinct introduces a tension between the marginal quality which
haunts aesthetics and the transcendental claims that the aesthetic experience is
somehow central to legitimating and 'grounding' knowledge. The pertinent
thing about Baumgarten's own formulations in this regard is that his ideas for
aesthetics as an alternative type of knowledge inevitably part company with his
essentially rationalist metaphysics [seeWessell 1972337],and derive in fact from
his ideas on empirical (as distinct from rational) psychology. It is in this respect
that Wessell writes: 'Aesthetics is not interested in the distinct causes of
sensation, etc. It remains with the phenomenon.' [Wessell 1972 338] Ernst
Cassirer had already put it in similar terms in his glowing appraisal of
Baumgarten in his 1932 work Die Philosophie der Aufklarung. There he refers to
the object of the new science of aesthetics as 'perfectio phaenomenon', an object
marked by its 'immanence': 'Er gibt ihr [Sinnlichkeit] eine neue Vollkommenheit;
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aber diese Vollkommenheit ist freilich daran gebunden, daB sie sich als rein
immanenten Vorzug erkennt und versteht.' [Cassirer 1932457]
The immanence that Cassirer refers to here derives from the paradox of the idea
of a 'science' of aesthetics. Baumgarten's analysis has to offer an understanding
of the scope and nature of aesthetics as a different kind of knowledge that is
more than mere empiricism, if it is to offer a 'scientific' basis for aesthetics. [See
Cassirer 1932455-7] And the quality that aesthetics describes is not accessible to
science's usual method of logical or rational analysis, and is even threatened by
it:
Sie versenkt sich in die sinnliche Erscheinung und sie uberHUStsich ihr,
ohne den Versuch zu machen, von ihr selbst zu etwas vollig-Anderem, zu
den "Grunden" der Erscheinung weiterzugehen. Denn dieser Fortgang in
die Grunde wtirde den asthetischen Gehalt der Erscheinung nicht
erklaren, sondern vernichten. [Cassirer 1932461]
This tension is echoed in Welsch's own formulations by the notion of
Aisthesiologie, which sees the study of the sensory as turning this kind of
experience into ontology or epistemology: contrast this for instance with
Caygill' s view of a distinct category of sensible knowledge as crucial to Kant's
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synthetic a priori, though Caygill does make a similar point that this comes out
of Kant's lectures on anthropology, not aesthetics or metaphysics:
In order to invent an integrated doctrine of sensibility it was necessary for
Kant to find a space for reflection free from the limits imposed by these
disciplines. Such space was opened in the lecture course on anthropology
that Kant offered for the first time in 1772-3. [Caygill2003164]
But understanding the conditions of possibility of thinking about a new kind of
(basis for) knowledge does not get us closer to an understanding of what might
constitute this 'aesthetic organisation'. Wessell usefully refers to some ways in
which the specifically aesthetic type of organization of experience might be said
to happen, focussing on such classical qualities as thematic unity and a
consonance of form and content. This is entirely consistent with the artistic
ideals of the period, but I will ask in what follows whether the legacy of
Baumgarten's ideas on the sensory does not lead more seamlessly to a modernist
aesthetic, in which the sovereignty of the rational and spontaneous mind is
challenged and its mechanisms are overturned.
Immanuel Kant
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Aesthetics and the indeterminate
As my discussions above indicate, the crucial figure in articulating the more
'philosophical' implications of the 'aesthetic' experience is Immanuel Kant.
Kant's views on aesthetics are of interest here in the general sense that their
terms, such as the crucial notion of aesthetic autonomy, have been seminal for
thinking about art and aesthetics in the subsequent two hundred years, but also
because they introduce certain ideas, such as the 'transcendent', to which
Welsch's ideas owe a specific debt. It was the same schism between rationalism
and empiricism that characterises Baumgarten's work that Kant was trying to
overcome, and from an initial position of viewing the aesthetic as a limited,
empirical study of sensory perception and subjective taste in the first Kritik, Kant
comes to see the significance of the aesthetic for his transcendental project by the
time of his Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Of course it cannot be taken for granted
that Kant means the same thing by aesthetic as Baumgarten. I have already
indicated that Kant is more interested in the indeterminate nature of the sensible
experience than Baumgarten's sensory knowledge or perfection. Emblematic of
this is Kant's crucial notion of the 'asthetische Idee', which 'fur sich allein so viel
zu denken veranlafSt, als sich niemals in einem bestimmten Begriff
zusammenfassen lrust'. [Kant 1963 246] For Kant this non-conceptual thinking
gives access to the pure realm of ideas, and ultimately underlines the sovereignty
of rationality. And this relationship of the aesthetic to rationality, which it was
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Kant's ultimate aim to vindicate, is perhaps the most significant divergence from
Baumgarten's position. Some reference to the sensuous nature of art is retained
in Kant's text, this is only insofar as the task of the poet is to try and make the
super-sensory domain of pure ideas, the invisible rational faculties - the
'Vernunftideen von unsichtbaren Wesen' - into sensuous images. [Kant 1963247]
These 'Vernunftideen' are one aspect of what Kant classifies as the
'transcendent', which is to say those objects which we cannot present intuitively,
that we can never experience with our senses. This idea of principles which pass
beyond the limits of experience, which Howard Caygill characterizes as
advancing 'beyond the pursuit of understanding' [Caygill 1995 399], will be a
touchstone for my further discussion of Welsch's anaesthetic in chapter four, and
the closely related terms of Kant's sublime will be discussed in the next chapter.
Aesthetics and the universal
Distinct from this contentIess and problematic experience of indeterminacy,
another Schwerpunkt for Kant's discussions of the aesthetic is the universality of its
judgments. Returning to Baumgarten's focus on sensory perfection, this occurs
in Kant's discussion of beauty, which for Kant points a 'Gemeinsinn' or 'sens
communis' in us. [Kant 1963123] And whilst Kant was not the first to attempt to
overcome the antinomy in judgements of taste between subjective pleasure in art
and the objective validity of aesthetic judgements, as Klaus Berghahn opines, his
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third Kritik offered the most convincing elaboration of the allegedly binding
nature of aesthetic judgements. [SeeBerghahn 1988 35] For Kant, taste only seems
to be a question of subjective pleasure: 'Die Allgemeinheit des Wohlgefallens
wird in einem Geschmacksurteile nur als subjektiv vorgestellt.' [Kant 1963 841
This universality is not to be interpreted as a precursor of the context-dependent
and empirical consensus theory of truth contained in Stanley Fish's notion of the
'communal decision as to what will count as literature'. [Fish 1980 10] Precisely
the point of Kant's judgement is that it is more binding than the normative
poetics of the seventeenth century. [See Schulte-Sasse 1988 1311 More than
merely local agreement, this universal judgement for Kant is necessarily and a
prioristically true. 'Das Geschmacksurteil beruht auf Grunden a priori.' [Kant
1963 96] As Andrew Bowie states, 'Kant's argument requires that the synthesis
of the data of sensuous experience should entail a necessity which cannot be
dismissed without contradicting the incontrovertible fact of self-consciousness.'
[BOwie 1990 16] Famously for Kant we cannot directly, sensuously experience
the 'Ding an sieh', and whilst this might suggest that our view of the world is
always determined subjectively, Kant's formulations precisely aim to escape
from this subjectivism. His insight is to suggest that the conditions for
perceiving the objective world are contained within our transcendental capacities
and faculties. As Andrew Bowie puts it: '[t]he world as an object of truth is
located in the structure of the consciousness we have of it'. [Bowie 1990 16]
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But this necessity appears paradoxical insofar as for Kant this binding and
necessary a priori is precisely the capacity within us for freedom, the capacity of
our super-sensory faculties for autonomy: 'eine ubersinnlichen Beschaffenheit
des Subjekts [... ], namlich die der Freiheit'. [Kant 1963 97] Does this elision of
necessity and freedom not propose a universality that is ultimately coercive?
Kant argues to the contrary: for him the experience of beauty, whether in nature
or in art, is an exemplary instance where the distinction between subjective
perception and objective and universal reality is bridged. But this 'freedom from
the particular' is not unproblematic. Firstly, there is a sense in which this
freedom is presumably untestable. How can we tell that we are acting freely?
How can we know that we are 'thinking for ourselves', exercising free use of our
reason? This begs the question of the difficult relationship between Kant's
transcendental philosophy and empirical reality. If Kant's philosophy describes
the basis for the possibility of knowing at all, what relationship does it have to
life as we live it? If his aim is to vindicate the authority of free reason, how does
the contextualised and particular nature of our thinking impact on this? How are
we to take account of issues of ideology and all the constraints on 'free' thinking?
Does the aim of uncovering the 'conditions of possibility' propel Kant's
aesthetics towards a kind of neo-Platonism, inherent in the view that what
counts as real is determined beyond the particular, material and contextualised
nature of experience? Does what makes experience possible become the sole
criterion for judging the value of that experience?
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Donald Crawford distinguishes between two different emphases in Kant's
conception of the relationship between the aesthetic experience and the 'Ding an
sieh', whieh could suggest how Kant might evade this charge of Platonism. On
the one hand, the 'expressive'l reading considers the aesthetic mode to be the
only way of seeing beyond the located and subjective Schein and perceiving the
objective and necessary Sein, emphasising the persistence of this realm of the
Sein, in spite of its ordinary unattainability. [See Crawford 1974 92ff.] On the
other hand, in the Iformalist' reading of Kant, against the pre-determined and
teleological faculty of non-aesthetic knowledge Kant posits what Burger refers to
as a 'rein hypothetisch erschlossenes Erkenntnisvermogen hoherer Art'. [Burger
1983 18, my emphasis,] This purely 'hypothetical' nature of the realm of
objective knowledge need not be taken as a form of nee-Platonism, but might
emphasize that such knowledge, as with the idea of universal agreement about
taste, is not necessarily obtainable in fact, but that it is merely a 'regulative' [see
1 Terminological difficulties are apparent here, as Crawford's nomenclature is
clearly not compatible with other understandings of these terms. Compare for
example M.H.Abrams influential monograph The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic
Theory and the Critical Tradition. [See Abrams 19533-29] Similarly, Charles Taylor
distinguishes between 'expressive' and 'designative' versions of meaning,
whereby designative generation of meaning corresponds to Crawford's
expressive truth, and expressive meaning refers to an essentially Romantic
conception of meaning as manifestly present. [SeeTaylor 1985 218]
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Kant 1963 388] or 'formal' idea. [See also Bowie 2003b 76] As such, the subjective
and merely particular is evaded, but crucially without proposing a prior realm of
Sein to which our knowledge must correspond but always fails to measure up. It
also suggests that any 'usefulness' that the aesthetic realm might have for us
must rest in the fact that it indicates a faculty that we are already reliant on, as
opposed to any unobtainable realm or object such as the 'Ding an Sich'. But if
universal agreement is only a (n albeit a priori) regulative principle - Kant's 'rein
hypothetisch' - must we also admit that this freedom from such particular
motivations can also never actually be achieved? Is the tension between freedom
and universality dispelled merely by claiming that that which is universal counts
as free? Does this replicate an irresolvable tension between our transcendental
capacities and their empirical restriction?
Interested disinterest
The tension between transcendental capacity and its empirical exercise is doubly
problematic in view of the fact that Kant's reading of the aesthetic experience is
not entirely without ideological pre-investment. For him the universality of
judgment of the beautiful is vouchsafed by its disinterested character, which
allows Kant to distinguish between the location of aesthetic experience in the
individual psychology, mere 'unmittelbare Wirkung' [Kant 1963 22], and the
determination of aesthetic judgment beyond that subjective realm. Kant
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distinguishes the universal perception of the aesthetic object, which is an
experience of beauty, from the individual's experience of that which is
pleasurable or good. Whilst our experience of pleasure in the object is seen to
have implications for our personal 'Zustand', the former event must take place
under conditions of our complete indifference.
Whilst it is hard to overestimate its significance for later aesthetics, centring on
the concept of aesthetic autonomy, it is apparent that Kant's positing of
subjective disinterest might have its own particular, strategic interest. Certainly
Adorno hints at the ethical motivation in his suggestion that Kant's disinterest
conceals a 'wildeste Interesse', an interest moreover that saves it from mere
indifference of which Hegel had accused it. [Adorno 1970 24] In Martha
Woodmansee's sociological reading, idealist aesthetics' refutation of normative
poetics gets its impetus from the rejection of the art that takes the upper class as
its milieu by the growing reading middle class in eighteenth century Germany.
[See Woodmansee 1994 11-33] Alternatively, Woodmansee points to Kant's
Pietism as a possible theological origin of the idea of denial of self which is
central to his concept of disinterest. [SeeWoodmansee 1994 19) This denial of the
self is a central focus of Hegel's critique of Kant's' contentless' understanding of
ethics. His solution to the problem of ethical grounding seems to dissolve the
ethical problem (by removing any possible content) rather than allowing it to
stand as a problem. Emblematic in this regard is Hegel's discussion of Stoicism
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in the Phiinomenologie des Geistes, who is seen to return to the security of the 'reine
Bewegung des Denkens'. [Hegel 1841 148] In Hegel's view, the Stoic's retreat
into the self-reflexive mind only gains freedom from oppression at the price of
closing the individual off from the 'vielfache sich in sich unterscheidende
Ausbreitung, Vereinzelung, und Verwickelung' [Hegel 1841 147] of the outside
world. In Hegel's dialectical terms this is philosophically unsustainable, and the
implication for Kant's ethics is that it is presumably the self and its interest that
generates problems for ethics: lose self-interested motivation, and the ethics are
easy. The evacuation of the individual seems particularly problematic because it
contradicts the constitutive role of free subjective imagination in Kant's attempt
to ground knowledge. For Hegel such empty formalism is 'cognitively
meaningless' [Kaminsky 1962 9], with the Kantian subject rendered
indeterminate to the point of uselessness, distilled to what Adorno calls' absolute
Form'. [Adorno 1970 23]
The emptiness also seems to correspond to what Isaiah Berlin in his 'Two
Concepts of Liberty' classifies as a 'negative' idea of freedom, which is
characterised as the '" negative" goal of warding off interference'. [Berlin 1958 12]
Berlin perhaps forces the point with the idea that this characterisation of freedom
'is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy' insofar as it is conceivable
that Ia liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of
personal freedom'. [Berlin 1958 14] In this relation Berlin also refers to Stoicism,
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which is taken as an apotheosis of this individual libertarian position: IAscetic
self-denial may be a source of integrity and spiritual strength, but it is difficult to
see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty.' [See Berlin 1958 20, 24]
Whilst Berlin registers that the Stoic position needs to be understood in the
context of the adverse prevailing political climate during the fall of the
independent democratic city states, he also asserts that such a 'strategic retreat to
an inner citadel' is an attitude of which 'every form of autonomy [... ] has in it
some element'. [Berlin 1958 20, 21] And whilst it would be tenuous to suggest
any direct analogy between then and our current political climate, it is fair to say
that quietism may be encouraged by other means, such as that articulated in the
idea of the world as aestheticised. Certainly Welsch's notion of anaesthetic art
might enact such a gesture of self-containment, and he also refers to the Stoic as
the 'perfekter Anasthet'. [Welsch 1990 26] The Stoic's quietist position is
discussed to similar ends by Julien de Lamettrie, Nietzsche and Herbert Marcuse,
each of whom will be significant interlocutors in the course of my discussions.
The point of these thinkers is often to emphasise that the exclusive focus on the
self ignores or distracts from other more social elements which impinge on our
freedom or ability to act ethically. It is no better turning inwards and ignoring
external determinants, removing precisely that which for Hegel offers resistance
to subjective determination and generates ethical problems, the concrete and real
conditions of the object world. [See Kaminsky 1962 8] As opposed to Kant's
notion of freedom as an inner light, Berlin again refers to 'positive' freedom as
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'only intelligible in terms of the social network in which I am [... ] an element'.
[Berlin 195837,40] Certainly it seems that the inevitable predetermination of our
experience by cultural (ideological) norms and expectations suggests that
freedom is always constrained by particular predisposition or context, which
suggests that Kant's notion of disinterest is implausible anyway. As such, Berlin
writes of freedom as self-realization within constraints, referring to the musician
for whom 'the playing of music is not obedience to external laws, a compulsion
and a barrier to liberty, but a free, unimpeded exercise'. [Berlin 1958 26] This
idea of 'unimpeded exercise' might be overstated, bearing in mind the
constraints within which musical performance occurs. (The same is probably
true of any performance that is similarly' guided' by a text which must in some
way be reproduced.) But this sense of 'freedom within constraint' sounds very
much like Kant's sublime, in which the freedom of our mental faculties springs
from the unfreedom of various extreme experiences. But by contrast my concern
will be to sketch out a more contextual or marginal idea of freedom in the face of
convention and expectation.
Early Romantic thought
Reflexivity and the sensory particular
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Kant's bad faith with the particular and the subjective was the focus of the early
Romantics and others' criticism of his attempts to ground truth. As well as its
unspoken interest, for the Romantics, Kant's disinterest was problematic insofar
as they were doubtful that one could go from the reflection within and on the self
to a positive foundation of truth outside. Access to knowledge starts and ends
with the subject. Turning back on Kant's problematic step towards the objective
basis of knowledge, Romantic thought reasserts the validity of the subjective and
particular basis of knowledge. This revalorisation of the particular was not only
a philosophical rejection of the possibility of attaining objective knowledge, free
of its particular location, but already a turn against the process of exchange, as
[ochen Schulte-Sasse notes,
[i]n their assessment of what art and being an artist should mean in an age
of commodity exchange, they were led to a valorization of the individual
characteristics (das Charakteristische) of artists and artworks: the
characteristic is that which remains identical with itself. [Schulte-Sasse
1988122]
As noted above, Baumgarten's focus on the different nature of sensory
experience already contained the seed of the challenge to Kant's later project of
grounding self-conscious knowledge and ethics as rational and necessary. This
however rested less on an assertion of the particularity of sensory experience,
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and more on the conviction as to the different nature of its ordering. Sensory
knowledge is granted relative autonomy, with indeterminate 'aesthetic'
impressions not necessarily being converted into determinate cognitive
judgments, but providing a different kind of knowledge.
But then, contrary to general assumptions, the early Romantic theorists do not
see intuition as direct or immediate, but mediated by endlessly postponed chain
of reflection. [See Bowie 1997 210] As Benjamin's discussion of Fichte and the
early Romantics in the essay Begriff der Kunstkritik makes clear, even seemingly
immediate and positive intuition is itself a reflection: 'Sein und Setzung hebt das
romantische Denken in der Reflexion auf.' [Benjamin 1974291 Moreover, it is not
merely aesthetic perception, but all cognitive moments that are but links in the
infinite process of reflection: 'Fur sie war diese Deutung alles Wirklichen, also
auch der Kunst'. [Benjamin 1974 62)2 The corollary of this thoroughgoing
reflexivity is the process of infinite reflection which Romantic theory
characterises as the search for grounds. This confirms the significance of
thinking on aesthetics as an articulation of the problems of grounding any
2 Arguably this chain of reflection is already implicit in Kant's view of the
subjective constitution of reality. Terry Eagleton refers to Kant's 'Copernican
revolution' as amounting to the self-reflexivity of epistemology as a whole. 'This
is to say that the self-referentiality of Kant's ethical subject or work of art has
now been projected into the very structure of cognitive argument, which is
always curled up on its own tail.' [Eagleton 1990 1311
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epistemology. Charles Taylor's more recent distinction between 'expressive'
truth and' designative' truth suggests that, even in a thoroughly scientific age,
epistemology has still not absolved itself of this aesthetic kernel. [See Taylor 1985
218]
Of course, Romanticism's more consistent treatment of the reflexivity at the heart
of the subjective determination of knowledge and the concomitant endless
reflection of groundless grounds for knowledge does not absolve the Romantics
of Kant's search for an ultimate ground. As far as the Romantics are concerned,
this subjective reflection itself guarantees truth's absoluteness, precisely by
avoiding the objectivity that Kant's system demands. As Terry Eagleton writes,
[i]f the founding postulate of a system is to be absolute, then it must
escape all objectification and so cannot be in any way determinate. For
such a principle to be determinate would imply some ground beyond
which it could be determined, thus ruining its absolute status at a stroke.
[Eagleton 1990 127]
The contrast is clear that grounding for the Romantics means avoiding
objectivity, whereas for Kant it entails avoiding precisely the subjective
interference which is seen by the Romantics to offer a ground. But to read this as
a position of extreme subjectivism, pursuing an absolute ground to the exclusion
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of any contact with the outside world (a tendency which Hegel's return to the
object will aim to correct), ignores the significant role that the external world
does play in the Romantics' conception of the process of reflection. For Schelling,
the limiting function of the external world is constitutive in our own self-
consciousness. [See Bowie 2003109-10, Schelling 1/3 390]
Kant, Romanticism and the turn against representation
To call Schelling's formulations subjective also ignores the key point that early
Romantic philosophy deploys crucially different notions of truth to its sense as
representative of a pre-existent status quo. Citing Novalis, Andrew Bowie notes
that
the Romantic view [... ] does not conceive of truth as a ground or origin in
any straightforward sense: 'Every real beginning is a secondary moment'
because it must always be relative to what follows for it to be a beginning
at all. [Bowie 1997 79]
Romantic theory's understanding of truth is no longer merely representative of
pre-existent reality, a question of the correspondence of concepts by determinate
judgement, but essentially forward-looking. As Schelling writes in his System of
Transcendental Idealism, '[s]elf consciousness is the source of light for the entire
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system of knowledge, but it shines forwards, not backward.' [Cited in Eagleton
1990 127] This notion of truth as creative particularity predates many similar
ideas of the way knowledge works by post-structuralist philosophers, and
significantly for Welsch's ideas, already indicates a significant intersection of
aesthetics and postmodern thinking. It also anticipates and underpins the
rejection, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, of the conventional
view of art as deriving its truth-value from mimetic representation. Art's casting
off of the obligation to represent, which becomes an essential strand of twentieth
century aesthetic theory and artistic practice, is arguably the main legacy of
Romanticism to later philosophy and literary theory. [SeeBowie199721-5]3And
whilst this discussion of grounding and the limitations of the representational
understanding of knowledge seems to have departed from the terms of
Baumgarten's sensory aesthetic, this idea of art as anti-representational will be a
strong thread through my discussion, apparent in the idea of art as non-
perception, as in Welsch's anaesthetic theory and Peter Handke's theatre, and art
as somehow immanent and immediate, as in [ean-Francois Lyotard's sublime,
3 That said, again arguably the crucial step away from a model of truth as
representation of or correspondence to an external 'object' is arguably already taken
by Kant in his thinking about aesthetics. In his reading of the aesthetic as a
reflection on our capacities, the value of art is separated from the artwork's
mimetic function, enacting what Rudiger Bubner calls the 'radikale
Emanzipation der Kunste aus den Zwangen des Abbildungsprinzips und der
gesellschaftlichenFunktionen'. [Bubner 1971211
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and art as sensory excess, as in Heiner Muller's drama. All will be seen to
meditate in various ways on the competing issues of art as representation and
art's'reality status'.
Negativity and immanence
Also significant in my discussions in this regard will be what I see as an essential
ambivalence in early Romantic philosophy's conception of truth, and the deferral
and reflection on which it rests. On the one hand, this doubly 'secondary' nature
of art - whieh follows from philosophy's age-old distinction between Sein and
Schein but with some crucially different conclusions - does not lead the
Romantics to renounce the search for the absolute, but rather to conclude that it
can only be known negatively. In this sense Andrew Bowie notes that 'the
attempt to arrive at cognitive certainty by defining something as true necessarily
leads to the realization that every particular proposition negates itself by being
dependent upon other propositions'. [Bowie 1992 35] For Terry Eagleton this
ultimate nullity of the unobtainable object identifies the contradictory nature of
Kant's idea of the 'Ding-an-sieh'; 'the thing-in-itself is posited and prohibited at a
stroke.' [Eagleton 1990 121] At the same time, some recent theory has
characterised Kant as the precursor to theories of the negative, such as Terry
Eagleton's reference to the contradiction between this negative moment and the
necessary universality which it claims to substantiate as the ambivalent status of
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Kant's epistemology. [See Eagleton 1990 131, see also Zizek 1993] I will return to
this idea of reflection theory as precipitating an aesthetic of negativity in the
chapters below.
On the other hand, the particular is validated precisely by its refusal to refer to or
be determined by an external framework in such a way that suggests that truth,
if it is available at all, is necessarily present - albeit one whose grounds may never
be attained. This seems to generate to two tendencies in anti-representative art.
Firstly, that which deploys a seemingly inaccessible truth, as in what Welsch calls
the anaesthetic artwork, which I have associated above with Kant's notion of the
'transcendent'. The danger for Welsch is that his sublime anaesthetic, as
discussed in the last chapter, seems to present this failure of the senses as an end
or truth in itself. Secondly, there is art which seems to gain its force by
deploying a positive and irrepressible 'presence'. In this sense, Romantic
thinking on art might be taken as a radicalisation of Kant's ideas on
purposiveness and indeterminacy. This version of the turn against
representation has been explicitly mobilised in art which operates at the sensory
extreme, and I will relate this idea of truth as a creative function to Heiner
Muller's theatre as a kind of enforced creativity that defies mere reproduction,
but crucially not just for the producers of the work but also its recipients. These
two ideas of art will be central to my theoretical analysis and my discussion of
art in the final two chapters.
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This sense of truth as an instance of the indeterminate and particular seems to
militate against the conceptual organisation of experience, looking rather to an
idea of knowledge as produced by and productive of particularities. But what
implications might this have for the possibility of judgment in general and, more
crucially for my concerns, the idea of art as critique? As far as judgment in
general is concerned, in view of Welsch and others' diagnosis of the world as
increasingly aestheticised, it is apparent that the suggestion that art or reality
gains its truth by virtue of its immanent particularity, its mere appearance, is
more problematic now than ever before. Does this kind of meditation on truth
leave us without an ideological basis for a critique of what is going on either in
art or in culture generally? Is this immanent particularity a discursive dead end?
Of course, to ask of the fate of critique is to fly in the face of the idea, noted in the
introduction, that the Romantic view of art as the location of particularity does
not admit of an approach which aims to analyze it by external, in this case
ideological, criteria. For Stanley Cavell, 'expressive' language is not only
constitutive of 'discursive' meaning (to use Taylor's terms), but exceeds the
capacity of this latter, which is incapable of shedding light on the specificity of
the aesthetic experience:
It is essential in making an aesthetic judgment that at some point we be
prepared to say in its support: don't you see, don't you hear, don't you
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dig? ... Because if you do not see something, without explanation, then
there is nothing further to discuss. [Cavell 1976 93, see also Bowie 2003b
77]
This echoes the idea of 'sensuous knowledge' as a different kind of knowledge,
and one which cannot be analysed in logical or discursive terms. In my
introduction I asked whether allying the particular to the thorny issue of
grounding might not lead to a very philosophical cul-de-sac for art, reaching an
irreducible point of particularity at which one cannot compare anything or draw
general lessons. Cavell is referring to aesthetic judgment in the broadest terms,
but I wonder whether aesthetics' Iepistemological turn' marks the point at which
it parts company with all but the most difficult art. Certainly some art does
thematise this question of the possibility of meaning, and evacuates any kind of
simply representative content, as we shall see in the case of Samuel Beckett and
Peter Handke's theatre. But what does it mean to refer to this constitutive
aesthetic moment as a necessary prerequisite of meaning if we do not need to re-
enact this type of experience again and again? After all, even if Romanticism's
expressive meaning is at the root of how what we say can mean anything, most
of us have, by necessity, left this problem of grounding long behind us in our
everyday use of language and meaning.
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The alleged analytical or ideological incapacity of this conception of art might be
especially problematic in view of the fact that traditionally artistic means, such as
harmony, beauty and the sensuous, are deployed towards ideologically loaded
ends, as some aspects of Welsch's ideas on aestheticisation suggest? Moreover,
this ideological refusal does not entirely defuse the question of what ideology
might be said to be operating in such philosophical arguments, and in particular
the pervasive negativity noted above. I will return to this issue of ideology when
I come to discuss Welsch's anaesthetics, and with particular reference to
Marcuse's concerns about 'difficult' art, in chapter four.
The association of art and indeterminacy is also double-edged for another reason.
On the one hand, associating this originary indeterminacy in meaning solely
with art is problematic, in the sense that it has defused the implications of these
insights for wider epistemology. Andrew Bowie makes the point that the
migration of particularity to the artwork has arguably had the effect of
distracting from any wider epistemological implications that Romanticism's
truth-theory may have had, to the cost of more recent continental theory. [See
Bowie 2003a 52] On the other hand the Romantic position might be taken to undo
the conception of art as a special domain in which such indeterminacy is
permissible. If this self-reflexive, creative constituting of reality is what we do
anyway, what is the status of art in life, and what role might it be said to have?
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But against this wider relevance of aesthetic indeterminacy, the heady
combination of transcendentalism and the particular seems to motivate Bowie's
concern, registered in my introduction, about the fact that 'the truth that art can
communicate threatens to become marginal to the central concerns of the
present'. [Bowie 1992 33] It should be remembered of course that Romantic
theory contains an in-built ambivalence towards the autonomous status of art
and the aesthetic. Friedrich Schlegel, for example, speaks of a reunification of art
and life, in a manner which demands the application of aesthetic principles to
other functionally autonomous spheres of life. [See Schulte-Sasse 1988 1321 For
Patricia Waugh even Kant's aesthetic autonomy, the separation of art from life,
'paradoxically also implies a form of aestheticism, the existence of art in life'.
[Waugh 1992 17] Does this suggest that art is significant for something more
prosaic than the philosophical issue of grounding meaning? Important
proponents of this idea of inserting art back into everyday life were the various
Dada movements, whose attempts to forge new connections I will refer to below.
This discussion will be in the context of a less transcendental sense of the role
and status of the aesthetic, arguably a sense which has its origins in Romantic
thinking about art. Patricia Waugh also points to the continuity between
Romantic thinking and postmodernity, specifically in the latter's 'radical
fictionalising' and its 'situatedness in the world'. [Waugh 1992 15] I will return
to the issue of fictionality in following chapters, but it is this' situated ness' that I
want to pick up on here.
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As well as this primary constitutive moment that allows for the possibility of
meaning at all, indeterminate art or art at the limits of perception might be said
to work on more located and everyday meaning. The conclusions Kant draws
from his analysis of the aesthetic experience focus on the transcendental qualities
of mind, but his model of the subjective cognitive faculties not also point towards
a more located and marginal understanding of the type of freedom art can offer,
which might not sacrifice a connection to context and ideological analysis.
According to Kant's model of the mental faculties, sense data must be mediated
by intuition, which in turn cannot remain mere intuition, must be measured by
the 'higher' faculties of judgment. So the way the world appears, whilst always
ultimately accessed through our sense perceptions, is mediated and often
substituted by our intuitions, which serve as short-cuts to knowledge of objects
around us. It is these intuitions, rather that the more direct sense perception, that
are unified by the rational faculties of the mind, the imagination and the
understanding. As such, in Kant's model it is not so much the rational that the
sensory must compete with for determination, rather it must meet the challenge
of our intuitions, which are seen by Kant to take over responsibility for our
awareness of objects from our sense perceptions. These intuitions for me
indicate a point at which precisely the rational sovereignty that Kant is trying to
establish is overturned, by such modest elements of consciousness as habits of
thinking and cultural conditioning. Of course reliance on habitual
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understandings, the reductive metaphors that Nietzsche bemoans as bereft of
sensual force, 'abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos' [Nietzsche 1973 III 2 180], is at the
opposite end of the perceptual spectrum from the originary aesthetic moment of
indeterminacy. This more economical mode of perception and communication
seems to be unavoidable, but also opens up a mode of art that retains a sense of
indeterminacy, albeit a more contextualised and marginal one. The habits and
cultural conditions that shape intuitions still set a challenge for freedom and
spontaneity: how in the face of cultural predetermination is new perception or
understanding forged, how are expectations overturned, what role is reserved
for art in this, and how might it coincide with the sensory? For Kant and the
Romantics, the pivotal factor in this generation of new experience is the insight of
the genius, but my concern will be to look at the reception of the new, which is
where I think art's political import has more likely resided. In my view this
suggests a means of theorising a more contextualised connection between the
aesthetic, the cognitive and the specifically sensory particular, in a way that has
been significant for twentieth century art theory and practice. This coincides
with Welsch's conception of the anaesthetic as the culturally informed non-
perception that underlies perception at all which I have labelled the 'cognitive
anaesthetic'. This is distinct from his seemingly more transcendentally inclined
(in my terms) 'sublime anaesthetic', and beyond this latter's austere evacuation
of content, might allow a relation to the wider consciousness-raising, or even an
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interaction with every habits of perception of which aestheticisation might be
conceptualised as an accentuated and ideologically loaded instance.
Viktor Shklovsky
Marginal poetics
The focus on intuition is interesting, in that it seems to be precisely in the face of
intuition's automatisation of perception that the Russian Formalists at the
beginning of the twentieth century conceived of the mode of operation of the
aesthetic, variously, as defamiliarisation or foregrounding. The above sense of
habit or even metaphor as a means to perceptual and cognitive economy coincides
with the automatised perception that is central to the definition of the poetic in
Russian Formalist thinking. Viktor Shklovsky, in his seminal discussion of
modernist poetics in 'Art as Technique' (1917) [see Shklovsky 1965], makes the
crucial distinction between the Symbolist conception of art which uses ready-
made images and the poetic as precisely undoing such economies of perception.
Of course, this kind of connection between perception within and outside of art
is not what one initially associates with the Russian Formalists. They are usually
likened to the New Critics, both being early twentieth century movements in
literary criticism whose concern was to protect the 'literariness' of literature,
Opposed as they were to its function as something else (such as any kind of social
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change). Stated in its most orthodox terms, their aim was to establish a science of
literary technique that was separate from any question of meaning. Indeed, it
was precisely this alleged absence of a social dimension that got the Formalists
into hot water with Leo Trotsky and saw them ultimately suppressed in the
1930s. [See Lemon & Reis 1965 99, xv] But much like Baumgarten's ideas on
aesthetics, there are ways in which this reading of the separateness of the literary
only superficially holds up.
On the one hand, for instance, Shklovsky's formulations remain true to Kant's
insistence on the disinterested nature of the aesthetic experience, inasmuch as the
artwork's aesthetic nature is locked into a kind of self-reflexivity that is said to
have nothing to do with what is represented: IArt is a way of experiencing the
artfulness of an object, the object is not important.' [Shklovsky 1965 4] On the
other hand, Shklovsky's ideas on defamiliarisation might be read as abandoning
Kant's transcendental guarantor, disinterest, and allowing a more context-related
and sociologically engaged conception of the relationship between cultural
context and aesthetic experience. Central to this is the retention of the referent,
which is implicit in Shklovsky's formulations insofar as he couches the strategy
of defamiliarisation in terms of a distinction between our experience of an object
with knowledge of it:
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The purpose of art is to impart a sensation of things as they are perceived
and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects
'unfamiliar', to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length
of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself
and must be prolonged. [Shklovsky 1965 12]
The retention of the referent departs from Kant's insistence that the aesthetic tells
us only about our own unlimited faculties, and confirms the shift from
transcendental terrain to the empirical. Of course, this begs the question of what
is the status of that which is known. Bereft of its transcendental conclusions, is
the ultimate purpose of defamiliarisation the indeterminate experience itself or a
more specific consciousness-raising? Whilst this retention of reference may seem
to be at odds with art that operates at the limits of perception, which sounds like
an extreme' formalist' position - underlined by the fact that I have characterised
Welsch's anaesthetic art in terms of an attempt to evacuate any content - I will
raise the idea of partial and problematised perception in chapter four (in theory)
and five and six (in practice) as a means whereby partial reference retains some
contact to cultural content.
Indeterminacy as sensory
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Another question begged is how this retention of reference might combine with
the analysis of the aesthetic experience in sensory terms. What overlap might
there be between Shklovsky's aesthetics of defamiliarisation and Baumgarten's
conception of the aesthetic as a kind of knowledge that is in some way sensory?
Certainly the two thinkers' ideas share a concept of the aesthetic experience as a
challenge to the rational or cognitive faculties. Moreover, Shklovsky does
emphasise the specifically sensory nature of the aesthetic experience, referring
for instance to the' sensation of things as they are perceived'. This sounds like a
kind of neo-impressionism, presenting things as they appear to us, but in fact he
starts his essay by positioning himself against Potebnya's idea of the poetic as
'thinking in images'. [Shklovsky 1965 5] Similarly his idea of poetry as offering a
'vision' of the object rather than knowledge of it [Shklovsky 1965 18] suggests a
certain compactness, but in fact for Shklovsky it is precisely any such' economy'
of imagery that the poetic interrupts. Moreover he identifies the sensory nature
of the aesthetic experience with this process of defamiliarisation: Iart exists that
one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make
the stone stony'. [Shklovsky 1965 12] In particular Shklovsky's notion of
'roughening' language [Shklovsky 1%5 22] seems to be claiming some kind of
sensory essence to the poetic, whereby linguistic innovation is able to renew the
'stoniness' of the stone.
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Shklovsky's distinction between the' experienced' and the 'known' valorises an
experience that is processed in a different way to rational or conceptual
knowledge in an echo of Baumgarten's ideas. This merely begs the question of
what this' experience' means, what kind of status and value it has. In an early
essay entitled 'Erfahrung' Walter Benjamin distinguishes between 'Erfahrung'
and 'Erlebnis' [see Benjamin 1977 54], where 'Erlebnis' is the 'felt life' of 'the
moment as it is lived in its intensity', as opposed to 'the accrued mass of such
moments, no longer in their lived actuality'. [Docherty 2003 24] At the same
time, it may be that Benjamin is drawing our attention to crucial elements of life
that cannot be empirically experienced, 'dalS es etwas Anderes gibt als Erfahrung,
dalS es Werte gibt - unerfahrbare -, denen wir dienen.' [Benjamin 1977 55] Only
in this 'Unerfahrbare' are we seen to be free. This 'Unerfahrbare' seems to hark
back to Kant's 'transcendent', but its paradox may only point to the idea that the
experience is intellectually unknowable or that it cannot be stated discursively.
This sounds like it is close to questions of grounding again: in more marginal
terms, Marquard takes up the distinction (originally Gadamer's) between
'Erfahrung' and 'Erwartung' as a means of expressing the aesthetic experience as
a means of defying conventional ways of seeing: 'in dem Mafse, in dem die
Wirklichkeit weg von der "Erfahrung" hin zur "Erwartung" tendiert, bewegt
sich - gegenlaufig: kompensatorisch - das Asthetische weg von der "Erwartung"
hin zur "Erfahrung"'. [Marquard 1989 98] It is worth noting that this
acknowledgment of the conventionality of art detracts from the sheerly sensory
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understanding of the experience. But again in my discussions in chapters five
and six I will elaborate ways in which such alternative modes of experience that
might be taken to emphasise the sensory are deployed in art, and to what effect.
Transcendental value or marginal effect
The conceptualisation of the aesthetic that I have elaborated here clearly involves
a quite different sense of the value of art from Kant's abstracted aesthetic
experience of the disinterested individual, which I have characterised as a
divergence between reading aesthetics as transcendental and as marginal. This
might also be conceptualised in terms of value versus effect. Kant's idea of the
aesthetic as opening up a realm of freedom from the determinate is still essential
to modernist art, but it is a more marginal freedom, inasmuch as it cannot be
universalised, but must be re-enacted again and again. In chapter three I will
conceptualise this cognitive process in terms of a fragile dialectic, which for
Christine Pries is the crucial characteristic of the limit experience of the sublime.
[See Pries 1989] The question remains as to where the capacity for such
innovation comes from, but the danger is that this focus loses sight of the practical
ways in which such interventions may interact with lived experience. Even in
philosophical projects, like Heidegger's attempt to describe 'Being', the limited,
sensory element of the aesthetic seems to recognise the contextual, local nature of
how the world means anything. Compared to the ethical import of aesthetics in
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the context of Kant's aesthetics, the import of art which enacts a marginal
intervention in the perceptual realm springs arguably from a less universalising
and more dynamic and marginal understanding of its effect. According to this
reading, art's truth-value ceases to underwrite its ethical guarantee; rather, art
conceived as critical intervention in the continuum functions by virtue of its
cognitive effect. The marginality of this kind of aesthetic experience is already
implicit in Andrew Bowie's characterisation of Russian Formalism as a breaking
of rules, which he contrasts with Terry Eagleton's more scientistic linguistic
reading of Shklovsky's notion of defamiliarisation. [See Bowie 1997 21] My only
reservation with Bowie's characterisation of Russian Formalism is the
identification of Shklovsky's defamiliarisation with the idea of the literary as an
attempt to 'say the unsayable'. [Bowie 1997 23] This (possibly only) sounds close
to precisely what Shklovsky was militating against, namely Potebnya's symbolist
idea of art as a kind of shorthand expression of what is otherwise difficult to
express. Might it not be possible to refer to art as a kind of 'unsaying' what has
been said, a kind of dismantling of what has sedimented into the understanding
of habit and expectation?
This more marginal understanding of the aesthetic might also offer a different
sense of the articulation of subject and object in the aesthetic experience. I asked
whether this 'unsaying' might not necessarily entirely relinquish its reference to
the object, but it precisely does not aim to create what Charles Taylor calls a
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'miniature universe' [Taylor 1985 230], rather by fragmentation and unsettling of
perception art precisely denies the coherent construction of such a universe.
Taylor is closer to this sense when he describes a constantly renegotiated border
between stable and established meanings and problematic and unfamiliar usages
of language as marking the territory of the poetic. At the same time, my concern
above has been to argue that the value of this marginal aesthetic inheres largely
in its destabilising effect, and this question of effect cannot but return to the self.
Unlike Kant's rarefied disinterest, our subjective experience of art is a complex
phenomenon, the epistemological and ethical import of which is shot through
with contextual, conventional aspects, such as conventions on standards of
decency and modes of representation, cut across by ideological investments, a
sense of which might allow a more plausible model of the economy of the
aesthetic experience and the marginal autonomy that is its lifeblood.
Cognitive aesthetics: retrieving the distrusted subject
The readmission of the empirical and marginal effect of art that the sensory
emphasises does not just reassert aspects of the specificity of the aesthetic object,
but also involves a restoration of the culturally located recipient as the locus of
art's significance. Arguably it is not until the theoretical contributions of the
Russian Formalists that an understanding of the function of the individual
psychology takes its place in a way which allows equal weight to be given to
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formal and psychological aspects of the complex interaction which characterises
the aesthetic event. But the play of intuition and habit indicates the recipient's
dual status as both the (in my view necessary) locus of art's effect and a limiting
factor in art's claim to present any universal - or in other terms ideologically
unbiased - aspect of reality. Indeed, the aesthetic is precisely the point at which
the spontaneous and rational mind may be challenged and its mechanisms
overturned. Philosophy's concern to establish universal grounds of knowledge
has motivated the historical relegation of the subject in philosophy, emblematic
of which is Kant's insistence on the disinterested nature of aesthetic perception.
This insistence is probably a reaction against the close relationship of the
aesthetic and the subjective, which stems in part from the sense that art's truth or
meaning 'feels personal' and seems to depend on a quality that exceeds more
than may be said to be objectively, quantifiably 'there'. The two terms are used
interchangeably in much eighteenth century writing on art [see Berghahn 1988
41, and for instance Kant 1963 86], a parallel that Christoph Menke underlines
when he notes the common birthplace of aesthetics and modern notion of the
subject. [See Menke 2000 40-1] Even Romantic thinking, which I have
characterised above as taking issue with Kant's bad faith with the subjective
aspect of knowledge, is fundamentally ambivalent on the question of subjective
reception. Novalis for instance refers to the ideal reader as an extended author:
'Der wahre Leser mug der erweiterte Autor sein.' [Cited in Benjamin 1974 68, see
also Bowie 1997 71] This mistrust of the subject and the subjective also motivates
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Hegel's content-oriented aesthetics, and recurs in Adorno's focus on the
enigmatic art object. Heidegger is also heir to Hegel's preference for the
guarantee of the aesthetic object, insisting more obliquely that the 'effect of the
work does not consist in an effecting'. [Heidegger 1975 74] Indeed, this
scepticism towards the subjective is summed up in Heidegger's understanding
of the whole of European philosophy after Descartes as a misguided attempt to
understand everything in terms of its relation to our consciousness. A similar
scepticism is also evident in less 'philosophical' strands of thinking about art. M.
H. Abrams for instance warns against I. A. Richards' attempt to base criticism
and interpretation in psychology. [Abrams 1953 4] Georg Lukacs refers
disdainfully to modernism's obsession with the subjective, either as the mere
registration of sense data or the more extreme representations of
psychopathologies as somehow more authentic than any ordinary view of the
world. [Lukacs 1963 30] Lukacs' polemical point is that this sacrifices any
perspective from which an ideology presentation and critique of society might be
mobilised. Of course, Kant's transcendental argument for the significance of the
aesthetic that precisely takes issue with its status as a mere vehicle for ideological
positions which could be better served by other means, but both investments in
the aesthetic are agreed on the unreliability of the subject in their respective
endeavours. Adorno's aesthetics combines the two concerns, giving a
sociological gloss to an essentially philosophical problem (or perhaps vice versa):
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in his view approaching the aesthetic object via reception will inevitably result in
its colonisation by the manipulated (or at very least unreliable) consciousness.
But my point here is to suggest that Baumgarten's focus on sense perception
introduces an empirical dimension that departs from universal issues of what
determines knowledge and makes it possible, and introduces more located,
practical - and even ideological - aspects of what affects our understanding of
the world. This is implicit in Kant's meditations on the cognitive faculties, which
are paradoxical in that they assert the possibility of a grounded transcendental
position through an analysis of subjective elements. [On this see Adorno 1970 22]
This role of the subjective moment is implicit in Nietzsche's understanding of the
incomplete nature of the 'true' artwork. For him, imperfection is the most
productive thing an artist can offer his audience. In the passage 'Reiz der
Unvollkommenhait' in Die frohliche Wissenschaft (the word 'Reiz' in German
indicates both an attraction and a stimulus or challenge) Nietzsche asserts that
'Sein Werk spricht es niemals ganz aus, was er eigentlich aussprechen mochte,
was er gesehen haben mochte: es scheint, dass er den Vorgeschmack einer Vision
gehabt hat, und niemals sie seIber'. [Nietzsche 1973 V 2 110] Benjamin in his
Kunstkritik essay similarly refers to the act of criticism as completing the artwork
[Benjamin 1972 79], and even in Adorno's formulations the subjective and
experiential nature of art cannot be suppressed indefinitely. A precursor to
Welsch's sublime anaesthetic, he prefers the art object that conceals itself from
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consciousness, which is already inevitably inhabited by false consciousness: 'bis
heute existiert das richtige Bewu1Stseinnicht'. [Adorno 1970 196] This motivates
his rejection of any hermeneutical understanding of aesthetic objects
(,Kunstwerke sind nicht von der Asthetik als hermeneutische Objekte zu
begreifen' [Adorno 1970 179]) and his insistence in the section on art's
'Ratselcharakter' in Asthetische Theorie on the mutual exclusion between art as
enigma and the empirical 'experience' of the artwork ('Registriert, wer aus dem
Kunstwerk heraustritt oder gar nicht in ihm war, feindselig den Ratselcharakter,
so verschwindet er dafur triigend in der kiinstlerischen Erfahrung' [Adorno 1970
1841). But at the same time as the enigmatic quality is threatened by experience,
the experience of the artwork - let alone the understanding of it - is always
threatened by its Rtitselcharakter: 'Unablassig wird die Erfahrung der Kunstwerke
vom Ratselcharakter bedroht.' [Adorno 1970 189] Presumably this threatening of
experience must take place within experience, but it is an experience which might
not reduce the poetic to 'discursive practices' [Bowie 1997 19J, nor discard the
crucial idea of the aesthetic as indeterminate. Adorno's formulations here
suggest a dialectical interplay of understanding and indeterminacy or enigma in
which no term is absolutely preferred. That is to say that this scepticism towards
the subjective moment does not necessarily contradict the central position of the
subject and the moment of reception in aesthetics, and might indeed render
implausible such antipathy towards the moment of subjective experience,
particularly in the case of modernist strategies in art. Elsewhere in the Asthetische
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Theorie Adorno remarks that art's subjective cognitive effect precisely help 'Kunst
aus dem Bann des absoluten Geistes herauszuholen' [Adorno 1970 20], echoing
my distinction between universal and marginal readings of aesthetics.
This readmission of the recipient is not necessarily a turn to sheer psychologism,
to an experience generated by the vagaries of the individual mind or locked into
an incomparable and non-transferable subjective event (as Stanley Cavell's 'do
you dig' suggests). Nor does this empirical view necessarily demand the kind of
research into reception which Adorno refers to elsewhere as mere
'administration', marketing work for the culture industry. [See Adorno 1978163]
Whilst the shared nature of such cultural habits or modes of thinking might
underlie some of the concerns regarding the susceptibility of the individual mind
to ideological pre-determination, that same shared nature must allay some of the
concerns about the difficulty of establishing any verifiable societal effect. It
needs no arguing that formal elements can reinforce certain ideologies, as Max
Weber indicated with reference to unified perspective in painting or the
observation of the unities of time, place and action in drama vis-a-vis
Enlightenment rationality. [See Burger 1983 10] And Adorno makes the point
that Kant makes good the old Wirkungsiisthetik by restricting it 'durch immanente
Kritik'. [Adorno 1970 22] Rather than this translation of art 'rein in die
psychische Immanenz' the saving grace of Kant's aesthetics is its formal focus.
[Adorno 1970 25] For me, moreover, Shklovsky's remarks on the poetic suggest
128
that the subjective experience and the formal qualities of a work of art can barely
be separated. This notion of an interaction between form and cognition is
implicit in Manfred Frank's ideas on the lessons German hermeneutics and
French structuralism and post-structuralism can learn from one another. He
accepts that talk about the death of the subject is analytically useful, but does not
believe any systems theory, like French structuralism, has been able to explain
the processes of signification and the alteration of signification that is crucial to
modernist aesthetics without the category of the individual. [See Frank 1984 18]
Specifically as far as Welsch's formulations are concerned I have characterised
the aestheticised world in terms of the particular mode of reception that it
encourages, namely a homogenisation of experience that engenders a kind of
cognitive passivity. I will take up this discussion of form and experience in
chapters five and six.
This formal nature of art - and here I am really talking about more or less
modernist strategies of defamiliarisation - also reinforces my remarks about the
significance of the psychological moment of the aesthetic experience. Whilst at
one level all art must at some point enter through the cognitive mechanisms of
the recipient, formally innovative elements do indeed seem to rely on an
activation of and a challenge to the mechanisms of the recipient's mediating
psychology more so than a merely theme or content based understanding of the
force of the aesthetic object. Adorno famously remarks that form is only
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distinguished from content by a process of evolution - 'so ist die Vermittlung
einigermafsen darin zu suchen, dafs asthetische Form sedimentierter Inhalt sei'
[Adorno 1970 15] - and this 'sedimentation' of content into form in the artwork
has an analogue in, and would be impossible without, the sedimentation of
habits of perception within our own cognitive mechanisms. In my view the
ways in which art is able to resist and overturn the habits of perception and
cognition might be taken as an instance of the kind of indeterminacy that has
been central to the investments in the aesthetic for the past two hundred and fifty
years.
As far as my reference to shared, culturally established norms is concerned, it is
in this sense that one might see art as disclosure working against art (or more
broadly culture) as a kind of consensus dialectically. Even Adorno's
indeterminacy or negation of meaning seems to recognise its dependency on
cultural norms of meaning, inasmuch as it is 'determinate negation' of what
obtains in reality [Adorno 1970 158], the specifically 'gesellschaftliche Antithesis
zur Gesellschaft'. [Adorno 1970 19, my emphasis] Elsewhere he insists on this
interplay between the societal and aesthetic aspects of art: 'Nichts an Musik taugt
asthetisch, was nicht, sei's auch als Negation des Unwahren, gesellschaftlich
wahr ware; kein gesellschaftlicher Gehalt von Musik gilt, wofern er nicht
asthetisch sich objektiviert.' [Adorno 1978 167-8] The difficulty with Adorno's
'gesellschaftlicher Gehalt', and the point at which in my view his formulations
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become excessively bleak, is that for him the artwork loses all validity if it is
reincorporated into the social whole.
Of course, the phenomenon of habit serves also to indicate the difficulty of
ascribing art's value to its effect on the individual psychology: Adorno buries the
artwork's value in its formal qualities precisely to preserve the autonomy of the
work of art in the face of an all-consuming and all-determining subject. But
rather than determining, the idea that the commodified lifeworld has a tendency
of turning us into passive recipients suggests that the challenge is not to by-pass
the subject, as Adorno advocates, but rather to reactivate it. A re-admission of
the individual psychology, and the interests and contexts which inhabit it, might
allow for a more sophisticated model of what may be described as the' economy'
of the aesthetic process. In my view both the mode of aestheticised perception
and broader cultural norms might plausibly be seen to be addressed by
Shklovsky's defamiliarising 'poetic', and in chapters five and six I will discuss art
at the limits of perception in terms of this reflection of the mode and norms of
perception and cognition. This will suggest at times, perhaps ironically in view
of my above remarks on Kant's disinterest, a metaphorical relinquishing of
subjectivity, but this I take to suggest a dismantling of the preconceptions and
conditioning that we carry about with us. Quite distinct from Welsch's avowed
scepticism about the possibility of individual contemplation in an aestheticised
world [see Welsch 1990 14], this will offer a more sympathetic view of the
131
individual's position in contemporary culture and the aesthetic moment, an
individual that must be sustained, with both its cognitive faculties and its
cultural roots intact, in order to be interrogated and to describe the effectiveness
of this kind of aesthetics of indeterminacy. And whilst this discussion of
psychology, defamiliarisation and the cognitive effect of art seems to have taken
us very far from the explicitly' sensory' terms, in my discussions in the chapters
that follow I will endeavour to show what role the sensory nature of the
aesthetic, what Patricia Waugh's calls 'a different kind of discourse from the
ratiocinative, involving body as well as intellect' [Waugh 199218],has had in this
aesthetic economy.
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Section 2 . Sublime
Chapter 3· Welsch and the Sublime
A significant element in my discussions in the introduction and in chapter two
has been the focus on the 'indeterminate' in the history of aesthetics in the last
two hundred and fifty years. Emblematic of this has been the shift in focus from
the harmonious aesthetics of beauty to the discordant aesthetics of the sublime.
The sublime - which Kant reads in terms of what it tells us about the
supersensory faculties - might seem to be fundamentally opposed to Welsch's
rereading of the aesthetic as sensory, but I have suggested that Welsch's key
category of art as sensory arrest, the anaesthetic, might be seen as a version of the
sublime or at least analysed in the context of theories of the sublime. This
analogy between the anaesthetic and the sublime is supported by Welsch's belief
that the latter is also a crucial source of the oppositional force of the aesthetic.
The sublime features in two of his theoretical contributions: firstly, in his reading
of Adorno's aesthetics, as indicated by the title of his Adorno essay, 'Adornos
A.sthetik: eine implizite Asthetik des Erhabenen': and secondly, in his
identification of this modernist 'Asthetik des Erhabenen' as decisive for
Lyotard's theorisation of postmodern thought, as well as the underlying role the
sublime plays in his conception of (an essentially modernist) oppositional art.
These latter ideas are presented in two essays, 'Die Geburt der postmodernen
Philosophie aus dem Geist der modernen Kunst,' and 'FUr eine postmoderne
A.sthetik des Widerstandes'. All three essays are contained in the collection
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Asthetisches Denken (1990), and will be the primary texts for this chapter.
Welsch's focus on the sublime is part of a resurgence of interest in the sublime
among theorists of the postmodern in the past twenty years [see Pries 1989],
which includes all of Lyotard's diverse investments in the sublime (for example,
the sublime as temporal caesura, the sublime as the infinite, the sublime as
negative presentation of the unpresentable, the sublime as a turning against the
will and a refusal of the dialectic [SeeLyotard 1985 and 1990]),Jameson's concept
of the sublime as 'cultural dominant' of the postmodern [See Jameson 1991 6],
and a thread which identifies the sublime with the Lacanian Real, as evidenced in
writings by Slavoj Zizek, Hal Foster, and Susan Stewart. [See Zizek 1989, Foster
1996 and Stewart 1991] My concern will be to present and discuss Welsch's
treatment of the sublime in the context of ideas by Adorno and Lyotard, as well
as the historical contributions by Kant and Schiller, as a means of offering points
of critique of his more general positions in aesthetics and as a preparation for my
subsequent discussion of the anaesthetic in chapter four.
The historical significance of the sublime
The legacy of Kant's sublime: reflexivity, anti-representation and the dialectic
The key theorist of the significance of the sublime for the aesthetic realm was
Kant, and the sublime plays a central a central role in his thoroughgoing
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'modernisation' of philosophy. But his position is not without ambivalence: as
with the aesthetic in general, Kant identifies the sublime as an effect of the
human mind, and therefore an essentially subjective experience. Its status as a
subjective epiphenomenon leads him to exclude it from philosophical enquiry,
stating even in the' Analytik des Erhabenen' in the Kritik der Urteilskraft that the
sublime is 'bei weitem nicht so wichtig und an Folgerungen reichhaltig' [Kant
1963 137] than the beautiful. Even in a discussion of aesthetics he relegates
consideration of the sublime to a mere' Anhang'. [Kant 1963137] But ultimately
the sublime does playa pivotal role in his formulations, allowing an inference of
our supersensible faculties of mind abstracted from any interest or determinate
context (insofar as the rational freedom that the sublime experience precipitates
implies an exclusion of any kind of subjective purpose, as underlined by Patricia
Waugh's characterization of the purity of the sublime. [See Waugh 1992 26])
This freedom is crucial to man's rational nature for Kant, who refers to the only
true content of the sublime as being an inconceivable 'Idee der Vemunft' or 'Idee
der Menschheit' [Kant 1963 154], and it is in this sense that Patricia Waugh
characterizes the sublime as 'connected to the sphere of pure ideas as the
beautiful is to the sphere of understanding'. [Waugh 1992 26] This inconceivable
quality of the sublime seems to be analogous to the indeterminacy of Kant's
'~sthetische Idee' [Kant 1963 247], referred to in my introduction, which
promotes thought but that cannot be reduced to concepts, and has prompted
commentators to read the experience of the sublime as symbolic or indicative of a
136
moral or epistemological grounding. Certainly the sublime has been valorised
by theorists since as an experience, albeit inferred, of the Absolute. Paul de
Man's describes the sublime as the crucial' articulation of a transcendental with a
metaphysical discourse'. [de Man 1996 73, see also de Man 1996120-1 and Bowie
199038]
The rational, supersensory core of Kant's sublime underlines the tension with
Welsch's focus on the sensory nature of the aesthetic. Indeed his sublime, as
Andrew Bowie puts it, precisely 'remind[s] us of the limitations of our sensuous
relationship to nature'. [Bowie 1990 37] The rational basis of the sublime
experience is precisely a consequence of this reaching of the limit of the sensory
faculties, the limit of our sensuous relationship to that which surrounds us:
'Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu konnen ein Vermogen des Gemiits
beweiset, das jeden Ma1Sstab der Sinne ubertrifft.' [Kant 1963 144] This
experiencing of the limit of our sensuous intuition precipitates an experience of
the limitless faculties of the rational mind, and points to two interrelated
characteristics of the sublime which are crucial to its significance for later theory:
its reflexive and dialectical nature.
Kant asserts the reflexivity of the sublime explicitly at the outset of the' Analytik
des Erhabenen': 'Ferner darin, da15beides [Schones und Erhabenes] kein Sinnes-
noch ein logisch-bestimmendes, sondern ein Reflexionsurteil voraussetzt.' [Kant
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1963133] This ultimately rational recuperation points to the dialectical nature of
the sublime, which comprises two distinct phases: 'das Gefuhl einer
augenblicklichen Hemmung der Lebenskrafte und darauf sogleich folgenden
desto starkem Ergiefsung derselben'. [Kant 1963 134]1 Bowie identifies the
dialectical nature of the sublime, in the sense that 'limitation entails the sense of
its opposite, the fact that we also have a capacity for Reason not limited by
sensuousness'. [Bowie199037]
This pure and contentless reflexivity is not just important for Erkenntnistheorie,
but underlies perhaps the most fruitful reading of Kant's sublime as significant
for thinking about art. The application of sublime theory to art - which
incidently goes against Kant's formulations, in which nature alone is the trigger
for the sublime experience - transposes the reflexivity of the sublime as a mental
experience and the failure of the representative faculties into the - essentially
1 In the same vein Kant writes 'Aber das Gemiit fuhlt sich in seiner eigenen
Beurteilung gehoben, wenn es, indem es sich in der Betrachtung derselben, ohne
Rucksicht auf ihre Form, der Einbildungskraft, und einer obschon ganz ohne
bestimmten Zweck damit in Verbindung gesetzten, jene blofi erweiternden
Vernunft, uberlatst, die ganze Macht der Einbildungskraft dennoch ihren Ideen
unangemessen findet.' [Kant 1963 152-153] And again, 'ein Gefiihl der
Unangemessenheit seiner Einbildungskraft fur die Idee eines Ganzen, urn sie
darzustellen, worin die Einbildungskraft ihr Maximum erreicht, und, bei der
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modernist - artwork. Here the failure appears as an analogous meditation on
meaning and the limits of mimetic representation. Eradicating any dependence on
external referent or ideology - and therewith any subservience as mere
instrument of their enunciation - combines with the resistance such art objects
offer to understanding by the rational mind. In practice this focus on meaning
and representation can displace all but the most existential content - as we shall
in the case of Samuel Beckett's dramas - a turn inwards that is crucial to ideas of
aesthetic autonomy in twentieth century theory and art practice.
The idea of the work as resistant to processing by the mind makes clear the anti-
modem, critical edge that the sublime takes on in its migration into the artwork.
But in line with my general concern to emphasize the role of the recipient, this
does not depart entirely from the terms of the sublime as a mental experience,
and one that is expressed in similar terms of pleasure as Kant's sublime. The
latter's indirect pleasure ('ein Lust welche nur indirekt entspringt' [Kant 1963
134]) becomes the more difficult pleasure of the autonomous modernist artwork,
what Adorno will call the 'Gluck an den Kunstwerken'. [Adorno 1970 31] The
asceticism that Adorno intones in Asthetische Theone - 'Der Burger wunscht die
Kunst uppig and das Leben asketisch; umgekehrt ware es besser' [Adorno 1970
27] - seems to be the model for Welsch's anaesthetic. In his view Adorno's idea
Bestrebung, es zu erweitern, in sich selbst zurucksinkt, dadurch aber in ein
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of a 'Gefuhl des Standhaltens' [Adorno 1970 31] as the source of pleasure in the
artwork contains 'bereits aIle Elemente von Adornos Stellungnahme zum
Erhabenen'. [Welsch 1990 114] Again this idea comes from Kant's sublime, albeit
in his pre-critical writings, which conceive of the sublime as a conscious
experience of time, 'lange Dauer ist erhaben'. [Kant 1913 8] In his more
modernist moments, [ean-Francois Lyotard echoes this idea of the work of art
precipitating a sublime moment of suspension, opening up 'the possibility of
nothing happening'. [Lyotard 19853]
This nothingness contrasts with Lyotard's own valorization of non-
representative art as generating matter or an event that is somehow immanent.
But again as far as Kant's formulations are concerned it might be that this gesture
of immanence is a variant of the mistake of 'Subreption' that recurs in treatments
of the sublime, which Kant defines as 'Verwechslung einer Achtung fur das
Objekt statt der fur die Idee der Menschheit in unserm Subjekte.' [Kant 1963 154)2
On the one hand, any claim as to the immanent force of the sensuous object runs
counter to Kant's famous insistence that the dubious pleasure in the sublime
does not belong to the object experienced in the first phase, but in the experience
rtihrendes Wohlgefallen versetzt wird.' [Kant 1963146]
2 This idea is extended in Jacques Lacan, as read by Slavoj Zizek, to attribute
determination of the sublime not to the object, but to desire for that object. [See
Zifek 1989194]
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of rational recuperation of the second phase: 'aber nicht etwa ein Wohlgefallen
am Objekte, wie beim Schonen [... ], sondern an der Erweiterung der
Einbildungskraft an sich selbst'. [Kant 1963142] A crucial consequence of Kant's
self-reflexive sublime is that its rational basis precludes attributing the
experience directly to the sensory experience of the object by perception: 'Nichts
also, was Gegenstand der Sinne sein kann, ist, auf diesen FuB betrachtet, erhaben
zu nennen.' [Kant 1963143] This relegation of the object will be of issue when I
come to discuss Adorno and Welsch's remarks on the sublime in art. In
particular for Kant, freedom must always be a quality of the super-sensory
faculties. But on the other hand there is arguably a sense of dubious self-
sufficiency in Kant's own sublime, inasmuch as the sublime (like many
categories that are crucial to Kant's philosophy) is empty of any specific content
and resists any particular purpose:
daiSer [der Begriff des Erhabenen] uberhaupt nichts Zweckma15iges in der
Natur selbst, sondern nur in dem moglichen Gebrauche ihrer
Anschauungen, urn eine von der Natur ganz unabhangige
Zweckma15igkeit in uns selbst fuhlbar zu machen, anzeige. [Kant 1963 136-
137]
This resistance to purpose is another clear link with aesthetic autonomy, and
precisely motivates Kant's mutual exclusion of man-made art and the sublime.
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In this way the sublime is a radicalised version of 'interesseloses Anschauen'
which for Kant characterises the experience of beauty, in as much as the object
that precipitates the sublime experience defies any kind of initial judgment:
Der wichtigste und innere Unterschied aber des Erhabenen vom Schonen
ist wohl dieser; [... ] das, was in uns, ohne zu vernunfteln, blots in der
Auffassung, das Cefuhl des Erhabenen erregt, der Form nach zwar
zweckwidrig fur unsere Urteilskraft, unangemessen unserm
Darstellungsvermogen, und gleichsam gewalttatig fur die
Einbildungskraft erscheinen mag, aber dennoch nur urn desto erhabener
zu sein geurteilt wird. [Kant 1963 135]
In chapter two I asked whether Kant's non-purposiveness was not a cloak for a
very particular purpose: that of pietistic self-abnegation. How do his ideas on
the sublime fare in these ideological terms? What politics or ideology is
operating in Kant's idea of freedom, pulled from the jaws of constraint? [See
Bowie 2003 44] In a sense this freedom seems incontrovertible, in as much as we
can always retreat into the inner sanctum of self-consciousness. But does this
free man's faculties of reason from any natural, external constraint, only at the
price of locking that freedom in the mind? Do Kant's ideas end up in a dialectic
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that turns the pre-modern fragility of the sublime into a one-way street, a 'royal
road' to the self-confirmation of the subject?
Schiller and the sublime artwork
Friedrich Schiller's essay on the sublime, 'Uber das Erhabene' written only three
years after Kant's' Analytik des Erhabenen' was published, is instructive here
and in particular his distinction between the 'material' and 'ideal' realms which
precipitate the sublime feeling. Like Kant Schiller valorizes the sublime as a
sensory means of indicating that which is non-sensory, infinite, or absolute.
'Und so hat die Natur sogar ein sinnliches Mittel angewendet, uns zu lehren, daB
wir mehr als blof sinnlich sind.' [Schiller 1966 611] Similarly, Schiller's sublime
follows its Kantian predecessor in that it is marked by a turning away from
external and material reality. But arguably Schiller's reading suggests a more
politicised polarisation of man and nature which may be taken as evidence of
man's extreme alienation from nature. [See Schiller 1966 607] For Schiller, where
man fails to overcome nature materially - in Schiller's terminology 'realistisch' -
he can resort to a retreat into culture that Schiller labels 'idealistisch':
Entweder realistisch, wenn der Mensch der Gewalt Gewalt entgegensetzt,
wenn er als Natur die Natur beherrschet; oder idealistisch, wenn er aus
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der Natur heraustritt und so, in Rucksicht auf sich, den Begriff der Gewalt
vernichtet. [Schiller 1966 607-8]
In this way, by rational power alone man is able to will a realm of freedom, a
freedom that is indicated precisely by the feeling of the sublime:
Wir erfahren also durch das Gefiihl des Erhabenen, daE sich der Zustand
unseres Geistes nicht notwendig nach dem Zustand des Sinnes richtet,
daE die Gesetze der Natur nicht notwendig auch die unsrigen sind, und
daB wir ein selbstandiges Prinzipium in uns haben, welches von allein
sinnlichen Riihrungen unabhangig ist. [Schiller 1966 610]
Like the claims made by commentators for Kant's third Kritik, this supersensory
liberation from nature is seen by Schiller to have ultimately moral implications,
in that it 'beweist unsere moralische Selbstandigkeit auf eine unwiderlegliche
Weise'. [Schiller 1966 610] But this moral claim is problematic insofar as this
purely mental freedom that it furnishes might be said to compensate for
unfreedom elsewhere. There is also a sense in which this notion of a willed
realm of freedom posits freedom on an uncompromising basis of all or nothing, a
radical position which seems to be implicit in Kant's formulations. As Steve
Giles points out, Schiller suggests that we are only free if we can be said to be
absolutely free: 'Nimmermehr kann er das Wesen sein, welches will, wenn es
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auch nur einen Fall gibt, wo er schlechterdings muss, was er nicht will.' [Schiller
1966 607, see Giles 1981 52] Schiller can only fulfil this absolute condition by
recourse to the curious notion that one can 'overcome' external constraints to
freedom by freely and autonomously subordinating oneself to them. [See Giles
1981 53] I have already referred to Isaiah Berlin's well-known essay 'Two
Concepts of Liberty' in chapter two, and Schiller here seems to conflate the two
conceptions of freedom that Isaiah Berlin would come to categorise as negative
and positive, that is to say freedom as an absence of determining constraints and
freedom as conditional and made possible by the constraints within which it
must operate. [See Berlin 1958 26] This also raises the question of whether the
'ideal' realm of culture can really be described as a realm of absolute freedom.
Does art's autonomy depend on its absolute independence from external
constraints? On the contrary, I have suggested above, and will reiterate in my
discussion of Adorno below, that art's autonomy depends precisely on its
interaction with that which constrains its freedom and independence, and
moreover, that this precipitates an inherent fragility that might be fruitfully
traced back to the Kantian sublime. But even Kant's own writings on the
sublime freeze the dialectic of the sublime at the moment where our capacity for
reason comes to 'recognise itself'. This is arguably an arbitrary moment, and
certainly shows Kant himself to be not immune from the problem of Subreption.
This is made most apparent in the characterisation of our rational capacity as a
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seemingly absolute 'Idee der Vernunft', which suggests itself as an (albeit
inferred, essentially 'missing') quasi-content of the sublime.
One crucial contribution that Schiller makes, however, is to propose the
transition from sublime as occurring in the mind to its manifestation in the art
object. I have already referred to the reading of Kant's sublime as significant for
thinking about art as contrary to his own intentions but as a very fruitful avenue
for theorising on the sublime. The application of sublime theory to art transposes
the reflexivity of the sublime as a mental experience and the failure of the
representative faculties into the artwork, initially as a presentation of the
absolute (what Schiller refers to as a 'Darstellung des Ubersinnlichen' [Schiller
1966614]), and ultimately as a meditation on meaning and the limits of mimetic
representation in the - essentially modernist - artwork. This is also the first
point at which the sublime becomes clouded (explicitly at least) with the idea of a
specific purpose, in contrast to Kant's non-purposive sublime. Is Schiller merely
making the underlying motivation of Kant's sublime explicit here or does this
idea of purposefully presenting the sublime in art miss the point of the
purposelessness of Kant's sublime altogether? Certainly the idea of 'presenting
the sublime' in art in this way goes against the very nature of Kant's sublime, but
it also proposes an idea of generating one's own freedom: Schiller's 'ideal' realm
of freedom is precisely man-made and cultural, rather than absolute and pre-
given. In this way, whilst Schiller's 'iibersinnlich' may sound like an a priori and
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transcendental category, as it is in Kant's formulations, it arguably takes an
important step towards the idea that we must generate our own - marginal -
freedom, and that art is the best place to do this.
The sublime as modern, anti-modern, modernist or postmodern
Even prior to Kant's contribution, the sublime had an essentially 'modern'
aspect. Longinus, usually credited as the initiator of interest in the sublime,
conceives of it in terms of a modernised and secularised religion, what Thomas
Weiskel refers to as 'transcendence without any controversial theology'. [Weiskel
19764, 16] This is echoed in Richard Wolin's reading of the sublime as a modern
legitimation of traditional authorities of myth and religion. [SeeWolin 198411]
This underlines the broader relationship between theology and modernist
aesthetics, which, as Stanley Cavell puts it, 'is to be understood in categories
which are, or were, religious'. [Cavell 1976 175] In the course of this chapter I
will come to ask whether the postmodern variants of the sublime, including the
anaesthetic, might not also unwittingly suggest, to paraphrase Weiskel, a
'theology without the controversial transcendence'. Weiskel and Wolin's
readings of the sublime suggest a notably different relation to traditional
mythical or religious authority than Kant's modern, rational project, namely the
retention of certain pre-modern aspects, such as absolute authority and
147
impenetrability, rather than Kant's thoroughgoing reassessment of what it is
possible to know.
That said the sublime is marked by ambiguity even in the pivotal role that it
plays in Kant's formulations, an ambiguity which is of course crucial in its later
theorisation as counterpoint to Kant's modem project. That is to say, even Kant's
tum inwards to our own faculties [see also Buck-Morss 1992 8-91 is famously
triggered by an experience that we cannot order, what Waugh calls 'an outrage
on the imagination'. [Waugh 1992 261 As such, the rational centre of the sublime
is precipitated by a sense of radical indeterminacy: sublimity is 'that experience
of an object which invokes an idea of reason, but one that is necessarily radically
indeterminate'. [Waugh 1992 261 That is to say, even Kant's sublime is forged by
the experience of the limit, if not of subjectivity, then of subjective, rational
control.
In this respect it is apparent that the seeds of what might be characterised as an
'anti-modern' or 'critical' (or what Thomas Weiskel has called the 'ultra-modern'
[Weiskel 1976 38]) conception of the sublime are already central to this
experience of pure rationality. The sublime's 'outrage on the imagination', in
contrast to the modern shift in the focus of the sublime from the metaphysical to
the rational and subjective, has been central to the theorisation of the sublime
from Edmund Burke to the postmodern. Whereas the experience of beauty is
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taken to be the result of a deep-seated harmony with nature, the transition to the
sublime has been read in terms of the Fall, an alienation of man from nature
which subverts pre-Iapsarian harmony with imbalance and dissonance. [See
Simpson 1987 247] And as far as the question of what is predicated on this
dissonance is concerned, there seem to be two alternative views. Firstly, the
sublime experience is seen to indicate that a rational limit has been reached in an
encounter with the chaos of nature. This view agrees with Kant's conception of
the sublime as a meditation on limits, but dispenses with his ultimate rational
recuperation. Secondly, Edmund Burke understands this dissonance and
disharmony as a quality not of nature, but of the human passions. [SeeWeiskel
197616, Burke 17731This conception of the sublime, like Kant's, sees the sublime
as a product of the human mind, but contrasts with Kant's reading in that it
focuses on the irrational element of the human mind. Of course, Kant would be
unlikely to disagree with this idea of the human mind as generating more or less
rational passions, but he would most likely object to any sense of the primacy of
these passions that Burke suggests. In Burke's view, rational ideas of order and
clarity are imposed upon man's nature somehow from the outside, and are
considered to be 'in some sort an enemy to all enthusiasms whatever'. [Cited in
Weiskel 1976 16-17J The common ground with the tension in Baumgarten's
formulations between confused ('obscuritas') and distinct ('claritas')
representations is apparent, and the parallel with my discussion of the sensory as
either hand-maiden to or challenge to the rational in chapter two. Our way of
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interacting with the world might have always been made up of these two
tendencies, clarity and chaos, and the question of which one is primary has been
a crucial one for philosophy since Aristotle.
Elements of this anti-modern investment in the sublime are central to its more
recent incarnations. A pivotal factor in the postmodern sublime is the sublime
notion of reaching the limit of man's faculties and specifically his ability to
control the external world, and the idea of accessing a chaotic and essentially
anti-human domain. [ean-Prancois Lyotard, for instance, whose formulations I
will treat in the last part of this chapter, refers to the sublime as an experience
(specifically of art) which defies conceptual control. [See Lyotard 1991110] It is
in this sense that Lyotard will write of a freezing of the dialectic before the
Kantian moment of rational-subjective recuperation. This refusal of rational
recuperation reflects what Patricia Waugh identifies in postmodern theory as a
'pervasive cynicism about the progressivist ideals of modernity'. [Waugh 19925]
Of course key elements of Kant's sublime remain. The alleged non-
purposiveness of the Kantian sublime, though disengaged from Kantian
transcendental claims, underlies the aesthetic and political significance of the
sublime as the locus of the non-conceptual. Kant had already identified the non-
conceptual or indeterminate idea as central to the importance of the aesthetic, but
Lyotard reads Kant's failure of the mind to represent the sublime object in terms
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of Heidegger's 'infinitely simple' notion of Ereignis, that can only be approached
by privation or suspension of conceptual faculties. [Lyotard 1985 2] As with my
discussion of the sensory, it is questionable though whether this complete
suspension or failure to recuperate rationally is plausible.
The irrepressibility of the rational faculties might be responsible for precipitating
the migration of the sublime into the artwork, and from the issue of
representation to mind to representation and meaning in art. So whereas Kant's
modern sublime identifies the sublime as a dialectic within the rational subject,
the anti-modern (or anti-rationalist) sublime wants to locate the sublime beyond
the power of the rational subject, and one refuge for this is the artwork. This
migration of the sublime into the artwork - artwork as a locus of non-
representation - might seem to sidestep the question that was central to Kant's
sublime, namely the grounds for representation of ideas to self. It is precisely
because of this of course that such readings of the sublime are appealing to
twentieth century theorists for whom the self is irretrievably tainted, such as
Adorno, or relegated to an arbitrary moment in the horizontal, as in much
poststructuralist philosophy. But I would like to reaffirm the significance of this
issue of representation to mind as a crucial element in the force of art which
operates at the limits of perception. The dialectical complexity and fragility of
the sublime might offer a more subtle means of conceptualising the modernist
imperative, not just of innovation, but of defamiliarisation. Against the idea of
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art as somehow immanent Iwill emphasise the context of art's conventionality
(and institutionality) as a key moment in the dialectic of art's innovation. This
does not dispense with the sublime: both Kant's version and the anti-modern
sublime rest on the idea of the sublime as emblematic of experience of limits. It
is in this sense that Weiskel describes the sublime as 'a necessary complement to
a psychology that stressed its own limits'. [WeiskeI197617] Christine Pries is on
similar ground when she refers to the sublime as a 'Grenzerfahrung'. [Pries 1989]
I will suggest that this might suggest the sublime might be allied to aesthetics
(and indeed art) not in terms of the antinomy of transcendence or immanence,
but as an essentially modernist aesthetics of rule-breaking. Of course, it might be
countered that this conventionality does not discount, and indeed cannot do
without, the moment of indeterminacy: for Lyotard, as we shall see, the
dialectical process still requires an immanent moment that remains beyond
conceptualisation: 'But this agitation [by which Lyotard here means innovation]
[... ] is only possible if something remains to be determined'. [Lyotard 1985 2]
This might be akin to Adorno's 'Mehr', which occurs in the Asthetische Theorie as
that indeterminate element which evades the measure of the artwork as an
agglomeration of facts: 'dies Mehr ist ihr Gehalt'. [Adorno 1970 322] (This'Mehr'
might be more obviously apparent in the mode of the sublime as excess, rather
than an absence of determinate content, which Thomas Weiskel calls the
'metonymical' mode of the sublime. [Weiskel 1976 29] Not strictly relevant for
my considerations here, this idea of excess will be pertinent for my reading of art
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which deploys sensory excess as an alternative to Welsch's ideas on the
anaesthetic.)
The evident tension between the idea of the sublime as a transcendental basis
and claims as to its immanent nature is symptomatic of the character of the
sublime as an unstable and nebulous category, a difficulty to pin down which is
in part attributable to its location at the interstices of a number of different and
often intractable antinomies. Is it resistant to human purpose or does it
ultimately attest to our ability to turn even the most extreme experience to a
certain end? Is it a quality of mind, does it belong in some way to material -
refusing the mind access, or does it describe a certain mode of formal
presentation? Christine Pries refers to the tension between the idea of the
sublime as perfection and as raw and immanent, a tension that will recur in
Lyotard's ideas on the sublime artwork. [SeePries 198931 Welschhimself speaks
of a 'prekare Dynamik des Erhabenen' [Welsch1990116], and Pries refers to the
essentially paradoxical nature of the sublime: 'Das Erhabene ist gerade nicht das
IIAufgehobene". Es ist ein Paradox.' [Pries 1989 11] For Pries, its paradoxical
nature derives from the sublime's thorough-going ambivalence: 'Das Erhabene
bleibt unentschieden, in der Schwebe, es schwankt. Dieses Schwanken bedingt
die grundlegende Ambivalenz des Erhabenen.' [Pries 1989111 This might make
the figure of the sublime emblematic of aesthetics as a whole, which itself
oscillates between the poles of aiming to provide a transcendental basis for the
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philosophical project as a whole to a valorisation of that which defies such
schematic or conceptual recuperation. But this ambivalence is not
unproblematic: most is arguably at stake in the conflicting ideas of the sublime as
somehow providing a mode of resistance to identity thinking and the sublime as
Jameson's postmodern 'cultural dominant'. [jameson 19916] What implications
does the sublime's central ambivalence have for its oppositional force? Is it
useful for articulating a position somewhere between its modern and anti-
modern poles? In the same vein as this ambivalence Pries characterises the
sublime broadly as an experience of limits - a point emphasised by the term's
etymology: 'Es bezeugt das Bewufstsein dieser Grenze.' [Pries 1989 11] For my
concerns this experience of limits suggests the sublime as in some way crucial to
the modernist aesthetic, not as sheer self-reflexive autonomy - though this will
be discussed in terms of the sublime below - but in terms of a more located
exploration of the limits of perception and understanding.
In the sections that follow I will firstly present Welsch's main ideas on the
sublime, centring on his treatments of Adorno's aesthetics and Lyotard's
theorisation of a postmodern aesthetic, indicating the main points for analysis
and criticism. I will then turn to Adorno and Lyotard's respective comments on
the sublime, which might offer possible correctives for Welsch. As well as
evaluating Welsch's ideas on the sublime in their own terms, my concern will be
to evaluate whether his terms justify the sublime's claim to a increasing
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relevance to the postmodern era, or whether it is a category that is too indebted
to its modern, and even modernist, roots.
Welsch's on the sublime
Adorno's 'Rehabilitierung des Erhabenen'
In his essay on Adorno's aesthetics, which he subtitles 'eine implizite Asthetik
des Erhabenen', Welsch refers to the Adornian sublime as a 'Rehabilitierung' of
Kant's 'hohles Erhabene' [Welsch 1990 116], which even amounts to 'eine
Negation des ehemaligen Sinns des Erhabenen'. [Welsch 1990 117] Welsch sees
Adorno's critique of the Kantian sublime as centring, firstly, on the ideological
basis of the sublime's 'Respekt vor Macht und GroBe' [Welsch 1990 117], and
secondly, on Kant's 'Verwechslung von Inhalt und Form'. [Welsch 1990 117]
These two criticisms are reflected in Adorno's own dual investments in the
sublime, namely the 'politicisation' of the sublime as a mode of resistance against
the sovereignty of the subject, and the shift of the locus of the sublime from
questions of content, which for Kant by virtue of the nature of the sublime
experience had to come from nature, to the formal idea of the sublime as
characteristic of the mode of modernist art. [See Adorno 1970 293-4] Welsch's
discussion of Adorno's sublime focusses on four main aspects, the first three of
which fill out the politicisation of the concept: firstly, the sublime as a
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'Wiederherstellung unterdriickter [... ] Natur' [Adorno 1970198, cited in Welsch
1990126], which leads to the idea of man's proximity to nature (an 'Erfahrung
moglicher Teilhabe an Natur und gemeinsamer Freiheit mit ihr'. [Welsch 1990
119]3); secondly, the idea of sublime art as an experience of 'unvereinbare,
unidentische, aneinander sich reibende Momente' [Adorno 1970 263, cited in
Welsch 1990 125], which is conceived as a moment of art's transcendence of or
problematisation of its own terms or concept (such as the artwork's formal or
3 Adorno's view here might be likened to Wordsworth's idea of the sublime as
precipitating a purifying communion with nature, contained in the Prelude. [See
Wordsworth 1928 410] It is interesting to note the parallels and differences
between Kant's conception of the interaction between man and nature in the
sublime and that expressed in Wordsworth's Prelude. For Wordsworth, the
sublime experience of the 'huge and mighty forms' of nature [Wordsworth 1928
410, line 393] allows man's grandeur to come to light, in accordance with Kant's
understanding of the sublime as enabling self-knowledge;
With life and nature, purifying thus
The elements of feeling and of thought,
And sanctifying, by such discipline,
Both pain and fear, until we recognise
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart. [Wordsworth 1928, lines 410-414]
But the difference is that Wordsworth's sublime is a purifying communion with
nature, rather than a turning away from nature, with none of Kant's antagonism
between man and nature, which arguably anticipates the anti-modern
investment later.
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thematic unity); thirdly, the related idea of the sublime as an anti-totalising mode
of 'Gerechtigkeit'. The fourth idea is a recognition of the sublime as the
subjective experience of an objective content (in spite of a focus on the capacity of
the sublime for freeing us from the 'Subjektivitatsprinzip' [Welsch 1990 120]).
Indeed, the idea of an identity with nature seems to be akin to Schopenhauer's
sense of resignation of the will, a compassion towards all beings that results from
the insight that all are fundamentally one [see Audi 19957181, which also recurs
in Nietzsche's idea of post-metaphysical philosophy as a 'translation of man back
into nature'. [Audi 1995 533] This surprisingly positive depiction of the subject's
relationship to the outside world in Adorno is tempered in Welsch's
formulations by the caveat that it is only an 'anticipation' of communion: 'Denn
im Erhabenen war es, wie gesagt, von Anfang an um die Emanzipation der
Natur aus der Unterdruckung durch den Geist und um die Antizipation einer
Versohnung mit ihr.' [Welsch 1990 127] 'Geist' here, the overcoming of which is
a prerequisite for the liberation of nature, I take to mean subjectivity, in such a
way that conceptualises Adorno's ideas on the sublime, as one might expect from
the co-author of the Dialektik der Aujkliirung and in line with Kant, in terms of the
tension between subject and object. This also identifies Adorno with the anti-
modern, that is to say largely anti-subjective, sublime that I identified in the
opening paragraphs above. Art for Adorno is by its nature 'kritisch am Ende
gegen das Ich-prinzip'. [Adorno 1970365, cited in Welsch 1990 118]
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Further, Adorno's 'emancipation' of nature from subject, and the subsequent
reconciliation of the two takes place in the context of a rejection of a bad version
of reconciliation, a domination by the subject which Welsch identifies with
humanism ('HumaniUit - das klassische Pendant von Versohnung' [Welsch 1990
134]). This is taken up further in Welsch's reading of Adorno's artistic sublime as
a rejection of humanism in favour of art that articulates its own 'Inhumanitat'.
[Adorno 1970293, cited in Welsch 1990 134-5] Ifwe accept that there is or can be
a qualitatively different kind of communion with nature, presumably the issue is
how it can be different, and how can we, from within our subjective view of the
world and nature, tell that it is different and be sure that it is the right kind of
relationship to nature.
Of course, Adorno's better known discussion of reconciliation is his critique of
Georg Lukacs' ideas on realism in art, 'Erpresste Versohnung' [Adorno 1974 251-
80), and as noted above, it is the artwork that Adorno looks to as a locus of the
sublime resistance to subjective domination. As far as Kant's mutual exclusion of
man-made art and the sublime is concernd, Adorno sees this as timidity on
Kant's behalf ('befangen' [Adorno 197031]), but elsewhere recognises that Kant's
position is entirely appropriate, due to the unreadiness of art-forms for the
presentation of the sublime. As Welsch puts it: 'Daher betrachtet Adorno Kants
VorsichtsmafSnahme, das Erhabene allein der Natur zu reservieren und nicht
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auch der Kunst zuzuschreiben, als geradezu hellsichtig'. [Welsch 1990 117] Kant
was writing prior to the technical innovations of aesthetic modernism, in which
Adorno, Lyotard, and Welsch see the sublime as activated.
So in what sense can art's formal organisation be seen to precipitate an
experience of sublime as resistance to reconciliation, and what light might these
shed on the kind of relation Adorno prefers between subject and nature? Welsch
does not really clarify the link between sublime effects and formal features, apart
from in the broadest terms of art as challenging its own concept. Of course,
formal reconciliation has traditionally been understood to manifest itself in the
beautiful, which Welsch characterises as a 'Horizont der Versohnung', achieved
in the ideal of 'asthetische Einheit'. [Welsch 1990 127] By contrast, and in a fairly
standard reading of Adorno's aesthetics, the sublime artwork is seen to be
generated in the turn 'von Versohnung zu Unversohnlichkeit, von der
Schlichtung der Widerspruche zu deren Artikulation'. [Welsch 1990 134] The
modernist artwork is exemplary in this respect, refusing formal unity and
negating meaning, as Adorno's discussions of Kafka and Beckett indicate. [See
Adorno 1974 281-324 and 1977254-287] The impetus for the ability to throw off
subjective control is given by the experience of the formal qualities of the work of
art. It is questionable whether we can avoid garnering some kind of unified
meaning: Welsch has already suggested that reconciliation is inevitable, and just
as I have noted the essentially anticipatory mode of the sublime above, the
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sublime artwork is seen only to postpone reconciliation, to achieve only a
'verweigerte Versohnung'. [Welsch 1990 1291
Art's capacity for - at least temporarily - releasing its material from the
'Gewalttat der Rationalitat' [Adorno 1970 209, cited in Welsch 19901261 is seen-
in rather abstract terms - to guarantee a certain' Gerechtigkeit'. [Welsch 19901351
It is in this sense that Welsch reads Adorno's sublime as a rejection of the
sublime's traditional association with the dominance of rationality, with what
Welsch calls the 'Komplizitat des Erhabenen mit Herrschaft'. [Welsch 1990 119]
Sublime art in particular is seen to subvert art's usual status as a 'Dokument von
Herrschaft' [Welsch 1990 124], as the artwork becomes a locus of difference or
heterogeneity. This is expressed by Welsch, in similar terminology to his
distinction between vertical transcendence and horizontal immanence above, as
a 'Horizont der Gerechtigkeit gegenuber dem Heterogenen'. [Welsch 1990 1351
This dialectical relation of art to domination and unification is seen by Welsch,
quite reasonably in my view, as the main justification for Adorno's theorisation
of modernist art in terms of the sublime:
Dies ist fur Adorno einer der wesenlichsten Grunde, warum das Erhabene
die Struktur der modernen Kunst generell bezeichnen kann: In ihm sind
Herrschaft und deren Brechung paradox und doch konsequent
miteinander verbunden. [Welsch 1990 126]
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In a perhaps overly subtle argument Welsch asserts that this justice is not a
'blanke Negation von Herrschaft' [Welsch 1990 126J, the unificatory logic of
which would, according to him, retain a 'herrschaftlicher Zwang'. [Welsch 1990
126)
The notion of heterogeneity seems to posit an irreducible necessity which,
contrary to the idea that reconciliation of elements in the mind is unavoidable,
insists that complete reconciliation is also impossible: 'Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit
ist jene Urnformulierung des Ideals der Versohnung, die in dem Moment
unausweichlich wird, in dem man an eine letzte Vereinbarkeit des Heterogenen
nicht mehr glauben kann.' [Welsch 1990130-1] This lends the claim to justice a
certain circularity. The question must be, where does this heterogeneity come
from. Does it belong to nature, in a Nietzschean sense of the manifold nature of
reality which we reduce into singularities for the benefit of our own constrained
understanding? This sense of heterogeneity is plausible, and might in fact be
hard to refute, in the unasnwerable sense that refuting such multiplicity - like
asserting it - merely begs the question as to whether we would be in a position to
perceive it. It does indeed seem that 'real' nature enters the argument here, with
Welsch suggests that nature's 'elemental' force is somehow essentially resistant
to the subject: 'Wichtig ist, daB Natur dabei selbst als "Elementarisches", als
Gegenstand voller Macht und GroBe auftritt. SoIche Gewalt kann nicht
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bezwungen, diese Macht nicht beherrscht werden.' [Welsch 1990 120] That said,
Adorno here seems to have returned to the terrain of Kant's sublime, which is to
say concerned with size, rather than heterogeneous particularity that underlies
the claims to justice. But the dubious suggestion of reconciliation with nature is
all the more problematic in view of the extreme nature of our relationship to
nature - due to advances in technology as well as a breakdown in the' organic'
connection to that environment - that modern technology has thrown up. We
have seen that Welsch himself identifies key aspects of reality as imperceptible,
and the nebulous concept of the sublime is sometimes referred to in this regard,
in the sense that Jameson writes of the sublime as characteristic of the
postmodern breakdown in the sense of a direct relationship to material reality.
The alternative view is that this heterogeneity in some way belongs to art's
formal qualities. This would suggest a kind of conditional heterogeneity,
measured in terms of (or more specifically by contrast to) formal unity and
unobscured meaning. As such, a literary work's narrative strategy might be
understood to retain a certain heterogeneity, as in Bakhtin's concept of
'polyvocality' [see Bakhtin 1984], or Adorno's idea of 'bestimmte Negation' of
meaning, as in his discussion of Beckett. [See Adorno 1974 320] In such terms in
my view a kind of surrogate experience of the heterogeneity of nature might be
more plausibly generated. This ties in with the idea that the difficulty of evading
our irrepressibly recuperating rational faculties means that the sublime, if we are
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to experience it without dominating it, must migrate into the qualities of the
artwork. But what would this mean? What good is the artwork without the
mind? I have already suggested in chapter two that there may be a crucial
interplay between form and the recipient, to say nothing of the fact that this idea
of fundamental heterogeneity seems to be opposed to a substantial idea of 'form'
(as in a mode of 'organisation' of content), and I will say more on this below.
The awareness of 'belonging to nature' is a curious quality or effect to attribute to
modernist art, in view of the fact that the latter has become ever more reflexive
and abstract, ever more removed from the natural realm. The fact that it is man-
made precisely leads Kant to exclude art from the experience of the sublime, and
burying the sublime experience in art's form, in art's internal unreconcilability,
makes the emphasis on reconciliation with nature and natural justice more
surprising. Again the question is what 'nature' we are talking about. Does this
'nature' refer to the 'material' of the artwork that is seen somehow to be given
voice, seen to bring 'Tendenzen des Materials zur Artikulation'. [Welsch 1990
126] This sounds akin to Wellsch's emphasis on the sensory nature of the
aesthetic experience, but might also be taken to suggest that the object refuses to
refer beyond itself, motivating Welsch's characterisation later in the essay of
Adorno's sublime art as immanent: 'Horizontalitat und strikte Immanenz bei
Adorno stehen Motiven von Vertikalitat und Transzendenz bei Lyotard
gegenllber.' [Welsch 1990147] (This comparison with Lyotard is curious coming
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from Welsch, whose appraisal of the Lyotardian sublime is otherwise fully aware
of the role that the claim to immanence plays in it, as we shall see below.)
Moreover the question arises what difference there is between this appraisal of
unreconciled formal elements of the work of art and the reception of those
elements in the mind. The focus on the immanent art object might risk reverting
to a focus on the content of experience, rather than on Kant's qualities of the
human mind that are highlighted by the experience. Alternatively we may still
be firmly on the terrain of the Kantian sublime here, with nature as a cipher for
the limits of the mind's ability to organise the experience of the artwork. So
.
whilst the balance of the sublime does seem to shift from Kant's subjective-
rational sublime to the idea of art as an object that resist the sovereignty of the
subject, this seems to require a more sophisticated account of what is meant by
such a reconciliation with nature. Adorno himself criticises Kant, as Welsch
reiterates, for just such a 'Verwechslung von Inhalt und Form' [Welsch 1990 117]
because of his focus on the capacities of the human mind, and it may be
unavoidable in a valorisation of the sublime as resistant to the subject that there
will be a tendency for it to become a valorisation of the object as in itself sublime.
But equally for Adorno the question arises as to whether the mind can so easily
be excluded here, as my remarks above about the irrepressibility of meaning
suggested. This returns to my discussion of the rejection of the recipient in
chapter two and the recipient is certainly evident in Welsch's description of the
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experience of the sublime in art, in a way that comes straight from Kant, as
precipitating a 'Wechselspiel of Lust und Unlust'. [Welsch 1990 123] This
'Unlust' is opposed to the pure pleasure referred to by Adorno as 'der asthetische
Hedonismus' [Adorno 197030, cited in Welsch 1990 114] generated by beauty in
art (and in Welsch's terms the beautification of even non-art elements in
everyday life). I have already associated this pleasure with an extreme
organisation of content. The pleasure that art must aim for derives from a more
ascetic 'Negation und Entronnensein' ('having slipped through the fingers'). For
Welsch, 'Einzig dies - nicht die hedonistische Lust der Angleichung - ist das
Gluck, das Kunst heute noch vermitteln kann, und genau diese Position kommt
in der Kategorie des Erhabenen zum Ausdruck.' [Welsch 1990 114] This owes
much to Adorno's remark on the relationship of the sublime to aesthetic
pleasure, some of which Welsch cites:
Dem asthetischen Hedonismus ware entgegenzuhalten jene Stelle aus der
Kantischen Lehre vom Erhabenen, das er, befangen, von der Kunst
eximiert: Gluck an den Kunstwerken ware allenfalls das Gefuhl des
Standhaltens, das sie vermitteln. [Adorno 197030-31, see also Welsch 1990
114]
Welsch's own ideas on art as anaesthetic have strong echoes of this idea of the
sublime as a means of resisting effects of aestheticisation, as will be discussed in
165
the next chapter. But as remarked above, this experience of displeasure and
pleasure seems to be a necessarily subjective view of the sublime. The question
is whether it is compatible with the idea of the sublime as an articulation of the
heterogeneous materiality of the object. By contrast to any such valorisation of
heterogeneity, Welsch seems to describe the experience of the sublime as a point
of stability and resistance: 'Nur so kann sie [Kunst] einen art des Widerstands
bilden, vermag sie dem Verblendungszusammenhang Paroli zu bieten.' [Welsch
1990 114] The idea of a 'Verblendungszusammenhang' refers to Welsch's
characterisation of postmodernity as pervaded by effects of aestheticisation. But
the idea of a specific 'art' of resistance seems to be counter to other suggestions
of the sublime's essential fluidity, indeed seems to want to reserve a space or
centre which remains unaffected by this fluidity. An analogous conception of art
as a kind of Reseroatbereich of wholeness and transcendence arguably recurs in
Welsch's conception of art as anaesthetic. Such tensions run through the
sublime, which may be conceived as a fragile alternation or paradox or as a
means of communion with nature and a royal road to a somehow intrinsic and
reliable mode of justice. In addition, I would question whether this 'Gefiihl des
Standhaltens', which comes from Kant, can only be used as a response to
aestheticisation, or whether it might be taken as a broader model for autonomous
art. Below I will suggest that this lengthening of experience is essential to the
refutation of expectation that is central to a modernist aesthetics of
defamiliarisation.
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Lyotard and the sublime: plurality and immanence
Welsch discusses the central role of the sublime in Lyotard's theorisation of
postmodernity in two essays, 'Die Geburt der postmodemen Philosophie aus
dem Geist der modemen Kunst' and 'Fur eine postmoderne Asthetik des
Widerstandes'. In the former, the echo of Nietzsche's Die Geburt der Tragodie aus
dem Geist der Musik is curiously not reflected in the essay, which in fact causes
certain problems for his argument for reasons that I will explain below. The
focus rather is on Lyotard is one of a number of French post-structuralist
philosophers (Foucault, Derrida and Lacan) who are identified as translators of
the precepts and practice of modern art into the philosophy of postmodernity.
[Welsch 199082] But for Welsch Lyotard is 'der Autor des Postmodernismus in
der Philosophie' [Welsch 199083] by virtue of his early and particularly precise
characterisation of postmodern thinking. The irony of this claim is evident, if not
intentional, in view of the fact that Welsch is at pains here and elsewhere to flag
up the heterogeneity of and the 'horizontal' relationship between the various
discourses of the postmodern. The immediate reason for Lyotard's privileged
position in Welsch's formulations is what the latter identifies as Lyotard's
'Kunstnahe' [Welsch 1990 841, his closeness, even in epistemological issues, to
questions of aesthetics. The constitutive role of modernist aesthetics for
postmodern thinking is the central idea ofWelsch's essay. Welsch is not alone in
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thinking this - Peter Osborne, for instance, considers Adorno's modernist theory
of art to be suitable not just for assessing postmodern art but also for
understanding postmodernity more generally [Osborne 1989 25] - but in
Welsch's discussion of the trickle-down of the formal innovations of modernist
art into a postmodem thinking the pivotal figure is Lyotard, who 'verteidigte
[... ] das postmoderne Denken gerade unter Berufung auf die Asthetik der
Moderne'. [Welsch 1990 85] Welsch delineates five aspects to modernist
aesthetics, of which its sublime nature takes a central position. He cites, firstly,
modem art's formalDekomposition', its dismantling of the 'traditionelles Wesen
der Kunst' [Welsch 1990 861 (the similarity to Adorno's notion of art as
interrogating its own concept is clear), and secondly, its reflexivity. These two
are seen to be largely contributory to the third characteristic of modern art,
namely its status as an aesthetics of the sublime: 'Diese Umstellung der Malerei
zieht den Wechsel von einer Asthetik des Schonen bzw. der Beschonigung zu
einer Asthetik des Erhabenen nach sich.' [Welsch 1990 88] Fourthly, the
modernist aesthetic's experimentality, and finally its plurality, are seen to be
consequences of its involvement with the sublime: 'Lyotard will das Erhabene
nicht erbaulich verstanden wissen, sondern - und damit komme ich zum
nachsten Punkt seiner Charakterisierung der modernen Kunst - experimentell.'
[Welsch 1990 90] He continues, 'Ist schon der experimentelle Charakter eine
Konsequenz des Erhabenen, so ist es die Pluralitat noch einmal.' [Welsch 1990
92]
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The ideas of art as experimental and formally reflexive acknowledge the
conceptual and self-reflexive mode of art's functioning: 'Als reflektierende ist die
Kunst der Moderne ein Unternehmen nicht mehr nur der Sinne, sondern auch
des Geistes und Denkens.' [Welsch 1990881 It is worth noting at this stage the
discrepancy between this idea of 'nicht mehr nur der Sinne' and Welsch's
previous focus on the sensory basis of aesthetics. (That said, it should be noted
that far from having abandoned his concept of aisthesis, Welsch in the same essay
ultimately reverts to the idea of 'aisthetisches Denken' as the logical conclusion
of the postmodern. [Welsch 1990 106]) Here Welsch rejects 'eine Beschrankung
aufs blofse Sehen und aufs blofs sinnliche Wahrnemen uberhaupt". [Welsch 1990
88] Welsch cites Lyotard as rejecting such 'Gegebenheiten' which do not take
into account of the mental nature of art as Vorstellung: 'daB das Bild nicht nur im
Auge entsteht, sondem auch im Geist'. [Lyotard 1985 97, cited in Welsch 1990 88]
Here Welsch returns explicitly to Kant, for whom the sublime precipitates an
awareness of precisely this supersensory capacity in us: 'die Erweckung des
Gefuhls eines ubersinnlichen Vermogens in uns', [Kant 1963143, cited in Welsch
1990 89] But as well as this more Kantian vein, Lyotard follows the transition of
the sublime from the supersensory human faculties to the artwork as a failure of
artistic representation and as an attempt to avoid the recuperation that the
rational faculties impose on material. Welsch does not say much more about this
interreogation of representation, though he does recognise the central role that
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questions of the failure of representation take in Lyotard's theorisation of the
sublime ('So ist wohl auch der folgende Herzsatz Lyotards zum Erhabenen zu
verstehen: "Die Frage des Undarstellbaren .. .ist in meinen Augen ... die einzige,
die im kommenden Jahrhundert den Einsatz von Denken und Leben lohnt."'
[Lyotard 1985 lOO, cited in Welsch 1990 92]) Rather he turns to the question of
the pluralism of modern art, which for him is crucial to its experimental nature:
'1st schon der experimentelle Charakter eine Konsequenz des Erhabenen, so ist es
die Pluralitat noch einmal.' [Welsch 1990 92] This idea of the sublime as plural is
clearly linked to the ideas of 'Gerechtigkeit zum Heterogenen' [Welsch 1990 130]
and the sublime as 'Unvereinbarkeit' [Welsch 1990 130] discussed in relation to
Adorno above. Of course one might accept that art in toto is characterized by a
certain pluralism, in the sense that art, unlike much science, is characterized by
an almost limitless array of discourses, which operate in parallel and do not
necessarily return to a central credo nor strive for a unified system. But below I
will ask whether this plurality has anything to do with the sublime, as well as
elaborating what I see as a crucial incompatibility between experiment and this
idea of sheerly plural art.
More plausibly related to the sublime is the idea of art as self-reflexive, which is
to a certain extent implicit in artistic experimentation. I have already discussed
the idea of art's self-reflexivity as a meditation on its own concept, including the
possibility and limits of representation, and while these issues are still relevant,
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here for Welsch the issue of reflexivity specifically refers to art that rejects any
realist reference or orthodox political 'commitment'. This quintessentially
Adornian valorization of aesthetic autonomy is presented in Welsch's essay 'Fur
eine postmodeme Asthetik des Widerstandes', in which he contrast Lyotard's
position to Peter Weiss's conception of engaged art. Welsch identifies Weiss's art
as what he calls a typically modern aesthetic of 'Widerstand', as opposed to
Lyotard's preference for the allegedly more postmodern 'Widerstreit'. [Welsch
1990 157] So whilst he recognizes that Weiss's politicized aesthetic resists the
reduction of art to mere aestheticism, Welsch characterises its conception of the
connection between politics and art as an 'Input-Hermeneutik' [Welsch 1990
158), by which he means that Weiss imports the elements which carry the
political import of the play into the art's form. The implication is that art is only
given value by virtue of what non-art uses it is put to, what perspectives and
insights it is employed to illustrate and promote:
In Konsequenz dessen wird die Fruchtbarkeit der Kunst dann allerdings
genau nur eine Fruchtbarkeit fur diese Perspektive sein. [...] Es geht nicht
darum, etwas der Kunst als Kunst zu entnehmen, sondern man mufi
umgekehrt die Bedeutungen und Bewertungen, auf die es ankommt, an
sie heraustragen, ja in sie hineintragen. [Welsch1990159)
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Such meaning is ultimately to be judged by non-aesthetic or 'kunst-extern'
criteria, (Welsch 1990158]and could do equally well without the receptical of the
artwork which becomes merely a vehicle in which to express them. Such art is
seen to forfeit the political force of art's formal resources. Such committed
interpretations or valorisations of art are also dismissed as essentially
'narzilltisch' [Welsch 1990 159],which seems to mean self-aggrandizing for the
author as subject - Adorno's influence is evident again here - and as such they
are seen to be open to exploitation: 'Mit einem solchen Verfahren wird man in
der Kunst immer das sehen konnen, was man sehen will.' [Welsch 1990159] By
contrast in Lyotard's formulations Welsch sees a dissociation of art from any
external, social measure of value: 'Lyotard legt nicht eine von vornherein
bestehende gesellschaftliche Perspektive als Mafstaboder Sonde an die Kunst an,
sondem orientiert sich an dem Eigenanspruchen der Kunst - die er wahrnimmt
und ernstnimmt.' [Welsch 1990 163] Welsch's preference for this radical
separation of art and life seems to go against the grain of his project of
dismantling such a hard and fast distinction in his return to the terms of aisthesis
as a study of perception.
The terminology that Welsch uses is curious too. He calls this disinterested and
autonomous quality of art 'Widerstreit' [Welsch1990162],whereby art is seen to
offer, curiously, resistance (Le. 'Widerstand') against various elements of
modernity, such as the invasion of language by technological terminology and
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modern life's '"kommunikative" Verflachung und Vereinheitlichung'. [Welsch
1990 162-3] But the claim that art's truth and value is not contingent on its
relationship to external referent, apart from being in my view hard to sustain,
might be better described as the seemingly more absolute 'Widerstand', rather
than a more dialectical'Widerstreit'. (For Kant Widerstreit refers to an essentially
dialectical opposition, that is to say neither 'real' nor 'logical'. It is not logical
because it does not arise from a mistake in thinking, but indeed arises from the
process of thinking itself. At the same time the opposition is not 'real' because
such dialectical oppositions do not result in such objectively grounded
knowledge that one could describe by the term 'real'. [See Arndt 2004]) Adorno
in my view is better at sustaining this dialectical quality of art's separateness,
insofar as he registers that whilst form saves art from mere empiricism, any hard
and fast distinction between the two moments is hard to sustain. [See Adorno
197015]
There is also the question of how these various notions of extreme separateness,
self-reflexivivity, autonomy and immanence relate to the historical and more
recent uses of the sublime. Welsch explains the political investment in aesthetic
autonomy with reference to Christine Pries' distinction between a 'metaphysical'
sublime and a 'critical' sublime [see Pries 1989 28], claiming that, rather than a
transcendent metaphysics, the sublime for Lyotard functions as an immanent
ontOlogy: 'Lyotard vetritt keine Metaphysik der Transzendenz, sondern eine
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Ontologie der unabsehbaren Moglichkeiten, und das Erhabene ist nicht vertikal,
sondern horizontal zu deklinieren und gewinnt genau dadurch kritische
Funktion.' (Welsch 199091] This 'critical' notion of the sublime derives from the
vein of sublime theory that focusses on its characteristic as an incomparable
instant, i.e. the first, not yet recuperated stage of Kant's sublime. Welsch
consequently characterizes the postmodern as a 'horizontal' constellation of
knowledge, distinguishing its 'Vielheitsoption' from the vertical legitimation of
knowledge which characterises the modern 'Einheitssehnsucht'. [Welsch199093]
In this way, any sense of an overarching frame of reference or any universally
binding measure of value is allegedly dispensed with, and it seems to be in this
dispensation that the political force of the sublime inheres. Emblematic of this is
the immanent understanding of the aesthetic event, freed from any subordinate
position to that external content which it might represent. The point of this
politics of the plural and different is that in such a schema there is no vertical
schema that would allow ultimate comparison between different objects or
cultural entities. In this way, Welsch takes a seemingly relativist position which
posits an infinite horizon of potentiality, without any claims to final validity
('Endgultigkeitsbehauptungen' [Welsch199091-2]). This is reiterated later in his
anti-foundationalist salvo: 'Es gibt keinen Generalnenner aller Gestaltungen,
keine Generalkriterien, keine Ceneralasthetik.' [Welsch1990163]
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But can such a rejection of external points of reference for establishing value
avoid self-contradiction? Even if one takes the view that art can refute all
external reference, the valorisation of immanence and plurality seem to introduce
a certain reference to an external value, precisely in the essentially philosophical
notion of plurality or incomparability as intrinsically positive. This is conceived
as an end in itself, and as such as a legitimating principle for diverse art-forms.
Moreover, all external reference and influence on meaning would presumably be
hard to eradicate, even in the most austere artworks. Indeed, I have already
mentioned John Cage's idea that even silent artwork cannot keep out ambient
noise and even precisely highlights the difficulty of excluding such inputs. And
whilst I have sympathy with the desire to distract from aesthetics' connection to
the transcendental, as thematised in my distinction between the marginal and
universal directions aesthetics can take, my feeling is that an aesthetics of the
incomparable results in a similar cul-de-sac to that generated by Kant's insistence
on disinterest. Moreover, in contrast to the claims of plurality and immanence,
in my view comparison and reference are irrepressible mechanisms and mode of
generation meaning, which art can and has temporarily disrupted, but on which
this disruption is ultimately dependent.
A further aspect of this 'horizontality' is evident in Welsch's characterization of
this mode of anti-representational, immanent art in terms of an Iexperience' that
Cannot be represented in conceptual terms:
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Dabei geht es wohlgemerkt nicht urn die Darstellung einer Entitat namens
Undarstellbares, sondern urn die Erfahrung, dalS keine Darstellung
hinreichend, endgtiltig, definitiv ist. Auf das Nicht-Darstellbare kann
man nur anspielen und die Unmoglichkeit seiner Prasentation fuhlen
lassen. [Welsch 1990 90]
This idea of the sublime as only a 'feeling' echoes Lyotard's idea of the sublime
as non-conceptual apprehension. It also returns to the crucial role of 'feeling' in
Romantic contributions to the philosophical issue of grounding knowledge and
language, although Welsch's valorization of the 'horizontal' seems precisely to
relinquish the need for such a prior basis. But without any such vertical schema
of value and means of comparison, how are we to distinguish between this
unrepresentable 'experience' and that aspect of the aestheticised life-world in
which events and reality are presented as an 'experience', with consequences
which we have already seen Welsch describe as 'politisch und ethisch desastros'?
In my view this points to a problematic fault-line in Welsch's theoretical
formulations between the ideas of immanence and claims to a critical potential in
the sublime - the potential for making us aware of aspects of our experience.
Moreover, there are serious questions of compatibility between this immanent
experience and what Welsch identifies as the self-reflexivity of modernist art,
which might be read in terms of its conceptuality and meditation on the limits of
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representation. Welsch's reference to the need to allude to the unrepresentable
suggests a residual reference which marks the limits of the immanent. This is
even more the case with art, to which both Welsch and Lyotard return and which
is by its very nature derivative, secondary and ultimately representative,
however much it refutes that gesture.
So in this section ideas of the sublime as a communion with nature, as a mode of
Gerechtigkeit forged out of heterogeneity of aesthetic form have been joined by
ideas of sublime art as reflexive, experimental, plural, anti-representational, an
incomparable and essentially immanent experience. But I have also suggested
that the political investment in the essentially plural and heterogeneous mode of
the sublime, which allegedly reconnects the sublime with its relevance for
postmodernity, is in tension with how modernist aesthetics seems to work, with
possibly key implications for its critical claims. In what follows I will look at
Adorno and Lyotard's own writings on the sublime, with a view to developing
this picture of the potential role of the sublime in contemporary thinking about
art and aesthetics, but in the hope of sketching out a more convincing
understanding of modernist art's critical potential and its continued relevance for
the aesthetic as a meditation on issues of perception.
Adorno on the sublime: dialectical autonomy
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References to the sublime in Adorno's own texts are relatively sparse, and, apart
from Welsch's contributions, and a notable essay by Albrecht Wellmer which I
will refer to below [Wellmer 1993], secondary literature on the Adorno's sublime
is limited. However, parallels between Adorno's aesthetics and the historical
discourse of the sublime are apparent, and in view of the currency of the sublime
as a mode of the aesthetic, Welsch's remarks are a timely contribution. Adorno's
references to the sublime in Asthetische Theorie in particular do seem to engage
with the core of his thinking on aesthetics, centring on the notion of aesthetic
autonomy, for which the sublime, after Kant, is said to be constitutive: 'Das
Erhabene, das Kant der Natur vorbehielt, wurde nach ihm zum geschichtlichen
Konstituens von Kunst selber, Das Erhabene zieht die Demarkationslinie zu
dem, was sparer Kunstgewerbe hieB.' [Adorno 1970 293] Much of the common
ground between Kant's sublime and Adorno's aesthetics has been covered in the
preceding discussions; the self-reflexivity, purposelessness and essential
indeterminacy which motivate the above claim to autonomy, the fact that both
are largely meditations on the relationship between and relative determination of
the subject and object; the concerns about 'Subreption' and the formal nature of
the sublime. But as discussed above, Welsch's opening thesis is that Adorno
does not remain faithful to the credo of the Kantian sublime, and that his
conception of the sublime amounts to the concept's 'Rehabilitierung'. This
involves a dual shift in the terms of the sublime, firstly from a natural sublime to
an artistic sublime, and secondly from an experience of rational superiority
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(much as the aesthetic is seen a means of developing reason) to an aesthetics of
the sublime which is characterised by a turn against the limiting version of
rationality which Adorno refers to elsewhere as identity-thinking.
I have traced this former shift from a natural to an artistic sublime back to
Schiller's essay 'Uber das Erhabene', but in respect of the latter issue of
rationality Adorno's artistic sublime is something of a reversal of Schiller's
position. We have seen that for Schiller the aesthetic realm, and indeed culture
in general, allows a signal freedom from external constraint. For Adorno, on the
other hand, whilst such appearance might elude the determinate mode of
conceptual thought that he refers to as identity-thinking, such a positive
assessment of art's particularity is undermined by Adorno's diagnosis of the
manipulation of consciousness and the uniformity of culture which characterises
and distorts contemporary understanding. [See Horkheimer & Adorno 1969
128ff.] Artworks are seen to approach a kind of truth only in as much as they
refuse to paper over the unfreedoms of society with some kind of premature
reconciliation, a facility traditionally associated with beauty but associated by
Adorno with Lukacs' critical realism. [See Adorno 1974 280] A positively
conceived mimetic realism at best results in naivety and sterile empiricism and at
worst precipitates a kind of mechanistic approach to literary creation that
throttles any kind of spontaneity. [See Adorno 1974 273-7] I have already
referred to Adorno's preference for art which turns against its own mode of
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mimetic representation, refusing meaning and understanding. This is more than
simply a strategy for art to defend its own autonomy, having its roots in
Romantic theory's sense that the grounds that make knowledge possible at all
are only ever knowable as a secondary moment. I will return to this
thoroughgoing negativity in Adorno, which I see as itself ideologically not
unproblematic, in relation to Welsch's anaesthetic in chapter four.
Dissonance
This introduces perhaps the most obvious I sublime' element in Adorno's
formulations, the preference for the unreconciled 'dissonance' of the sublime
artwork over the coherence, unity and harmony of beauty. As he writes in
Asthetische Theorie, 'zart verstanden, war, nach dem Sturz formaler Schonheit, die
Moderne hindurch von den traditionallen asthetischen Ideen seine [das Moment
des Erhabenen] allein ubrig'. [Adorno 1970293-4] Art must aid the non-identical
[see Adorno 1970 14], refusing to replicate the unity and uniformity of the
administered world: 'nicht, durch seine Besonderung die herrschende
A1lgemeinheit der verwalteten Welt zu vertuschen'. [Adorno 1970 130] As
Albrecht WeImer puts it, 'Nicht durch Versohnung der Widersprilche, sondern
dadurch, daE sie diese zur Sprache bringen'. [WeUmer 1993 187] Adorno's
investment in the sublime, like Kant's, is motivated by the issue of freedom, but
whereas for Kant, freedom is ultimately only possible in the human mind,
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Adorno sees the human mind as irredeemably manipulated. The dissonant
artwork becomes the refuge of Kant's project to find the indeterminate: 'ihr
Losendes hat einzig noch im Widerspruchsvollen und Dissonanten seine Statte'.
[Adorno 1970 130] This already brings us onto the other main aspect of Adorno's
Rehabilitierung of Kant's sublime, namely the shift from Kant's subjective and
rational sublime to Adorno's sublime art as a valorisation of the non-human and
non-rational. The reconciliation with nature that Welsch emphasises is the
hoped-for conclusion of this sublime experience.
Nature: the self and the world
The source of Welsch's idea of sublime art as forging a seemingly unmediated
relationship to nature is Adorno's own writing on art: IWeniger wird der Geist,
wie es Kant mochte, vor der Natur seiner eigenen Superioritat gewahr als seiner
eigenen Naturhaftigkeit.' [Adorno 1970 410] Similarly Adorno writes earlier in
the Asthetische Theorie: 'Enthullt sich jedoch die Erfahrung des Erhabenen als
Selbstbewtilltsein des Menschen von seiner Naturhaftigkeit, so verandert sich die
Zusammensetzung der Kategorie erhaben.' [Adorno 1970295] As such, Welsch
is right to focus on nature as central to Adorno's concept of sublime art, and he
does register that the interplay between subject and object is perhaps the key
battleground for aesthetics, which seems to be both the subject' s undoing and its
redemption. But the paradox contained in the idea of a 'Selbstbewtilltsein des
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Menschen von seiner Naturhaftigkeit' - the self-consciousness that precisely
separates us from mere nature - suggests a certain cognitive complication, which
is already a key aspect of Kant's 'Copernican turn', which precisely
problematises our relationship with nature. As Andrew Bowie points out, the
end of divine guarantee of the coherence and order of the natural world means
that the human mind and its capacities become the focal point of coherence, such
that I the relation of the human and the natural becomes a major problem'. [Bowie
1990 3] This schism between man and nature is hypostatised even further by the
Romantics, for instance in Schelling's sense of man as always a fragment and
someone to whom nature's wholeness is no longer accessible. [See Bowie 1997
82] In any case I have referred in the previous chapter to Welsch's valorization
of the Stoic as the 'perfekter Anasthet' [Welsch 1990 26], which seems to be
predicated on a certain sense of man's separateness from the external world.
In particular, the awareness of 'belonging to nature' is a curious quality or effect
to attribute to modernist art, in view of the fact that the latter has become ever
more reflexive and abstract, ever more removed from the natural realm. This
raises the question exactly what nature signifies in Welsch and Adorno's
formulations. It is presumably not the heterogeneous nature which pre-exists
our understanding of it, more likely a metaphor signifying what might be called
the 'other' of reason [see Habermas 1985 354], a force demarcating the limits of
the power of subjectivity, or as a force questioning the logic of identity. But
182
Welsch's unguarded references to a seemingly unproblematised and present
nature, the erstwhile trigger for and non-essential 'content' of Kant's sublime,
makes him susceptible to the error of taking the object of the sublime for the
experience or relationship which it precipitates. This returns to Kant's
'Subreption', which Welsch himself refers to in Adorno's terms as the
'Verwechslung von Inhalt und Form'. [Welsch1990117] This tendency towards
slipping into a reference to the object seems to follow from what I have identified
above as the inherent fragility of the concept of the sublime: the difficulty of
answering the question of exactly what the sublime 'belongs' to allows Kant to
draw the opposite conclusions in favour of the subject, but Adorno's aesthetics
are predisposed in favour of the object, and Welsch convincingly emphasizes
Adorno's valorization of that element of the art-object which somehow resists
subjective processing. (In this respect, Adorno's sublime aesthetics remains true
to the spirit of the first part of Kant's sublime, namely the prohibition of the man-
made sublime object.) But his protectiveness towards the object in the face of
Kant's sovereign subject is in part a recognition of and rearguard defence against
the unavoidable practicalities of mediation, in particular the mediation of the art-
object by its formal nature and by subjectivity. Kant of course saw the two as
inextricably associated, seeing art's formal organising principles as essentially
human, but my point in chapter two was to suggest that even the defamiliarising
formal innovations of modernist art operates on principles which, whilst not in
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some way intrinsically human, depend upon subjective reception for their
effectiveness.
Adorno himself is arguably more circumspect in his treatment of nature: his
reference to 'SelbstbewulStsein' above recognises the mediation by the subjective
faculties. For Adorno, the eighteenth-century preoccupation with raw nature is
already a story of the subject: 'Die Entfesselung des Elementarischen war eins
mit der Emanzipation des Subjekts und damit dem SelbstbewufStsein des Geistes.
[· ..1 Ihr Geist ist Selbstbesinnung auf sein eigenes Naturhaftes.' [Adorno 1970
2921 In Adorno's view this interpretation of nature as anti-subjective is already
anticipated in Kant: 'Sie [Natur] war selbst in ihrer Kantischen Version von der
Nichtigkeit des Menschen tingiert'. [Adorno 1970 295] Adorno describes this
concept of nature as a critique of the (Platonic) absolutist world of forms ('Kritik
an der absolutistischen [... ] Formenwelt' [Adorno 1970 292]), and in an
important passage in Asthetische Theorie Adorno reads the eighteenth-century
concept of nature as essential to the transposition of the sublime into art: 'Zur
Invasion des Erhabenen in die Kunst trug einst der Naturbegriff der Aufklarung
bei.' [Adorno 1970 292] Though Habermas doesn't mention the sublime
specifically, his reference to 'limit experiences' is quite clearly on the same
terrain: 'Seit der Fruhromantik werden fur die exaltierende Oberschreitung des
Subjekts immer wieder mystische und asthetische Grenzerfahrungen in
Anspruch genommen.' [Habermas 19853611
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As such, nature might more loosely refer to the notion of 'our place within the
world' which Martha Nussbaum identifies as a neglected aspect of rationality
[see Nussbaum 2001], a prior intelligibility or understanding which might be
associated with Heidegger's 'ontological difference'. [See Bowie 1997 160]
Alternatively, the reference to the realm of nature might not be reality per se, but
precisely a metaphor for this lost reality. Of course, presumably Welsch knows
that nature is a metaphor for the objective realm here, but he seems to forget the
'lost' nature of this reality, the fundamental dislocation which marks man's
relationship to that which is not man. The philosophical roots of this dislocation
might be found in Kant's phenomenological turn, though their contemporary
effects are more likely to be sought in the kind of ideological manipulation which
precisely makes the subjective consciousness for Adorno an unreliable locus for
any freedom, with important ramifications for Adorno's aesthetics as far as the
above noted issues of unity, reconciliation and meaning are concerned.
The sublime and the negative
Welsch, however, perhaps not surprisingly, compounds the tendency to think of
nature, and therefore the justice it guarantees, as unproblematically 'there' with
an overly optimistic appraisal of the function and potential of art in Adorno's
theory. On the one hand, Welsch interprets 'Gerechtigkeit' as actual
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reconciliation, or at least a tension which can be resolved in art; on the other
hand, he valorises the 'unreconciled' as an instance of heterogeneity. It is
understandable that Welsch chooses to emphasize the utopian or reconciliatory
aspect of Adorno's aesthetics, particularly in view of his parallel veneration of
Lyotard as a thinker. But these emphases arguably fail to do justice respectively
to the dialectical complexity which inhabits any such relationship to nature, and
to the pervasive negativity of Adorno's writings. In Welsch's interpretation,
nature, by the resistance it offers to the subjective principal, is the guarantor of
freedom. This is plausible as a reading of Adorno, for whom art becomes 'der
geschichtlicher Sprecher unterdriickter Natur'. [Adorno 1970 365, cited in Welsch
1990 1181 And Welsch might be right in suggesting that, for Adorno, the
question of man's bond with the natural or material world has become the chief
preoccupation of modern art, but only if this view is tempered by the
understanding of art as itself a symptom of humanity's separation from and
domination of nature: 'ihre [die Kunstwerke] eigene Dynamik, ihre immanente
Historizitat als Dialektik von Natur und Naturbeherrschung'. [Adorno 1970 151
This may be a separation that art wants to overturn ('Kunst mochte gerade durch
ihre fortschreitende Vergeistigung, durch Trennung von Natur, diese Trennung,
an der sie leidet und die sie inspiriert, revozieren.' [Adorno 1970 1411), but this
merely begs the impossible question of exactly what nature art wants to return
to. The thoroughgoing separation that art's creative force witnesses seems to be
implicit in Schiller's man-made and cultural/ideal' realm, which is itself perhaps
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a overly optimistic account of a sense of dislocation which has its origins in
Romantic thinking, in the infinite reflection through which we are separated
from the world around us. Welsch's concern, with the concept of
aestheticisation, is to identify more recent and less philosophical reasons for this
division, but the reasons why art cannot reunite man and a kind of pre-Iapsarian
world presumably do not change. Rather for Adorno culminates in a modernist
aesthetic which expresses modem man's distance from, rather than closeness to,
that world. [See Sheppard 2000 59] Such indications of the impossibility of
communion and the irredeemable sense of our dislocation are evidenced for
instance in Beckett's austere anti-dramas. At moments Welsch recognises this
sense in which harmony for Adorno is only viable 'im Ausdruck ihrer
Negativitat'. [Welsch 1990 106] He acknowledges the untenability of any
positively construed relationship between art and nature in his reference to art's
status as by its very nature a 'Dokument von Herrschaft' [Welsch 1990 124], but
his suggestion of unmediated communion with or proximity to nature fails to
take full account of art's problematic socio-political function and its status as
symptom of dislocation.
Indeed, it might be that the pervasive negativity of Adorno's preferred examples
of modernist art is itself a sublime feature, beyond the broad terms of the 'Sturz
formaler Schonhotr' which renders art a locus of disharmony and the
unreconciled. More circumspectly than Welsch and Lyotard's valorization of the
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unreconciled as heterogeneity as a value in itself, Adorno emphasises the
function of non-appearance in Kant's sublime: 'Kants Lehre vom Gefuhl des
Erhabenen beschreibt erst recht eine Kunst, die in sich erzittert, indem sie sich
urn des scheinlosen Wahrheitsgehalts willen suspendiert, ohne doch, als Kunst,
ihren Scheincharakter abzustreifen.' [Adorno 1970 292] As such, art's retraction
from positive statement and simple presence might indicate its debt to the
sublime. Indeed, for Adorno, positive presentation of the sublime undermines
its very force: 'was als erhaben auf tritt, klingt hohl'. [Adorno 1970 294] This
prohibition of anything being present as a sublime object motivates Adorno's
understanding of the sublime as only possible latently: 'Versohnung ist ihnen
nicht das Resultat des Konflikts, einzig noch, daB er Sprache findet. Damit wird
aber das Erhabene latent.' [Adorno 1970 294]
This latency is of course highly ambiguous. Is the sublime in art latent only
insofar as it refers to this paradoxical mode of art as non-presentation? Is it latent
merely because it describes the artwork's formal qualities, rather than any
content? Or might it be taken to indicate that the art object is not itself sublime,
as in Kant's version, but precipitates an experience of the sublime? Below I will
suggest that these ideas suggest two (not necessarily mutually exclusive, and of
course not definitive or exhaustive) strands of theorizing the sublime; firstly, as a
meditation on the limits of representation, and secondly, as a focus on a dynamic
and dialectical conception of art's autonomy which takes more account of the
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cognitive element of the aesthetic. In spite of Welsch's positivity elsewhere, the
former idea of art as non-presentation or refusal suggests key parallels between
the sublime and Welsch's idea of art as anaesthetic.
Happy positivism and pluralism
Compared to Adorno's negativity, Welsch's idea of Gerechtigkeit seems to adopt
an essentially postmodernist position that valorises the plural, horizontal, or
heterogeneous as political per se, exhibiting the kind of 'positivisme hereux' that
Manfred Frank and others have taken issue with. [Frank 1984 16, see also
Eagleton 1997 127] The plural is evident in many aspects of modernist aesthetic,
from the multiplicity of styles and genres in artistic production to Bahktin's
arguments about the 'polyphony' of Oostoyevksy's novels [Bahktin 198417], and
this is a crucial argument for Welsch, of course, that modernist art is in some way
constitutive for postmodern pluralism. But any suggestion that this multiplicity
begins with modernist art cannot ignore the role of modernist (as opposed to
modern) philosophy in shaping that aesthetic in the first place. [See Giles 1993
177-8] This returns to my comments above about Welsch's curiously unfufilled
title, as Nietzsche is the obvious reference point here. This omission is doubly
curious, in view of the fact that elsewhere Welsch does refer to Nietzsche as a
crucial figure in the pervasive 'iisthetisch-fiktionale Charakter von Erkenntnis
und Wirklichkeit' [Welsch 1996 81], and even cites his Geburt essay as a key
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instance where this understanding of the world as 'aesthetisches Phiinomen' is
registered. [Nietzsche 1973 I 47, cited in Welsch 1996 70]. Henri Bergson is also
an important figure, and interestingly for Welsch's ideas on perception and
epistemology Bergson registers this pluralist approach to philosophy as an
inevitable conclusion of phenomenology's focus on perceptual experience. [See
Bergson 2002 249-50] Already for Bergson, an implication of this turning around
of the priorities of philosophy, beginning from perception, is that there must be
as many philosophies' as there are original thinkers'. [Bergson 2002 250]
Immanence and the dialectic: art's Geist
This valorisation of the plural is closely connected to the argument rehearsed
above that art's autonomy is guaranteed by its immanence, vouchsafed by
elements whose determination is only 'kunst-intern'. [See Welsch 1990 158-159]
There is good reason for interpreting Adorno's calls for art's separateness in
these terms, as Adorno himself writes:
Ich meine, mit anderen Worten, die sehr spezifische, auf die Produkte des
Geistes zielende Frage, in welcher Weise gesellschaftliche
Strukturmomente, Positionen, Ideologien und was immer in den
Kunstwerken sich selbst durchsetzen. [Adorno 'Thesen zur
Kunstsoziologie' 1978210-11]
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Elsewhere he refers to the 'inunanente Logik' of the artwork as the 'Theodizee
des Zweckbegriffs in der Kunst'. [Adorno 1970 188-9] But, and this might argue
against more austere readings of Adorno's ideas on art's role as one of negation,
Welsch fails to take full account of the relationship which is suggested in
Adorno's writings between the 'genuin-asthetisch' and 'kunst-extern'. [Welsch
1990 158] Adorno's formulations elsewhere speak against a conception of purely
artistic meaning: even in the 'Engagement' essay his formalism seems to locate
autonomous art's effect precisely in the process of transformation to which it
subjects non-artistic meaning:
Entledigt kein Wort, das in eine Dichtung eingeht, sich ganz der
Bedeutungen, die es in der konununikativen Rede besitzt, so bleibt doch
in keiner, selbst im traditionellen Roman nicht, diese Bedeutung
unverwandelt die gleiche, welche das Wort draufsen hatte. [Adorno 1974
410]
Moreover, this relationship between that which is internal and external to art is
characterized by its dialectical nature, a quality which pervades Adorno's
understanding of aesthetic autonomy and its inherent fragility. Adorno does
reject the idea of a dedicated, committed political 'message' in art [Adorno 1974
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429], but he also objects to an undialectical or unmediated conception of the
relationship between the real and the artistic. ado Marquard is instructive here,
for he refutes the 'AusschlieiSlichkeit asthetischer Immanenz' whilst noting the
necessity of some concept of self-determination by art: 'Asthetische Immanenz ist
wichtig; doch eben so wichtig ist es zu sehen, dalSdas, was nicht das Asthetische
ist, fUr das Asthetische wichtig ist.' [Marquard 1989 11] The artwork's mode of
critique is immanent, in the sense that it turns on the concept of art and the
possibility of meaning, but in Adorno's view conceiving of it as somehow 'pure'
results in bad art:
Noch im sublimiertesten Kunstwerk birgt sich ein Es solI anders sein; wo
es nur noch sich selbst gliche, wie bei seiner reinen verwissenschaftlichten
Durchkonstruktion, ware es schon wieder im Schlechten, buchstablich
Vorktinstlerischen. [Adorno 1974429]
The concept of 'Geist' is precisely emblematic of the dialectical nature of
Adorno's view of the relationships between art (and its formal nature), reality
and subjectivity. In Asthetische Theorie Adorno identifies art's Vergeistigung
explicitly with the sublime:
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Kants Theorie des Erhabenen antezipiert am Naturschonen jene
Vergeistigung, die Kunst erst leistet. Was an der Natur erhaben sei, ist bei
ihm nichts anderes als eben die Autonomie des Geistes angesichts der
Ubermacht des sinnlichen Daseins, und sie setzt erst im vergeistigten
Kunstwerk sich durch. [Adorno 1970143]
Geist is all the more pertinent here because of its underlying ambiguity. On the
one hand, as this quote exemplifies, it refers to the mediating subjective
consciousness. It is also in this sense that Adorno speaks of the sublime, in
contrast with Kant, as opposed to the 'Souveranitat des Geistes.' [Adorno 1970
294] On the other hand, it can indicate the seemingly Idealist sense of objective
reality, of which art is the sensory presentation, as in the (characteristically
paradoxical) 'immanente idealistische Moment, die objektive Vermittlung'.
[Adorno 1970 141] This seems to privilege the Hegelian objective and mimetic
moment of Geist:
Der Geist der Kunstwerke ist, ohne aIle Rucksicht auf eine Philosophie des
Objektiven oder subjektiven Geistes, objektiv, ihr eigener Gehalt, und er
entscheidet fiber sie: Geist der Sache selbst, der durch die Erscheinung
erscheint. [Adorno 1970 135]
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Adorno also seems to be referring to the objective moment of Geist when he
writes of art as a go-between between Geist and its 'other': 'Die Kunstwerke,
mogen sie noch so sehr ein Seiendes scheinen, kristallieren sich zwischen jenem
Geist und seinem Anderen.' [Adorno 1970 138] But Geist, whether as art or
reality, cannot automatically be reduced to objective nature, and is to be opposed
to any such positivist materiality: 'Wird jedoch Geist selber auf sein naturhaftes
Mai5 gebracht, so ist in ihm die Vernichtung des Individuums nicht langer
positiv aufgehoben.' [Adorno 1970 295] Indeed, the subject cannot simply be
suppressed in this overcoming of the subject: 'Im adaquaten Verhalten zur Kunst
ist trotzdem das subjektive Moment bewahrt.' [Adorno 1970 396] Indeed, for
Adorno it is in its negation that subjectivity is redeemed: 'Der Augenblick dieses
Obergangs ist der oberste von Kunst. Er errettet Subjektivitat, sogar subjektive
Asthetik durch ihre Negation hindurch.' [Adorno 1970 401] So whilst one might
take it that the reference to both objective and subjective moments as Geist is just
a frustrating inconsistency of terminology, it does seem that the mediating
concept of art's Vergeistigung suggest a more complex interrelationship between
objective reality, the subject, and art. As such, it might be more fruitful to think
of Geist as a fluid and dialectic-enabling concept, with different and shifting
positions, rather than fixed meanings and significations. Where Kant's sublime
explores the border between the subject and object, the concept of Geist is
expressive of Adorno's view of the nebulous nature of the two. Even the 'simple'
valorisation of nature or the object as a location of non-identity is no longer
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possible or useful, as Adorno remarks: '[e mehr Kunst ein Nichtidentisches,
unmittlebar dem Geist Entgegengesetztes in sich hineinnimmt, desto mehr mufi
sie sich vergeistigen.' [Adorno 1970 292] The anti-foundationalist consequence of
this spiritualisation of art is that art's meaning is not simply a question of static
being, but is expressed by Adorno in terms of a tension of becoming: 'Das
Moment des Geistes ist in keinem Kunstwerk ein Seiendes, in jedem ein
Werdendes, sich Bildendes.' [Adorno 1970141] This echoes Adorno's comment
above regarding the transformative potential of modernist aesthetics.
A crucial instance of this dialectical nature of the sublime that operates at the
subjective level, but does not relinquish its claims to external reality, is what
Welsch refers to as its 'paradoxes Wechselspiel von Unlust und Lust'. [Welsch
1990 123] This comes straight from Kant's understanding of the sublime as an
experience of oscillation between pleasure and displeasure (the latter he
describes as a 'negative Lust' [Kant 1963135, see also Kant 1963154]), which both
Adorno and Welsch refer to. This experience of displeasure is presumably a
consequence of the failure to reconcile disparate elements that is associated with
the sublime. For Kant of course, the experience is ultimately one of pleasure in
the face of displeasure, a consequence of our capacity for remove and reflection.
But both the openness of this gesture of unity and harmony to exploitation and
its fallacy in the face of so many problems propel Adorno towards a subversive
aesthetics of displeasure and shock, albeit one that is expressed in terms of a
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paradoxical pleasure: 'Gluck an der Dissonanz'. [Adorno 1974 270] This might
suggest a kind of self-reflexive experience of displeasure, much like Kant's
sublime, with no necessary interaction with the external world. However, a
central argument for my thesis is that this oscillation of pleasure and displeasure
might also be central to the defamiliarising experience of the modernist aesthetic
as described by Viktor Schklovsky.
The challenge to expectation or artistic or perceptual convention which
characterises experimental art is associated in particular with that which is
unpleasant to the senses: 'das sensuell nicht Angenehme hat Affinitat zum Geist'.
[Adorno 1970 292, cited in Wellmer 1993 189] This return to the sensory is
significant as far as Welsch's ideas on the parameters of aesthetics are concerned,
and ties in with my suggestion that one might ascribe a residual sensory nature
to the sublime experience. The idea of unpleasant sensory experience seems
appropriate as a riposte to the sickly sweet pleasures of the aestheticised world,
and the idea of art as unpleasant to the senses will be a central one for my final
chapter, which will discuss the aesthetic and implications of sensory excess, in
contrast to Welsch's preferred mode of art as sensory absence.
But my point is that this dialectical nature of the sublime is of wider significance
than the oscillation of pleasure and displeasure. In my view the sublime might
be emblematic of a more general feature of modernist aesthetic, namely the
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dialectical nature of aesthetic autonomy. I started this discussion of Adorno's
aesthetics with his suggestion that the sublime is in some way crucial to art's
autonomy: 'Das Erhabene, das Kant der Natur vorbehielt, wurde nach ihm zum
geschichtlichen Konstituens von Kunst seIber. Das Erhabene zieht die
Demarkationslinie zu dem, was spater Kunstgewerbe hieK' [Adorno 1970 293]
The question is what Adorno means by this. I have already discussed the idea of
an aesthetics of dissonance. Alternatively Adorno might be referring to the more
usual reading of the sublime as a meditation on representation and
representability .
Undoing representation and meaning
When transposed into the modernist artwork, this fragile dialectical interplay is
usually read in terms of the limits of representation, which is crucial as we shall
see to the transposition of the sublime into Lyotard's aesthetic philosophy.
Within the formal entity of the (modernist) artwork the failure of form that Kant
reads as an internal failure of the faculties of representation to mind becomes a
problematisation of representation. Of course, this interrogation of
representation is a plausible reading of Adorno's sublime. I referred above to
Adorno's 'negative' aesthetics resorting to non-appearance of the object as a
means of defending art's autonomy: one way for art to avoid its reduction to
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mere utility is by defying its own status as a means of communication or
reconciliation by problematising its own formal and significatory unity:
In der verwalteten Welt ist die adequate Gestalt, in der Kunstwerke
aufgenommen werden, die der Kommunikation des
Unkommunizierbaren, die Durchbrechung des verdinglichten
Bewu1Stseins. Werke, in denen die asthetische Gestalt, unterm Druck des
Wahrheitsgehalts, sich transzendiert, besetzen die Stelle, welche einst der
Begriff des Erhabenen meinte. In ihnen entfernten Geist und Material sich
voneinander im Bemuhen, Eines zu werden. [Adorno 1970292]
But this oft-repeated idea of representing the unrepresentable, or saying the
unsayable, seems to be fundamentally ambiguous, insofar as it leaves
tantalisingly open why that which is unrepresentable precisely is
unrepresentable. Presumably several reasons might obtain: Kant's transcendent;
the failure of the faculties or the concepti the failure of representative means,
excessive complexity of the object to be represented, as in Jameson's sublime.
Also the question arises whether we are talking about a failure of means or
faculties or a conscious problematisation of them. Whatever is the case, this
insistence on art as a meditation on the limits of representation seems to be much
less Iaffirmative' than the idea of sublime art as an immanent object, celebrated
for its inaccessibility by concepts.
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But for me the risk of focusing on representation and its suspension is that this
might short-circuit the modernist aesthetic process, cutting out its crucial
'cognitive' moment (that which is central to Kant's idea of the sublime as a
failure of representation to mind). This analysis in terms of representation still
suggests an underlying sense that the measure of art is its capacity for
correspondence to reality. Conceptualising any defiance of such correspondence
as non-representation or non·appearance does not necessarily shake the order of
representation.
Perhaps more fertile than the issue of representation is the question of meaning.
The sublime is seen to undermine the generation of meaning in art, as in
Adorno's paradoxical formulation, 'Kommunikation des Unkommunizierbaren'
[Adorno 1970292], which in turn is echoed in Welsch's conception of modern art
as a 'Moment des Inkommensurablen und Unkommunizierbaren'. [Welsch 1990
142] For Adorno, art is absolved, by virtue of its spiritualisation, of the
imperative to 'mean' or 'intend' something, 'dem Ansatz nach der Sphare des
blofien Bedeutens, den Intentionen entrissen'. [Adorno 1970 139] Whereas Kant's
formal failure ultimately recuperated by the experience of the absolute and
transcendental, for Adorno, formal failure is precisely an indication that this
transcendental grounding of meaning is absent and unobtainable. As such, there
is more at stake here than representation: as Albrecht Wellmer makes clear:
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IAnders bei Kant ist fur Adorno nicht nur die Darstellbarkeit, sondern auch die
Denkbarkeit des Absoluten problema tisch geworden. Deshalb hedarf die
Philosophie der Kunst ehensosehr, wie die Kunst der Philosophie hedarf.'
[Wellmer 1993179] This essentially early Romantic elision of art and philosophy
returns to the idea of the aesthetic aiding or marking the failure of Kant's project
of underpinning experience with universal guarantees, but my preference is for
an aesthetic which understands itself as dismantling the elements of
communication that we use in more everyday settings. In the final section of my
thesis I will ask whether a more creative sabotage of culturally grounded habits
of thinking, as attempted in Peter Handke and Heiner MUller's dramas, might
not be more successful as a way of challenging the manipulated consciousness
which exercises Adorno and might be said to underlie Welsch's ideas on
aestheticisation.
This more Ieveryday' interrogation of meaning follows for me from the
understanding that such a complete absence of meaning is as paradoxical as
Lyotard's notion of an absence of form in the formally deconstructive artwork.
Resistance to interpretation is hard to sustain completely. A more contextual
understanding might involve the idea that meaning is dismantled dialectically,
as supported by my remarks on the essentially dialectical and dynamic nature of
the sublime. Thus one might take Adorno's reference to the constitutive nature
of the sublime for autonomous art as a reference to its dialectical nature and its
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cognitive implications. In the same passage of Asthetische Theorie Adorno
emphasizes the essentially fragile and dialectical nature of the sublime, as always
open to its opposite: 'Freilich schlagt am Ende das Erhabene in sein Gegenteil
urn.' [Adorno 1970 295] Paul de Man similarly notes that the sublime is 'shot
through with dialectical complication' [de Man 1996 73, see also Bowie 1990 37],
and it is in this sense that Welsch writes of the 'prekare Dynamik' [Welsch 1990
116] and an essentially Kantian 'nicht zur Ruhe kommender KonfIikt' [Welsch
1990 140], which are said to characterise the sublime. This dialectical and
dynamic nature is already there in Kant's understanding of the sublime as an
experience of limits, which underlies Christine Pries' description of the sublime
as a 'Grenzerfahrung'. [See Pries 19891 As such, an appreciation of those
characteristics of the Kantian sublime that are retained in its transposition into
art, of the ways in which the Kantian sublime already anticipates some of the
ways autonomous art works, might foster an understanding of the more
dialectical and mediated relationship between man and nature through art.
This dialectical nature is as important as art's autonomy, which is not absolute
and guaranteed, but to be continually renewed. This point is central to [uri]
Tynjanov's concept of aesthetic evolution. I touched on the dynamic nature of
the aesthetic above when referring to Adorno's idea of the 'Moment des Geistes'
as a 'Werdendes, sich Bildendes'. And the dialectical tension might be what
Adorno is referring to in the opening section of Asthetische Theorie: 'Deutbar ist
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Kunst nur an ihrem Bewegungsgesetz, nicht durch invarianten. Sie bestimmt
sich im Verhaltnis zu dem, was sie nicht ist. [... ] ihr Bewegungsgesetz ist ihr
eigenes Formgesetz.' [Adorno 1970 12] In this sense Adorno writes in
'Engagement' that it is not a question of preferring committed or autonomous
art, but of the 'Konflikt der beiden grofsen Blocke [... ]. Von ihm hange die
Moglichkeit von Geist seIber so sehr ab.' [Adorno 1974 409] Moreover, the
specifically cognitive nature of this dialectical fragility is evidenced in Kant's idea
of the sublime as an explicit experience of time. [See Kant 1913 8] Precisely this
kind of slowing down and lengthening of experience is deployed in what
Schklovsky calls the poetic. Similarly, Albrecht Wellmer associates the sublime
with the alienating aesthetic experience that overturns aesthetic conventions,
operating 'ungeschtitzt durch asthetische Konventionen'. [Wellmer 1993 187]
This freedom from convention is seen to precipitate a loss of objectively assured
systems of meaning ('Verlust objektiv verburgten Sinns' [Wellmer 1993 187]),
though perhaps this is overstated, bearing in mind that even divergence from
convention is often a meditation on conventions. Coinciding with my discussion
in chapter two of the implicit psychological and cognitive nature of the
modernist aesthetic, Wellmer reads this meditation on conventions as a
specifically cognitive, consciousness-raising facility of art, namely a 'Fortschritt
des BewuBtseins, den Adorno immer wieder mit dem Eindringen des Erhabenen
in die moderne Kunst verknupft', [See Wellmer 1993 187-90] Of course, this
focus on the reception of modernist art's divergence from the conventional and
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habitual leaves unasked the question of production: who is responsible for
pushing the boundaries in such a way that cannot be explained simply with
reference back to existing rules? [See Bowie 199032-3] The answer usually relies
on the notion of genius, and is a valid direction from which to approach the
question, but my concern is not to pursue this question of origin and possibility,
but to ask after the political force of such rule-breaking, its impact on our
everyday perceptual habits.
This issue of cognitive impact is not entirely at variance with Adorno's turn
against the sovereign subject, in view of the idea I have cited above as saving the
subject through its own negation. Referring to the moment of shock, Adorno
asserts '[e]r errettet Subjektivitat, sogar subjektive Asthetik durch ihre Negation
hindurch.' [Adorno 1970401] Wellmer also refers to the fragility of Geist - 'die
Naturverfallenheit, die Hinfalligkeit des Geistes' [Wellmer 1993 183] - that
informs Adorno's critique of the Kantian sublime. For Adorno the feeling of the
sublime topples the subject from its sense of superiority, but far from Welsch's
dubious 'oneness' with nature and the object, this seems to derive precisely from
an unsettling of the conventions and habits that constitute the life-world around
us. This idea of subjectivity as the battle ground of the aesthetic will be a thread
that runs through the next three chapters. In chapter four I will suggest that
Welsch's ideas on art as anaesthetic return to those elements of the Kantian
eubltme which protect the sovereign subject against the external impositions
203
which he characterizes as the aestheticised world. In my final two chapters,
which will look at recent drama which operates at the limits of perception, I will
suggest that, through a paradoxical negating or partial dismantling of
subjectivity, Heiner Muller's drama in particular attempts to offer an alternative
means of counteracting these aestheticised elements that make up our life-world,
precisely by imposition of experience which breaks out of the patterns and
norms of aestheticised experience.
I hope that the above discussion will serve both to support Wolfgang Welsch's
thesis regarding the location of Adorno's aesthetics in the discourse of the
sublime, as well as to indicate the shortcomings of his formulations. These centre
on Welsch's tendency to revert to a self-present understanding of the sublime,
which derives from a slippage from unreconcilable formal elements within the
artwork to reconciliation with nature. Similar is the leap to an excessively
positive conclusion of the potential for Gerechtigkeit in the sublime artwork.
These seem to rely respectively on an undialectical grasp of Adorno's formalism,
which valorises an autonomous 'kunst-intern' understanding of artistic meaning,
neglecting the seemingly necessary reference to that from which, according to a
reading of modernist aesthetics as one essentially of defamiliarisation at least, art
must continually distinguish itself, and from a failure to take account of the
pervasive negativity in Adorno's ideas on the relationship between art and
reality (notwithstanding his remarks that Beckett's comedy enacts a 'negation of
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this negativity', which can barely said to offer consolation [See Adorno 1974
297]). Analogous to this is problem of 'Subreption', whereby art's dialectical
interaction with non-art is neglected in favour of a valorisation of the Isublime'
object, from whose formal qualities is inferred an immanent political
significance, marking Welsch's position as an essentially postmodernist one. By
contrast I have suggested that it might be more fruitful to conceptualise the
sublime as an oscillation between poles (for example, between kunst-intern and
kunst-extern, between expectation and experience), bringing out the dialectical
subtlety that is already crucial to Kant's sublime.
jean-Francois Lyotard's postmodern sublimes
The previous section has been concerned with the understanding of the sublime
as a possible template for the quasi-autonomous modernist artwork. For Welsch,
however, the significance of the sublime is not limited to its identification with
the modernist artwork, but rather it also inheres in its specific relevance to the
postmodern situation, both for postmodern thinking. This is due to such
features as the artwork's alleged 'immanence', its plurality or heterogeneity,
which Welsch also refers to as its horizontal nature, and its anti-foundationalism
('keine Generalnenner' [Welsch 1990 163]), the sublime aspect of its formal
decomposition, and the experimental (and presumably open-ended) nature of
both modernist art and postmodernist philosophy, which seems to return to the
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idea of the knowledge it proposes as horizontal. By its 'horizontal' and
'immanent' nature art is seen to be governed only by its own 'Eigenanspriichen'
[Welsch 1990 163], which is to say that it resists any insertion of content and
criteria from outside the artwork, and 'gewinnt genau dadurch kritische
Funktion'. [Welsch 1990 91] Alongside the preference for a 'Vielheitsoption' over
'Einheitssehnsucht' [Welsch 1990 93], Welsch refers to the immanence of the
aesthetic as a kind of 'Nicht-Darstellung' [Welsch 1990 90], which seems to offer
the most obvious connection to the traditional terms of the sublime. Some of the
above ideas are evident in Lyotard's formulations, and their connection to the
sublime will be clarified in the discussion of his terms that follows. This will not
proceed by using Lyotard to criticize Welsch, as in the above discussion of
Adorno, but rather by using Lyotard as an exemplary theorist, by virtue of his
prolific output on the subject, of the postmodern sublime and a good way of
assessing its claims and critical potential. From this discussion I will draw
implications for Welsch's ideas on the sublime, as well as indicating relevant
issues for his related ideas on the category of the anaesthetic.
Lyotard has written over half a dozen texts on the postmodern sublime,
identifying the sublime variously as a 'negative presentation' of the
'unpresentable' [see Lyotard 1984 73-81], as a temporal sublime as caesura or the
experience of anxiety it causes [see Lyotard 1985 1-18], which Lyotard also
conceptualizes as a denial of the dialectic [see Lyotard 1990 303], as a immanent
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'matter' [Lyotard 1991110] or an instance of the inhuman [see Lyotard 1991108-
142],which commentators have identified as a turning against the subjective will
[see Beidler 1995179], and finally as an idea of the infinite. In what follows I will
discuss the main aspects of Lyotard's many treatments of the sublime, which
range through positive and negative, infinite and immanent, experimental and
plural. I will point out the tensions between his various positions, central to
which is its characterisation as immanent and plural versus its designation as a
means of theorising the quintessentially modernist experimental and innovatory
aesthetic.
Lyotard's Kantian sublime
In spite of Welsch's claims as to Lyotard's archetypal status as a postmodern
thinker, there is much in his writings on the sublime that locates him close to
Kant's quintessentially modern and subject-centred interrogation of the rational,
as well as his penchant for the transcendental. Just as I have identified
significant continuities with Kant's terms in Adorno's 'Rehabilitation' of the
Kantian sublime, in 'Presenting the Unpresentable: The Sublime' Lyotard locates
the sublime in an overtly Kantian framework: 'That which is not demonstrable is
that which stems from Ideas and for which one cannot cite (represent) any
example, case in point, or even symbol.' [Lyotard 1982 68] This echoes Kant's
crucial notion of the' aesthetic' or 'indeterminate' idea, with his underlying thesis
207
that the failure of imagination is exposed and ultimately recuperated by the
conceptual faculties which generate these 'Ideas'. [Lyotard 1991 136] The
Kantian sublime as an experience, albeit inferred, of the absolute is seen to
provide just the transcendence needed as a grounding for Kant's whole critical
project. [See de Man 1996120-1] For Lyotard too the turn to a sublime aesthetics
marks the shift away from the narrowly 'aesthetic' question of taste and beauty,
to the question of the possibility of a transcendental grounding of knowledge
and ethics: 'This heralds the end of an aesthetics, that of the beautiful, in the
name of the final destination of the mind, freedom.' [Lyotard 1991 137] It is in
this sense that Lyotard also refers to the sublime as the 'concretization of an
objective infinity' or the 'universal Idea'. [Lyotard 198266,68]
At this point Lyotard refers to - and sounds very much like - Kant in his
discussion of abstract concepts, like 'humanity' or the' good', which he describes
as the unrepresentable subject-matter or content of the sublime:
That which is not demonstrable is that which stems from Ideas and for
which one cannot cite (represent) any example, case in point, or even
symbol. The universe is not demonstrable; neither is humanity, the end of
history, the moment, the species, the good, the just, etc. - or, according to
Kant, absolutes in general - because to represent is to make relative, to
place within the conditions of representation. [Lyotard 198268]
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But it is questionable whether there is anything particularly transcendental or
absolute about these categories; abstract concepts after all are not necessarily
absolute concepts. Lyotard further elides the two categories with the suggestion
that for Kant the abstract, whilst not a representation, is a demonstration 'that the
absolute exists', and moreover one that is achieved 'through "negative
representation"'. [Lyotard 1982 68] Even this idea of a demonstration is perhaps
too strong, bearing in mind the considerable inference that goes on in Kant's
establishing of the transcendental. That said, this idea of negativity, though
hardly the way we usually think about' abstract' concepts of goodness et cetera,
does point to a crucial strand of modern European philosophy's attempt to
establish grounds for judgment and knowledge at all.
This negativity is more reminiscent of Adorno's sublime aesthetics, and
significantly for Lyotard's own formulations seems to be at odds with Lyotard's
own position elsewhere on the sublime, where he compares Adorno's nostalgic
and backward-looking sublime with a joyous postmodern dismantling of rules
and categories. [See Lyotard 198481] This identifies Lyotard as a proponent of
what Manfred Frank calls postmodernism's 'positivisme heureux'. [Frank 1984
16] Frank is sceptical that any such a notion of sheer heterogeneity can sustain a
philosophical grounding.
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Immanence and autonomy
In this way, Lyotard parts company with the transcendental conclusions Kant
draws from indeterminacy, with the more typically postmodern investment in
the sublime as gaining its force through immanence. [See Lyotard 1991 110] He
suggests that unmediated perception of the matter of the sublime is possible, if
only for an instant, as an 'incomparable quality.' [Lyotard 1991141] Our relation
to this matter, which he describes in paradoxical terms as 'immaterial matter'
[Lyotard 1991141], is non-purposive and non-teleological, clearly replicating the
self-reflexivity of purpose that is crucial to Kant's aesthetics. Indeed, it cannot
have anything to do with such teleological relations, as it is seen to 'withdraw'
from every relationship: 'It is presence as unpresentable to the mind, always
withdrawn from its grasp. It does not offer itself to dialogue or dialectic.'
[Lyotard 1991142] Here, Lyotard is exploiting a crucial ambiguity at the heart of
Kant's sublime - namely that transcendence is only inferred from the failure and
recuperation of the mental faculties. Does the inference of the transcendental
follow necessarily from the indeterminacy of the sublime experience, or could it
lead one to conclude the immanence of such an experience, which is to say the
fact that it teaches us about nothing but itself? Can we reasonably stop to draw
our conclusions at the point of the failure of form and mind? Or does Lyotard's
logic only work if we prematurely halt the process of the mental faculties,
Lyotard's so-called freezing of the dialectic?
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This notion of the sublime experience as one of immanence not only replicates
Kant's exclusion of intention, but as we have seen above also aims to exclude all
that is 'non-artistic' from the interpretation of the artwork's import. In The
Inhuman: Reflections on Time Lyotard defends art's autonomy, drawing a
distinction between two 'orders of activity that it is necessary to keep apart from
each other.' [Lyotard 1991 135] These are classified as 'cultural' and 'artistic'
activities. The former is described as a response to 'the demand coming from
society' [Lyotard 1991136], which in spite of its undertones of Adorno's culture
industry actually refers to a Schillerian idea of cultural education centring on the
principles of taste and beauty. (In 'Presenting the Unpresentable: The Sublime'
Lyotard describes the avant-garde as absolving itself of the 'cultural
responsibility' for unifying taste. [Lyotard 1982 67]) 'Artistic' activity, on the
other hand, is privileged for its separateness from an aesthetics of taste unified
around the ideal of beauty, and is said to respond only to the question: 'what is
art?' This seems to be saying essentially the same thing as Walter Benjamin in
the Kunstkritik essay, namely that the discussion of whether an artwork is 'good'
or not is actually a response to the question of whether it actually 'counts' as art
or not. [See Benjamin 1972 79] There might be a paradox at the heart of this claim
to immanence: on the one hand, such ideas of aesthetic immanence preclude any
external means of judging art, whether in terms of its political or ideological
content, or according to questions of 'taste'; on the other hand, this 'immanent'
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art is placed above that which is seen to be affected by any external criteria, that
is to say, presumably on an overarching schema of value. Paradoxically, for
Lyotard this absence of overarching (aesthetic) criteria is a consequence precisely
of the transcendental nature of the sublime or indeterminate. This may not
contradict Kant's ideas on the transcendental nature of beauty and the sublime,
in as much as they are seen to bypass questions of personal taste.
The rejection of external input underlies Lyotard's valorisation of minimalism as
a sublime form of art which absolves the art-object of anything but its artfulness,
which Welsch celebrates as 'genuin-asthetisch' because it does not rely on
elements that are 'kunst-extern' for its political force. [Welsch 1990 167, 159] But
this claim to immanence also posits a fairly undialectical model of art's
autonomy that seems, as noted above, to sacrifice any interaction between art
and that from which it distinguishes itself. So whilst Lyotard asks whether
Kant's transcendental conclusions lead aesthetics into a cul-de-sac - '[o]ne can
legitimately wonder whether this shift from imagination to pure reason leaves
any room for an aesthetics' [Lyotard 1990298] - one might also wonder whether
Lyotard's immanence leaves any room for art. What would the purely aesthetic
look like when it has been divested of this 'external' content? Would such a
meaning-informing context have to have such hegemonic status? If such art is
seen to guarantee the validity of the plural and heterogeneous, must some plural
aspects not appear as a kind of content? Does this render such an idea of
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autonomy nothing but a highly philosophical position? I have already remarked
on Adorno's somewhat more nuanced position on this question, with reference
to his idea of the need for art to transform what is external to it.
Moreover, the plea for art-immanence as an absence of external reference seems
to preclude Gadamer's relatively uncontentious notion of an unconscious
horizon of cultural conditioning as a precondition of perception at all. Perhaps
the problem here turns on whether we are talking about individual and more or
less conscious subjective determination of the political import of an artwork (by
its author, for example), or a shared and more or less unconscious horizon of
expectation, as Gadamer has put forward. Whilst the former might relegate the
aesthetic qualities of the avant-garde artwork, the latter seems to be a
prerequisite for its effectiveness at all. Benjamin for instance might reject the
idea of any external criteria of judgment for art, but he does refers to the function
of critique as one which takes place in the consciousness of the recipient: 'durch
und durch Positiven der Erhohung des BewuBtseins im Reflektierenden'.
[Benjamin 1972 67] This sense of the recipient's role in 'completing' the artwork
returns to my sense of the irrepressible role of the recipient in philosophical
aesthetics, and moreover suggests that their specifically consciousness-raising
function might be crucial to how we assess artworks.
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In the same way it is questionable whether the critical potential of art really
depends on this separateness from individual investment: the demand of
immanence might deny the possibility of a specific stand-point from which
criticism may be actioned. The conceptualisation of such a stand-point might be
possible within a more flexible understanding of modernist art's autonomy as
periodically re-established in dialectical relation with various contexts. This
would include other artworks whose mode it subverts, as well as various aspects
of external reality.
Form and matter
For Lyotard art's immanence is not only a matter of the inadmissibility of
external or generally valid aesthetic criteria, but is also seen to derive from a
failure of art's formal quality, giving rise to a somehow 'immediate' experience
of the artwork. Lyotard refers to Kant's idea of 'formlessness, the absence of
form' [Lyotard 1984 781as an instance where formal organisation of material is
somehow lacking in the work of art. The idea of harmony between form and
matter, which is central to the aesthetics of the beautiful, has been superceded by
an aesthetics of the sublime in which form falls away - 'the paradox of an
aesthetics without sensible or imaginative forms' [Lyotard 1991136] - and sheer
matter is approached. As Lyotard puts it, 'the aim for arts [... J can only be that
of approaching matter', [Lyotard 1991 1391 This entails 'approaching presence
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without recourse to the means of presentation'. [Lyotard 1991 139] The example
that Lyotard cites is the minimalist avant-garde, whose turning away from
signification and presentation is noted by Paul Beidler: 'the fact that the sublime
cannot be presented becomes irrelevant when art loses interest in presentation, as
is the case with minimalism'. [Beidler 1995 179] This is combined with a de-
emphasis of technical ability. (It is worth noting that the simplicity exhibited in
minimalism is already identified with the sublime in Kant's pre-critical writings.
[Kant 1913 48]) But is minimalism really characterised by a loss of interest in
presentation, or by an intense interest in the fate of presentation? As such, this
'rejection' of form is self-contradictory, insofar as it, like Kant's treatment of the
sublime, arguably says more about the mode (or perhaps form) of our perception
of art than the object itself. As such, and in line with investments in the sublime
by Kant, Adorno and others, Lyotard's critique of form is as much a comment on
the relationship between the subject and object as a reference to the qualities of
the object itself. It is questionable whether this idea of art as sheer matter
absolved of the ordering and presenting moment of form plausible anyway. It
certainly goes against the broader insights of Kant's critical writings, in
particular his insistence on the necessary categories which precede any
perception, not to mention the less transcendental, more contextualised
hermeneutical imperative of 'Hinterfragen'. [See Frank 198410] It also seems to
resurrect that idea, which Adorno has already dismissed with Kant's concept of
'Naturmaterial', that matter can exist and be perceived in and of itself. That said
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Adorno himself is ambivalent on this, asserting at one point in relation to the
sublime that in some art the material of the work 'wird kahl, nackt sichtbar'
(Adorno 1970 2921, and there is a sense in which Lyotard's essentially
Nietzschean skepticism towards the organizing conceptual realm echoes
Adorno's critique of identity thinking: for Lyotard, the sublime perception is one
that we have not first' controlled, programmed, grasped by a concept [Begriff]'.
[Lyotard 1991110]
But Lyotard rejects the kind of modernism that Adorno values, which I have
characterized above in terms of its negativism. (Though it is worth pointing out
that the identification of modernism as nostalgic ignores what Richard Sheppard
has called the 'modernolatory' element in some modernism, exemplified in
Italian Futurism, which is marked by an 'unreserved commitment' to the
progressive and innovative aspects of modernity. (Sheppard 2000 82]) Adorno
famously refuses to claim anything as positive for art as jubilation at the new or
immanent, speaking rather in paradoxical epithets which express the possibilities
of art which are snatched from the jaws of its impossibility: 'Archaisch sind die
Kunstwerke im Zeitalter ihres Verstummens. Aber wenn sie nicht mehr
sprechen, spricht ihr Verstummen selbst.' (Adorno 1970 426] References to
silence and the unsayable as the most effective mode of art - 'Nur die intensive
Richtung der Worte in den Kern des innersten Verstummens hinein gelangt zur
Wirkung.' [Adorno 1970 304-5] - anticipate Welsch's own ideas on the
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anaesthetic as the only refuge for art in the face of the sensory excess and veneer
that characterises postmodernity. Lyotard refers to such instances of the
unsayable as a 'nostalgic sublime', which is characterized by its futile search for a
lost absolute or a lost formal unity. He prefers a postmodem sublime that is
characterized by its tendency towards infinite experimentation. Lyotard claims
that such aesthetic innovation is 'fundamentally not nostalgic and tended toward
the infinity of plastic experiment rather than toward the representation of any
lost absolute.' [Lyotard 198268] Welsch follows this gesture, claiming to want to
exploit the oppositional force available in modernism, whilst absolving it of its
reactionary and cynical aspect [Welsch 1990 157], and what he describes at one
point as a preference for the postmodem 'Vielheitsoption' over the modern
'Einheitssehnsucht' [Welsch 1990 93] seems to coincide with Lyotard's distinction
between a progressive and nostalgic sublime. But Lyotard himself is also at his
most openly contradictory here, approvingly citing Adorno's terms [see Lyotard
1991 110 and 116] and reiterating his idea of art as a '''negative'' presentation',
[Lyotard 1984 78] We have seen Welsch refer similarly to the sublime in art in
terms of 'ktinstlerische "Darstellung" (die eigentlich eine Nicht-Darstellung ist)'.
[Welsch 1990 89] Lyotard had already asserted that witnessing the failure of
representation has been the main concern of most twentieth century art: 'The
momentum of abstract painting since 1910 stems from the rigors of indirect,
Virtually ungraspable allusions to the invisible within the visual.' [Lyotard 1982
68] This in my view underlines the untenability of his ideas on a refusal of form
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and an accessing of sheer matter, confirming the mediated nature of art by its
own formal organisation and conceptuality.
And significantly for Welsch's ideas on aestheticisation and the 'exploitation' of
the aesthetic, Lyotard sees the vacuum left in the absence of aesthetic standards
as being filled by money: the value of artworks is assessed according to the profit
they yield. [See Lyotard 1984 76] Money (or the power it bestows) is thus seen to
assume the status of the transcendental Idea, evidence by Lyotard's reference in
'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde' to capital as 'an economy regulated by an
Idea - infinite wealth or power.' [Lyotard 1985 16] Paul Crowther notes this
parallel in Lyotard's formulations, focussing on the 'infinite analysability and
transformation' of the market [Crowther 1992 194], and this connection between
the market and the sublime underlies Paul Beidler's distinction that, whereas in
modernist art the sublime is seen as a mode of resistance, postmodernity as an
epoch is seen itself to be characterised by the sublime: 'The difference, then, is
that if modernism alludes to the sublime, postmodernism is itself sublime.'
[Beidler 1995 177] This echoes Jameson's notion of the sublime as the 'cultural
dominant' of the postmodern. [jameson 1991 6] In the broadest sense, the
sublime is taken to characterise our experience of the capitalist system around us,
which eludes our cognitive or conceptual faculties, what Jameson calls 'the
impossible totality of the contemporary world system'. [Jameson 1991 37J For
Jameson, similarly, this sublime nature of reality marks the rift between our
218
everyday (sensory) experience and abstract knowledge of society. [jameson 1991
381 This idea of a failure of representation contrasts markedly with the
conception of the sublime as particularly suitable for representing the
characteristic features of the postmodern, which Welsch suggests in one of his
versions of the anaesthetic. But is this anything more than a smokescreen which
gets in the way of real-world analysis of markets and their effects? Surely the
challenge is to present more than surface. Brecht had already pointed out that
social reality' ist langst nicht mehr im Totalen erlebbar'. [Brecht1967 172, see also
Giles 1997141] His point here is of coure that art which attempts the 'einfache
"Wiedergabe der Realitat'" [Brecht 1967 1711, that is to say art that is merely
mimetically representative of surface phenomena, fails to indicate the
increasingly complicated and no longer self-evident interconnections within the
capitalist system. At the same time, it makes little sense to me to describe
'reality' as characterized by indeterminacy, when our faculties seem to strive for
sense and order. Can indeterminacy endure in anything but a specifically
counter-cultural deployment? In particular it seems doubly ironic that some of
the sublime elements of reality, such as what Susan Bordo calls the 'non-
humanness' of technology [Bordo 1992 1751, are seen as a bad thing, whereas
when art possesses this non-human quality it is seen to contain oppositional
force, and similarly when characterised as 'unconsumable', the sublime is
understood to resist the process of commodification in a positive way.
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Experiment, innovation and the 'remainder'
It is also questionable whether Lyotard's infinite and plural experimentation is
even plausible as a means of describing art and its critical potential. For Lyotard
and Welsch's terms, there seems to be a crucial tension between the idea of art as
plural and 'infinitely forward-looking' and art as experimental. Emphasizing the
plurality of experimental art seems to abstract the particularity of the specific art-
object, that element (or those elements) which set it apart as experimental, from
the very context which generates its experimental force. Art is not sheerly plural,
but rather an interaction of precisely such moments as art's formal
decomposition and reflexivity, as is implicit in Tynjanov's theory of aesthetic
evolution. As such, art's reflexivity and formal dismantling works at cross-
purposes to an 'anything-goes' pluralism. Indeed, experimental art seems to rely
on a preference of one (most recent) moment of art over other (previous)
moments.
That said, Lyotard does refer more plausibly to the essentially dialectical process
of innovation which characterises modernist art, in which a certain immanent
'occurrence' [Lyotard 1985 2], which he identifies with the sublime, plays a
crucial role: 'this agitation [here Lyotard is referring to innovation] [... ] is only
possible if something remains to be determined'. [Lyotard 1985 2] The sublime is
in this respect identified with a kind of 'freespace' that precisely makes the
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dialectical movement possible. Again this remainder is the equivalent of
Adorno's 'das Mehr', albeit that Adorno is readier to acknowledge the always
dialectical relation of this element of the process: 'das Mehr ist nicht einfach der
Zusammenhang sondern ein Anderes, durch ihn Vermitteltes und trotzdem von
ihm Gesondertes.' [Adorno 1970 122] Perhaps this is simply a question of
emphasis, but more generally, in my view Adorno's understanding of this
process of innovation is more sophisticated than Lyotard and Welsch's, firstly
because it allows a moment of conceptual mediation (Adorno reads art both in
terms of its own conceptuality and in terms of its effect on consciousness and
cognitive process, as allowing a 'Durchbrechung des verdinglichten
Bewufstseins.' [Adorno 1970 292]), and secondly because he accommodates an
understanding of the formal conventionality of art, which Lyotard and Welsch's
allegedly wholesale dismissal of form cannot do. As far as the idea of
postmodern or sublime art as formless is concerned, it seems likely that,
throughout the dialectical process of disruption and realignment of expectations,
of suspension and reassertion of norms, art only temporarily escapes its formal
cohesion as art. In this way, Adorno's retention of the category of form might be
seen as a more realistic understanding of the nature of avant-garde art which is
caught in a continual renegotiation with its own status as art.
Conceptuality, conventionality and the cognitive nature of the modernist aesthetic
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Lyotard and Welsch are not unaware of the conceptuality of modernist art.
Welsch, for example, defines the reflexivity of modern art as not only something
for the senses, but for thought: 'Als reflektierende ist die Kunst der Moderne ein
Untemehmen nicht mehr nur der Sinne, sondern auch des Geistes und Denkens.'
[Welsch 1990 88] This tallies with Christopher Butler's understanding of art's
conceptuality is a key ingredient of the dialectic of innovation which
characterises early twentieth century modernist art (and arguably all art).
Innovation is said to take place 'within a broadly philosophical matrix of ideas', a
conceptual sphere 'which is fundamental to the enabling of the innovatory
impulse'. [Butler 1994 249] Recognising modernist art's increasingly conceptual
or cognitive nature presumably detracts from Welsch's wish to reconfigure the
aesthetic as essentially sensory. Moreover, echoes of the Kantian sublime are
apparent in this concept of art as something for the mind, a return of the
conceptual or cognitive moment that is repressed in Welsch and Lyotard's ideas
of sublime art as an experience of immanence and sheer matter. Is there not also
a world of difference between these claims and Lyotard's essentially Kantian
idea of sublime art as an 'evasion' of our conceptual faculties, as something that
we have not 'controlled, programmed, grasped by a concept [Begri££]'?[Lyotard
1991110] Whether called the non-identical, the indeterminate or the remainder,
a failure of the conceptual in the face of innovation is in some respects still
conceptual, even as it marks the limit of our determinate capacity for concepts.
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For Albrecht Wellmer, innovation's indeterminate spark occurs where the non-
identical offers a space of freedom from conventions of representation,
perception and cognition. [Wellmer 1993 187-90] This returns to my
understanding of the sublime as useful for describing the modernist aesthetic's
fragile dialectic of innovation and convention. I have suggested above that
Lyotard's various investments in the sublime as on the one hand immanent and
'unobtainable' [Lyotard 1984 81] and on the other as pure and transcendent are
two sides of the same coin, but neither are very convincing as models of aesthetic
autonomy. Lyotard himself expresses the idea of his unhesitatingly positive,
open and characteristically postmodern sublime in terms of a 'jubilation which
result[s] from the invention of new rules of the game'. [Lyotard 1984 80] But I
have already asserted the logical flaw in any characterisation of innovation as
immanent: the reference to the 'new rules of the game' indicates a
conventionality (and its corollary, an institutionality) of which art cannot ever
fully overcome. Lyotard himself, when discussing the modernist break with
mimetic representation, indicates the implicit conventionality of art: "'Modern
painters" discovered that they had to represent the existence of that which was not
demonstrable if the perspectival laws of construizione legittima were followed.'
[Lyotard 1982 67] This is to say, with Schoenberg, that 'no new technique in the
arts is created that has not had its roots in the past'. [Cited in Butler 1994 47]
Schoenberg conceives his own innovations as evolutionary, rather than somehow
radically new: atonality is an extension of and addition to tonality, or as Franz
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Marc says of Schoenberg's suspension of tonality: IA so called dissonance is only
a more remote consonance.' [Cited in Butler 1994 47] Moreover, art can only
break the rules of the game temporarily, suspending their operation until new
rules and new expectations coalesce around the innovation. In this way,
autonomous art's relationship to the new must always be conceived dialectically:
whilst its imperative is innovation, this innovation is only a temporary (and
always recuperated) disruption of our expectation.
Of course, the conventionality of art is broader than the coordinates of the
sublime. The question even arises whether such a focus on innovation and
conventionality loses touch with the specificity of the sublime. Paul Crowther,
for instance, questions whether the broad formulation of innovation has
anything to do with the specifics of the sublime, and suggests that Kant's theory
of genius might stand as a better model for the innovatory process of avant-
garde art. [Crowther 1989 73] But Crowther's focus on genius is at odds with the
idea that the sublime marks a turn away from authorial intention, which Paul
Beidler describes as a 'turning against the will' [Beidler 1995 179], and which
underlies Welsch's reading of Adorno's sublime, as well as Lyotard's notion of
the sublime as the 'inhuman'. [Lyotard 1991 1] Moreover, this general
understanding of the sublime as what Weiskel calls a necessary complement to a
psychology which stresses its own limits [see Weiskel 1976 17], central to the
Kantian sublime, points to what I think is a potentially fruitful way of conceiving
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of the operation of the sublime in art, namely in terms of art's cognitive, and
specifically defamiliarising, effect. The cognitive nature of the sublime is already
implicit in Wellmer's idea of the non-identical as an experience at the limits of
psychology that is unprotected by aesthetic convention. [See Wellmer 1993 187-
190] The cognitive aspect of art had already been explicitly thematised in the
writings of the Expressionist playwright Georg Kaiser, who at the end of the 1917
essay 'Das Drama Piatons' describes our experience of drama as a 'Denkspiel',
which draws us 'aus karger Schau-Lust zu gluckvoller Denk-Lust'. [Kaiser 1971
IV 545] This turn against 'Schau-Lust' suggests the refusal of beauty, whether in
its classical Kantian or postmodern aestheticised variants, opposed as they are by
a more modernist 'Denk-Lust'. Once again, this 'Denk-Lust' returns to the
Kantian sublime, which belongs to the mind rather than the senses. However,
the Kantian conclusion of the superiority of the rational intellect is not the only
conclusion that can be drawn here: the opposite might also be instructive.
Moreover, the sublime interaction might not just teach us about ourselves, but
about the way we interact with the external world.
It might be plausible to distinguish between two ways of conceiving of this
cognitive function of art: firstly, as a kind of reconstruction of aspects of our
cognitive processes, or secondly, as a dismantling or disruption. Whereas the
former suggests a mode of art that remains closer to mimetic representation, the
latter marks a more distinct departure from those terms. Jarneson's ideas on
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representation in the postmodern era follow on from Brecht's notion of the
failure of mimetic representation. As Christopher Butler reminds us, conceptual
art is not to be thought of in simple terms of a direct correspondence to reality:
Such signs may reveal the way in which we conceive of the external
world, which means that art of this kind does not (really) represent, but
rather shows us how the mind might use signs to remind itself of aspects
of the external world. [Butler 1994 721
This reference to 'how the mind might use signs' reiterates the idea of a
specifically cognitive function of art, which Butler referring to art as thematising
'the ways in which we conceive of the external world'. [Butler 1994721 It seems
to be along these lines that David Frisby calls for 'radically new cognitive and
experimental maps' [Frisby 1985 4], and Fredric Jameson conceives of art as a
kind of 'cognitive mapping'. [jameson 1991 51] This idea for a 'new radical
cultural politics' is seen to be not mimetic, but rather to allow representation' on
a higher and much more complex level'. [jameson 199150 and 51] This cognitive
nature of art (in the sense of focussing on patterns of thinking) is not a smaller
aspect of art's conceptuality (in the sense of being self-reflexive about the concept
of art). Indeed, it precisely seems to go beyond this conceptuality in as much as
it can go beyond the limits of such self-reflexivity, able to thematise the types of
COgnition that we expect from non-art reality, as well as art. As Steve Giles
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points out, Jameson's cognitive mapping is anticipated by Brecht [see Giles 1997
1861,for whom the issue of the representability of an increasingly complex reality
is a central issue. Giles suggests reading Alexander Kluge's prose collages in
these terms.
In contrast to this idea of reconstruction, the 'Denk-Spiel' that takes place in
Schklovsky's defamiliarisation aims to dismantle our habits and norms of
perception and disrupt and slow down the usual course of our cognitive
processes. Both Schklovsky and Mukarovsky reject any kind of impressionism,
that is to say the idea of art as 'thinking in images' [Schklovsky 1965 3] or
'Denken inBildern'. [Tynjanov 1969 393] This seems to turn on the cliche that' a
picture is worth a thousand words', and that evocation of such imagery in poetic
language can aspire to a similar economy of words and thinking. For
Schklovsky, art or the aesthetic is seen to oppose the clarity and 'economy of
mental effort' [Schklovsky 1965 51 that this suggests, rather deploying rather an
unsettling experience that Tynjanov describes as a 'Verstofs gegen das System'.
[Tynjanov 1969 395] Schklovsky describes this kind of problematised perception
in almost Kantian terms as an end in itself:
The technique of art is to make objects 'unfamiliar,' to make forms
difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the
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process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.
[Schklovsky 1965 12]
Schklovsky defines the poetic as the project of problematising this
automatisation. For Christopher Butler, Dada offers an example of this idea of
art as an 'investigation of subconscious and automatic processes'. [Butler 1994
45] Rather than Brecht's concern to reproduce reality 'im Totalen' [Brecht 1967
172], and Jameson's still essentially 'representative' strategy of 'cognitive
mapping', this disruption of our cognitive processes suggests more marginal and
arguably more modest aims, such as exposing or challenging of the
automatisation of human existence or creating a cognitive free space. This
(relatively) indeterminate cognitive moment is arguably implicit in Schklovsky's
formulations, and as such might share the sense of indeterminacy as ideas of art
as 'remainder', as non-identical, and as anti-conceptual discussed above. But
crucially different implications seem to be drawn from this experience, and ones
that suggest a reconnection with the life-world, as opposed to the immanence
and transcendence discussed above.
The above sentences from Schklovsky sound like Kant's sublime, in which the
object is only the trigger for the more interesting mental response: 'Art is a way of
experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important.' [Schklovsky 1965
12, original emphasis] Kant's insistence that the force of the sublime cannot be
228
ascribed to any fixed object apart from the mind also finds an important echo in
the idea that we cannot ascribe this aesthetic, defamiliarising force, as espoused
in Jan Mukarovsky's theory of aesthetic function and developed in Jurij
Tynjanov's theory of aesthetic evolution. [see Mukarovsky 1977 and 1979, and
Tynjanov 1969 66-78, see Giles 1995 and Sheppard 1989 16-24] So Tynjanov
writes 'wird das, was heute ein literarisches Faktum ist, morgen zu einem
einfachen Faktum des Lebens und verschwindet aus der Literatur.' [Tynjanov
1969 399] But what ramifications does this relegation of the object have for
representation? Does the dismantling of our habits of perception, of 'standard'
reality, relinquish or refuse the power to represent in any positive way? Does it
capitulate to the idea that representation can only be true if it is somehow
'negative'? As such, does such a break of habits claim to reconnect us with a
certain kind of 'real'? And what status does that 'real' have if it is not our
habitual real? If it discloses something, is that something somehow truer? Does
this lead us inevitably back to Adorno's 'negation'?
In my view it is pivotal to the dialectical nature of this kind of formalist-cognitive
reading of the aesthetic that it does not relinquish all connection with the
external referent. For Schklovsky, 'art exists that one may recover the sensation
of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony'. [Schklovsky
1965 12] This sensory experience in art should not distract us from the
essentially cognitive nature of what Schklovsky is talking about; in one key
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respect it is precisely the opposite of Lyotard's notion of art as an experience of
'sheer matter', somehow subverting its mediation by form. For Schklovsky,
defamiliarisation and form are practically synonymous: 'I personally feel that
defamiliarisation is found almost everywhere form is found.' [Schklovsky 1965
18] But the important point is that this formalism is not at the expense of our
awareness of the referent. Schklovsky conceptualizes this in terms of the
difference between what we 'perceive' and what we (think we) 'know': 'The
purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not
as they are known: [Schklovsky 1965 12] This distinction returns to the
discussion of the competing reality-claims of Erlebnis, Erfahrung and Eruiartung,
noted with reference to Walter Benjamin and Odo Marquard in chapter two.
This turns on the tension between the material particularity of lived experience
and the accrued and sedimented results of such moments. Is this intensely lived
experience the same as Lyotard's immanent occurrence? In other words, what
relation does this Erlebnis] Erfahrung bear to the contextual Ertoartung in contrast
to which it is generated? Of course, the crucial point is that particular experience
that some art specializes in both deviates from and depends and reflects on the
context of previous experience. Gadamer reminds us that our knowledge of
objects is determined by shared convention in much the same way as modes of
artistic representation. Gadamer levels this awareness of perception's
dependence on context against what he calls Kant's 'Lehre von der reinen
Wahrnehmung'. [Gadamer 199096] I will return to this question of the aesthetic
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as intervening in located but latent shared expectations as opposed Kant's
transcendental aesthetic below.
Welsch is on similar terrain in one of his readings of the anaesthetic, namely as
the unthematised cultural and cognitive preconditions to perception mentioned
in chapter one. In the next chapter I will return to this aspect of Welsch's
formulations, which will be contrasted to his idea of aesthetics as a study of sense
perception which seems to flatten out the terrain of the aesthetic as a question of
perception switched on and off, bereft of any more sophisticated mechanism that
might take account of such habits and preconditions of perception. Indeed, the
idea that art can switch perception off seems to be least accommodating of
external reference, and its opposite, sensory excess, seems to suggest a return to
immanence or anti-conceptuality. But even extremes cannot be said to be
internally and immanently constructed of perception and can tell us about habits
of perception. I have already mentioned John Cage's (in)famous silent pieces,
and Cage himself writes of the experience of silence as bringing to the fore that
which is not normally thematised. [See Cage 1961 22-3] I will also discuss this
idea of exposing the latent and unthematised elements of perception in relation
to Peter Handke's theatre in chapter five. Moreover, the deployment and
thematisation of the cognitive and perceptual in art is not just an issue of the
mind and ideological investment, it marks an important return to the bodily, and
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its interrelation with the ideological. I will discuss this in chapter six with
reference to Heiner Muller's theatre.
As well as conventions of representation, this idea of dismantling habits of
perception might reflect on the status of the 'real'. Does the identification of
habits of perception suggest that the real is in some way' derealised', in the sense
that what we take to be true is only justified circularly, as a fulfillment of what
we expect to be true. The idea of imperceptible art as an 'anti-fiction' seems to
suggest that this is a problem that art might redress. But how would this relate
to the idea of the sublime as somehow characteristic of a de-realised world in the
light of techno-scientific advances? The tension is certainly apparent between
the idea of the sublime as giving an impression of the imperceptible aspects of
the world and the essentially modernist understanding of the sublime as
describing a mode of cognitive intervention that is somehow resistant to these
habits. In terms of its' reality status' Gadamer's conventional context is in some
ways opposite to the view of the sublime taken by Kant, for whom it is not that
the determinate (and conventional) is the context that allows the indeterminate
to exist, but rather the opposite: from indeterminacy one can infer the super-
sensory basis on which the determinate must depend. Charles Taylor makes the
same point in his conception of the expressive spark which offers a foothold for
meaning in designative language. [See Taylor 1985 221] Does conceptualizing
the sublime as a defamiliarising deviation from convention rob it of these
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transcendental conclusions? This question returns to my distinction between
two conceptions of what aesthetics can offer: universal grounds or marginal
intervention. But if I have suggested that Lyotard's arrest of the dialectic, like
Kant's, is arbitrary and incomplete - in spite of any claim that the horizontal and
heterogeneous is absolved of the requirement of grounding - does a similar
problem arise here? Can we stop at the idea of indeterminacy as a marginal
intervention? Conversely, do we lose anything by leaping to Kant's
transcendental conclusions? Does the conceptualization of the transcendental as
indeterminate mean that we have reached an end of what we can talk about, as
in Wittgenstein's assessment of the limits of philosophy: 'Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, daruber muss man schweigen'? [Wittgenstein 1922 188J Would
empirical cognitive analysis offer a means of asking how this indeterminacy
works, what determinate preconceptions it unpicks, or would it be a case of the
Emperor's new clothes, the goose that lays the golden eggs?
On the one hand, art's cognitive effect seems essentially to belong to a
Wirkungsasthetik, and as such to an empirical aesthetics whose effect presumably
depends to some extent on the context of its reception. This insistence on context
(and expectation) for art's effect might rather suggest a conception of the
aesthetic as local intervention, getting away from Kantian attempts to theorise in
transcendental terms where the value of art comes from. This might be the sense
behind Hal Foster's idea of an 'anti-aesthetic' which entails I interference' in the
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'vernacular' rather than any universal models for the value of art. [Foster 1985
xiii] But in Schklovsky's terms such art is not itself vernacular, but precisely
interrupts the vernacular. Hal Foster's point is that we should abandon the
illusion of the aesthetic as a privileged and autonomous realm, but this does not
take into account the alternative view of the way aesthetic autonomy can work.
The need to abandon the concept of autonomy disappears if one has a more
dialectical, flexible account of art's distinction from everyday life.
For me such flexibility is offered by a cognitively informed and culturally located
conception of the aesthetic, which I have associated with the fragile, dialectical
and essentially cognitive nature of the sublime as a limit experience in my
discussion above. That said, the above discussion of the modernist and
postmodernist sublimes clearly points towards a number of difficulties regarding
the theoretical usefulness of the Janus-faced concept of the sublime. Does the
concept of the sublime suffer from being too vague for useful application to art
or reality? Does it indicate an escape from conceptual control which opens up to
plurality or indeed closes around an immanent singularity? Is it a kind of
infinite and transcendental 'Idea' or a refusal of the conceptual? Can it be
theorised in terms of the formal innovation of the modernist artwork, or at least
the effect of that limit of meaning on the human mind, or is it an aspect of our
everyday experience of postmodern reality? If it describes a way of responding to
reality, does this operation disclose a different 'real', that we had somehow not
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seen before, or a 'real' that is unobtainable or an experience that indicates a
transcendental realm? My overriding concern in seeking clarification here is to
ask what becomes of the oppositional force of the sublime as a theory of art in the
face of its theorisation as a cultural dominant. My point has been to suggest that
the sublime can be useful as a means of theorising oppositional art in particular
in characterising the intersection of form and its cognitive impact to provide a
more dialectical sense of art's autonomy. Through a more located and
contextualized nature of the aesthetic's indeterminacy one might find a pathway
between Kant's transcendental autonomy and sheer empiricism. The question
for Welsch in the next chapter will be to what extent his ideas on anaesthetics
admit of this dialectical flexibility and this engaging of form, cognition and non-
art experience in a way that his broader ideas on aesthetics suggest.
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Chapter 4 . The ideology of the anaesthetic
Welsch does not draw attention to or explore the parallels between his notion of
anaesthetic and his discussion of sublime theory in relation to Adorno and
Lyotard, but the former might well be conceived as a variant of the sublime. This
is particularly evident in its conceptualisation as a means of characterising the
allegedly imperceptible nature of reality or in his preference for art which
problematises sensory experience, this latter being the aspect that I referred to as
the 'sublime anaesthetic' in chapter one. Welsch allocates this type of art a truth-
value, at least implicitly, by virtue of its opposition to the fictionality of the
aestheticised world, in which respect it echoes Lyotard and others' investment in
the sublime as a non-conceptual 'impossible-real' [Zizek 1989 194], or an
experience of matter somehow 'beyond formal organisation'. But in contrast to
Lyotard's notion of the sublime as an immanent quality that defies conceptual
control, the anaesthetic is to be located in the context of Welsch's broader
conception of aesthetics, following Baumgarten, as a study of sensation and
perception, and moreover as a dialectical 'Kehrseite' or 'Doppel' of or
'Gegenbegriff' to the aesthetic. [Welsch 1990 10-111 It is an aspect of a broader
contemporary culture that he characterises in terms of a combination of
anaesthetic and aestheticised elements. As such, as we have seen, the anaesthetic
embraces various ideas, including an involuntary shutting off in the face of
sensory excess, whereby we are able to withstand aspects of the commodified
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world; a cognitive precondition of perception, a method of selection without
which we cannot perceive anything; a cultural version of this precondition, or a
recognition that the criteria of selection are culturally defined; an instance of
imperceptibility, which is seen to be somehow representative of a technologically
changed reality; and finally a strategic response in art to the various
manifestations of aestheticisation.
I have already registered the tension between the return to a focus on art and
Welsch's stated project of a broader discipline of aesthetics - 'Ich mochte
Asthetik genereller als Aisthetik verstehen: als Thematisierung von
Wahrnehmung aller Art'. [Welsch 1990 9-10, my emphasis] Perhaps the success
of such a project would depend on the extent to which one was able to articulate
the interaction between everyday perception and various models of art as
particular and distinct, but related, modes of perception. This will be a concern
in the discussions that follow. Similarly, there is nothing necessarily wrong with
having multiple and varying ideas on how art functions; it would seem to be
restrictive and unrealistic to insist that art can only function in one way. For
Peter Burger, the impossibility of privileging one model of artistic functioning
over another is an essential characteristic of the contemporary aesthetic:
Fur die Gegenwart ist von einem Nebeneinander verschiedener
Materialzustande auszugehen. Das Nebeneinander von II realistischer"
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und "avantgardistischer" Kunst ist heute eine Tatsache, gegen die es
keinen legitimen theoretischen Einspruch mehr gibt. [Burger 1983 11]
This 'Nebeneinander' is echoed in Welsch's own conviction as to the essential
plurality of modern art and the absence of any overarching criteria for judging
art, discussed in chapter three. [SeeWelsch 1990 68] But there I argued that this
plurality is at odds with the way the (essentially modernist) aesthetic of
experiment and innovation that Welsch is trying to describe works, and here I
will suggest that there may be crucial incompatibilities between Welsch own
distinct ideas of art and the role that the anaesthetic plays in them. One such
incompatibility is evident between the idea that the imperceptible artwork is
somehow resistant to perception (what I have called the 'sublime' anaesthetic)
and the idea that such imperceptible art is specifically useful for developing our
sensitivity towards those elements of existence which are increasingly shown to
be imperceptible (this latter describes what I have labelled the 'pragmatic'
anaesthetic) .
In my view though this tension between the pragmatic and oppositional
understandings of art is less problematic than the contradiction between
Welsch's conceptions of art as salvaging some kind of authenticity in the face of a
de-realised world (again the 'sublime' anaesthetic) and art as a defamiliarising
intervention in our habits of perception (the 'cognitive' anaesthetic). This tension
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is apparent insofar as the former offers the anaesthetic as art's solution (or at least
response) to problems in the everyday world, whilst the latter sees the
anaesthetic, in the guise of latent cultural habits and norms, as the problem to be
addressed in art. Welsch himself defends his fast and loose use of the concept of
anaesthetics in terms of its dialectical flexibility [see Welsch 1990 9], but the
problem is not the dialectical interplay between aesthetic and anaesthetic, but
that these ideas of artistic function rest on two distinct and conflicting
conceptions of what the anaesthetic is, prior to its application to art. Firstly, the
anaesthetic is understood as a response, either conscious or involuntary, to a
specifically postmodern aestheticisation, a switching-off in the face of an excess
of sense-perceptual experience. Secondly, the anaesthetic is understood as a kind
of unconscious cognitive selection procedure that is the necessary and
unconscious precondition of perception at all. This is a process which art is seen
to be able to bring to light, in a de-anaesthetising 'Bildarbeit' [Welsch 1990 35]
that exposes the latent and anaesthetic conditions of knowledge. Aside from the
fact that this latter, cognitive, anaesthetic involves a shift from the treatment of
the aesthetic in terms of the sensory, surface phenomena and claims of
immanence to an awareness of the cognitive complexity of perception, the
operation of such latent preconditions to perception presumably raises the
question of whether it is plausible to speak of such non-perception at all.
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In my presentation of the anaesthetic in chapter one I also indicated other
slippages from Welsch's central idea of rewriting the aesthetic in terms of the
sensory, such as the characterisation of aestheticised world as fictional. This
suggests that the imperceptible artwork is a kind of receptacle of truth. Itmay be
reasonable for art to make these claims, but it should be acknowledged that, far
from an ideological 'Pause' or free-space - as Lyotard and others claim with
respect to the sublime - they do invest the sublime anaesthetic with crucial
philosophical and, I shall argue in what follows here, ideological elements.
Philosophical anaesthetics: negativity and ideology
In view of the fact that it is conceived as a response to everyday experience,
Welsch's anaesthetic proposes a very philosophical understanding of art's
function. In chapter one I noted the common ground between the anaesthetic
and theoretical investments in silence. Famously for Wittgenstein at the end of
the Tractaius, silence is all that's left to us once philosophy has unraveled its own
claims to be able to reach absolute values and truths: 'Wovon man nicht sprechen
kann, daruber muss man schweigen.' [Wittgenstein 1922 118] The paradoxical
status of Welsch's 'unsichtbare Objekte' might be taken, after Wittgenstein, as an
indication that the limits of propositional logic have been reached. Certainly this
would chime with Welsch's notion that aesthetics has gained in importance
because of the failure of philosophy to accommodate the sensory: 'Die
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angesprochene Uberschreitung kann jedoch, eben als Uberschritt ins
Aisthetische, schwerlich philosophisch, kann vielmehr selbst nur aisthetisch und
somit in prominenter Funktion kiinstlerisch geleistet werden.' [Welsch 1987 24]
(This also for Welsch justifies his own return of art to the centre-stage.) But in
spite of his remark about philosophy here, in chapter two I located the
'indeterminate' quality of sensory absence in a fairly philosophical tradition,
with reference to Kant and the early Romantics. But quite distinct from Kant's
project to vindicate the authority of reason, such a philosophical position might
have parallels with various notions of truth in religion, in particular in mystical
thought and oriental religion. So Meister Eckhardt, the thirteenth century
Christian mystic, writes of a Godhead, whose 'is-ness' ('isticheit') cannot be put
into words since 'to say it is already negating it', and that can only be
experienced as 'nothing' ('niht'), as a void 'bereft of matter and form, where the
soul comes to naught'. [Cited in Buning 1990 136] So this post-philosophical
paradox has echoes of Taoism, which Lothar Schroder describes as the 'letzte
Wirklichkeit der Welt'. [Schroder 1991 218] Tao refuses all significatory
exchange, 'hat keine Form, besitzt kein Abbild und ist nicht aussprechbar und
nicht iibertragbar. Zur existentiellen Form des Tao wird deshalb das Schweigen.'
[Schroder 1991 218] George Steiner in 'Language and Silence' also mentions the
Taoist idea of 'ever-deepening silence' [Steiner 1969 31] as somehow higher or
truer than language, which itself is 'tarnished, flattened to the touch like a coin
too long in circulation'. [Steiner 1969 70-71] Silence has therefore been elected by
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'the most articulate' [Steiner 1969 68], a renewal that takes the paradoxical form
of a 'renunciation' or 'abdication'. [Steiner 1969 69] Buddhism similarly reveres
silence, or emptiness, as an end in itself, and an absence which indicates an
origin. These positions all exemplify what Michael Hardt calls 'negative
metaphysics' [Hardt 1991244], and echo the idea discussed in the last chapter of
the sublime experience as a kind of secularised religion. [SeeWeiskel1976 3J
Welsch is not alone in seeing art as particularly suitable as a vehicle for this kind
of inexpressible truth. In her 1969 essay, 'The Aesthetics of Silence', Susan
Sontag characterises the 'negative' status of this kind of art in post-theological
terms: 'As the activity of the mystic must end in a via negativa, a theology of
God's absence, a craving for the cloud of unknowing beyond knowledge.'
[Sontag 1969 5] So it is that the imperceptible and the silent in art become a kind
of refuge for such metaphysical claims. For Peter Weiss in Die Asthetik des
Widerstands, for instance, silence is not only thematised as a source of
disenfranchisement and powerlessness,' as a means of coping in adverse
circumstances, but is also characterised as somehow mystical and crucially
1 As Weiss writes in his autobiography: 'Er mufste lernen, sich in dern neuen
Sprache anzusiedeln, oder er mu15tein der Sprachlosigkeit untergehen.' [Weiss
1968 181] This powerlessness is also evident in Beckett's Not I, where we learn of
the narratee's inability to articulate: 'so disconnected ... never got the message ...
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'authentic'. Of the silent figure of his mother in the novel the narrator asserts
'was sie in sich trage, sei eine Wahrheit, eine schreckliche, fur uns noch
unverstandliche Wahrheit'. [Weiss 1998 884, see also Langer 1988 45] In his
Noiizbucher he makes clear the paradoxical inaccessibility of this visionary force:
'Sie sieht alles, wir sehen nur ihr Verstummen.' [Weiss 1981 763] Similarly, in the
same acceptance speech for the Georg Buchner prize that Welsch cites at the end
of' Asthetik und Anasthetik', Botho StrauB associates the silence which pervades
his dramatic and prose work with revelation: 'Niemand spricht metaphysicher
als der, dem Gott sich jah in der Umkehrung offenbart, in Abgrund, Wunde und
Leere.' [StrauB 1999 31] And in his Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit the link with the
mystical tradition is made explicit: 'Dieses Schweigen wird - wie in der
mystischen Tradition - als Gott angesprochen.' [StrauB 1999 53] This idea of
revelation coincides with Welsch's analogy between art as anaesthetic and the
specifically invisible element of pre-modern theological belief. [See Welsch 1990
25] Marius Buning discusses Samuel Beckett's late plays as inhabited by a
similar mysticism, in the sense that ultimate meaning always evades our grasp,
and, by virtue of the fact that 'to say it is already to negate it', may only be
accessed by silence or emptiness. [See Buning 1990 136] Bjarn Myskja refers to
the 'awareness of Nothing', as opposed to any meaning for our age, as the 'main
contribution' of Beckett's Molloy. [Myskja 200148] I will return to this discussion
or powerless to respond ... like numbed ... couldn't make the sound ... not any
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of such imperceptible art as a 'negative' of presentation, and to Beckett's later
dramas in particular, in chapter five.
This turn to art and its relationship with philosophy and mysticism clearly takes
us some way from Welsch's interest in the broader 'everyday' significance of the
aesthetic as sensory. Indeed, in the light of Welsch's comments about Aristotle's
own betrayal of the sensory, it is worth asking whether this marks Welsch's own
,Asthesiologie' . Certainly it is symptomatic of the tension between Welsch's
different uses of the same terms that his concern to 'rehabilitate' the sensory
contrasts sharply with his identification of sensory excess and artifice as one of
the main problems we face in a newly aestheticised world. His skepticism about
the possibility of fruitful contemplation (and presumably therefore of evaluation)
in the face of contemporary experience is matched by an ambivalence towards
the idea of the sensory as offering resistance to the dominant effects of
contemporary aestheticisation. On the one hand he does suggest that sensory
experience may be a 'Komplement und Kompensat' [Welsch 1987 22] to the over-
determination by an abstract or rationalist view of the world: 'aber der
Aristotelische Ansatz enthalt doch gewichtige Strukturen, die transformiert
durchaus fruchtbar zu machen waren und gerade als Korrektiv moderner
Einseitigkeit zukunftsweisend werden konnten', [Welsch 198730] On the other
sound'. [Beckett 1986 378]
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hand his notion of art seems precisely to return to a contemplative and abstract
mode of art.
Moreover, does this elision of the epistemological concerns that have motivated
philosophical movements like phenomenology, and the deleterious effects of
everyday phenomena (with quite different provenance) work? Would the
seconding of the aesthetic to specifically philosophical questions of
determination, grounding and the status of the real preclude the aesthetic's
usefulness as a means of describing everyday perception? Alternatively, does
this same usefulness depend on the aesthetic's mediation by more or less
philosophical questions? As far as this everyday nature of the problems Welsch
is addressing is concerned (problems such as the excess of sensory experience,
the mediation of reality by images, the predominance of veneer over substance,
and the thoroughgoing beautification of our environment), an initial difficulty
with Welsch's notion of anaesthetic art as a response to everyday phenomena is
that it is implausible that one type of minimalist art can address or resist all of
them. Moreover, if one allows that these phenomena of aestheticisation include
an ideological aspect, it is questionable whether Welsch's anaesthetic, reduced to a
binary treatment of aesthetics as Iperception: on' or Iperception: off', is equipped
to address the ideological complexity of what is really occurring in the disparate
phenomena of aestheticisation. Whilst it is plausible that the anaesthetic as
sensory might resist mass consumption, it is not clear that the anaesthetic avoids
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manipulation of consciousness which is apparent in, for example, the
commodification or the fetishization associated with Baudrillard's concept of
'sign value'. [See Baudrillard 1998 77] And if aestheticisation is what Mike
Featherstone refers to as an 'intensification of image production' [Featherstone
1991 65], as Welsch's idea of a 'mediale Bildwelt' suggests [Welsch 1990 15],
surely this image production is not reducible to mere image, but must be
conceived in more complex terms of what is being represented and how. The
preference for style over substance in all spheres of life from politics to food
cannot be criticised by disengaging the perceptual in toto, but must presumably
be exposed in relation to the more concrete facts which it conceals.
This neglect of questions of ideology and habit in favour of more extravagant
issues of nothingness or the infinite echoes the problem which, in Daniel Bell's
view, sets up an obstacle to realistic social change: 'Our fascination with the
apocalypse blinds us to the mundane'. [Bell 1976 8] Bell is referring, from a
somewhat different political position, to the cataclysmic prospect of revolution
which undermines the more modest aim of social change, and the point I want to
discuss below is that Welsch's anaesthetic might precisely distract us from
reflecting on norms of perception and behaviour (which some art as
imperceptible does indeed seem to meditate on). Is it unfair to criticize the
anaesthetic in the first place for proposing an aesthetics, a theory of art, that is
limited to crude and binary positions of perception on or off, and then condemn
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it for drifting onto the terrain of other problems than merely sensory excess and
beautification, such as ideas of fictionality and representation? Might not such
ideas in fact open up a greater complexity beyond Welsch's characterization of
the aesthetic and aestheticisation in terms of sense perception, whereby such
phenomena might be conceived as ideologically sophisticated instances of
rationalization?
One problem returns to the implication, central to investments in the sublime in
the last chapter, that the silent or imperceptible artwork offers a space free from
ideological imposition, a moment which defies consumption and all that that
entails. This seems to be the same freedom which we saw Botho Strauf valorise
as the 'Unvermittelte'. But the measure of hermeneutical sophistication
introduced by Welsch's cognitive anaesthetic, that is to say the awareness of
latent preconditions to perception, should indicate that such immanence is
implausible. This is doubly the case for certain forms of modernist art, whose
conceptuality and conventionality, as argued in chapter three, speak strongly
against simple valorization of art as somehow immanent. This claim to
immanence is already highly conceptual, as is made clear by its status as a
response to the particularly philosophical problems of epistemology and
grounding. And it is arguably the philosophical nature of Welsch's ideas on
minimalism that undermines its claims to ideological free-space: whilst it is not
inconceivable that minimalist art allows a moment of respite and a breathing
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space, it is also apparent that the slippage from aesthetic questions (those
concerning perception) to epistemological questions (those concerning truth and
fictionality) is not unproblematic. Even if philosophically this indeterminacy is
convincing and has important consequences, as a politics of art it brings with it a
certain ideological investment.
For a start, the idea of anaesthetic as anti-fiction or respite seems to cast art in the
mode of a kind of therapeutic compensation. This quasi-classical conception of art
as a guarantee of value contrasts with the modernist tradition of art (in contrast
to what Lyotard says) that works at removing any such security with its
insistence on our inability to reach a positive basis of meaning. (The debt to early
Romantic philosophy is clear here, and it is in this sense that Friedrich Schlegel
asserts that '[wjhoever has thought the infinite can never again think the finite.'
[Cited in Bowie 2003 52])
Art as compensation: Marcuse I
The compensatory mechanism evident in the sublime anaesthetic exposes it to
Marcuse's somewhat heavy-handed but in my view valid critique of Idealist
aesthetics, as elaborated in the essay 'Uber den affirmativen Charakter der
Kultur'. [Marcuse 1965 56-101] The initial target of Marcuse's essay is the
traditional, neo-classical aesthetics of beauty, in as much as beauty, in Kant's
248
transcendental aesthetics. Such a view of art as universal guarantor is seen to
foster the idea of culture as an unreal and ideal realm as a consolation for the
trials and failures of reality, a 'schlechter Trost' which not only remind us of
what could be, but stands as an obstacle to practical improvement of the
conditions of the real world: 'Die Kultur bejaht und verdeckt die neuen
gesellschaftlichen Lebensbedingungen.' [Marcuse 1965 64]2 Hans Robert JauB
echoes this with the idea that aesthetic pleasure is complicit in the process of
'Sich-Abfinden mit dem Bestehenden'. UaufSin Weinrich 1975 285] These ideas
return to Schiller's notion of culture as an ideal realm in which man is free to
overcome nature hypothetically, as discussed in chapter three. And whilst the
essentially utopian sense of this view of culture is politically problematic, there is
also a sense in which even more marginal understandings of the value of art - in
2 The contrast is notable between Marcuse's critique of art as a metaphysical Trost
and what Theo Girshausen sees as Nietzsche's affirmation of the same: 'Das
Entsetzen wird in der Tragodie zum Erhabenen, der absurde Ekel in der
Komodie zum Komischen gelautert, Diese Cefuhls-Katharsis rettet den
Erkennenden vor der unausweichlichen Konsequenz, die ihn die Kunst aus der
,wesenseinsicht' im dionysischen Zustand gefolgt ware: der radikalen
Weltverneinung, die keine Moglichkeit mehr laBt, den Trost im Jenseits der
Transzendenz zu finden. Kunst ist fur Nietzsche somit eine Art irdische
Transzendenz: sie ist metaphysischer Trost, der das Leiden an Natur und
Geschichte gleichsam in der Schwebe halt, es nicht zur Verzweiflung werden
lafSt.'[Girshausen 1978100]
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terms of new ways of seeing - also see the aesthetic as a realm of freedom in
terms which are ultimately quite similar to Schiller's.
Of course, Welsch's aesthetics is not centred on beauty, which as art's
'vordergrundigstes Moment' has precisely been exploited and reduced to mere
'Eintonigkeit', [Welsch 1990 14] His point is that beauty has long since lost its
transcendental lustre, and aestheticisation is more likely to be a source of
distraction and false consolation: this seems to motivate Welsch's preference for
the imperceptible as a strategic response. Marcuse's essay concurs, tracing the
process whereby beauty loses its ideal status: 'Von ihrer Verbindung mit dem
Ideal getrennt, im Bereich der blofsen Sinnlichkeit, verfallt die Schonheit daher
der allgemeinen Entwertung dieser Sphare.' [Marcuse 1965 83] Bereft of the
status it achieves for Kant and Schiller as an intimation of the ideal realm of
freedom and unconditioned truth, Marcuse's 'Vorboten moglicher Wahrheit'
[Mareuse 1965 85], and reduced to mere 'Schau' [Marcuse 1965 83], beauty is
relegated to a means only to enjoyment. But the problem for Welsch's
formulations is that inaccessibility of the anaesthetic suggests that, in ideological
terms, might be said to replace beauty as the guarantor of an 'Ideal' or absolute
realm. George Steiner, for instance, whose essay on silence I cited above, makes
the link between silence and the ideal: 'In much modern poetry silence
represents the claims of the ideal.' [Steiner 1969 701 Similarly, Adorno identifies
silence with both aesthetic transcendence and its opposite: IAsthetische
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Tranzendenz und Entzauberung finden zum Unisono im Verstummen: in
Becketts oeuvre.' [Adorno 1970 123] The theological overtones of the
imperceptible noted above underline its ideological susceptibility: for Marcuse,
art's theological aspect evidences its regressive consolatory function that claims to
provide this kind of 'new mythology' or 'negative' meaning. [SeeMarcuse 1965
86] John Cage's suggestion, for instance, that music is there to prepare the mind
for divine influence [see Revill 1992168] would be grist to Marcuse's mill. For
Peter Weiss the force of silent truth derives both from its characterisation as
revelation and its inaccessibility. In chapter three Inoted Thomas Weiskel's idea
of the sublime as a secularised religion - 'transcendence without any
controversial theology' [Weiske119764, 16] - and religious practice in particular
has for centuries insisted on iconostasis, the inaccessibility and non-presentability
of the ultimate object of worship. As well as Judaism's Bilderverbot the Russian
Orthodox Church insists on the concealing of the altar and Islam prohibits the
use of images of God or man in its holy places. The fact that such devices
reinforce the hierarchical distinction between the people and God's earthly
mediators supports Marcuse's view of the essentially conservative function of
culture - though religion's control mechanism is hardly challenged by
Protestantism's internalisation of religious obligation.
Elsewhere of course, far from the intimation of a quasi-religious absolute, Welsch
himself intends that the anaesthetic should have a practical function (which I
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have labelled 'pragmatic') of warning us that reality itself is imperceptible. This
is a consequence of scientific developments in the last fifty years or so, though it
is still arguably empiricist, albeit opening up realms of reality that were both not
known about before, but also are still neither perceptible nor perhaps
conceivable to the average person. The idea that art should replicate this
experience of 'unreality' - a kind of paradoxical neo-impressionism - seems
precisely to refute any such consolation-function. But it is questionable whether
the kinds of artworks that we have referred to are or could ever be interpreted as
such a warning. And as far as the idea that the minimalist artwork refuses any
consolatory function is concerned, Adorno's warning is perhaps pertinent that
the austerity of artworks which exclude celebration and consolation
paradoxically gain these characteristics ever more: 'Selbst Kunstwerke, welche
Feier und Trost unbestechlich sich verbieten, wischen den Glanz nicht weg,
gewinnen ihn desto mehr, je gelungener sie sind.' [Adorno 1970 123] (Adorno
himself exploits this paradox of course in his preference for works of writers like
Kafka and Beckett, whose works shimmer with meaninglessness. Adorno makes
the link between such meaninglessness and silence explicit: 'DaiS die
bedeutungsferne Sprache keine sagende ist, stiftet ihre Affinitat zum
Verstummen.' [Adorno 1970 123] Though, for Adorno, determinate negation of
meaning such as that which Beckett generates in his plays precisely refuses
consolation. )
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But Marcuse's uncompromising stance is itself somewhat puritanical. Andrew
Bowie characterizes art's 'negative' response more positively in his distinction
between dogmatic theology and a negative theology that 'kills the pain of
meaninglessness by making the negativity part of something that can transcend
it'. [Bowie 2003 55] This idea of 'pain' serves as a reasonable reminder that
interpreting - and dismissing - religious belief or its substitutes as a spurious
guarantee of meaning only tells half the story. The need for such certainty or
consolation presumably springs from somewhere: for Nietzsche the need for
metaphysical security out of which both religion and science derive comes from
a fundamental and primary fear. [SeeNietzsche 1973V2 275-6] That said, whilst
one might question whether it is fair to deny such consolation before material
conditions have improved, Marcuse's point is that the promises of religion and
art distract from the project of changing material conditions. But beauty or its
replacement - if that is what silence and imperceptibility are - are not the only
source of distraction in the modern western world of mass entertainment and the
culture industry. And the irony is of course that such difficult modernist art is
aimed precisely at refuting the modes in which these phenomena operate. But
Marcuse's concern is to point out that the secondment to modern, bourgeois end
of individuation renders such a protected realm illusory, any possible autonomy
exploited and rationalised:
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Die Kultur soll die Sorge fur den Glucksanspruch der Individuen
ubernehmen, Aber die gesellschaftlichen Antagonien, die ihr zugrunde
liegen, lassen den Anspruch nur als verinnerlichten und rationalisierten in
die Kultur eingehen. [Marcuse 196567-8]
Implicit in Marcuse's critique here seems to be the sentiment that if we sort out
material problems, culture will follow. This is as devaluing of culture as its
banishment into an ideal realm. The challenge of re-engaging allegedly
autonomous culture with the everyday is all the harder insofar as the modernist
aesthetic of which Welsch's anaesthetic is arguably a variant defines itself by its
overturning of conventional ways of representing and seeing the world.
Elsewhere, Marcuse himself refers to the need for distance between the' aesthetic
dimension' and the everyday in order to articulate new ways of thinking. [See
Marcuse 1978] I will discuss this issue further below in relation to Marcuse's
specific critique of 'difficult' art.
Of course, Marcuse is not the first to be suspicious of the consolatory function of
culture. Many theorists are equally skeptical about the idea of culture being
deployed as an obstacle to social change, such as Gramsci in his concept of
hegemony, Horkheimer's own notion of affirmative culture, and Althusser's
'state ideological apparatuses'. [On this see Jay 198484] And Nietzsche in Jenseits
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von Gut und Bose had already criticized the hypocrisy at work in the mechanism
of leisure (this time as a respite, rather than as guarantor of an absolute), which
only reinforces its opposite:
Die arbeitsamen Rassen finden eine grosse Beschwerde darin, den
Mussiggang zu ertragen: es war ein Meisterstiick des englischen
Instinktes, den Sonntag in dem Maasse zu heiligen und zu langweilen,
dass der Englander dabei wieder unvermerkt nach seinem Wochen- und
Werktage lustern wird [Nietzsche 1973VI 2112]
Adorno's reference to the idea of art as 'trostspendende
Sonntagsveranstaltungen' [Adorno 1970 10] echoes this suspicion of culture.
Nietzsche's reference to antiquity's obsession with fasting is once again a
reference to Stoic philosophy. The Stoic's asceticism for Nietzsche, like Hegel
before him, is nothing more than a subordinating mechanism whereby' ein Trieb
sich ducken und niederwerfen lernt, aber auch sich reinigen und scharfen lernt'.
[Nietzsche 1973 VI 2 112, see Hegel 1951 158££.] But in Die frohliche Wissenschaft
this process of subordination is characterized not as an avoidance of displeasure,
but a question of training oneself 'Steine und Gewurm, Glassplitter und
Skorpionen zu verschlucken und ohne Eke! zu sein'. [Nietzsche 1973 V 2 224]
Nietzsche characteristically graphic terms describe a process whereby the Stoic
IsolI endlich glecihgultig gegen Alles werden, was der Zufall des Daseins in ihn
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schurtet'. [Nietzsche 1973V 2 224] Nietzsche continues that Stoicism may well be
advisable for those who live in violent times, '[£]ur Menschen, mit denen das
Schicksal improvisiert'. [Nietzsche 1973 V 2 224] So is Welsch's valorization of
the Stoic, noted in chapter two, saying with Nietzsche that ours is a time in
which we are at the mercy of the fates? Certainly Welsch seems to be proposing
the return to the self as a coping mechanism in the face of forces that we can no
longer control. As such my ideologically motivated complaint might be
unreasonably harsh criticism of Welsch's essentially plausible suggestion that
minimalism might be able to offer respite from a hectic and ideologically laden
contemporary world.
One difficulty with this notion, though, is its apparent contradiction with
Welsch's ideas on Adorno's aesthetics as an aesthetics of the sublime, which
seems to suggest art as an ethical model that de-emphasises the self. The self is
clearly both central to and the major obstacle to any ethics and I will say more
about the status of self in art below. But even if we choose to condemn the return
to the self as a coping mechanism, does it make sense to conceive of this
mechanism as operating in the artwork? Of course, for Nietzsche, art's essential
quality should be a refusal of this essentially conservative and ultimately
submissive gesture of the Stoic. 'Eine Kunstler-Dienstbarkeit im Dienste des
asketischen Ideals ist deshalb die eigentlichste Kunstler-C 0 r r u p t ion, die es
geben kann'. [Nietzsche 1973 VI 2421] (For Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal is based
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on the same abstraction as the veneration of scientific truth ('Oberschatzung der
Wahrheit' [Nietzsche 1973VI 2420]). Can we speak of art in the same terms as a
return to the self? But art's self-reflexivity, as in the notion of art as only 'kunst-
intern', does suggest a similar kind of protection or conservation of what is
proper to art. I will say more about this in the context of the anaesthetic as a
particular turn against representation below.
Whither the sensory? Marcuse II
Aside from any ideological concerns, in Welsch's own terms the anaesthetic
seems to indicate a thoroughgoing ambivalence towards the concept of the
sensory. I have already registered his suggestion that sensory experience may be
a 'Komplement und Kompensat' [Welsch 1987 22] to the over-determination by
an abstract or rationalist view of the world, but the valorisation of the anaesthetic
as in some way 'authentic' might be taken to perpetuate what Marcuse calls
idealist philosophy's' Abwertung der Sinnlichkeit' (Marcuse 1965 58], and this in
the context of a proposal for returning to aesthesis as a discussion of the sensory
nature of our experience. The ideas of art's inaccessibility and anti-fictionality
seem to work against Welsch's central claims regarding the dialectic of the
aesthetic and anaesthetic, insofar as the anaesthetic's claim to truth seems to me
to offer itself as an absolute model of artistic autonomy, underlined by Welsch's
comments on the purely 'kunst-intern' nature of the authentic artwork. By
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contrast Marcuse follows the eighteenth century materialist philosopher Julien
Lamettrie in valorising the sensory as in some way pivotal to human nature.
(Nietzsche's remarks on the Stoic do suggests that sensory experience is
instrumental for the Stoic, but only as a means of its own overcoming, a means of
protecting the non-sensory self: 'Auf das Erhabene ausgerichtet, erheben sie sich
fiber alle Geschehnisse und glauben sich nur so weit wahrhaft Mensch, als sie
aufhoren zu sein.' [Marcuse 1965 69]) Marcuse cites Lamettrie's anti-Idealist
essay 'Discours sur Ie Bonheur', in which the bodily is experienced in and for
itself:
Und wie werden wir Anti-Stoiker sein! Diese Philosophen sind streng,
traurig, hart; wir werden zart, froh und gefallig sein. Ganz Seele,
abstrahieren sie von ihrem Kerper, ganz Kerper, werden wir von unserer
Seele abstrahieren. Sie zeigen sich unzuganglich der Lust und dem
Schmerz; wir werden stolz sein, das eine wie das andere zu fuhlen.
[Lamettrie, cited in Marcuse 1965 69]
Lamettrie and Marcuse in this respect belong to the tradition that I referred to in
chapter two which reasserts the material or sensory element of experience as a
pivotal source of knowledge or as somehow more authentic than its rational
elaboration. Disparate contributors to this tradition included Nietzsche, Husserl
and Heidegger, to say nothing of Baumgarten. In the same vein as this critique
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of abstraction Marcuse's concerns about affirmative culture echoes Nietzsche's
assertion, in Der Antichrist, of the disadvantage of seeking truth in an abstract
and absent realm: 'Wenn man das Schwergewicht des Lebens nicht in's Leben,
sondern in's 'Jenseits' verIegt - in's Nichts - , so hat man dem Leben uberhaupt
das Schwergewicht genommen.' [Nietzsche 1973 VI 3 215] This idea of the
sensory as a corrective to idealist excesses is also central to Marx's writings, who
in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts criticises Hegel'S category of mental
labour as alienated,
To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with
natural powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his
being and of his vital expression, or that he can only express his life in
real, sensuous objects. [Marx 1992390]
These ideas of the sensory as somehow pivotal to human experience might seem
to be reiterated in Welsch's intentions for the discipline of aesthetics as a study of
the sensory. The question is how the quintessentially particular aesthetic-sensory
aspect of our being may be said to constitute experience in advance of the
necessarily general mental capacities that allow that experience to be organised
and understood. In this respect the notion of the incomparable particular as
somehow determinate for or constitutive of experience seems to be as 'headless'
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as Welsch's subsequent postmodernist valorisation of the plural. But these
reminders of the specifically sensory nature of experience are not without value,
particularly in aesthetics, as a corrective to what Hans Georg Gadamer has
referred to as the' Abstraktion des asthetischen BewuBtseins'. [Gadamer 198694]
The sensory particular has been crucial to ideas of the specific nature of what
distinguishes art in the twentieth century, and in particular in radical theatre, a
tradition I will trace in chapter six. There I will ask how this reassertion of the
material relates to the ideological concerns I have raised. Is this materialist
imperative only useful as a corrective to the excesses of speculative philosophy
or does it allow for an analysis of the way art's sensory nature might interact
with our ideologicallifeworld? Do these assertions of the body or material as
somehow politically charged prior to its inscription by any cultural or ideological
factors merely replicate the sublime as idelogical free-space, or does it even turn
back the philosophical clock to a more simplistic, essentially empirical
understanding of our relationship to the real?
Contemplation, the Idifficult' and the contested subject: Marcuse III
The references to Stoic philosophy and the turn inwards to a discrete self above
indicate the crucial issue of subjectivity and individuation in any question of art's
political or ethical status. The issues of subjectivity and individuation have been
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central to aesthetics since Kant: it is the interaction between the spontaneous
individual and the necessary structures of consciousness that takes Kant's
philosophy beyond the essentially receptive model of experience of previous
empirical philosophy. The subject has also been pivotal in my discussions: in
chapter two I suggested that the subject - and its cognitive workings in particular
- is a crucial moment for any idea of art's resistance to perceptual norms and
ideological pre-investments. Is this saying anything more than the truism that
art is made for human minds by other human minds? In view of the scepticism
towards the recipient discussed in chapter two, I think it is. Of course, in view of
what I have said above regarding the Stoic's turn inwards to the self, it is evident
that the role of individual consciousness can also be in some way complicit with
the ideology of art as promise or distraction. It is in this sense that Marcuse and
others characterise bourgeois individuation as an internalisation
('Verinnerlichung') of freedom in the individual. As such, affirmative culture is
seen to function as a 'Disziplinierung [des Individuum] zum Sich-Fugen in eine
schlechte Ordnung'. [Marcuse 1965100] For Marcuse this 'Disziplinierung' is not
enacted only by the formal order that is associated with beauty, but even more so
by what he calls Idealist philosophy's 'WUrdigung alles Schweren und
Erhabenen'. [Marcuse 1965 71] The idea of art as a meditation on such
conceptually challenging issues or objects might be the stick to the carrot of art's
consolatory function. In chapter two I indicated the specific interests that are
discernible in Kant's disinterest, and Marcuse's critique similarly implies that
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complete resistance to utility is implausible: the irony is that such 'Wiirdigung
des Schweren und Erhabenen' might support a quietism that ultimately best
serves politically conservatism.
There is a certain irony, of course, in criticising this preference for the 'difficult'
on ideological grounds, in that difficult art itself tends to be mobilised against the
ideology and specific utility that operates behind beautification and the formal
organisation of the artwork. [See Nietzsche for instance 1973V 2 115-8] Difficult
art is an ambivalent meditation on consciousness, both celebrating (or at least
necessitating) the conceptual - the point I made in chapter three regarding the
sublime - and causing problems for the supremacy of the subject. But the
implicit point of Marcuse's critique is that this kind of autonomy takes us out of
the frying pan of beauty's perfection into the fire of the sublime's inaccessibility.
A crucial issue in this regard might be whether such inaccessibility indicates art
is complete or whether its incomplete nature, underlined by its inconclusiveness
or paradoxical nature, acts as a spur to the audience. So for instance the
imperceptible nature of Pistoletto's 'Cube' and de Maria's 'Vertical Earth
Kilometre' suggests objects that are complete and whole, if inaccessible: their
wholeness is in some way guaranteed by their closed ness from us. By contrast, I
will suggest with reference to some of Peter Handke's early work in the next
chapter that inaccessibility can act as a spur to thought.
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This idea of art as a challenge to thinking relates to an equally pressing question
for my argument, namely the question of how Marcuse's belief that difficult art is
somehow complicit in bourgeois individuation compares with my
understanding that the individual recipient is a necessary component of this kind
of conceptual art, central to much of modernist art's effectiveness. Marcuse here,
after all. seems to share the suspicion of the individuated subject as recipient of
art that I have referred to in Heidegger, Adorno and others. Of course, the
radical suspicion of the historical category of the individual precisely motivates
the valorisation of the 'difficult' in art and philosophy. The difficult status of the
individual is captured in Horkheimer and Adorno's remark at the end of the
Dialektik der Aufkliirung:
[d]ie radikale individuellen, unaufgel5sten Zuge an einem Menschen sind
stets beides in eins, das vom je herrschenden System nicht ganz Erfafste,
gliicklich Uberlebende und die Male der VerstUmmelung, welche das
System seinen Anhorigen antut. [Horkheimer & Adorno 1988 257]
But is it not questionable whether the ideological impurities of the culture
industry can stain the individual recipient but not the artwork, as Adorno claims
in the essay 'Vermittlung'?
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Nicht ist zu furchten, die Reinheit des Kunstwerks werde befleckt von den
Spuren des Seienden in ihm seIber, fiber das es nur soweit sich erhebt, wie
es am Seienden sich miiSt. Wohl aber ist zu furchten, dcill jene Spuren in
der Sache verfliefsen und den Erkennenden verleiten, sie durch
Konstruktion zu erschleichen. [Adorno 1978165]
Adorno's rejection of the recipient is motivated at least in part by the difficulties
that are raised by locating the force of the artwork in the potentially limitless
instances of its reception. The difficulty with reception seems to be that it is
incompatible with desiring a specific outcome from art. This concern seems to
motivate Novalis' classic formulation: 'The true reader must be the extended
author.' [Cited in Bowie 1997 71] How can one be certain that the artwork's
meaning is not misconstrued under these conditions? This problem is even more
pertinent in the case of art's non-cognitive effect. The difficulty with Welsch's
intentions for anaesthetic art, in this regard, is that one seems forced to presume
a certain analogy between the formal qualities of a work of art (for example its
minimalism), and our experience of it (for example a restful and recuperative
calm). Such an analogy cannot necessarily follow: in the case of the
imperceptible, this kind of art might well make us think all the more, akin to
Lyotard's idea of the sublime as generating an anxiety, 'the possibility of nothing
happening, of words, colours, forms or sounds not coming; of this sentence being
the last'. [Lyotard 1985 3] Adorno saves himself the trouble of such
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indeterminacy by rejecting the sociological study of art's reception, and in
particular of music, as a 'blofses Epiphanomen'. [Adorno 1978 167] For Adorno,
defiance of reception and negation of meaning famously become the artwork's
deeper meaning.
But this rejection of the individual for me is a crucial aspect of Adorno's failure to
advance a positive social or political alternative in a pessimistic view of a
totalised world. [See Best and Kellner 1991 284 and Osborne 1989 27] In my view
the very awareness of the constitution of the individual subject within
,discourses' or ' ideologies' of power and social convention which might
undermine any humanist faith in subjective self-determination [see Foucault
1984 99-120, in particular 110] also demands that we look to the individual as the
means of unpicking any such ideology. But aside from the question of who is
supposed to enact the change in society which art might precipitate or anticipate,
it seems that a moment of contemplation is essential to the privation or
overcoming of thought which Lyotard valorises [see Lyotard 1985 I], and
constitutive for the kind of difficult art that Adorno prefers. Indeed, in the same
essay, Adorno recognizes that aesthetic and sociological issues are not so easily
separable: 'Nichts an Musik taugt asthetisch, was nicht, sei's es auch als Negation
des Unwahren, gesellschaftlich wahr ware.' [Adorno 1978 166-7] Of course, this
merely begs the question of what such an analogy between art's formal qualities
and its sociological qualities might mean. Does this latter social truth of art have
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anything to do with our individual experience of the work? And certainly, the
latter's references to shock and the essentially defamiliarising cognitive force of
art suggest that the rejection of the subject is in part at least a rhetorical device. It
is in this sense that Martin Jay refers to Adorno's increasing focus on the
cognitive power of art. [See Jay 1984 91] I have already referred to Manfred
Frank insistence that we retain the individual agent at the centre of any aesthetics
or politics. For Frank this issue of subjectivity points to a crucial point of tension
between French structuralist or post-structuralist models of reality and German
hermeneutics, in their conceptions of freedom. The problem is how to combine
an awareness of the social and linguistic structure which govern our perceptions
and actions with an idea of human freedom and spontaneity, and the awareness
of the 'theory-constitutive role of subjectivity' in meaning and alteration of
meaning. For Frank, neither model has given enough credit to the other's
concerns: 'Mein Eindruck war und ist, dafi weder die Hermeneutik die Tiefe des
strukturalistischen Arguments gegen die Zentralitat des Subjekts ermessen noch
der Strukturalismus/Neostrukturalismus bis an die Wurzeln einer tragfahigen
Theorie des Subjekts gefragt hat.' [Frank 1984 12] This crucial tension between
hermeneutic and structuralist positions shares the ambivalence at the heart of the
reception of 'difficult' art, namely that the sovereignty of the recipient'S faculties
of perception and understanding are challenged, but that the individual recipient
cannot be done without in the functioning of this art. On the one hand, the
constitutive subject is not to be trusted, as is implicit in John Cage valorization of
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the ambient noises which are uncovered in silent music for their spontaneous
and unintentioned nature: 'The essential meaning of silence is the giving up of
intention.' [Kostelanetz 1988 189] On the other hand, the subject is the locus of
the artwork's effect, even where (and perhaps particularly where) that effect is
one of holding back any conclusive or determinate meaning.
A similar tension is apparent in Welsch's formulations. On the one hand he
shares the mistrust of the individual's capacity for reflection, bemoaning the end
of contemplation, whose anachronism is a consequence of contemporary reality's
bad excess of the sensory or commodity exchange: 'Im postmodern-
konsumatorischen Ambiente hingegen haben die Anregungen einen anderen
Sinn. Sie erzeugen leerlaufende Euphorie und einen Zustand trancehafter
Unbetreffbarkeit.' [Welsch 1990 14] The deleterious drug-like anesthetising
effects of sensory excess are seen to have drastic political consequences - 'ftir die
Politik aber desastros', [Welsch 1993 81 On the other hand the receiving subject
seems to be an essential moment in any 'imperceptible' art's effect. Firstly, of
course, it is precisely the individual that is supposed to be protected from the
anaestheticisng effect of too much 'asthetische Animation' by the 'Kleinereignisse
oder Nichtereignisse' of anaesthetic art. [Welsch 1990 141 Secondly, the sublime
anaesthetic's arrest of the sensory seems to depend on the grace of a moment of
internal reflection, much like Kant's sublime. Certainly artworks that are said to
be anaesthetic do seem to presuppose a moment of reflection and contemplation
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in our reception of them, at least insofar as they raise more general philosophical
questions about such issues as identity, infinity and paradox. I have already
suggested above, for example, that the force of Michelangelo Pistoletto's 'Cube',
which comprises six mirrors facing each other, comes only when we try to
imagine what exists and is visible within the confines of the cube which is also
paradoxically empty and infinite. Similarly, the theatre of Robert Wilson, whose
slowed-down and virtually wordless Deafman Glance might be conceived as an
instance of the sublime anaesthetic, is designed to give the audience therapeutic
'time for interior reflection'. [Innes 1993202]3
As the references to Manfred Frank and Andrew Bowie's ideas suggest, this issue
of constitutive subjectivity is crucial to philosophical questions of grounding,
since Kant and Fichte. In particular since Kant and the Romantics the absence of
external stimuli is seen to precipitate reflection on the nature of self. Robert
Adams writes with reference to Novalis: 'As the world of sense falls away,
serving no further function than to limit the expansion of the ego by reflecting it
back on itself, the inner world recedes into infinite dimensions and perspective.'
[Adams 196628] Again Adams relates this reflexivity specifically to the absence
3 One might see Wilson's dramatic pieces as the theatrical equivalent of John
Cage's music. A 268 hour long performance Wilson's 'KA MOUNTAIN AND
GUARDenia Terrace', for instance, was staged over seven days at the 1972 Shiraz
festival. [See Innes 1993 202]
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of external stimuli: 'the experience of (physical) Nothing is the only path to the
delights of an (imaginative) Everything'. [Adams 1966 132] Lyotard's
postmodern variant registers the fear of nothing happening at all [see Lyotard
1985 1-18], and it is in this sense that Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear
interpret the experience of absence as one of pure existence: '[t]he time comes
when no reflection appears at all. One comes to notice nothing, feel nothing,
hear nothing, see nothing. [...] But it is not a vacant emptiness. Rather it is the
purest condition of our existence.' [Gallagher & Shear 1999 413] As far as
Welsch's formulations are concerned, it is curious that this reflection on our
rational faculties and our 'pure existence' seems to be precisely the kind of
capacity that is discounted by his comments on the levelling and hi-jacking of
contemplation. As such it is paradoxical that, like Adorno, the preference for the
difficult and imperceptible is a measure of his scepticism about the power of the
rational mind.
The turn against representation
I have already characterised the transposition of philosophical aesthetics' focus
on the self-reflexive mind onto art as a turn against representation.
Epistemologically this takes place as a crucial turn against a correspondence
view of truth, or at least the recognition that correspondence needs a further
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explanation or foothold. [See Taylor 1985] In art, which is by its very nature a
'presentation', this appears as a questioning and undercutting of its ability to
represent, and thereby a paradoxical assertion of art's status as more than mere
fiction and construct. As if in a long-lasting hangover after the apotheosis of
mimetic realism in the nineteenth century, much modernist art has sought to
shrug off the obligation of representation. For Steve Giles, the turn against
representation occurs decisively in Cubism, with the focus on surface 'as a
material entity in its own right' [Giles 2003 228, my italics], though it is fair to say
that artists have expressed the desire to escape this obligation of reference to an
external and real content intermittently for the last one hundred and fifty years.
And as well as a focus on the materiality of art's material, the apparent evacuation
of content has been an important mode of this tradition, overlapping with the
idea of art as imperceptible. Flaubert, for instance, in a letter written whilst
writing Madame Bovary expresses the desire to write, 'a book about nothing, a
book dependent on nothing external [... ] a book which would have almost no
subject, or at least in which the subject would be almost invisible, if such a thing
is possible.' [Steegmuller 1954 131] I have suggested John Cage's compositions
as a possible musical version of the anaesthetic, and this idea of an evacuation of
content is echoed in John Cage's witty comment: 'I have nothing to say and I am
saying it and that is poetry.' [Kostelanetz 19711]
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As far as Welsch ideas about the oppositional nature of the anaesthetic are
concerned, these examples come across less as a device intended to defy the
widespread excess of perception, but rather as a by-product of the artist's
frustration at the obligation of more or less realist representation. But this anti-
representative strategy, this refusal of reference, is also evident in Welsch's
description of the only example that he gives of anaesthetic art, Walter de
Maria's 'Vertical Earth Kilometre', which he calls an 'exemplarisches Werk des
Entzugs' [Welsch 1990 40], which coincides with my description above of the
strategy of imperceptibility as a kind of reduction. The conception of the
imperceptible in art as the apotheosis of non-presentation is supported perhaps
most strongly by references in Welsch's formulations to the art-anaesthetic as a
tum against art's traditional claim to be able to present everything. [SeeWelsch
199040] Welsch characterises the in my view essentially modernist idea of art as
problematising art's function of presentation as a retort to what he alleges to be
the specifically 'modern' idea of art as able to present anything. [SeeWelsch 1990
40] This reference to the 'modern' underlines the parallel between this
specifically artistic issue of representation and the essentially modern faith in
scientific reason. Art is merely the test-case of this failure of scientific,
propositional language, as has been rehearsed by post-structuralist theorists
since. [See for instance Deleuze & Guattari 1986] But rather than post-
structuralism's essentially Nietzschean critique of truth, one aim of the
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anaesthetic seem to be to shake off the stigma of fictionality, what Proust refers
to as the 'LUge der Darstellung'. [Cited in JaufS1975 298]
Imperceptible as anti-fiction
Of course there is a paradox in the suggestion that art might refute such
fictionality, insofar as art by its very constitution comes from and belongs to the
realm of the' created' or hypothetical. But non-perception might be said to claim
a paradoxical kind of 'reality', if only by virtue of its 'reduction', of what might
be thought of as a convergence of truth and fiction at the point of silence or
inactivity. At the same time, the attempt to relinquish the responsibility of
representation gets caught in a 'Catch-22' situation, insofar as it appears as a
meditation on conventions of representation, a shadow of the order of
representation which abstract art cannot shake off. As T. J. Clark remarks,
paintings like Malevich's suprematist pieces do not signify' absolute blankness
or emptiness [... ] they really are paintings!' [Clark 2000 268] And the point for
Welsch's formulations is that artworks which deploy the imperceptible tend to
be engaged in more complex issues than a mere negation of sensory perception,
for instance meditating on art's' obligation' of representation.
But in view of his idea of a dialectical interaction between art and the everyday,
the anaesthetic's seemingly very conceptual mode of resistance, characteristic of
272
art's increasing conceptuality (that is to say, its increasing self-understanding as
a meditation on the concept of art) and self-referentiality, might be seen to result
in an increasing Verharmlosung of art. This may be an instance of what Simon
Jarvis, writing about Adorno's highly esoteric aesthetics, calls the deployment of
'fetish against commodity fetishism' [Jarvis 1998 118], that is to say that which
'does not criticize commodity fetishism by being less fetishized and accordingly
less illusory than the fetishized commodity, but by being more fetishized'. [Jarvis
1998 118] Is this the neutralising of art's critical potential which for Adorno is the
inevitable price of its autonomy? 'Neutralisierung ist der gesellschaftliche Preis
der asthetischen Autonomie.' [Adorno 1970 339] But this fetishization and high
philosophical debate is problematic in Welsch's terms, as the inoculation of
aestheticisation is precisely what the anaesthetic is supposed to avoid, and the
anaesthetic seems to stand or fall by virtue of its dialectical interaction with the
opposite, namely the everyday aesthetic experience. It is questionable whether
Welsch's sublime anaesthetic even occurs in the same arena as aestheticisation,
that is, the everyday, or whether it is only to be experienced in the security of the
art gallery or the modernist text. Is this extreme modernist aesthetic not
anachronistic as a response to a problem that Welsch characterises as specifically
postmodern? Then again, Welsch's main proposition is that it is precisely the
everyday characteristics of postmodernity that are responsible for necessitating
the refusal of such 'Werke des Entzugs'. [Welsch 1990 40] As such, this
apotheosis of modernism might be precisely necessary.
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That said, as well as undermining Welsch's idea of a dialectic between the
anaesthetic and aestheticisation, this might also indicate certain limits to
Marcuse's critique of Idealist aesthetics: can beautiful or difficult art be said to
distract from the inequalities of everyday life if it is not seen by those who
experience those inequalities. The aestheticised world is arguably the more
likely distraction, and the more likely source of ideological distortion. Moreover
it is worth pointing out that whilst Marcuse objects to autonomy per se in his
essay on' affirmative culture', to the 'Reich der eigenttimlichen Werte und Selbst-
Zwecke' [Marcuse 1965 63], he himself ultimately resorts to a similar idea of art's
function in what he calls the 'aesthetic dimension', in which he defends art's
distance from actuality and invokes Stendhal's definition of beauty as both the
'promise' and 'memory of the happiness that once was', rather than its
immediate possession. [See Marcuse 1978 68] The question is how this promise
avoids the fallacy, which exercised both Marcuse and Adorno, of overcoming in
thought or art what is still split in reality. [SeeJay 1984 87] As Habermas puts it,
rationalised everyday life 'could hardly be saved from cultural impoverishment
through breaking open a single cultural sphere - art - and so providing access to
just one of the specialized knowledge complexes'. [Habermas 1985b 11]
But this is not to say that art's autonomy must be abandoned wholesale. My
concern here is whether a conceptualisation of aesthetic autonomy is conceivable
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that does not slip into a mere defence of autonomy that is more than a 'Kehrseite'
of its own exploitation. This might also offer a means of critique, examining the
particular ideological purposes which it is being exploited for, rather than the
idea of purpose in itself. This need not lose sight of the indeterminacy which has
been crucial to the special nature of the aesthetic since Baumgarten nor of
Welsch's characterisation of the aesthetic in terms of perception and the
cognitive. But at the same time it need not entirely relinquish the separation
between art and the everyday which Mike Featherstone refers to as the
'hierarchies of signification'. [Featherstone 199165] Peter Burger, whilst warning
against relinquishing art's autonomous status, refers to the idea of art's
,Alternativen zum Bestehenden' in terms of a 'Freiheitsspielraum'. [Burger 1974
73] This echoes Marcuse's idea of art as a dimension of 'counter-consciousness',
that is to say 'a realm in which the subversion of experience proper to art
becomes possible'. [Marcuse 1978 9, 6] This suggests a realm for cognitive
exploration, without resorting to the idea of art as a reserved realm which
promises meaning by virtue of its unobtainable nature. Whilst in Burger's view
this freedom is safeguarded by the 'Distanz der Kunst zur Lebenspraxis' [Burger
197473], I will ask whether or not it is possible to conceive of art as Marcuse's
,aesthetic dimension' in more marginal terms. As opposed to the idea of
'Freiheitsspielraum' as an alleged ideological vacuum afforded by the minimalist
anaesthetic artwork, or the ideology-free zone of Lyotard's postmodern sublime,
in what follows and in the next chapters I will try to sketch out ways in which art
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which operates at the limits of perception might be conceived as just such a
'subversion of experience', and moreover in ways that might be conceived as
critical and related to aestheticisation.
Anaesthetic as deviation from perceptual and cognitive norms
The idea of aesthetics as an intervention in cognition as a means of conceiving of
art's relation to the everyday, rather than the seemingly narrower and more
surface-oriented category of sense perception, returns to Welsch's own
alternative use of the term anaesthetic as denoting the latent and unthematised
preconditions to perception. The awareness of the more or less sophisticated
processes of cognition that accompany even 'non-perception' inserts a
complexity into Welsch's sensory model of the aesthetic. This latent experience
causes problems for the idea of the sublime anaesthetic as somehow sheerly
imperceptible, and - insofar as it identifies these latent preconditions as the
object to be thematised - what I have labelled the 'cognitive' anaesthetic
conceives of an opposite function of art to its sublime variant. Whereas the
sublime anaesthetic suggests a mystifying function for art, by which I mean the
function of obstructing the cognitive processes of perception, the cognitive
anaesthetic suggests a demystifying function, whereby art exposes and thematises
the usually non-thematised elements of perception.
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It is in this sense that Welsch refers to art as a 'Machtinszenierung' and to
'feminist' art as an intervention in our 'psychosozialen Bilderhaushalt' [Welsch
1990 36], indicating that the target of this kind of art is the unconscious
underlying assumptions - art conceived as a kind of 'cognitive behaviour
therapy'. This might allow for a more plausible reconnection with the everyday
effects of aestheticisation by encouraging an analysis of the ideological
tendencies that underlie such phenomena. Welsch does characterize this idea of
art operating on latent material in sense perceptual terms: '[Moderne Asthetik]
zielt eher auf das Unsinnliche als auf das Sinnliche. Mindestens arbeitet sie
daran, standig die Grenzen des Wahrnehmens zu thematisieren und zu
verschieben.' [Welsch 1990 65] But of course, such unthematised cultural or
ideological assumptions and norms which might be exposed by art are not
'unsinnlich' in the same way that Welsch intends for the sublime anaesthetic.
This emphasises Welsch's failure to make a dear distinction between different
ideas of how art functions, and the limitations of his understanding of aesthetics
as an essentially sensory mode of experience.
That said the opposition between the cognitive and sublime anaesthetic might
not be insuperable. Like Marcuse, Hans Robert JaufSis sceptical about so-called
'negative' art, hut his remarks stem from different concerns. In his essay
'Negativitat und Identifikation: Versuch zur Theorie der asthetischen Erfahrung'
DauB 1975 263-340], aside from taking issue with the idea that critique is only
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possible through 'negative' art [see JauE 1975 265], as you would expect from the
reception theorist par excellence, JauB reminds us that the 'negative' is only half
the story. JauB insists on a more sophisticated understanding of the moment of
reception:
So fruchtbar danach die Kategorien einer Asthetik der Negativitat
erscheinen mogen, kann man doch zweifeln, ob Leistung, Horizontwandel
und gesellschaftliche Funktion der asthetischen Erfahrung mit alledem
schon zureichend beschrieben sind. [Jau151975264]
For JauB this negativity cannot be valorized in itself - because positive and
negative are not fixed points, as a consequence of the context-dependent locus of
reception: 'weil sie im Prozefs der Rezeption einem alIer asthetischen Erfahrung
eigentumlichen Horizontwandel unterliegen.' [JauB 1975 266] That which is
'negative' changes over time, such that even so-called 'negative' artworks can
become 'klassisch'. [JauE 1975 266J This is because the 'konstitutive Negativitat
des Kunstwerks' must be mediated by the 'Identifikation als ihr
rezeptionsasthetischer Gegenbegriff' [JauiS1975 267], a hermeneutical insistence
which might be implicit in Welsch's references to a dialectic of aesthetic and
anaesthetic.
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Iaufs's idea of a dialectic of identification and negation reiterates the idea that the
two main ideas of art contained in Welsch's formulations on the anaesthetic,
namely art which deploys non-perception and defamiliarisation, are not as
mutually exclusive as Welsch's formulations suggest, rather that what I have
called the sublime anaesthetic also necessarily includes a cognitive aspect.
Seemingly 'negative'or problematised perception could conceivably serve as a
means for exposing the latent and unseen. This is certainly how John Cage
intends his silent pieces to function, as noted above, with silence bringing to the
fore the normally unheard but ever-present sounds that accompany life. [See
Cage 196122-3] That it to say that an absolute halt of the senses or of cognition is
implausible, as suggested by Welsch's idea that latent cognitive activity
underlies any and all perception. It is in this sense that Susan Sontag refers to the
obstruction or deviation of perception as a 'limited, vicarious participation in the
ideal of silence'. [Sontag 19697] Indeed, for Sontag, art can only ever be silent in
a 'non-literal sense' [Sontag 1969 10]: '[m]ore typically, he continues speaking,
but in a manner that his audience can't hear. Most valuable art in our time has
been experienced by audiences as a move into silence (or unintelligibility or
invisibility or inaudibility).' [Sontag 1969 7] Examples of this kind of art might
include the frustration of the audience's perception in Botho Straufs's Die
Hypochonder or Peter Handke's Quodlibet - the latter playwright will be a key
focus for the next chapter.
279
This 'unintelligibility or invisibility or inaudibility' might tell us nothing about
the referent, a seemingly 'contentless' reflection only of our own capacities, as in
Kant's sublime. But to be anything other than the autonomous, indeterminate or
self-reflexive Kehrseite of everyday experience presumably it must involve at least
a trace of an experience of some referent. For me the partial nature of this silence
offers a way of breaking out of what Fredric Jameson calls the' prison-house' of
formalism and reconnecting with the material reality, and in such a way that
precisely meditates on the cultural habits and expectations that underlie and
inform perception. This seems to me to be particular important if art is to be
conceived as operating in dialectical relationship with the everyday, at least in
any sense other than the broadest one that they are both forms of perception.
But what might be lost in annexing anaesthetics to an aesthetics of
defamiliarisation that indicates the unthematised preconditions or cultural habits
that underlie perception? Does theorising art at the limits of perception as a
consciousness-raising break from and reflection on cultural norms and habits of
perception lose the sense of Welsch's anaesthetics as the experience of the
imperceptible - an imperceptibility which does seem to be apparent and
intentional in artworks like Pistoletto's 'Cube' or de Maria's 'Vertical Earth
Kilometre'? Reading the imperceptible as a defamiliarising strategy certainly
seems to be in danger of losing sight of Welsch's terms of art as a means of
addressing (by opposing) the widespread phenomena of aestheticisation. Of
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course Welsch himself does not conceive of the cognitive anaesthetic specifically
with the problem of aestheticisation as sensory excess or veneer in mind. But I
have argued that the sublime anaesthetic, inasmuch as it is a meditation on issues
of truth and representation, and a valorization of indeterminacy for whatever
reason, does not convincingly address aestheticisation either. Moreover, the
reconnection that Welsch wants to make with everyday experience seems more
plausible in these more cognitively sophisticated terms. The point for me is that
Welsch's focus on the limits of perception as a means of destabilising the cultural
norms of perception is valid, because art at the extremes of perception seems
eminently able to unsettle and reflect on our perceptual and cognitive habits.
Welsch does refer to art as an 'Experimentierfeld sinnlichen Sinns, ein
Laboratorium sinnlicher Denkkraft'. (Welsch 1987 24] This seemingly
paradoxical reference to I sinnliche Denkkraft' echoes Baumgarten's concept of
Isinnliche Erkenntnis' [Baumgarten 1983 vii] already blurs the distinction
between the sensory and the cognitive and opens up a more sophisticated
understanding of the interaction of art and cognition. I have already suggested,
with reference to Christopher Butler's arguments, that this cognitive nature of
the modernist aesthetic might in fact be taken as a reasonable description of a key
feature of much groundbreaking art in the twentieth century, for instance
disrupting expectation and connecting usually unconnected features. But
Welsch does not really articulate how this 'Denkkraft' might coincide or contrast
with his own sensory focus, and indeed how this Iexperimental' art might
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interact with his understanding of contemporary reality as being characterised
by the sensory. This returns to my sense of his failure to articulate more closely
how the sensory can be critical. But in my view a cognitive understanding of
BUrger's 'Freiheitsspielraum' might be a more plausible variant of Welsch's ideas
for aesthetics as sensory, and a more plausible model of the dialectic that Welsch
envisages between the aesthetic and anaesthetic. The capacities of the cognitive
anaesthetic, that is heightening perception, might contribute to a more
ideologically capable exposition of latent assumptions and connections. It may
be that one could conceptualise aestheticisation more generally as an instance of
precisely the 'economy of mental effort' [Shklovsky 1965 5] and automatisation
of perception, and conformity to cultural norms, that Shklovsky opposes in 'Art
as Technique'. Beyond the valorisation of a momentary withdrawal and respite
from aestheticisation, playing with the limits of cognition and perception might
be understood as a means towards a more critical and durable engagement with
the processes and implications of the ideological and rationalized underside of
aestheticisation.
Aesthetics of excess as an alternative to the imperceptible
The Dadaists, mentioned by BUrger in relation to the idea of art as generating a
'Freiheitsspielraum', are also pertinent for my broader concerns insofar as their
shock tactics offer an alternative and in certain respect opposite understanding of
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the cognitive significance of art as a predominantly sensory experience. This
contrast is significant for the terms of my thesis not just in respect of this
'sensory' dimension but also in terms of the interaction it seems to offer with
latent cultural or perceptual habits and norms. Of course, the parallels between
an aesthetics of the imperceptible and an aesthetics of shock are numerous: as
well as the fact that they both may be said to emphasise the moment of
perception, both seem to operate at the limits of experience and representation:
both seem to deploy a certain 'indeterminacy', a freedom and openness, as in
John Cage's wish to 'mak[eJ something that didn't tell people what to do'
[Kostelanetz 1988 74], and Peter Burger's characterisation of the avant-garde
artwork as posing problems for the recipient: 'Die Problematik des Schocks als
intendierte Reaktion des Rezipienten besteht darin, daB er im allgemeinen
unspezifisch ist.' [Burger 1974108]
But this reference to 'indeterminacy' also raises the question of how an aesthetics
of excess and shock measures up against Marcuse's reservations about difficult
art. Does Dada's ludic shock absolve this indeterminacy of any residues of the
seriousness and the idealist sense of promise which Marcuse finds so
ideologically suspect? Indeed, avoiding art's traditional seriousness was
precisely central to Dada's critique of the institution of art, gaining them the
reputation as the first postmodernists. Dada's aesthetic invasion of life was not
based in, and indeed militated against, a concept of the aesthetic as a value in-
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itself - Welsch's 'moderne Utopie einer total-asthetischen Kultur'. [Welsch 1990
38] This recurs in Shklovsky's idea of the process of perception as an 'aesthetic
end in itself' [Shklovsky 1965 12], but the idea of art as a value-in-itself is the
main object of Hans Richter's criticism of nee-Dada: 'Neo-Dadaism is an attempt
to establish such a shock as a value in itself.' [Richter 1965197]
This contrast might be illustrated with reference to the opposite relationship each
takes to time and temporality. The imperceptible has often been associated with
the experience of a disturbance, a caesura, in the space-time continuum. [See
Adams 1966 3] I have already cited Kant's idea of the sublime as an explicit
experience of temporality ('Eine lange Dauer ist erhaben.' [see Kant 19138]), and
this might be likened to Lyotard's claim of a general failure of space and time.
[See Lyotard 1991 113] But with a paradoxical gesture towards the eternal and
unchanging, which is brought out in Botho Straws's notion of the role of the artist
as responsible for the 'Pause'. Dada's shock, by contrast, works by speeding up
and conflating experiences. And quite the opposite of the seemingly infinite
spiritual experience of contemplation of the imperceptible, Dada's shock tactics
are characterized by their short-lived nature, as Peter BUrger writes, 'Nichts
verliert seine Wirkung schneller als der Schock, weil er seinem Wesen nach eine
einmalige Erfahrung ist'. [BUrger1974108]
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So is it fair to say that, if the minimalist aesthetic of which the anaesthetic is a
variant is essentially conservative, the aesthetics of shock is more radically anti-
conservative? Might shock or excess be conceived as Welsch's 'Kehrseite' or
Sontag's 'antidote', or does it refuse this kind of consolation? Does shock's
alleged indeterminacy fall into the same problematic cliche of sheer immanence
as Lyotard's distinction between a nostalgic modern sublime and an open and
joyous postmodern sublime? If shock, like the anaesthetic, operates at the limit
of experience and representation, can such extremes of art can contain thematic
content and harbour anything but the most basic political intentions? If the rapid
experience of shock is an 'einmalige Erfahrung' [Burger 1974 108], as Burger
suggests (in line with Docherty's 'moment as it is lived in its intensity' [Docherty
2003 24]), can it be said to have cognitive value or any kind of critical function?
Can it be said to show us things in a new light? Can it be said to undo some of
the effects of the aestheticised world? At one point Peter Burger describes this
short-lived nature of shock in terms of being 'konsumiert' [BUrger 1974 108],
which would seem to discount it as a possible antidote to aestheticisation.
Moreover, shock might be seen to precipitate precisely the kind of 'leerlaufende
Euphorie und [... ] Zustand trancehafter Unbetreffbarkeit' [Welsch 1990 14] that
Welsch bemoans in contemporary aestheticised experience. But perhaps the
antidote of shock is precisely what aestheticisation demands, depending of
course on exactly how aestheticisation is being characterized: shock might well
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be suitable for breaking through the veneer and surface-effects of the
aestheticised world.
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Section 3 . Art at the Limits of Perception
Chapter 5 . Applied Anaesthetics:
the Art of the Imperceptible
The only example Welsch gives in the essay on anaesthetics is Walter de Maria's
'Vertical Earth Kilometre', a steel rod, buried in the ground and concealed from
view, but he does pinpoint an interesting variant of minimalism that seems to
amount to a tradition, elements of which I referred to in the preceding chapters.
Most of the examples of the anaesthetic I have suggested have been visual, as in
James Turrell's 'space division constructions', or aural, such as John Cage's
music, and in this respect I have followed Welsch himself. But at the end of the
essay on the anaesthetic, Welsch cites the author and playwright Botho Straufs,
for whom it is specifically the Dichter who is responsible for' das Unvermittelte,
den Einschlag, den unterbrochenen Kontakt, die Dunkelphase, die Pause.'
[Welsch 1990 401 Consistent with this I will turn in what follows to more verbal
forms of art, in order to discuss whether the concept of the anaesthetic might
plausibly describe or theorise actual instances of art. Of course, if such
'Dichtung' were truly silent it would leave little room for any kind of art at all, let
alone the kind of interaction with the everyday which Welsch asserts. But in the
last chapter I referred to Susan Sontag's idea of 'non-literal silence' [Sontag 1969
10J, which I suggested moreover might to some extent overcome the apparent
incompatibilities between Welsch's disparate investments in the anaesthetic. My
particular focus in both the chapters that follow will be drama, and below I will
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examine how non-perception and non-presentation have operated on the stage in
some recent drama, assessing to what extent these examples might plausibly be
theorised in terms of the anaesthetic. Moreover whilst it might seem paradoxical
to suggest that such 'difficult' and 'formal' art as Samuel Beckett's, Peter
Handke's and Heiner Muller's might in some way deliver the promise of
dialectical interaction between art and the everyday that Welsch's terms make,
particularly in light of my comments with reference to Marcuse in the last
chapter, I will endeavour to make this claim. Pivotal to this will be my emphasis
on the role of the recipient in their work and the transformations of perception
and consciousness through techniques that may be characterized in broadly
sensory terms.
Dismantled drama: a radical tradition
Peter Handke and Botho StrauB are of course not without precursors in this
respect: the tradition of modern drama that I will draw on here are those plays in
the last century that have engaged in the specific dismantling of the various
elements of traditional drama such as action, character psychology, causation,
dialogue, and meaning. In contrast to the pivotal position of action in classical
drama - for Aristotle '[t]ragedy is not an imitation of persons, but of actions and
of life' [Aristotle 1996 11] - the futility of action has been a dominant theme in
modem European drama since Shakespeare. Theo Girshausen refers to the
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'Hamlet-problem' in relation to Heiner Muller [see Girshausen 1978 98-9], and
Georg Buchner's Dantons Tod explicitly thematises the futility of individual
action in the face of the tide of history. But it is worth distinguishing between
these precursors and dramatists for whom this paralysis becomes the crucial
theme and formal device. This might be said to start with what Steve Giles has
called the 'acutely anomie situation' in Chekhov's dramas [Giles 1981 211], the
purposeless and repetitive 'Beschiiftigung' which Giles calls the 'analgesic
injections of habit, game and ritual'. [Giles 1981 235] (The reference to 'analgesic'
here shares the metaphorical terrain of Welsch's anaesthetic. In this case habit
and ritual are seen as having anaesthetic effects - in much the same way as
Welsch's idea of anaesthetic as the effect of the process of unconscious selection-
but what pain do they protect against? The threat of nothingness, or what Steve
Giles calls the 'problem of identity' or the 'obliteration of time'? [Giles 1981 235])
But already in the early dramas of Maurice Maeterlinck, written in the 1890s,
over half a century before Beckett's Godoi, waiting - a central retarding device of
classical drama - had been deployed 'not [asJ a tool of drama, but its focus',
[McGuinness 2000 214] Most famously, the blind characters who give the play
The Sightless (Les Aveugles, 1890) its title are reduced to a passive waiting-game,
caught in an absurd discussion about why the priest, their erstwhile guide who is
sitting dead beside them, has left them. With this replacement of Iaction with
inaction, events with eventlessness, and dialogue with a semiotics of silence'
[McGuinness 2000214], Maeterlinck's theatre statique takes the first radical step
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towards inactivity which will culminate in recent performance art's
experimentation with such extremes as complete absence of activity from the
stage.t and even non-presence.s
Of course dramatic action is more than mere 'activity' for Aristotle, and
presupposes certain features, such as causality and agency: Steve Giles
distinguishes 'generative action' from mere on-stage activity. [Giles 1981 5J The
breakdown in causality and agency is a crucial point in the dismantling of action
in some modern drama. Robert Brustein notes, for instance, that this dismantling
does not just amount to 'vacancy', that is to say Maeterlinck's absence of activity,
but also 'accident'. [Brustein 1964 4] Likewise, Beckett's pieces are not
characterised by sheer inactivity or even disjointed and repetitive activity, but
rather are inhabited by fragmentary narrative, broken causal connections and, in
the case of the later plays like Not I and Footfalls, evacuation of the very
psychological interiority of character. In what follows I will suggest this
evacuated interiority, and the attendant and central problematisation of
1 For example, Teching Tsieh's year-long pieces living in a cage or Marina
Abramovic and Ulay's motionless sitting seven hours at a time. Both referred to
in Graver 1995 62.
2 For example, Chris Burden's hiding himself from the (potential) audience by
hiding in a locker or by leaving town. Also referred to in Graver 1995 44. Colin
Counsell likens Samuel Beckett's Breath to installation art, rather than theatre, in
view of the absence of any actors. [SeeCounsell 19964]
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meaning, might at its most extreme be taken as an instance of Welsch's
anaesthetic art.
Of course a simple equation between Welsch's 'arrested perception' and the
formal dismantling of action, dialogue, meaning and other aspects of drama
would not be convincing. Such dramatic techniques do not operate purely at the
level of perception, rather at a more sophisticated level of reference and meaning,
and theatrical or psychological norms and expectations. But a central point of
my discussion in the last chapter was that Welsch's theorisation of the
anaesthetic went beyond his own stated focus on issues of perception, for
example in the ideas of the anaesthetic as defying artistic representation and as
somehow invested with truth-value - albeit what I have characterised as a
'negative' truth, inasmuch as it is claimed only by virtue of art's 'anti-fictionality'
and by virtue of a process of 'reduction'. Similar concerns and techniques are
also evident to varying degrees in Beckett and Handke's drama, supporting the
view that there are significant parallels between Welsch's theory and recent
dramatic practice. And whilst this detracts from Welsch's specific focus on
perception, it may be that conceiving of the anaesthetic in terms of a formal
dismantling of dramatic norms saves it from what the dubious notion of art as
sheer and immanent non-perception. That said it will be apparent that both
Handke and Beckett also specifically thematise or deploy obstructed perception,
overlapping with Welsch's narrower formulations. The plays in which they do
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this practically overlap chronologically, with Handke's early plays Das Miindel
will Vonnund sein and Quodlibet, from the late sixties, preceding Beckett's late
plays from the early 1970s, Not I, That Time and Footfalls. It is in these pieces,
which might be viewed as the apotheosis of this dismantling of dramatic
presentation, that the failure of action becomes a problem specifically for
reception and perception.
Samuel Beckett's Not I: evacuated interiority and narrative incoherence
Genre crisis
Not I is a play without beginning or end. The audience is placed in the position
of interloper, glimpsing a mere section of an exchange between two figures on
the stage, the' Auditor' and the 'Mouth'. The words that pour out of the Mouth
are unintelligible at beginning and return to the same unintelligibility at the end:
'As house lights doum mouth's voice unintelligible behind curtain.' [Beckett 1986 376]
'Voice continues behind curtain, unintelligible, 10 seconds, ceases as house lights up.'
[Beckett 1986 383] Four brief movements are the only discernible on-stage
'activity' in Not I, in which action is supplanted by narration. Since Aristotle,
narration has traditionally been seen as the opposite of dramatic action, with all
the attendant complexities of telling rather than showing. [See Aristotle 1996 5~6]
The 'negative' to action's 'positive', Wolfgang Iser describes narrative as 'ein
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Nicht-Gegebenes bzw. ein Abwesendes'. [Iser 1975 531] Similarly, JaulS sees it as
inhabited by the 'irrealer Gegenstand' which 'fur die asthetische Wahrnehmung
das Wirkliche - eine vorgegebene Realitat vemeinen mufs'. GaulS 1975 263]
Narrative tends to refer back to the past, but the idea that instances of modern
drama have been 'dominated by the past' and 'permeated by memory' [Giles
1981 269] (these quotes refer to the dramas of Ibsen and Chekhov respectively)
cannot simply be ascribed to the thematics of historical change and nostalgic
reflection, but also to a renunciation of present action. In this sense the
renunciation of action in Beckett's pieces is emblematic of what Jovan Hristic
identifies as a wider genre crisis. [SeeHristic 1972]
But as I have indicated the constituent parts of dramatic action are more than just
on-stage activity, and the qualities of coherent causal logic and psychological
depth can be retold as well as enacted. That is to say that coherent and
generative action does not always require activity on stage, but can be conveyed
by narration, like a play within a play, as a means to incorporate or indicate
previous action. But in Beckett's pieces narrative is no pragmatic device, but
rather is integral to the displacement of action and meaning in Beckett's theatre.
This is underlined by the fragmentary nature of the play's narrative, fraught as it
is by incompleteness, incoherence, questions of the identity of its subject and of
its authorship and reliability.
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The point at which the audience picks up the flow of words that issue forth from
the Mouth is an orthodox starting point for a narrative, the birth of the 'tiny little
girl' who is its fleetingly glimpsed and problematic subject. But we soon learn
that her story is barely worth telling: 'nothing of any note till coming up to sixty
when ... '. [Beckett 1986 376] What we do hear is incomplete; gaps and hesitations
punctuate fragments of sentences, which relate fragments of episodes:
practically speechless ... how she survived! .. that time in court ... what
had she to say for herself ... guilty or not guilty stand up woman ...
speak up woman ... stood there staring into space mouth half open as
usuaL. waiting to be led away ... glad of the hand on her arm [Beckett
1986381]
Here, for example, we learn nothing of the alleged crime, the woman's plea, or
the verdict. We are offered an incongruous intimacy with her emotions, albeit
that the motivation and impetus for these emotional responses remain a mystery.
And the fact that we do not know why she is crying is overshadowed by the fact
that we do not even know if she is crying: 'sitting staring at her hand ... there in
her lap ... palm upward ... suddenly saw it wet ... the palm ... tears presumably ...
hers presumably ... no one else for miles ... no sound ... just the tears'. [Beckett
1986380-1]
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Moreover, the fact that we do not know if she is crying is further overshadowed
by the fact that we cannot be sure who the she being referred to actually is. The
relationship between narrator and narratee is never clarified, such that John
Knowlson refers to the 'partial, though incomplete, concurrence' between these
positions. [Knowlson & Pilling 1979 201] He and others have registered the 'Not
I' of the play's title as referring to a failure in the process of individuation
[Knowlson & Pilling 1979 201, see also Acheson 1993 7-8], though in the later
play, Footfalls, this is echoed in the suggestion of Mayas never having been born,
and having no self-consciousness (the proper name already contains an idea of
hypothesis). [See Knowlson & Pilling 1979 282] In his essay on Endgame,
'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen', Theodor Adorno describes Beckett's
characters as 'verschleppt aus Innerlichkeit'. [Adorno 1961 203] This is
understood both in terms of psychological motivation and effective agency, and
is seen as part of a wider removal of specific characteristics from Beckett's art, a
'Verlust aller Qualitat'. [Adorno 1961195] Adorno reads this dismantling of the
dramatic individual as agent as a critique of the bourgeois ideology of the
individual, which marks Beckett's decisive move beyond the cult of the
individual which flawed both Existentialism and Expressionism. [See Adorno
1961199] The retention of the individual is paradoxical, for Adorno a case of the
'Verwendung von Formen im Zeitalter ihrer Unmoglichkeit'. [Adorno 1961 214]
I will say more in the next chapter about the eradication of the individual, which
is famously dismantled in Heiner Muller's work.
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But I have already suggested in preceding discussions that the evacuation of the
individual is not as self-evidently positive and redemptory as some post-
structuralists suggest. For one thing, it is apparent that the sense of imposition
and resistance which characterises the narration might be taken to hint at an
infringement on autonomy, as John Knowlson puts it, 'the experience of being
recounted is virtually synonymous with the experience of being observed'.
[Knowlson & Pilling 1979 201] Alternatively, the seemingly involuntary torrent
of speech in Not I has been associated by some commentators with a mystical
experience, such as James Acheson's idea of an 'ineffable experience like the
mystic's of union with God'. [Acheson 199391 This is interesting in the light of
my comments regarding the role of silence in mysticism. It also chimes with the
reading of the possibly religious reference in the title, which Acheson relates to
Saint Paul's idea in the Epistles that it is 'not I' that writes but Christ. [See
Acheson 199361 But such a conclusive and redemptive reading as this suggests
does not seem to be in keeping with Beckett's other work. Indeed, Knowlson
refers to the passage in The Unnamable where the narrator states that such a voice
'issues from me, it fills me, it clamours against my walls, it is not mine, I can't
stop it, I can't prevent it, from tearing me, racking me, assailing me [... J but can
only be mine'. [Knowlson & Pilling 1979199]
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Narrative reliability
Equally disconcerting as not knowing enough about the subject of the narrative
and the motivation of the retelling is that we cannot be sure who does know. The
above repetition of 'presumably' is one of several rifts in the veneer of narrative
reliability. Initially we assume that the Mouth, which after all can only be there
to tell the story, is its authoritative source. This assumption is undermined when
the Mouth is corrected, much to its own surprise: 'nothing of any note till coming
up to sixty when ... what? ... seventy? ... good God!' [Beckett 1986 376] In contrast
to the Mouth's assertions of narrative authority - 'no! .. she!' - the narrative
seems to be strewn with factual errors: ' ... what? .. not that? . nothing to do with
that? .. ' [Beckett 1986 382] It is as if, not just guilty of not learning its lines, the
'facts' of the story are as new to the Mouth as they are to us. The impression is of
a possible story that we are not hearing, which suggests the arbitrariness of the
story we do in fact hear. At these points of interruption, of which there are four
in the piece, the Mouth's hesitant monologue is disturbed by a suggestion of
dialogue, a shift from the third person narrative to direct speech, like a Brecht
character directly addressing the audience. But we neither see nor hear the
source of the external prompt, if such a prompt is even given. The only possible
interlocutor seems to be the' Auditor', who is 'facing' and 'intent on' Mouth.
[Beckett 1986 376] But its seemingly connected 'four brief movements', which
are said to be 'gesture of helpless compassion' [Beckett 1986 375], hardly suggest
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an authoritative intervention. The stage directions indicate that they should
'lessen[] with each occurrence till scarcely perceptible at the third' [Beckett 1986
375], both reflecting and exacerbating the audience's own lack of comprehension.
Of course, narrative reliability is frequently at issue in the modern novel, due to
such obstacles as limited knowledge, personal involvement or a problematic
value-system. [See Rimmon-Kenan 1983100] In his essay 'Standort des Erzahlers
im zeitgenossischen Roman' Adorno considers this undermining of narration, in
its assumptions both of continuity and identity in the character's experience, and
of authority and control in the narrator's handling of the material, to be a
consequence of the increasing alienation between people and even towards
ourselves in the new reality of modern society. [See Adorno 1974 42-3] He
characterizes this as a 'Verdinglichung' of relations and their facilitation by
'Schmierol' - seemingly subjectivity's version of the facade of aestheticisation.
Dismantled meaning
For Adorno, Beckett's dismantling of psychological interiority is also centrally a
meditation on meaning and representation: 'das Zeichen eines Inneren, aber das
Innere dessen Zeichen er ware, ist nicht mehr, und nichts anderes meinen die
Zeichen'. [Adorno 1961 202] Clov scoffs at Hamm's idea that they might be
carriers of meaning: 'Mean something! You and I, mean something! [Brief laugh.]
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Ah that's a good one!' [Beckett 1986108] It is ironic that this comment comes as
one of the play's clearest references, but the point for Adorno, implicit in the title
of his essay, is that Beckett's nonsensical words, actions and relations conjure up
a 'Ratselwesen' [Adorno 1961 192] that defies recuperation in an external and
coherent meaning: 'Die Interpretation des Endspiels kann darum nicht der
Schimare nachjagen, seinen Sinn philosophisch vermittelt auszusprechen.'
[Adorno 1961190]
This scepticism about the possibility of meaning motivates Adorno's idea of
Beckett's theatre as enacting a 'Subtraktion' - which is to say a kind of
abstraction but bereft of the positive content. It is worth remembering in this
respect that the Romantics associated negation with the finitude of the particular
and the determinate [see Bowie 1997 68], and whilst Adorno calls this refusal of
referential meaning a disruption of the 'Einheit von Erscheinendem und
Gemeintem' [Adorno 1961189], one might also say that the immanent meaning
generated in Beckett is precisely a case of this unity being taken to an extreme.
The chain of reference has been short-circuited. I have noted Adorno's idea of
the removal specific characteristics in his representations - the 'Verlust alIer
Qualitat' [Adorno 1961 195], but in Romantic terms, this short-circuiting of
reference might mark the paralysis of the referential mechanism, of the meaning-
function of drama, which fails to escape the particularity of any words or action.
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Of course, complete absence of meaning is a paradox, in as much as meaning can
always be retrieved, even if it is limited to the idea of there being no meaning.
(This echoes the gesture of Kant's sublime, to draw sense from nonsense, rational
control from chaos.) So even though Colin Counsell writes that 'there is no
meaning' [Counsell 1996 116], and Adorno that Beckett's work is an 'Ausdruck
seiner Absenz' [Adorno 1961 189], elsewhere the latter is characteristically
resistant to the idea that meaning is simply absent, or 'einfach negativ'. [Adorno
1961 189] There is no such sheer absence in Beckett, rather a playing with the
possibility of meaning. Adorno himself recoups 'positive' meaning from
Beckett's work in the form of its critique of subjective interiority. Similarly one
might identify the hopelessness of the Isituation', the futility of a gratuitously
repeated activity as its essential message. Emblematic of this refusal to
relinquish meaning is that in Breath the rising and falling light never goes out
completely, arguably making it in this respect a more subtle piece than Martin
Creed's 2001 Turner Prize-winning 'Lights Going On and Off'. The activity on
stage never dissolves into sheer nonsense, but is fraught by an intentional non-
elucidation of meaning.
Foregrounding technical apparatus
In this sense one might interpret Beckett's Endgame as refocusing attention on the
presence of activity on stage, and denying its suitability for representing any
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coherent story. One device that contributes to this is the fore-grounding of
technical apparatus, such as Beckett's use of lighting in Breathe, in which the
rising and falling light never goes out completely: 'Not bright. If 0 = dark and 10
= bright, light should move from about 3 to 6 and back.' [Beckett 1986 3711
Whereas normally a means to signify something else, here lighting refuses to
signify anything beyond itself and becomes an enigmatic end in itself. In this
respect Breathe anticipates Beckett's later work, of which Knowlson writes that
'Beckett was anxious as a director to make the lighting and sound levels as much
a part of the formal patterning as was the verbal text.' [Knowlson & Pilling 1979
225] A spotlight picks out the human head in That Time, as it had followed the
protagonists - or rather determined their action - in the earlier short piece Play.
In both Not I and That Time most of the stage is in darkness, in the former pierced
only by the suggestion of physical being, in the disembodied 'Mouth', and the
hint of physical action, in the' Auditor'. [Beckett 1986 375] As Marius Buning has
it, '[w]hat characterises the late plays, above all, is the pervasive and compulsive
presence of almost total darkness, only to be mitigated by subdued portions of
light.' [Buning 1990 137] In his hook on the holy and its relationship to
rationality, written in 1917, Rudolph Otto refers to the intrinsically mystical effect
of darkness: 'The darkness must be such as is enhanced and made all the more
perceptible by contrast with some last vestige of brightness, which is, as it were,
on the point of extinguishing: hence the 'mystical' effect begins with semi-
darkness.' [Otto 1959 83] Alternatively, this use of lighting might be used to
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focus the audience's attention on the minimal events on stage, but it is also one
aspect of Beckett's theatre in which he returns to the rudiments of perception.
Beckett had become 'preoccupied with the effects that could be obtained by
varying the intensity and the speed of both speech and lighting'. [Knowlson &
Pilling 19791121 This minima of visual stimuli fosters an increased sensitivity to
language and to the rhythm of the words. As Enoch Brater puts it, '[tjhe stark
interplay of space, sound, and light therefore makes us sensitive to language and
its repetition, which controls the flow of this work.' [Brater 1987441
But the sound that is accentuated by the darkness is not itself a means to a
representative end, a particularly effective rendering of Beckett's thematic
message. Rather, the sound is a kind of an end-in-itself, as Beckett puts it in an
instruction to one of his actresses, BillieWhitelaw: 'What matters is the rhythm of
the piece - the words are merely what pharmacists call the excipient.' [Quoted in
Brater 1987 381 Beckett's production notebooks indicate how important musical
parallels are to him as a director, for instance in the musical pitch differentiating
voices in Play, the pacing of the delivery in Krapp's Last Tape and of May's step in
Footfalls. The stage notes for the latter refer to 'clearly audible rhythmic tread'
[Beckett 1986 399] of which is said later, in the dialogue V reports between
mother and child, May: 'I mean, Mother, that I must hear the feet, however faint
they fall. The mother: The motion alone is not enough? May: No, Mother, the
motion alone is not enough, I must hear the feet, however faint they fall.' [Beckett
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1986 401] This leads James Knowlson to read Beckett's work as less
'psychological' and 'realistic', and more' musical'. [Knowlson & Pilling 1979 283-
4, see also Buning 1990 138]
This modulated pacing is largely absent from Not I, whose 'sound stage' is
characterised by an alternative but related strategy that is common to Beckett's
later work, namely the inexorable and almost impenetrable flow of words. I
have already referred to ideas of the religious or mystical nature of this
involuntary flow, but it was clearly central to Beckett's intention for the piece.
The playwright pushed the actress Billie Whitelaw, when playing Mouth, to
speak faster and faster [see Fischer-Seidel 1994 74], saying: 'I am not unduly
concerned with intelligibility. I hope the piece may work on the nerves of the
audience, not its intellect.' [Brater 1974 198] Similarly, the playwright wanted
That Time to be impossible to understand the first time round, and in order to
maintain the momentum of the play he allowed no laughter pauses in the Royal
Court revival of the play in 1976. [See Knowlson & Pilling 1979 116] The
common ground with the focus on the modulation of perception here is the more
'direct' and sheerly 'sensory' nature of the performance. James Knowlson
acknowledges that it is 'tempting to see the impact of the play in sensory, even in
visceral terms' [Knowlson & Pilling 1979 205], and Enoch Brater refers to the
particularly visceral effectiveness of Not I, and even its hypnotic force. [See Brater
1974195,198723] George Devine, Beckett's long-time lighting collaborator refers
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in his director's notes to words as 'dramatic ammunition' rather than as carriers
of meaning, which he compares to his own idea of light as a dentist drill. [Cited
in Knowlson 1971 91]
Of course just as Beckett's work cannot be said to be without meaning or to
evade interpretation entirely, the meditations on narrative, meaning and identity
above make clear that Beckett's late theatre cannot be said to be merely sensory.
But perceptual sphere does playa pivotal role in Beckett's late work. Even the
issue of identity that Not I's narrative pokes holes in might be said to turn on the
individual's status as a being that is perceived. I have indicated Knowlson's idea
that 'the experience of being recounted is virtually synonymous with the
experience of being observed'. [Knowlson & Pilling 1979 201] (This returns to
the terrain of Beckett's earlier filmed piece, Film (1963), in which the protagonist,
0, is plagued by E, which ultimately turns out to be a's own self-awareness,
expressing what Beckett calls the 'inescapability of self-perception' [Beckett 1986
323] or what Raymond Federman refers to as the Iagony of perceived ness' .
[Federman 19711) But the overlap with Welsch's ideas on aesthetics is evident,
both in the focus on minimalism which throws the audience's focus onto simple
sensory elements and in the strategy of making perception of events on stage
difficult. That is not to say that Beckett's work fulfill Welsch's anaesthetics of
respite, with its consolatory undertones: if anything, it precipitates quite the
opposite: a disconcerting half-understanding. But the above features of and
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comments on Beckett's work also seem to echo the two aspect of claims to
authenticity that I discussed above in relation to aniaesthetics as sensory,
namely art deployed as anti-fiction by virtue of a process of reduction, and as an
overwhelming and concrete presence. Robbe-Grillet was the first to refer to the
privileging of 'sheer presence' in Beckett's pieces, which he identifies with their
hermetic nature (and associates with Heidegger's notion of man's thrownness).
[See Robbe-Grillet 1963 106, 105, 95] Likewise Brater claims that 'it is not the
possible fictivity of the process which ensnares our attention, but its
overwhelming and outrageous authenticity'. [Brater 1987 40] In a similar vein
Fischer-Seidel distinguishes between 'visible fact and audible fiction' in Beckett's
late work [Fischer-Seidel 1994 79], a view which seems to rest on the above idea
of authenticity by virtue of reduction. Beckett's visuals are certainly more spare
and minimal than his words, but even if we trust our eyes more than our ears
this does not seem to amount to a positive statement of authenticity, in view of
the fragments of bodies and inconclusive gestures that Beckett's Not [ offers.
Beckett's art clearly offers an experience that is in crucial ways the opposite of
aestheticisation's perfect surface and 'tweaked' receptivity, insofar as the pre-
digested meaning of aestheticisation is subverted by Beckett's indigestible
meaning. In my view Fischer-Seidel is closer to the critical sense of Beckett's late
work when she refers to his refusal to leave visuality to the popular media.
[Fischer-Seidel 1994 80] For me this refusal turns on what Jonathan Kalb refers
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to, citing Robbe-Grillet, as the 'invention of a new type of audience/stage
transaction'. [Kalb 1989 47]
Transmission and habit
This kind of transaction is of course precisely thematised throughout Beckett's
work, from Cascando (1962), in which the 'Opener' and 'Voice' share a
fragmentary story, the through the indeterminate relationship between Mouth
and Auditor in Not I, the three voices of That Time, rapidly delivered to the
suspended and illuminated face of the 'Listener', to the parallel figures of the
'Reader' and 'Listener' in the later Ohio Impromtu (1981). The use of sound and
light also reflects on the issue of transaction, or perhaps better transmission: for
instance the figures in urns in Play (1962)are provoked to speak by the spotlight,
and for Hugh Kenner the role of light has also been seen as 'a metaphor for our
attention (relentless, all-consuming, whimsical)'. [Kenner 1968 210-11] This
suggests that Beckett is not only dismantling the customs of theatre, what Colin
Counsell calls Beckett's' one-man assault against theatrical norms' [Counsell 1996
4], but might be said to reach beyond the stage precisely via these issues of
problematised reception.
This underlines the fact that the sensory nature of Beckett's pieces and the gaps
in understanding are deployed to destabilise our intellectual faculties and the
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means of our interaction with the outside world. Since his early 'Proust' essay,
published in 1931, Beckett had been interested in the workings of the human
mind, and the relationship between inner and outer worlds. Like Proust, Beckett
is preoccupied by the pernicious effects of habit, referring to it as the 'dull
inviolability, the lightening-conductor of [man's] existence'. [Beckett 19318] Just
as lightening is dangerous, Beckett cites Proust's idea that without habit life
would be both deadly and delicious. [Beckett 103117] Habit is both a 'minister
of dullness' and an 'agent of security' [Beckett 193110], a protection against the
suffering and privation of reality. [See Beckett 193113] His plays might be seen
as an oscillation between these poles of suffering and boredom.
Beckett's concern about the levelling effect of habit on experience underlies his
remarks on involuntary memory, to which he sees Proust's entire book as a
monument. [See Beckett 1931 21] Memory and habit are seen always to be
'conditioned by the prejudices of the intelligence which abstracts from any given
sensation, as being illogical and insignificant, a discordant and frivolous intruder
whatever word of gesture, sound or perfume, cannot be fitted into the puzzle of
a concept.' [Beckett 1931 53] And this reference to gesture, sound and smell is
indicative of Beckett's understanding that, just as the processes of intellection are
responsible for this levelling, the mode of their overturning is described in
specifically sensory terms. Beckett describes 'the essence of any new experience'
[Beckett 1931 53-4] as being resistant to analysis, which underlies what Beckett
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describes as a 'total past sensation' which can only be happened upon 'by
accident', [Beckett 1931 54, his emphasis] 'Thus the sound produced by a spoon
struck against a plate is subconsciously identified by the narrator with the sound
of a hammer struck by a mechanic against the wheel of a train', [Beckett 193154]
This accidental sound retains Kantian aspects, in both its insistence on the
purposeless nature of the experience - Beckett refers to it as 'a sound that his will
had rejected as extraneous to its immediate activity' and as a 'subconscious and
disinterested act of perception' [Beckett 193154] - and its nature as a 'pure act of
cognition', [Beckett 1931 55] Beckett associates this purity - an 'integral purity
[that] has been retained because it has been forgotten'[Beckett 193154, his emphasis] -
with a kind of Artaudian 'Idea' or 'essence': 'Habit has laid its veto on this form
of perception, its action being precisely to hide the essence - the Idea - of the
object in the haze of conception - of preconception,' [Beckett 1931 11] This
'vetoed essence' returns to the kind of intangible, mystical core that refuses
positive statement and can only be 'evoked', which I have associated with the
aesthetics of silence and negativity, In the same vein, Beckett's darkness, the
spareness of action and fragmentary meaning might suggest intimations of this
'Idea' or 'essence', But equally the speed of delivery in That Time and the torrent
of words of Not I might be read as a means of warding off the operation of habit
and the mental facility of intellection, which are fostered by what Beckett refers
to as the 'poisonous ingenuity of time', [Beckett 193140]
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But of course a key question posed in the last chapter was whether this kind of
'negative' art or non-presentation of the 'Idea' is a cul-de-sac for art, which I
discussed both in terms of art's 'completeness' and the possibility of art retaining
connection to an external referent. It is with these issues in mind I will turn now
to Peter Handke's theatre, whose early works share the same transformation of
the relationship between audience and stage as Beckett's later works, albeit
expressed as a more explicit challenge to the audience. Similar meditations on
the rudiments of sense perception and habitual responses are evident in Handke.
Moreover, I asked the question above whether such meditations on the limits of
meaning and perception could be reconnected with everyday habits of
perception as a kind of critical interrogation, rather than the seemingly more
redemptive 'Idea' that evades those habits - the combination of Welsch's
imperceptible art with art which reflects on the cultural and cognitive
preconditions of perception. For the young Beckett the only interaction with the
everyday seems to be an evocation of past experience. He writes of '[t]he
identification of immediate with past experience' as 'amount[ing] to a
participation between the ideal and the real, imagination and direct
apprehension, symbol and substance. Such participation frees the essential
reality that is denied to the contemplative as to the active life.' [Beckett193155-6]
In what follows I will suggest that Handke's theoretical writings and his
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theatrical work might take us a step further towards such a critical articulation of
the evocative and the everyday.
Peter Handke's Das Mundel will Vormund sein: anti-reference and non-perception
Direct comparisons between Beckett and Handke in the secondary literature are
few. Corbett Stewart refers to Handke's inconsistent attitude to Beckett, which
ranges from direct quotation (in Handke's 1968 piece Horspiel Nr. 2) and the
influence of Beckett's use of action (or rather inaction) to Handke's rejection of the
older playwright's simplistic symbolism. Stewart also usefully registers other
parallels, such as the use of the clown by both dramatists and the master/slave
relationship. (Stewart notes their different reasons for this focus: Beckett's 'wide-
ranging existential metaphor' is contrasted with Handke's 'attack on society's
restrictive codifications' [Stewart 1990 309], in terms which incidentally echo, at
least loosely, my distinction between aesthetics' more transcendental and its
more marginal concerns.) The point might even be extended to register that
whilst Beckett's hermetic work seems to offer an almost 'timeless' depiction of
the existential situation (I have referred above to Heidegger's idea of our
'thrownness'), Handke belongs to a generation which sets higher store by a more
socially grounded cultural critique. This might indicate thoroughly different
motivations for their ostensibly similar strategies, pertinent for my
considerations, of narrative fragmentation, the limitation of narrative perspective
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and the attack on signification. This distinction of generation and disposition
might also be illuminating for Jonathan Kalb's discussion of the two playwrights.
Kalb starts out from the understanding of Handke's broad debt to Beckett, in
particular in his Kaspar figure, which 'becomes entangled in an action more
serious and disturbing than anything one would expect in Kasperltheater or even
Kabarett'. [Kalb 1989 47, see also 144] But Kalb takes issue with Handke's
remarks in Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms (1972) where the latter
dismisses the 'Beckett'schen Pantornimen' as 'unre£lektiert' and uncritical of
theatre's essential claim to present unequivocal meanings. [Kalb 1989 261,
Handke 1972 27] Kalb acknowledges that Handke would have only been
referring to Beckett's earlier work, but in this respect it is notable that Handke's
dismantling of dramatic norms, such as the specific focus on the rudiments of
perception, predates Beckett's more radically dismantled late work. (The idea
that influence between the two playwrights might be more than one-way traffic
may be recognised in Kalb's remarks about the difficulty of periodising Beckett,
who 'is Artaud's junior by little more than a decade, Brecht's by only eight years,
which means that he can be both precursor and contemporary to Handke and
Muller.' [Kalb 1989 145]) Moreover, there is arguably a specifically social
dimension to Handke's cultural critique which is less evident in Beckett.
All that said my concern here is not to indicate respective debts between the two
playwrights, nor to explore the specific parallels or links between them for their
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own sake, but rather to trace their common interest in a specific kind of drama
that meditates on and plays with perception. Of particular interest in that regard
is Peter Handke's early short mime play Das Mundel will Vormund sein (1969) and
the spoken piece of the same year, Quodlibet. Das Mundel is a play of gesture and
non-verbal language, whose depiction of a curiously apocalyptic 'Ursituation'
[Ruhle 1972 143] is dearly similar to that of Beckett's Endgame. In this case the
mutually dependent but hierarchical relationship of master and servant is based
in this case on the relationship between Prospero and Caliban in Shakespeare's
Tempest+ but like Beckett's characters' short and guttural names, emphasising the
renunciation of individuated personality, Handke's figures are referred to only
by generic names, the servant character, the 'Mundel', and the master, the
'Vormund'. Their relationship is acted out in physical gestures, with the Mundel
deferring to the Vormund, at the same time as manifesting the sole focal point of
his master's authority: the Hegelian subtext is clear. In the first scene, for
example, the Mundel is half way through eating his second apple, when the
Vormund enters and, by staring at the servant, gradually and at some expense of
time and attention, induces him to stop eating the apple. This is followed by
exchanges of repetitive reciprocal activity, summarised at one stage as follows:
IGegenseitiges Anstarren, gegenseitiges Anschauen, gegenseitiges
3The title of the play comes from the German rendering of a quote from the
Tempest, 'My foot, my tutor?', cited by Handke on the frontispiece; 'Was, das
Mundel will ein Vormund sein?' [Handke 1992193, see also Innes 1979 248]
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Durcheinanderdurchschauen, gegenseitiges Wegschauen. Man schaut einander
aufs Ohr.' [Handke 1992 201] For Gunther Ruhle, this kind of action thematises
the 'Lernprozesse' of conditioning and domestication via norms and otherwise
meaningless strings of words which are also central to Handke's earlier and
better known Kaspar. [Ruhle 1972 140] And whilst the outfits of the two
characters and their activities, falling from ropes and pulling large hoses across
the stage, are reminiscent of farce, Handke states at several points that it is not
comic: 'Nichts Komisches ereignet sich.' [Handke 1992 208] And it is this
insistence of how we as audience (or reader) relate to the activity on stage (or in
the text), rather than the relationship between the two characters on the stage,
that interests me here.
The most immediate implication of Das Mundel's lack of dialogue is that its text
consists largely, and necessarily, of stage directions. Similar to Beckett's Not I,
this precipitates a slippage - at least for the reader of the play - from dramatic
action to narrative telling. But the narrative of this silent piece is not dialogue,
but a written text that can equally well be read as performed. Indeed, certain
elements of the direction are clearly included with a view to their poetic value,
for example when we are told of the Vormund: 'er steht da, er stellt das Dastehen
dar, mehr nicht.' [Handke 1992205] Similarly, some of the words on the page
resemble concrete poetry, as in the episode where the Milndel writes on the door:
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Er schreibt langsam an der Tur herunter:
K+M+B
K+M+B
K+M+B
K + M + B [Handke 1992208]
(This action refers a traditional aspect of celebrating Epiphany in Southern
Germany and Austria, where boys dressed as the three kings visit houses,
marking the front door of each they visit with the letters of Kaspar, Melchior and
Balthazar, so that the kings may protect the house for the coming year.) The
genre confusion is compounded by the inclusion of elements in the direction
which might be lost in the enacting of this silent piece, such as indications of
psychological motivation and bald statements of what might not happen, like' die
Katze bewegt sieh, oder auch nicht.' [Handke 1992 197] These might serve as a
guideline for the director or actors, but in many instances it is hard to see how a
director could generate these specific effects merely by force of the action or
sounds on stage.
More central to my concerns is the fact that many of these directions are not so
much an objective description of what happens on stage, but a commentary on
the implied audience's subjective impression of these events, as Rolf GUnter
Renner remarks: 'Vieles von dem, auf das sie hinweist, ist subjektiver Eindruck,
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nicht objektivierbare Form der Auffuhrung.' [Renner 1985 40] This might be
understood as an aspect of what is probably the defining feature of Handke's
early work, the dismantling of the invisible barrier between stage and audience.
For Mereille Taban this is pivotal to Handke's turn against the closedness of
what she calls 'absolute' theatre. [Taban 1990 139] Rather than a presentation
which we sit back and enjoy, Handke's Sprechstucke draw the audience 'ins
theatralische Geschehen'. [Nagele & Voris 1978 74] The same central formal
device is true of this silent piece, and the continuity with Handke's first work, the
earlier and better-known Publikumsbeschimpfung (1966),is evident. As Gunther
Ruhle notes: 'Stummspiele sind Herausforderungen an das Publikum.
Stummspiele bringen das Publikum zum Spielen und zur Selbstdarstellung.'
[Ruhle 1972 144] It is in this sense that Peter Iden describes Das Mandel as a
Lehrsmck for the audience, albeit 'freilich in einem neuen Sinn.' [Iden 1972144]
So how might Handke's Lehrstiick be understood to operate and how might it
relate to Welsch's ideas of imperceptibility and latency? Handke himself
describes the aim of his theatre in terms of a strategy of alienation: 'irgendwas zu
machen, was das Schauen und das Zuhoren der Leute irgendwie befremdet.'
[Quoted in Litten 1972157] For Nagele and Voris, this means a 'sharpening' of
perception: 'Sprache so zu benutzen, daB sie das Bewu15tsein und die
Wahrnehmung scharft.' [Nagele & Voris 1978 120] But what exactly is to be
made strange in this new light, what is to be perceived anew? Common to all
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Handke's early pieces, of course, is their subversion of our expectations of
theatrical convention. But the question for me is whether there is any perceptual
renewal outside of this formal renewal which might support the idea of reading
aesthetic perception as somehow significant for everyday perception.
'Pures Theater': anti-reference and anti-theatricality
The thematic content of Das Mundel seems to be the patterns of domination, in
the same way that Kaspar takes as its material the patterns of language
acquisition. And Handke's own notion of a parallel between on-stage activity
and IAu1Senwelt' suggests that theatre might aim to sharpen our perception of
both on-stage action and the everyday. [See Handke 1972 91] But of course, any
direct link between the stage and reality would be at variance with Handke's
own rejection of specific engagement in favour of a greater formalism. [See
Nagele & Voris 1978 71-4] In particular, a central motivation for Handke's pieces
is the refusal of the idea of art as creating an illusory meaning or 'Bild von der
Welt'. [Nagele & Voris 1978 75] Indeed whilst Handke's Kaspar is about the
(albeit restrictive) acquisition of language which generates meaning from
nonsense, a central theme of Das Mundel is the problematising of reference and
coherent meaning. Akin to what I have said about Beckett's theatre as 'short-
circuiting' meaning, Handke in his theoretical writings refers to 'unmittelbares
Theater', which defies the need to generate an alternative coherent reality: '[Das
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Stuck] braucht nicht die Vermittlung einer Geschichte, damit Theater ensteht, es
ist unmittelbares Theater [... 1: auf der Buhne gibt es nur das Jetzt, das auch das
Jetzt des Zuschauers ist.' [Handke 1972 203, 2061 Peter Iden refers to this
immanence as Handke's 'pures Theater' [Iden 1972 1441, of which
Publikumsbeschimpjung is the clearest and most explicit example. This piece
begins with the four 'Sprecher' on stage practising their 'Schimpfworter', which
are barely audible and from which 'sich keine Bedeutung ergeben [soIl].'
[Handke 199213, 141 But from the moment the Sprecher tum to the audience, it
is not perception that is denied, but the audience's institutionalised expectations
of theatre: 'Sie haben sich etwas erwartet./ [... ] Sie haben sich eine andre Welt
erwartet.' [Handke 199215] (Of course, this rejection of theatricality is somewhat
disingenuous, as many elements of theatre inevitably remain in all three pieces.
In Publikumsbeschimpjung the Sprecher ironically acknowledge their adherence to
the unities of time, place and action which the piece observes: 'Dieses Stuck ist
also klassisch.' [Handke 1992 28]) This essence of theatre, 'was des Theaters ist'
[Handke 1992 17], is its conception not simply as 'another world', but also its
claim to be a mirror of reality: 'Sie sehen keine Gegenstande, die andere
Gegenstande vortauschen. Sie sehen keine Dunkelheit, die eine andere
Dunkelheit vortauscht.' [Handke 1992 18] The expectation that is being denied is
that of illusionist representation. In view of the fact that the Sprecher will talk
about 'nichts Erfundenem' [Handke 1992 36], there seems to be an imperative of
faithfulness to the external world. This is the paradoxical status of this kind of
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art: its anti-fictionality suggests truth is an issue, but not any truth that might be
verified externally. It is precisely the subordination of theatre's 'reines Spiel' to
meaning and reference to reality that the Sprecher complain about: 'Immer
lauerte etwas zwischen Worten, Gesten und Requisiten und wollte immer Ihnen
etwas bedeuten.' [Handke 199232]
In Publikumsbeschimpfung this manifests itself as a rejection of the piece's
'meaning' at all. Even the moments of non-perception, the emptiness of the stage
or the silences which punctuate speech, are not intended as dramatic devices,
pregnant with meaning, but rather emptied of special significance:
Die Leere dieser Buhne bedeutet nichts. Diese Buhne ist leer, wei!
Gegenstande uns im Weg waren. Sie ist leer, weil wir keine Gegenstande
brauchen. [... ] Unsere Pausen sind nicht beredt wie das Schweigen. Wir
sagen nichts durch das Schweigen. Zwischen unseren Worten tut sich
kein Abgrund auf. [Handke 1992 18, 22]
This failure of referential language is also central to some of Handke's poems, for
example' Abbrechen mitten im Satz' (1968),which does just that, and 'Vergleiche
fur nichts Vergleichbares' (1968),which consists of twenty-nine similes without a
final term. (This idea of the interchangability of similes and the failure to reach
an end term anticipates Stanley Cavell's remarks in 'Aesthetic Problems of
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Modern Philosophy' on the relationship of a metaphor - and ultimately all
language - to its referent. Rather than being in some way unique and 'resistant
to paraphrase, one metaphor may be exchanged for any other equivalents in an
unending chain which never actually touches what it speaks about. [See Cavell
1976 77-8] And in Das Mundel, whilst meaning does not break off, there are
moments where representation and meaning 'bound up in' a closed circle. The
Mundel, for example, 'steht da, er stellt das Dastehen dar, mehr nicht' [Handke
1992205] and the cat 'stellt das dar, was sie tut'. [Handke 1992 195] This anti-
illusionist theatre seems to make a similar claim to 'realness' as that in Beckett's
spare but concrete stage presences, in as much as the simple actions that happen
on the stage happen there and nowhere else. For Peter Iden, this absolution from
the obligation of meaning also offers an interpretation of the title of the play,
whose formal qualities become more important than its meaning; in effect they
become its meaning: 'das Instrument nimmt sich selbst zum Thema.' [Iden 1972
146] This rejection of theatre as reference to a - necessarily absent - external
reality has its technical correlate in the actions in Das Mundel, which are
repeatedly said to occur without theatrical effect. The Mundel eats the apple' als
ob niemand zuschauen wiirde' [Handke 1992 196], and with 'keine besondere
Eigenart Apfel zu essen'. [Handke 1992197] At the end, the curious activity of
pouring sand into water is done 'gernachlich, ohne Gleichmafsigkeit, ohne
Feierlichkeit'. [Handke 1992 215] This seems to offer the clear parallel with the
minimalism inherent in Welsch's anaesthetic, namely art as dispensing with
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excessive artifice. Exaggerated theatricality of traditional drama is rejected in
favour of a kind of non-acting. By the same token, this does not mean that
actions should be particularly ascetic: the final action is said not only to be
without 'Peierlichkeit', but also without the 'Gleichmafsigkeit' of such a self-
conscious holding back.
Non-perception as anti-fiction
This refusal of asceticism is notable, in view of my remarks in the previous
chapter about the function of austerity as consolation and ultimate reconciliation.
In this respect I cited Adorno's warning that artworks which exclude celebration
and consolation paradoxically gain these characteristics ever more: 'Selbst
Kunstwerke, welche Feier und Trost unbestechlich sich verbieten, wischen den
Glanz nicht weg, gewinnen ihn desto mehr, je gelungener sie sind.' [Adorno 1970
123] Welsch is of course not so cautious. But aside from his remarks on
fictionality and stoicism, for him art's minimalism is important for the respite it
allows our faculties of sensory perception. This focus on sense perception
coincides with the remarks of several commentators on Handke, whose refusal of
meaning is seen to invite interpretation at the level of simple perception. Iden,
for example, writes of a reduction of theatre 'auf das, was daran sinnlich
wahrnehmbar ist'. [Iden 1972 146] Hallmuth Karasek refers to the audience's
experience as a Isensualistische Nachprufung von Mmimalvorgangen', [Karasek
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1972 150] Handke himself writes of a turn from representation to the merely
sensory: 'Der Weg geht tiber die Sinnlichkeit, tiber das sinnlich Erfassbare.'
[Handke 197229] But beyond this return to simple perception, in what follows I
shall argue that it is crucial to the way in which Handke's art might be more than
just a cul-de-sac of non-representation, and might in fact be conceived as
dialectically related to what wider cultural norms. This has implications, in my
view, for the viability of Welsch's ideas on the anaesthetic as being about
perception and the cultural norms which underlie that perception.
More than the rudiments of sensory perception, Das Mundel involves a
thematisation of more sophisticated cognition, as much as one can make this
distinction. As noted above, the stage directions indicate not only what
objectively happens on stage, but also what we (allegedly) subjectively see on or
hear from the stage: 'Im Hintergrund der Buhne sehen wir, als Hintergrund der
Btihne, die Vorderansicht eines Bauernhauses.' [Handke 1992 195] And, 'Jetzt
wird die Musik fast unhorbar, wie das Hauptthema an manchen Stellen eines
Films fast verschwindet.' [Handke 1992 204] The text also informs us of the
duration and progression of our perception:
Neben dem Hackklotz, auf einem Schemel, haben wir schon auf den
ersten Blickjemanden sitzen sehen, eine Figur.
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Jetzt, nachdem wir die anderen Einzelheiten ringsherum kurz
aufgenommen haben, wenden wir uns wieder dieser Gestalt zu' [Handke
1992195]
The text also includes curious reminders not to ignore certain things have been
happening stage: 'vergessen wir nicht, weiter auf die Musik zu horen, die weder
leiser noch lauter wird'. [Handke 1992200]
Handke also presupposes a specific audience expectation and experience of the
actors' activities: 'dann kommt der Vormund mit dem Gummischlauch, den er
hinter sich her zieht und schliefslich fallen lafSt'. [Handke 1992 200] This
'schliefslich' seems to suggest that we should feel an element of tension about this
moment of physical theatre. And whilst we could happily wait for the arrival of
a second character on stage to establish the first figure's identity when watching
the play, in the written text we are informed of our 'own' deductions before a
comparison is even possible: 'Die Figur auf der Buhne ist jung - also erkennen
wir daiS diese Figur auf der Buhne wohl das Mandel darstellt.' [Handke 1992
196] Alongside such seemingly superfluous inferences, essential directions are
all but neglected: 'Es mu15wohl kaum mehr erwahnt werden, daiSdie Person, die
vor dem Bild des Hauses auf einem Schemel hockt, eine Maske tragt.' [Handke
1992196] At other times, Handke indicates insights into the characters thoughts
which would not necessarily be apparent from merely watching the action: 'Das
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Mundel sitzt da. Wohin mit den Beinen?' [Handke 1992 201] Similarly,
otherwise ambiguous gestures in the Mundel and Vormund's mime are
interpreted for us: 'er antwortet, in dem er den Hut abnimmt und vor sich auf
den Tisch liegt.' [Handke 1992 201] Handke also tells us how we perceive and
understand things, such as that repeated activities lose their sense: Idas wird so
oft wiederholt, dafi es seine Psychologie verliert' [Handke 1992 201]; or that the
slowness with which certain things take place precludes our finding them funny:
'Auch er tut das so langsam, dafSes gar nicht zum Lachen ist.' [Handke 1992 207]
This repetition or exaggerated slowness inevitably emphasizes the sensual
element of the characters' actions, and contributes to Handke's refusal to create a
convincing illusion of an alternative reality.
But in what way does this curious invasion of usually objective direction by
subjective inference invest Handke's work with anaesthetic effects? Of course,
some of this detail actually tells us what we might not otherwise notice, and in
some cases could not otherwise know in the absence of any script. But then who
is the text intended for, the actors or the audience? Though if the stage directions
were read over a public address system simultaneous to the on-stage action it is
possible that this would be even more of an obstacle to perception and
comprehension. (I will refer below to Werner Gerber's production of Heiner
MUller's Bildbeschreibung, in which the text was both read out and a recording of
it played over a PA) And certainly some of these interventions do seem to share
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common ground with Welsch's anaesthetic in that they not only thematise
perception, but also set up obstacles to perception. In particular, this involves a
curious emphasis on what we (the audience) cannot see or hear. Sometimes this
is because we have become used to certain phenomena: 'An die Musik haben wir
uns schon gewohnt.' [Handke 1992 212] At other times it is too dark for us to be
able to see: 'Aber diesen Sachverhalt nehmen wir kaum mehr wahr, denn [... ] die
Buhne [wird] auch schon langsam wieder Finster. Die Szene ist zuende.'
[Handke 1992 198] Sometimes it is because we notice only after the event has
occurred: 'Das Mundel steht schon einige Zeit, als wir es stehen sehen.' [Handke
1992 211] Sometimes it is because the action happens too fast for us to perceive:
'so schnell [... ], daiSwir, wenn wir hatten zahlen wollen, kaum viel weiter als bis
eins hatten zahlen konnen.' [Handke 1992206] Sometimes we are distracted by
some other activity on the stage: 'Vor lauter Schauen haben wir fast ubersehen,
daiS die Figur den Apfel schon aufgegessen hat.' [Handke 1992197] Sometimes it
is because things simply are not there to be seen: 'Huhner sind nicht zu sehen.'
[Handke 1992 197] Sometimes we see but are unable to recognise objects, as at
the start:
Ein Gummimantel, schwarz, bedeckt den Gegenstand einerseits ziemlich,
andrerseits hat er, obwohl er den Gegenstand bedeckt, sich nicht in allem
der Form dieses Gegenstands angepa15t, so daB wir nicht erkennen
konnen, was der Gegenstand auf der Buhne darstellt. [Handke 1992 195]
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Similarly, we sometimes hear something, but are unable to identify it:
1mFinstern beginnt jetzt eine neue Szene, wir horen es. Was wir horen, ist
ein lautes Atmen, das von einem Tonband uber Lautsprecher kommt. Das
Atmen fangt, nach einer Stille im Finstem, gleich ziemlich laut an und,
indem es fortgefUhrt wird, wird es weder gleichmafsig lauter noch leiser,
sondern es schwankt immerzu in seiner Lautstarke: derart, dafi, wenn wir
meinen, jetzt wUrde es gerade immer lauter werden, bis zu dem
Lautestmoglichen, es plotzlich wieder ziemlich leise wird, und, wenn wir
glauben, es konnte jetzt und jetzt verstummen, es plotzlich wieder
rnoglichst laut wird, und zwar weitaus lauter als ein naturliches Atmen.
[Handke 1992 198]
This is reminiscent of Beckett's Breath, referred to above, in which not the
eponymous breathing, but the light oscillates in a way that is neither dark not
light. This scene is echoed towards the end of the piece, when, the stage in
darkness, unidentifiable noises arise:
Es wird lauter, das heiBt, immer raumlicher - ein Rocheln? ein sehr
angestrengtes Luftholen? Oder nur ein groiser Blasebalg? Oder ein
riesiges Tier?
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Es wird recht gleichmaBig lauter.
Allmahlich wird es zu raumlich fur diesen Raum.
Ist es hier, ist es dort?
Plotzlich ist es still. [Handke 1992 214]
The status of these phenomena is hard to define: they may exist (or not exist)
only to defy our perception of them. In my view this text is characteristic of
Handke's shift in focus from on-stage action to the audience, which Rolf Gunter
Renner caIls Handke's 'Begrundung der Wirklichkeit des Theaters durch den
Zuschauer.' [Renner 1985 41] But of course crucial aspect of Handke's work is
precisely a refusal to generate any such 'Wirklichkeit': it is apparent that the
thematisation of perception in Handke's Das Mundel does not so much generate a
new reality, but precisely undermines the possibility of any such determinate let
alone convincing new reality. As in Beckett's Not I, these obstructive ruptures
and blind-spots in Handke's description serve a similar strategy of disrupting the
audience's ability to generate a coherent' story'. As such, it is apparent that the
force of Handke's theatre cannot be found in its focus on the audience alone, but
in the interplay between the audience and the question of the status of the
phenomena witnessed on stage. On the one hand, the presentation of these
phenomena occurs largely through our subjective perception of them. On the
other hand, we are also compelled to question and try to reconstruct their
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possible 'reality' or otherwise. At the same time it seems that such refutations of
representative function cannot fail to make a paradoxical reality-claim, an
authenticity derived from an experience beyond the artifice of conventional,
theatrical presentation, an 'unmittelbares Theater', limited to acts which are
actually and undeniably occurring on the stage.
But this 'incontestable experience' is not the only claim to truth that inhabits
Handke's piece. These misperceived or non-perceived phenomena and these
immediate and immanent actions cannot entirely escape their status as theatrical
elements. And in the sense of Adorno's remark at the start of Asthetische Theorie
that nothing in art is self-evident any more [see Adorno 1970 9], a Ideeper'
significance seems to derive inevitably from the incorporation of a gesture or a
fragmentary phrase in the artwork. As such, actions like the Mundel's pouring
sand into water do seem to beg some kind of allegorical interpretation, even at
the same time as they refuse direct interpretation. Indeed, as in Beckett it seems
that their meaning inheres precisely in their evasion of determinate
interpretation. Handke makes this redundancy of language explicit in the 1973
essay 'Die Geborgenheit unter der Schadeldecke', in which he suggests that
'sprachlose einzelne W5rter' are all that is left in the face of an inauthentic and
colonised language: 'Alles weitere gehorte dann schon zu der Fiktion von
Verstrutdigung'. [Handke 1974 73] This idea of the 'Fiktion von Verstandigung'
sounds very much like the opposition I have identified between the fictionality of
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the aestheticised and the truth of silence or sensory absence. It is a view of art
that I have associated with what Michael Hardt calls a 'negative foundation of
being', whereby '[b]eing seems to rest precariously on a poetics of silences.'
[Hardt 1991 244] The quasi-mystical vein in minimalist art, identified in
connection with John Cage, is also evident in drama, as attested to by works and
comments by Botho Straufs and even Peter Weiss. Maurice Maeterlinck, noted
above as an early proponent of contentless and paralysed drama is also an
important precursor in these ideas of the spiritual dimension of art. In his
theoretical writings he suggests the function of silence and inactivity in drama as
a guarantor of ideal realm, whereby such minimalism is seen to offer' a kind of
new beauty [... ] more spiritual, more abstract, than was the old'. [Maeterlinck
1994 xx] This is in spite of his expressed wish to 'sortir du monde der realites
evidentes, sans rentrer dans celui des chimeres anciennes' [Maeterlinck 1908 xiii-
xiv]; in the last chapter I asked whether such 'ancient chimeras' can be avoided
in this new quasi-religious function of art as a compensation for material.
But Handke is arguably not capitulating in his essay, rather making a 'call to
arms'; a demand that we speak out our 'Sprachlosigkeit'. [Handke 1974 73] My
concern in the last chapter was not only that readings that take art as a response
to essentially epistemological and ontological problems might be politically and
ideologically problematic, but that they sacrifice the possibility of art relating to
everyday reality dialectically, as Welsch's cognitive anaesthetic sketches, and to
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the features of everyday aestheticisation in particular. My point here, as
suggested above, is that the thematisation of perception and the deployment of
incomplete perception in Handke can offer some dialogue with the everyday life-
world this side of a more philosophical function of the artwork. This involves a
more marginal intervention in the life-world that reintroduces fragmentary
elements of 'content' into the artwork, rather than relying on the expurgation of
the latter. Crucially for Welsch's formulations it seems to open the door for a
treatment of perceptual and cognitive habits.
Quodlibet: misperception and cultural norms
Space for a certain kind of referent seems to open up in the piece that Handke
wrote immediately after Das Mundel, Quodlibet, in which a similarly imperfect
perception is deployed as a process of tapping, and frustrating, certain theatrical
expectations and perceptual norms. In Quodlibet, as in the opening moments of
Publikumsbeschimpjung, the utterances of the players are only to be half-
understood by the audience: 'Die Zuschauer horen zwar zu, verstehen aber nur
selten ein paar Wi)rter oder Satzteile oder einfache, alltagliche Satze.' [Handke
1992 220] But the key difference from Publikumsbeschimpjung is that this half-
perception is not a mere warm up, but the main mode of the piece. Again, like
Das Mundel there is no set text, and the actors are instructed to speak about what
they have experienced that day: 'Es steht den Schauspielern frei, was sie reden
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wollen: fiber das was sie gerade in der Zeitung gelesen haben, was sie am Tag
erlebt haben.' [Handke 1992 219-220] The resulting' einfache, alltagliche Satze'
are precisely so 'belanglos' and 'nichtssagend' [Handke 1992 220] that the
audience eavesdrop in vain for a conversation or even a complete sentence, let
alone a story-line.
The fragmentary exchanges of this opening section are peppered with
misunderstandings, word-play and cross-talk. So for instance it begins with a
reference to something being broken, it is never made conclusively clear whether
this is a bottle or someone's neck. Similarly, 'vor Angst geschuttelt' transforms
into 'vor Gebrauch schutteln', and 'ertrankte Kinder' becomes 'Er trankte Rinder,
John Wayne, glaube ich, wie hieB nur der Film?' [Handke 1992 222] Snatches of a
poem are read out: , ... ob auf Astern Tautropfen blieben ... / ... ob Sorgen im Alter
zerstieben ... ' [Handke 1992 223] Voices from all parts of the stage interchange,
which further disorientates the listener from any reconstruction of a coherent
statement or story. There follow several different phases of speaking, the first in
which crucial words are omitted from sentences: 'jeueils ein Wort uberhaupt
weglassen und siehi sie dabei einander beziehungsvoll und miiunsserisdi anschauen.'
[Handke 1992 224] So for instance: 'Wenn im Radio ... angesagt wird, lasse ich
alles liegen und stehen.' [Handke 1992 224] The omission of what is often the
decisive word of the sentence leaves the audience frustrated. The second phase
is characterised by wrong words slipped into the exchange: 'sie gebrauchen ein
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falsches Wort for das richtige, in der Annahme, daft sie einander schon richtig verstehen' .
[Handke 1992 224] This plays with allusion and clichee, and also opens up the
potential for misunderstanding. The phase ends with a joke, which is only half
heard and clearly misunderstood by many on the stage. Next, sentences
gradually come to the fore that are the stock responses of politicians and
hecklers: 'Siitze aus dem Repertoire, das Politiker for Zwischenrufe aus dem Publikum
anwendbar ist, aber auch angewendet wird, wenn es keine ZwischenruJe gibt.' [Handke
1992 225] Again the point seems to be a reference to clichee and standardized
and restrictive forms of communication.
This technique of allusion is clearly not the kind of strategy that Welsch's
anaesthetic as non-perception describes, but in my view might suggest a strategy
of misperception and moreover one which points at and thematises latent
preconceptions in much the same way as the cognitive variant of Welsch's
anaesthetic suggests. I have already mentioned Susan Sontag in this regard, for
whom misperception allows a 'limited, vicarious participation in the ideal of
silence'. [Sontag 1969 7] Misperception is the compromised version of silence:
'The exemplary modern artist's choice of silence is rarely carried to this point of
final simplification, so that he becomes literally silent. More typically, he
continues speaking, but in a manner that his audience can't hear.' [Sontag 19697]
I have already noted John Cage's view on the impossibility of absolute silence,
and Peter Handke concurs: the idea of complete non-perception is dismissed by
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his 'Sprecher' in Publikumsbeschimpfung: 'Versuchen Sie, nichts mehr zu horen.
Versuchen Sie, nichts mehr zu riechen. Versuchen Sie, keinen Speichel mehr zu
sammeln. [... ] Sie sammeln ja Speichel. Sie horen ja zu. Sie riechen ja.' [Handke
1992 29] And in Quodlibet this anticipation and irrepressible hearing is exploited
by Handke's use of allusion and half-reference. As Handke puts it, alongside the
snatches of banalities, are to be heard 'Worte und Satze, die im Theater als
Signale wirken: Ausdrucke der Politik; der Sexualitat; der Analsphare: der
Gewalt.' [Handke 1992 220] That is to say, these words are not to be heard, but
misheard: 'statt "vergasen" wird auf der Buhne vom "Vergaser" gesprochen, statt
von "betonter Nichteinmischung" wird von der "Betonmischmaschine", statt
von "Auschwitz" spricht man vom "Aus-Schwitzen"'. [Handke 1992 220] The
point for me is that this misperception in Quodlibet is more flexible than the
silence in Das Munde! in that it allows reference, albeit fragmentary and merely
suggested, to culturally loaded words. In Welsch's terms, this allows an
articulation between his two ideas of the anaesthetic, namely non-perception and
the unthematised normative frameworks which underpin perception and
meaning+
4 A similar thematisation of perception and cultural norms is central to some of
Beckett's shorter works, for example the Ghost Trio, a play for television written
in 1975. The female voice begins with a reference to the audibility of her own
voice; 'Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. [Pause.]
Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. [Pause.]' [Beckett
1986408] In the ensuing first short act we are directed to look in detail at the
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Radically obstructed perception is plausible as a response to aestheticisation
insofar as such art is the precise opposite of the pre-digested phenomena that
characterise the aestheticised world. The same could be said of Adorno's
determinate negation of meaning, but does this' opposition', insofar as it resides
in meaninglessness and silence, allow for the kind of cognitive, dialectical re-
engagement with the everyday that are the promise at the heart of Welsch's ideas
for the aesthetic? Non-perception, as a more extreme version of theatre's turn
against action and representation, seems to get ever further from a notion of
content and a dialectical relation to the everyday. But in my view this more
modulated playing with perception in Handke lets referent and cultural norms
back into the picture. As such, as well as saving art from the cul-de-sac of
extreme self-reflexivity or non-reference, the return to some vestige of content
might also be said to make a more plausible link with Welsch's ideas on
aestheticisation.
stage set, and each small part we examine is said to tell us enough about the rest
of it. 'Having seen that specimen of wall, you have seen it all.' [Beckett 1986 408]
Beckett is clearly playing with the concept of allegorical representation, ironically
reducing our experience of events to a spareness, evacuated of feeling and
content much like Expressionist drama. And akin to Handke's
Publikumsbeschimpfung, he goes on to parody the expectations and automatic
connections we make in experience representative art; 'The kind of window- [... ]
The kind of door- [... ] The kind of wall-'. [Beckett 1986409]
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Compared to the insistence on a seemingly sheer self-determination or autonomy
that leads to art's refuge in silence or seemingly contentless art, Handke's
modulated idea of misperception does not call for abandoning the idea of art's
separateness in toto, nor the conception of the aesthetic as a quite separate mode
of experience. But does Quodlibet's fragmentary referential content - which
hardly amounts to explicit, discursive ideological critique help it avoid the
ideological pitfalls which attend the idea of art as absolute or does it fall between
two stools? But perhaps this fine line might be a good way of addressing the
ideological basis behind some of the effects of aestheticisation. This fragmentary
cultural reference might be read as forging a middle path between the
rarefied meditation on the limits of meaning and the pre-packaged and ready-
made meaning which seems to characterise the aestheticised world.
Perception and identification: anaesthetic as Wirkungsiisthetik
I have already suggested that this meditation on norms and expectations
underlines the pivotal role of the culturally located recipient, as distinct from
Kant's transcendental capacities or Adorno's banished subject. This returns of
course to my discussion in chapter two of philosophical aesthetics' ambivalent
relationship to the subject. On the one hand, the aesthetic is bound up with the
subjective experience, or indeed the experience of self as subject, as noted with
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reference to Christoph Menke in chapter two. On the other hand, aesthetic
theory from Kant, through Romanticism, to Heidegger and Adorno, whether in
its quest for the absolute or merely a space beyond particular ideological
investments, has been characterised by a mistrust of the subjective recipient.
More recently Hans Georg Gadamer and Hans Robert JauB have redressed this
imbalance with their focus on the contextualised moment of reception.
Ironically, however, a sceptical attitude towards the moment of reception might
be encouraged by the rigid conception of the process of reception in Hans Robert
JaufS's concept of 'Identifikation', discussed in chapter four. [See JauB 1975 263ff]
JaufS's identification proposes that if we perceive something it must also in some
way be said to make sense. Hegel registers this concept of a dialectical
interrelationship between meaning and perception in the double sense of the
word 'Sinn'. [See for example Hegel 1971 69] This short-circuiting of sense and
meaning is also central to Welsch's conception of anaesthetic as cultural non-
perception: to receive sense-data necessarily involves investing those impulses
with culturally-determined meaning and sifting out those perceptions that one
cannot attribute meaning to. But this rigid conceptualisation of identification is
surely undermined by precisely those examples of art which do seem to elude
the search for clear meaning: art like Beckett's and Handke's theatre are instances
where one perceives something that does not make sense, indicating precisely
that meaning and perception are not co-extensive. One might even say that the
truth that these art-forms can offer is antithetical to meaning, Adorno's
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determinate negation of meaning, and that their truth is redeemed precisely by
defying 'identification' by the recipient.
That said, Albrecht Wellmer has also suggested the implicit dependence on this
moment of subjective aesthetic experience in Adorno's own understanding of
aesthetic value. [See Wellmer 1993 185-93] And in my view a reception-
theoretical approach might steer this kind of interpretation-resistant art between
the Scylla of mysticism and the Charybdis of social irrelevance. It's an obvious
point to say that the inaccessibility of art's meaning is activated only at the
moment of its problematic reception, but in my view this does cause problems
for the aforementioned mistrust of the recipient. In Handke's Quodlibet it seems
that the recipient is more than just the point of cognitive failure. On the one
hand, the recipient might be taken as the main purpose of Handke's art, as
references to Handke's Sprechsiucke as a new kind of Lehrstiick [Iden 1972 144]
and as drawing the audience 'ins theatralische Geschehen' [Nagele & Voris 1978
74] indicate. My discussion of Das Mundel began with Handke's focus on
audience, and alongside the above ideas of theatre's function as immanent and
self-present truth or capacity for exposing norms, an underlying aim (or perhaps
simply 'method') of Handke's theatre is to develop a certain receptivity in the
audience. For Nagele and Voris, this Schillerian receptivity ('Schaffung eines
listhetischen Zustandes') opens up a space for thinking differently, 'Wecken eines
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Moglichkeitssinnes, der uberhaupt erst Alternativen denken kann'. [Nagele &
Voris 1978 73]
This idea of opening up alternative ways of thinking might be a variant of the
idea of the aesthetic as experience of an excess beyond determinate or discursive
meaning, what Menke calls an 'epistemological break' [Menke 2000 40] and
perhaps the characteristic feature of the aesthetic experience since its inception in
the middle of the eighteenth century. In drama theory this allergy towards the
determinate and contingent recurs in Antonin Artaud's preference for ancient
mime for its evocation of less determinate or 'obvious' [Artaud 1993 29-30] ideas,
to its 'modern European' variant, which is seen to function as a simple
replacement for words. Ideas, or, as Artaud puts it,
attitudes of mind, aspects of nature in a tangible, potent way, that is to say
by always evoking natural things or details, like that Oriental language
portraying night by a tree on which a bird that has already closed one eye,
is beginning to close the other. [Artaud 199329]
Language itself is implicated in this contingency, as indicated by the references
to the crisis of language at the turn of the century above. But the idea of verbal
convention as an obstacle to contact with reality, dismissed by Heidegger as 'the
worst of conventions' [Cited by Sheppard 1978 328}, begs the question of what is
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left if you remove language. By contrast, Handke's theatre does not just conjure
circular, autotelic meaning, but plays with conventions of language and
perception in a way that might be said to raise consciousness. As GUnther RUhle
puts it: 'Stummspiele bringen das Publikum zum Spielen und zur
Selbstdarstellung.' [Ruhle 1972144]
So rather than a transcendental idea of the aesthetic as accessing a space beyond
the determinate, this might point out a more marginal free space within culturally
specific and located expectations. As such, Handke's pieces might suggest a
middle-ground between the sheer autonomy and self-reflexivity of this autotelic
use of language, exploiting a critical role that such a specifically aesthetic
experience can play within everyday life. The opening up of the receptivity of
the audience might activate a less 'absolute' intervention, which in the case of
Quodlibet is achieved not via a rejection of identification in toto, but by working at
its limits. This suggests a way of referring to but also partially escaping from the
ideological pre-investment of cultural phenomena, Welsch's 'cultural
anaesthetic' . In my view this allows a key shift of emphasis, from the aesthetic
object as truth-functional in-itself, by virtue of its refutation of coherent
referential meaning, to the effect of the artwork on the audience and specifically
its activation of the aforementioned half-reference to cultural references and
expectations.
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Returning to the question of aestheticisation, T. J. Clark characterises this
aestheticisation as phenomena being 'scrubbed and tweaked into post-modern
receptivity'. [Clark 1999 3] But my point is that 'receptivity' cannot be
discredited wholesale by this association with the postmodern, and is central to
the potentially oppositional function of art in postmodernity. It seems to me that
the strength of this focus on problematic perception and a renewal of receptivity
in the audience lies in its denying the easy 'consumption' of packaged sensory
perception and meaning which is central to the characterisation of
postmodernity as aestheticised. For Adorno, this focus on receptivity merely
renders phenomena as little more than a mirror of the recipient's manipulated
consciousness. But is it not plausible that Handke's toying with perception
precisely re-activates a recipient that had been rendered passive by the 'tweaked
and scrubbed' phenomena of postmodernity?
Of course, this reliance on a moment of reception might suggest an open-
endedness, a relinquishing control over what is perceived and understood in the
aesthetic experience. Whilst this open-endedness might be of concern to
formalists and Marxists alike (I have already drawn the contrast with the
protective tenor of Adorno's treatment of modernist texts), for Nietzsche, art's
incompleteness and imperfection is precisely the source of its value. As noted in
chapter two, art's failure to reach completion imparts a desire in the recipient of
art. For Robert Wilson, whose dramatics works I have associated with the
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anaesthetic above, the open-ended nature of minimalist art offers the recipient a
moment of cognitive freedom. In a way that overlaps with Welsch's
understanding of contemporary aestheticisation, Wilson conceptualises this
cultural and ideological overload as an infringement on our freedom of thought
and mental association, against which people 'sign-off' as a 'means to survival'.
[Cited in Innes 1993 202] This motivates his idea for a theatre to which people
can react in their own way, a freedom that also extends to artists and actors, who
are to explore and develop their own styles. [See Counsell 1996 180-1] This
notion of freedom echoes John Cage's motivation for writing 4'33": 'I was intent
on making something that didn't tell people what to do.' [Kostelanetz 1988 74]
But can we really speak in terms of cognitive or interpretive freedom in the case
of Beckett or Handke? The prescriptive tenor of Handke's Das Mundel seems to
speak against this idea: we are told that we do notice this, and that we do not
notice that. Moreover, the challenge to find coherent meaning or to piece
together a narrative which is central to Das Miindel and Not l's fragmentary
presentation seems intent on frustrating the audience, rather than allowing it any
moment of freedom.
More crucially for my argument here, Handke's works are conscious of the
cultural context in which they operate, with the consequence that any such
Cognitive freedom could presumably only ever be marginal and momentary,
pitted against the backdrop of the necessary network of culturally determined
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expectations. For Handke as for Welsch, cultural determination is both the
necessary medium of and an obstacle to perception. Peter Brook identifies
similar constraints on the side of production. Spontaneity and innovation
struggle in the face of individual as well as cultural conditioning, which for
Brook reduce dramatic enterprise to 'deadly theatre'. [Brook 1968125] In an echo
of Antonin Artaud's idea of art as an assault on the 'obvious ideas' [Artaud 1993
3D], Brook writes of 'the hair's-breadth of terror before the blankness, and then
the reassuring ready-made idea coming to the rescue.' [Brook 1968 126] For
Brook it is the task of theatre to undo this preconditioning, in the actors as well as
the recipients, to 'eliminat[e] cultural accretions' [Counsell 1996 169, see also
Brook 1968 125-6], but any attempt on the part of the aesthetic experience to
evade this 'reassuring ready-made idea' is an 'almost impossible' struggle
against the collusion of imagery and memory. [Brook 1968 126] The concept of
imagery here returns to Shklovsky's critique of Potebnya's notion of the poetic as
'thinking in images', and the reference to the workings of memory puts me in
mind of Marcel Proust's references in In Search of Lost Time to habit, the' skilful
but slow-moving arranger'. [Proust 1981 7] Against this Proust posits a notion of
'involuntary memory' that bypasses the habitual connections of consciousness.
The constitutive function of our necessarily limited 'Erwartung' - or
'Erwartungshorizont', as Gadamer would have it - is an essential element of
reception theory's hermeneutical insight.
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This reading of cultural over-determination as a process of inducing people to
think and respond in certain 'ready-made' ways fleshes out Welsch's idea of
aesthetic accumulation and the cognitive anaesthetic, and is already more
sophisticated than his one-dimensional conceptualisation of the problem as
sensory excess. The linguistic element of this determination of experience by
cultural preconditioning is expressed in the notion that language 'itself' speaks.
It is in this respect that Antonin Artaud sees theatre's avoidance of language as
crucial to how art can operate counter-culturally. But as we have seen, Handke
is more circumspect about this rejection of language as the medium of our
experience. For me, the struggle with cultural pre-determination is evident in
Handke's works and it is a struggle that takes place at the level of language. In
particular Peter Handke's notion of the Nachbild, mentioned in the prose piece
Mein Jahr in der Niemandsbucht, is a possible means of reconnecting this
indeterminacy with a kind of reference to cultural habits and norms. Peter Brook
had already written in similar terms of art as burning a trace, though his terms
suggest a more conscious combination emotion and argument:
When a performance is over, what remains? Fun can be forgotten, but
powerful emotion also disappears and good arguments lose their thread.
When emotion and argument are harnessed to a wish from the audience
to see more clearly into itself - then something in the mind burns. The
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event scorches on to the memory an outline, a taste, a trace, a smell - a
picture. [Brook 1968152]
It seems that everything has to be right for this to work: the audience have to be
committed to change and the combination of emotion and argument must be just
right. On the other hand, Peter Handke's pieces discussed above, such as
PublikumsbechimpJung and particularly Quodlibet, suggest using the limits of
perception as a means to provoking the audience into a reflection on cultural
norms and habits. His Nachbild idea suggests a way in which this half-perception
might bypass our usual habits of perception:
'Wenn du von einem Gegenbild ein Nachbild erwartest', sagte er mir
einrnal, 'darfst du ihn keinesfalls fixieren, du must, dabei aufmerksam,
durch ihn durschschauen, erst damit wird sein Nachbild verlasslich und
bestandig, und seine Gestalt wird an so1chen Nachleuchten oft eher zu
Entdeckungen fuhren als an dem Ding seIber!' [Handke 1994657]
Certainly, Handke's idea of'durchschauen' seems to propose the same kind of
half perception that is imposed on the audience in Quodlibet. As such, if the
packaged and pre-digested phenomena of aestheticisation may be characterised
in these cognitive terms as an enforced passivity, T. J. Clark's 'scrubbed and
tweaked [... J receptivity', it might be that Handke's combination of partial
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perception re-activates and re-engages the recipient's mind. This operates via a
disturbance in expectations, a toying with assumptions and pre-determined
cognitive connections. This returns to my distinction, in the course of my
discussion of Lyotard in chapter three, between art as correspondence to reality
(or the idea) and art as provocation to habits of mind, citing Christopher Butler's
idea of art as 'reveal[ing] the way in which we conceive of the external world,
which means that art of this kind does not (really) represent, but rather shows us
how the mind might use signs to remind itself of aspects of the external world'.
[Butler 1994 72]
Adorno also refers to art as generating an afterimage, a Nachbild, but in his case
this is an image of a transcendental, primordial experience of fear, 'Nachbilder
des vorweltlichen Schauers im Zeitalter der Vergegenstandllchung'. [Adorno
1970 124, see also 428] This sounds like the same kind of experience that is
central to Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty [see Artaud 1993 33], but for me it is
important that Handke's undermining of habitual cognitive patterns does not
relinquish its connection to cultural context and content, whilst at the same time
refusing to relegate art to mere representation of ideologically pre-determined
positions. I have associated art which deploys silence or the imperceptible with a
turn against the real, or a shaking off the obligation to represent, but implicit in
my discussion of the ideological problems of silent and imperceptible art is the
suggestion that such art is in fact still in thrall to the representation paradigm
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(insofar as it represents a 'super-sensory idea'). My contention here is that
Handke's fragmentary reference is more successful in dismantling or shaking the
representative order. If I am right to characterise Handke's experimental drama
as finding a middle path between non-reference and reference, can his work be
said to remain true to the specificity of the aesthetic experience, at the same time
as engaging with our ideologically tainted preconceptions? In my view it would
be dismissive to characterise this cognitive intervention as a limited function of
ideological statement. Does Handke's method here bridge the gap between what
art can do that other things cannot and art understood as ideological critique? Is
it really anywhere near critique? Might it suggest that the perceived gap
between formalist aesthetic concerns and everyday life does not have to be
bridged only via the understanding of the ontological or epistemological
implications of the aesthetic realm, but via the kinds of experience it can foster
offering vernacular interference in the patterns of habitual thinking? It is not a
question of what such aesthetic experience can tell us about our assumptions,
because it is by its very nature open-ended, but that it has a de-stabilising effect
on our assumptions, forcing a kind of renewal.
In conclusion, there are clearly aspects of Handke and Beckett's works
considered here that have crucial overlaps with Welsch's theorisation of the
anaesthetic; instances where perception is obstructed, where perception or non-
perception are thematised and where the fictionality of the aesthetic is
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challenged. But there is clearly more going on in these pieces than Welsch's
simple arrest of perception, such as the dismantling of dramatic form in the work
of both dramatists, the critique of conventions of representation and the
meditation on meaning. But this focus on such self-reflexive issues as dramatic
convention and the possibility of meaning arguably renders the relationship of
these pieces to aestheticised reality as esoteric as Welsch's anaesthetic. The
problems I identified with Welsch's formulations, it will be remembered, were
not only its incapacity for ideological engagement, but its tendency towards
mysticism, and its failure to challenge - and indeed its arguable reinforcing of -
art's separateness. As far as this latter is concerned, the conceptually difficult
works in which anaesthetic elements dominate, like Handke's Das Mundel and
Beckett Not I, seem to perpetuate a certain institutionality, in that their nature
confines them to small, experimental theatres. But several features make
Handke's art distinct, namely its explicit challenge to the audience and its
incomplete but still partial cultural reference.
I have contrasted the open-endedness and lack of completion of Handke's work
with the sense of completion of the silent or imperceptible work. Of course, there
are certain instances of this kind of work which do demand input from the
audience: the playing with the infinite in Pistoletto's 'Cube', and the provocation
of contemplation by a work like Walter de Maria's 'Vertical Earth Kilometre'.
But at the same time they carry with them a sense that whatever we do, we
347
cannot affect the other-worldly intrinsic nature of the work, it is in some way
closed off from us. More pointedly, the implication hovers around these works
that silence or absence enacts a reduction not just of sensory excess, but a
negation of the untrue. I have made this point with reference to Welsch's ideas
on fictionality in previous chapters. But whilst some of his remarks about silence
suggest this investment, Handke's more openly jesting and provocative work is
not so precious. Pertinent in this respect are Nietzsche's remarks on what is
valuable about art. I have already referred to the function of the incomplete, but
an understanding of the value of art as provocation might also be informed by
his notion that we cannot get to truth by reduction, but must rather create anew:
'Nur als Schaffende konnen wir vernichten!' [See Nietzsche 1973 V 2 98] This
sounds like Lyotard's sheer positivity, which I have criticised above as
undialectical and unrealistic as a description of the way art works, a point which
Handke's retention of fragmentary cultural reference underlines. And of course,
we can criticise ideologically suspect phenomena by pointing out the disparity
between what is being presented and what is being concealed. But the point for
me in Nietzsche's remarks about creativity is that they emphasise the idea, rather
than unpicking particular cognitive and cultural conditioning to isolate its falsity,
of jolting us out of our present thinking by making new associations and
combinations. It is precisely this kind of reinvigoration of the modernist
aesthetic that was pioneered by Dada.
348
But this is no simple Lyotardian preference for joy over nostalgia: Dada shares
other modernist movements' or practitioners' concerns about a modern world
that was seen as excessively instrumental or utilitarian. But, as Richard
Sheppard asserts, the Dadaists were the first movement to try to go forwards
without first taking a nostalgic step backwards. [See Sheppard 1978 330] With
other modernists the response to the view of language or culture as already
corrupted as a means of genuine expression is precisely in the kind of refusal or
silence that Welsch seems to opt for, either encapsulated in art, or the real silence
of ceasing to produce art, the course taken by Hofmannsthal and Rimbaud. [See
Sheppard 1978 330] The 'high' modernism of Pound, Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Yeats
and others tends to give in to a 'real pessimism' about language (and its failure to
do justice to the 'real'), culture and humanity, for instance in the turn inwards of
what Sheppard calls the 'peculiarly modern notion of literary language as
1/ autotelic'''. [Sheppard 1978 328] But this seems to be the least fertile conception
of modernist art, and might even be little more than an elitist response cloaked in
humanist concern. Sheppard contrasts this high modernism with the positions
and techniques of the Dadaists, which is not nostalgic for language's now lost
capacity for communication, a broken unity between language and reality, but
concerned to generate new combinations and associations. This combining
seems to be the opposite of the aesthetic purity of Lyotard's Kantian 'aesthetic
idea', and seems to survive by virtue of its interaction with expectations and
attitudes that are not purely formalist. Culturally informed expectations are
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disturbed by Dada's surprise effects, its excessive noise and its incongruous
associations. In this way art becomes counter-cultural, and crucially for my
concerns social rather than purely aesthetic. [SeeSheppard 1978333]
Emblematic of this counter-cultural nature of Dada's art for me is the sense that a
high modernist aesthetics of silence is displaced by an aesthetics of sensory
excess. In the essay cited above, Richard Sheppard contrasts high modernism's
with Dada's 'total sensory stimulation and corporal engagement'. [Sheppard
1978335] The resonance with Welsch's idea rehabilitating the sensory is evident
here, and already in Handke's work this almost physical engagement is stated as
a means of dismantling the representative hierarchy between stage and audience,
for example in his Publikumsbeschimpfung, in which the Sprecher resort to the
eponymous strategy of verbal abuse:
Weil auch das Beschimpfen eine Art ist, mit Ihnen zu reden. Indem wir
beschimpfen, konnen wir unmittelbar werden. [... ] Wir konnen einen
Funken iiberspringen lassen. Wir konnen den Spielraum zerstoren. Wir
konnen eine Wand niederrei15en. [Handke 199238]
My concern in what follows however is not to return to Dada, but to ask whether
more recent performance art (as well as Handke's) might operate with extremes
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of perception in a way that might also be said to generate cognitive or ideological
force. My focus will be on the dramatic work of Heiner MUller, which I will
consider as a mode of art which certain perceptual and cognitive parallels to
Welsch's ideas on the imperceptible. Like silence and imperceptibility, an excess
of physical experience is seen as somehow slipping under (or perhaps above) the
threshold of the representable. Elaine Scarry even goes so far as to assert that
physical pain is 'language-destroying'. [Scarry 1985 19] But crucial questions for
me will be whether this sensory excess makes a stronger case for intervening in
and engaging with the anaestheticising effects of Welsch's aestheticised culture,
and whether such art can combine Welsch's focus on perception or cognition
with a treatment of ideological factors and cultural norms which seem to
underlie his more cognitively sophisticated ideas on perception.
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Chapter 6 . Theatre of Excess
'Wir sind nicht die Arzte, wir sind der Schmerz.' Alexander Herzen!
Radical aesthesis: a counter-tradition
In the above discussions a recurrent problem of Welsch's formulations has been
the fact that his meditation on the real and the fictional or the latent and
unconscious habits that underlie perception are at variance with his proposal to
read aesthetics in terms of the sensory. But arguably Welsch's focus on the
sensory may ultimately be borne out insofar as we accept that the sensory must
always be understood as a more complex economy than rudimentary sense data.
It is in this sense that I cited in chapter two the sensory aspect of Viktor
Shklovsky's ideas on defamiliarisation. Even what I have referred to as a more
philosophical meditation by art on the 'status of the real' often turns to the
sensory and material as a direct and incontrovertible instance of the real, as in
Heidegger's idea of an 'unvermittelte Begegnenlassen der Dinge'. [Heidegger
195059] Both contribute to a diverse and more or less philosophical and more or
less radically materialist tradition that I have associated with thinkers such as
Lamettrie, Marx, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Marcuse. In chapter two I also cited
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Susan Buck-Morss, who reads the enigmatic 'Nachwort' to Walter Benjamin's
Kunstwerk essay in specifically sensory terms [see Buck-Morss 1992], and
Benjamin is also an obvious precursor of Welsch in his analysis of the effects of
modem technology on perception. His much-cited essay ends with the well-
known reference to the aestheticisation of politics, referring of course to fascism,
and with his famously enigmatic call to arms for a politicised art: 'Der
Kommunismus antwortet ihm mit der Politisierung der Kunst.' [Benjamin 1974
469] Buck-Morss takes this as a reference to sensory or bodily knowledge, a
concept of the body that she clarifies in a subsequent interview to be pre-
symbolic but not pre-political. [See Kester 199740] Steve Giles is also on similar
terrain when he interprets Benjamin's final words in the Kunsttoerk essay in terms
of Benjamin's remarks on Dada's 'tactile quality'. [Giles 1997 160] Giles likens
this politicisation to the kind of art which Antonin Artaud's drama theory is seen
to offer, characterised by 'revolutionary discharge and the collective body'. [Giles
1997 120] Artaud's curiously titled 'Theatre of Cruelty' valorises the sensory
elements of performance as offering a way out of the dominance of theatre by
words and by petty narratives of human psychology. [See Artaud 1993]
Both Artaud and Dada are important antecedents of a recent resurgence of
radically materialist view of how art - and theatre in particular - can work, which
1Cited in Trifonow 1979192.
353
Dietmar Kamper and Christoph Wulf refer to as the many recent 'Varianten der
Korperkunst', [Kamper & Wulf 1982 9, see also Sierz 2001] It is in this sense that
Stanton Garner for instance refers to the 'almost obsessive interest in the body as
a political unit' after Brecht. [Garner 1990 145] Brecht himself is ambivalent
about the status of the body in theatre. Analogous to his concerns about the
limitations of mimetic representation, noted in chapter three, he registers the
limitations of an aesthetic of 'Erlebnis' in an increasingly complex world. [See
Brecht 1967 172] For Brecht this traditional notion of art has become outdated:
,Aber der alte Begriff der Kunst, vom Erlebnis her, flillt eben aus.' [Brecht 1967
172] In Brecht's view, paradoxically, and in a gesture that might be traced back
to the early Romantics, something more 'Kunstliches' or 'Gestelltes' is required
for a representative depiction of society. [Brecht 1967 172] (Brecht's terms here
refute the ideas of aesthetic immanence that were seen in my discussions of the
sublime to give a somehow direct and non-conceptual experience of the real, but
of course Brecht is interested in a very different kind of 'real' than that which
inhabits Lyotard's 'Unpresentable', Adorno's 'Unkommunizierbare', or indeed
that which Slavo Zizek refers to Lacan's 'das Ding, the impossible-real object of
desire'. [Zizek 1989 194]) That said Brecht's early 'Lehrstiicke' are a seminal
moment in this tradition of corporeal theatre, which Rainer Nagele reads as an
important and already Artaudian 'mutual interpenetration' of voice and body,
indicating that learning is more than a simply cognitive process. [See Nagele
1987112-20, here 113] As well as Artaud's ideas, a significant reference point in
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what follows will be Nagele's idea of Heiner Milner's work (among others) as a
fusion of the corporeal and cognitive. [SeeNagele 1987112]
Moreover for Nagele it is not merely the sensory nature of Brecht's 'Lehrstucke'
but their violence and crnelty that are allied to the learning process. Not only a
twentieth century phenomenon, this sensory extreme has been repeatedly
valorised since the Romantics, evident in Byron's Romantic summation of
human existence: '[t]he great object of life is Sensation - to feel that we exist -
even though in pain.' [Cited in Marchand 1974 109] In Buchner's Lenz the
protagonist's half-hearted suicide attempts are more 'in Augenblicken der
fiirchterlichen Angst oder der dumpfen, ans Nichtsein grenzenden Ruhe ein
Versuch, sich zu sich selbst zu bringen durch physischen Schmerz'. [Buchner
1957 33] Nozdrev in Gogol's Dead Souls is said to 'quarrel[] in order to feel,
beating on his face, the fists of inescapable, undeniable reality'. [Cited in Adams
1966 54] On the face of it this extreme sensory experience seems to have an
obvious claim to reality: in the 1932 essay 'Uber den Schmerz' Ernst [unger
characterises pain as the universal and unchanging category that is distinctive of
mankind. [See Junger 1980 145] This is of course a singularly anthropocentric
view, and ironically this reality claim might be particularly persuasive because it
overturns that characteristic which is arguably more distinctive of man, namely
language. Elaine Scarry highlights pain's resistance to any rhetoric or
metaphorical remove, referring to the 'language-destroying' nature of real
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physical pain. [Scarry 1985 35] The question for art is whether this anti-
metaphorical aspect defuses its representative potential, or whether it might be
said to guarantee its status as a kind of irreducible 'hyper-reality'.
In what follows I will relate certain aspects of this tradition to Wolfgang Welsch's
concerns both regarding his reconfiguration of aesthetics in terms of sense
perception and even his characterisation of contemporary culture as
aestheticised. In particular I will look at the theatre and the ideas of Heiner
Muller, referring amongst other things to his use of violence and sensory excess,
his Artaudian turn against word, and what seems to be a radically materialist
concept of history. In chapter two I suggested significant differences between
the disparate valorisations of the sensory, including a counterweight to the
dominance of ideas, a radical critique of the assumptions of conceptual thinking,
and the valorisation of an enigmatic 'real'. Heiner Muller will be seen to share
something with a number of these positions. Moreover in spite of the apparent
contrast with Handke and Beckett's minimalism there will be key overlaps in
terms of the challenge set to perception and cognition, which will be central to
my conceptualisation of this kind of art as belonging to the terms of Welsch's
reconfiguration of aesthetics. The question for Muller's theatre is whether it can
offer a means of engaging with cognitive habits, combating manipulated
consciousness and addressing the varied phenomena of aestheticisation, and to
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what extent it too is limited to questions of mere sensory perception or turns to
more philosophical issues of truth and authenticity.
Heiner Muller: anti-minimalist
Central to my discussion in the previous chapter was the way Handke
specifically thematises and problematises audience perception, with obstructive
ruptures and blind-spots and fragmentary reference emphasizing the audience's
inability to generate a coherent story or convincing 'reality'. Similar strategies of
'non-perception' are evident in the drama of Heiner MUller, for example in the
Bochum premiere of Der Auftrag, which borrowed the format of a 'peep-show'.
The idea was to highlight the imperfect position of the audience as voyeurs, as
MUller remarks in one interview,
daIS man den Zuschauern klarmachen mufi, daIS sie Voyeure sind.
Voyeure konnen nie alles sehen, was sie sehen wollen. So haben wir einen
Raum entworfen, der das Publikum immer wieder zum Teil ausschliefst
aus dem Geschehen. [MUller 1986 136]
MUller suggests a similar device for staging the first part of Verkommenes Ufor
[MUller 2002 84], and as far as Welsch's formulations are concerned, this
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reduction of spectator to voyeur has its parallel in Welsch's understanding of the
anaesthetic in everyday life as the mediation of reality by distance and images
(although Welsch's suggestion of the 'instante ErfUllbarkeit' of desires in the
'Welt der Telekommunikation' [Welsch 1990 18] brushes over any question of
whether simulation is any less real or satisfying than actual physical contact). In
contrast to Handke's non-perception, the erotic overtones of this device, in
keeping with the' nacktes Glied' and 'Traum von einem ungeheuren/ Beischlaf in
Chikago/Blutbeschmierte Weiber/In den Leichenhallen' which inhabit MUller's
Verkommenes Ufer [Muller 2002 73-4], are not so much sacred as profane. As
these graphic images suggest, MUller's theatre is in some ways at direct cross-
purposes with theatre which operates through imperceptibility and
understatement. If Muller mentions silence, it is always a problem, something to
regret. So when Norbert Eke calls MUller an 'Arrangeur der Abwesenheit' [Eke
1999198] he is referring to a specific absence, namely the absence of revolution.
In Lessings Schlaf Traum Schrei the central figure refers to his costly preference for
silence: 'verbrannt von meiner immer heftigeren Sehnsucht nach Schweigen. Ich
habe die Taubstummen urn ihre Stille beneidet im Geschwatz der Akademien.'
[MUller 1983 35] And in terms that directly connect with Welsch's essay
'Asthetik und Anasthetik', in one interview MUller takes issue with Botho
StrauB's work for its thematisation, and passive acceptance, of the' zunehmende
Unsichtbarkeit von Geschichte'. [MUller 1986154] For MUller, this paradoxically
renders Strauf a mere 'Fotograf' [MUller 1986 148], which is presumably
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informed by Brecht's understanding of the limitations of realist photography
referred to in chapter three. The question is how Heiner Muller claims to do
more, and with what success.
Muller also rounds on the formal method of Beckett's minimalism as a theatrical
cul-de-sac. It is no coincidence that the occasion of Muller's criticism of Beckett is
his Buchner Prize acceptance speech, 'Die Wunde Woyzeck' (1985): for Muller,
Beckett's theatre is trivial in comparison to the searing and painful vision of a
playwright like Buchner, 'dem die Parzen bei der Geburt die Augenlider
weggeschnitten haben'. [Hornigk 1990 115] This echoes Gilles Deleuze's idea of
the politicised writer as one who has experienced an 'excess of life' and who
'returns from what he has seen and heard with red eyes and pierced eardrums,'
[Deleuze 1997 2] Welsch himself cites Bunuels Andalusischem Hund, 'wo ein
Rasiermesser durch ein Auge schneider' [Welsch 1990 37), which seems to be an
instance of what he refers to as 'radikale Schnitte' which cut into 'asthetische
Gewohnheiten'. [Welsch 1990 37] This idea of 'asthetische Gewohnheiten',
which in Welsch's terms might mean either artistic norms or broader cultural
habits of perception, another point I will take up below.
Thematic treatment of oiolence
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The consideration of sensory excess as a formal or technical strategy might
provisionally be distinguished from MUller's treatment of physical violence as a
(historical) theme, whereby his gruesome texts are littered with bloody bodies
and graphic violence, as the Hamlet figure in Die Hamletmaschine explains,
'WEllS BRAUCH 1ST EIN STUCK EISEN STECKEN IN/DAS NACHSTE
FLEISCH ODER INS UBERNACHSTE'. [MUller 2001 546] Most extreme in this
respect are the pervasive brutality in MUller's version of Macbeth (1971) and the
bloodbath of the later Anatomie Titus Fall of Rome Ein Shakespearekommentar (1984).
Though largely faithful to Shakespeare's original, MUller's version of Macbeth
distinguishes itself by its gruesome embodiment of relations of power. Duncan,
for example, is introduced 'auf Leichen sitzend, die zu einem Thron geschichtet
sind.' [MUller 2001 269] This is echoed later, when Macbeth justifies the plotted
regicide in graphic corporeal terms: 'Ich war sein Fleischer. Warum nicht sein
Aas/ Auf meinen Haken. Ich hab seinen Thron ihm/Befestigt und erhoht mit
Leichenhaufen.' [MUller 2001274] Later he speaks of preventing his own demise
with 'Ein Wall aus Leichen gegen meinen Tod'. [MUller2001309]
This corp orality reflects the violence of Duncan's regime, as distinct from the
latter's benevolence in Shakespeare's original. Macduff and Lennox's exchange
with the hung-over porter on coming to wake the dead king, for example, turns
suddenly and brutally violent:
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MACDUFF SolI ich dich an die Pforte nageln, Pfortner,
Tut es mit dem Schwert.
LENOX Ich will dir Beine machen, Armstumpf. Lauf.
Haut ihm das Stelzbein ab. Beide lachen. [Muller 2001284]
Later, Macduff rips out a servant's tongue, cutting off midstream his typically
Shakespearian rhetorical flourish: 'Der KOnig ist der KOnig. Und/lsts der nicht
ists ein andrer. Der oder der.' [Muller 2001 286] Macbeth's regime is one in
which fear of violence secures fealty: 'ich besteh nicht auf Beweisen/Solang die
Furcht Euch in der Treue halt'. [Muller 2001 310-1] But the soldiers' skinning
alive of the traitorous Lord in Scene 18 brings out the proximity of Macbeth's
violent order to chaos, only hinted at in Shakespeare's original, in a world in
which not only servants, but noblemen are the victims of summary violence. Not
that Macbeth is distinguished for his particular violence: in Scene 22 the English
conquerors are shown to be no better than their Scottish counterparts, and at the
end, rather than celebrating the return of benevolent governance, Malcolm has
Macduff killed for fear of him covetting the crown: 'Willt/Ihr konnt nicht spielen
mit dem Knaben Malcolm.ZPur Euren Kopf ist Platz auf meinem Speer.' [Muller
2001 324] As Kalb notes, '[t]he world in this Macbeth, like that in Anatomy of
Titus, never possesses any political health or divine order to which it can be
restored by return of a rightful monarch'. [Kalb 199889]
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Macbeth's gruesome but incidental violence descends into a fully-blown
bloodbath in Anatomie Titus Fall of Rome, whose corporality is already
emphasised in Muller's title. In its gruesomeness, Muller's version is little
different from Shakespeare's original story of murderous revenge: in both the
violence culminates in the scene in which Titus invites Tamora and Satumin to a
conciliatory banquet at which they are served their own heirs, and the exposure
of Tamora's marital infidelity precipitates a string of killings in which all the
main characters are serially disposed of. The key difference between Muller's
and Shakespeare's versions is that, rather than Shakespeare's off-stage
dispatches, the violence in Muller's version is more explicit, with the string of
brutal murders supposedly taking place on stage, after the murdered bastard
infant son is thrown onto the table. [Muller 2002 186-8]
Muller is resistant to simple considerations of the 'MaB an Brutalitat' in these
plays [Muller 1990 23], so one might ask what their purpose is. At one level it
seems to be a presentation of History as violent, underlined by the remark in
Anatomie Titus: 'OAS OENKMAL 1STEIN TORSO UNTER OEM BElL.' [MillIer
20021291 Humanity is here exposed by and in all its brutality, as Muller makes
clear in the couplet on the title page to the play: 'Der Menschheit/Die Adem
aufgeschlagen wie ein Buch/Im Blutstrom blattern'. [Muller 2002 99] So does
this violence get in the way of Muller's theatre as history? For Bernhard Greiner,
this violent action precludes any treatment of the historical continuum. [Greiner
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199073] But alternatively, Muller's version of history might be understood as a
radically materialist one, rectifying the 'zunehmende Unsichtbarkeit der
Geschichte' in Botho StraufS's work. The historical authenticity of MOller's plays
is the opposite of inaccessible, and might be said to be closer to the 'reality' of
medieval political violence and power play. Might this be said to redress the
imbalance identified by Leslie Adelson, 'that the grand abstraction of history
would seem to obliterate the very concrete stuff of which it is made'? [Adelson
1993 1] Does it rectify the process of abstraction that Bryan Turner calls the
'submergence' of the body from history and theory? [Turner 198434J
Greiner is right that only a limited kind of history is presented in Muller's work.
Although the focus on the personages and stories of classical drama still seems to
be the stuff of what Negt and Kluge call 'long-distance history' [cited in Adelson
1993 12], Anatomie Titus, more so than Macbeth, is theatre not of ideas, but of
murderous action seemingly stripped of all political intrigue. This exemplifies
what Hans-Thies Lehmann identifies as a focus on the corporeal in theatre more
generally: 'An die Stelle des mentalen Duells [... J ruckt die korperliche Motorik.'
[Lehmann 1999 367] Unreflected violence solves the problem of passivity and
the paralysis of action by thought - Nietzsche's 'Hamlet-Problem', perhaps the
obstacle to revolution in Muller's view - but for Theo Girshausen, this action is
only made possible by delusion: 'Die Erkenntnis totet das Handeln, zum
Handeln gehort das UmschIeiertsein durch die Illusion.' [Girshausen 1978 98-9J
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In particular, action seems to be uncomplicated by ethical questions. Anatomie
Titus dispenses with any moral discussion. Untroubled by guilt, the only
backward glance in what Bernhard Greiner calls Idie FortfUhrung der Blutspur'
[Greiner 1990 70] is one of revenge.
It is apparent that this kind of excessive theatre can treat themes, such as
revolutionary action and the nature of History, but the focus on sheer and
physical action raises the question of whether MUller's theatre suffers from the
same incapacity for ideological subtlety as I have associated with Welsch's
imperceptible art. Of course this materialist version of history that focuses on
corporality is already ideologically charged, inasmuch as it holds up a tangible
reality this side of 'long-distance' versions of history and those that centre on the
question of how we got where we are today. But this model of history is
something of a straw target, and the sensationalisation of history is an equally
pressing problem in contemporary culture.
Andreas Keller associates the preference for the corporeal over the abstract with
vitalist philosophy: 'Gegen die Sublimierung der vitalen Lebensinteressen in der
zivilisierten Welt setzt MUller die sinnliche Revolte triebhafter Korperlichkeit.'
[Keller 1994 111] But what makes MUller's corporality particularly vitalist, and
as far as the issue of ideology is concerned, what are vitalism's politics? Is it
forged only by the crude brutality - as a kind of anti-Enlightenment gesture - of
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Heiner Muller's pieces? It is all very well for violent art to 'show what humans
are capable of' [Sierz 2001 239], to thematise the violence of history and society,
but an important question is whether this new brutaIism, which has also been an
important current in recent British and Irish theatre [see Sierz 2001], indicates or
contributes to a worrying loss of humanity and compassion in the audience. Is
Muller's land beyond subjectivity also a land beyond humanity? Antonin
Artaud claims that violence can have a pacifying effect:
Violent, concentrated action is like lyricism; it calls forth supernatural
imagery, a bloodshed of images, a bloody spirit of images inside the poet's
head as well as in the audience's. Whatever conflicts may obsess the
mentality of the times, I defy any spectator infused with the blood of
violent scenes [... ] to indulge in thoughts of war, riot or motiveless
murder. [Artaud 1993 62]
But this seems to be narve to the problem of desensitisation - which might
without too much contortion be associated with Benjamin's aestheticisation of
politics - as well as the fact that the people who are alive to the didactic quality
of violent imagery are probably not the kind to start wars or riots.
As far as Muller's work is concerned, any vitalist-type valorisation of murderous
action there must contend with the fact that in his plays bodies tend to be treated
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as the locus of conflict and abuse, rather than as a moment of resistance. This
might point to a deeper humanity in some of MUller's treatments of pain and
suffering. In contrast to the treatment of murderous violence as sheer and
arresting action in Muller's Shakespeare adaptations, dismembered bodies and
death are a constant undercurrent in MUller's more impressionistic and lyrical
pieces. So whilst it is fair for Horst Domdey to emphasize MUller's focus on the
moral burden of Tiiter [Domdey 1991 lOO], his version of history is also peopled
by a succession of victims' bodies. I have already mentioned the
'Blutbeschmierte Weiber' which people the start of Verkommenes Ufor, and in the
rest of the piece dead bodies inhabit the same world as the living. When Medea
accuses her husband Jason, the murderer of her brother, of marital infidelity, for
example, she stands there, 'den zerstuckten/ Bruder im Arm'. [MUller 2002 74]
Even the living are condemned as 'Gespenster/Der Toten des Krieges der
morgen stattfinden wird'. [MUller 2002 81] Not relegated to history, violence and
death is insisted on as a necessary and ever-present part of life, as suggested
explicitly in the parody of the Lord's Prayer in Die Hamletmaschine: 'Unseren
t~glichen Mord gib uns heute'. [MUller 2001 551] In contrast to the idea of the
amorality of murderous action above, these bodies seem to function as a
reminder of injustice: 'Die Toten starren nicht ins Fenster/Sie trommeln nicht auf
dem Abort/Das sind sie Erde von den Uberlebenden beschissen'. [Muller 2002
74]
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The corporeal as formal method
But the corporality in Muller's pieces is not only a reassertion of this 'submerged'
aspect of history, whether the moral reminder of the forgotten victim or the
vitalist's amoral carnival of violence. Rather it goes beyond mere thematics and
marks a deployment of physical excess as a formal strategy, and moreover one
that touches on the question of what is essential to drama. For Julian Hilton, the
distinction between form and theme, whilst elastic, is crucial to drama, marking
the schism between drama's literary aspect and its specific quality as performance.
[Hilton 1987 8-11] Hilton identifies a literary bias from the outset of drama
theory, with the relegation of questions of performance and spectacle in
Aristotle's Poetics to an optional extra, the stuff of mere stage mechanics. [Hilton
19877-11] Of course, this reading of Aristotle overlooks the fact that his central
concept of catharsis presupposes a certain impact in the audience [see Aristotle
1996 10], as well as the fact that a central component of a tragic plot for Aristotle
is suffering, which 'is an action that involves destruction or pain (e.g. Deaths in
full view, extreme agony, woundings and so on.), [Aristotle 1996 19] But it is
certainly fair to locate Muller in a broader movement in twentieth century drama
which aims to redress the balance of theatre in favour of performance and
spectacle.
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The reassertion of the physical aspect of performance is articulated most
persuasively in Antonin Artaud's ideas on theatre, for whom theatre's medium is
not verbal but sensory - a concrete and physical experience for an audience who
'think with their senses first'. [Artaud 1993 651 MUller's own comments on
theatrical technique in interviews and essays echo those of Artaud. In terms of
production, he speaks of an artist's skill as consisting of 'auf den eigenen Kerper
zu horen und den eigenen Korperrythmus in das entsprechende Medium
umzusetzen. [... ] Kunst kommt aus dem Korper und nicht aus einem vom
Korper getrennten Kopf.' [MUller 1990 128-9] Certainly, performers of MUller's
Hamletmaschine have remarked on the need 'sich auf sich und ihre Korperlichkeit
[zu] konzentrieren'. [Girshausen 1978 67] The parallel is apparent here with
Beckett's focus on the rudiments of perception, discussed in the last chapter, and
both writer-directors have elicited similar responses from their collaborators. In
Beckett this return to the body imposes a simplicity in the performance, a
minimalist turn against special effects and props, which works in parallel to the
'Subtraktion' of meaning and the 'Verlust aIler Qualitat'. [Adorno 1961195] But
MUller's pieces can hardly be described as minimalist, and as I will discuss below
for the recipient the sensory nature of the experience is manifest in anything but
a paring down of perception.
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Sensory as anti-representation
This reassertion of the body is in part also a meditation on issues of aesthetic
representation and the status of art as 'real', akin to the tum against theatre's
fictionality in Handke's Publikumsbeschimpfung and Das Mundel. I have already
cited Scarry's notion of pain as 'language-destroying' [Scarry 1985 35], and
likewise David Gamer sees the body in extremis as 'occupy[ing] the non-
linguistic space behind the play's verbal edifice'. [Garner 1990 153] Artaud's
focus on the sensory is motivated by the wish to undo this relegation of the body
as mere mouthpiece and vehicle of words and ideas, and to free it from its
subservience to words, which Rice and Malone call its status as 'just the graphic
representation of the written word'. [Rice & Malone 1993 113] The question is
what fills this vacuum left by the evacuation of metaphorical meaning. The
valorisation of the body as somehow an immediate experience of seemingly vital
forces coincides with Foucault's conception of the body as resistant in-itself to
ideology or consciousness. [See Foucault 1980 58] Certainly the emphasis on the
physicality of the players shifts the focus from any generative or linear narrative
to what Bernhard Greiner calls the 'Ereignischarakter des Theaters' in Maller's
work [Greiner 199079], which would seem to satisfy what Frederic Jameson has
referred to as aesthetics' 'hunger for the sheer event'. [Iameson 1991 309] The
parallel is apparent between this immanence and Peter Handke's theatre, in
which the Sprecher refute the connection of the things on stage with other, absent
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referents: there authenticity is derived from absence, that is to say the evacuation
from art of the fleeting and fictional; Muller's physicality and corporality
suggests an opposite but essentially similar irresistible presence. David Graver
also cites the example of the Fakir, a pain artist, whose effect on the audience is
notable, generating an 'overpowering sense of reality' and an 'imposing
immediacy' [Graver 1995 61, 53] bearing out what I have referred to above as a
subversion of the metaphorical relation by a kind of 'immediacy'. But at its
extreme corp orality and performance are presumably mutually exclusive. David
Graver, for instance, registers the tension between violence and theatrical
representation as one in which the formal conventions of theatre are broken, that
'[v]iolence generally destroys theatricality' and is 'hard to hold within a
theatrical context'. [Graver 1995 43, 46] As in Handke's Publikumsbeschimpfung,
violence contravenes the distance generated by the formal conventions and
representative order of theatre, a point brought graphically to its logical
conclusion in Joe Coleman's 'Kitchen', in which the artist threatens the audience
with a gun, until they leave the auditorium. [SeeGraver 1995 49]
But it surely does not follow from this 'immediacy' that the body is in some way
immune from ideological investment. It has after all been 'over-written' with
many cultural and political ideas, such as the body alienated by labour, abused
by torture, or manipulated into the body beautiful in the ideal world of the
advertiser. At very least this alleged immanence seems to be a quintessentially
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philosophical valorisation of the physical. Jacques Derrida, in his essay on
Artaud's 'Theatre of Cruelty', defines this anti-representative sensory as the
attempt to reach an
inaccessible limit of a representation which is not repetition, of a re-
presentation which is full presence, which does not carry its double within
itself as its death, of a present which does not repeat itself, that is of a
present outside time, a nonpresent. [Derrida 1978 248]
This is of course a curious position for the antagonist of the 'metaphysics of
presence' [see for example Derrida 1978 280] to take. This paradoxical idea of a
'nonpresent' seems to echo Kant's 'transcendent', which is to say those objects
which we can never experience with our senses, and underlines the highly
philosophy reading of this allegedly immanent experience. (It is worth noting in
this respect that a similar shadow of metaphysics also falls over Antonin Artaud
writings on theatre and the aesthetic, insofar as his ultimate answer to the
question of what the corporeal, sensory, wordless and anti-psychological in
drama is getting at is expressed in terms of 'certain predominant powers, certain
ideas governing everything' [Artaud 1993 60] and 'the great metaphysical fear
underlying all ancient theatre'. [Artaud 1993 32]) Moreover Derrida's
valorization of the sensory extreme as breaking out of the metaphysical order of
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representation seems to mix metaphors with his characterization of metaphysics'
'logocentrism' as operating by a kind of violence. [SeeDerrida 1978 79ff]
The sensory as anti-conceptual
That said, Muller also refers to the body as antithetical to discursive or
conceptual understanding, asserting with respect to a ballet dancer's body: 'Ein
Kerper ist unverstandlich, Ein Kerper lafStsich nicht analysieren. [... ] Man kann
ihn nicht verstehen. Man nimmt ihn wahr.' [Muller 1990 43] For Muller, even a
poetic text can operate at the level of the sensory: 'Wenn ich einen Text, einen
poetischen Text, lese, dann will ich den zunachst mal nicht verstehen. Ich will
ihn irgendwie aufnehmen, aber mehr als eine sinnliche Tatigkeit denn als eine
begriffliche.' [Muller 199043] Florian Va15enrefers to this focus on the body as
'politisches Korpertheater' [Va15en1992 25], but what exactly are the politics
here? Crucial is of course vitalism's primacy of the bodily over the conceptual,
which I registered above with reference to Keller's idea of the desire to overturn
civilization's 'Sublimierung der vitalen Lebensinteressen'. [Keller 1994 111] One
might associate this with a general post-1960s counter-cultural movement, what
Dietmar Kamper and Christoph Wul£ refer to as the 'lang erwartete Blockade des
Zivilationsprozesses'. [Kamper & Wulf 1982 9] But of course this anti-conceptual
and counter-cultural gesture has its roots in the eighteenth century, as discussed
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in chapter two. Its most articulate proponent would be Nietzsche, for whom, in
Gunther Marten's words, '[d]er Leib, der am Gesamtleben partizipierende
Organismus, ist [... ] eine solidere Grundlage des Erkenntnis als die begrenzende
ratio des Menschen'. [Martens 197141] This quote comes from a book in which
Martens elaborates the links between vitalism and Expressionism, characterizing
vitalism as the conviction of the 'begriffliche UnfafSbarkeit des Phanomens'.
[Martens 1971 35]
Identifying the deleterious effects of conceptual thinking is all very well, but
what can a sensory extreme experience offer as an alternative? This question
reiterates that of what politics or ideology might inhabit this vitalist aesthetic:
does it propose itself as an immanent and irreducible value or might the sensory
extreme be seen to operate at a conceptual or ideological level? In places
Muller's utterances echo Artaud's fairly crude antipathy towards the verbal and
the conceptual: 'Ich hab ja gar keine Ideen. Ich habe nie Ideen gehabt'. [MOller
1990127] He also refers to the experience of art 'mehr als eine sinnliche Tatigkeit
denn als eine begriffliche' [Muller 1990 43], and his theatre is conceived as a
backlash by the body against ideas. In one letter he writes of the body on stage
as offering resistance' gegen die Notzucht durch den Sachzwang der Ideen, das
WORT DAS MORD WIRD'. [MOller 1989 63] Andreas Keller reiterates this
opposition of the corporeal to the conceptual: 'Besondere Bedeutung gewinnen
fur Muller Naturphanomen, die sich nicht auf ein konkretes begriffliches
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Konzept zuruckfuhren lassen.' [Keller 1994111] And the stage offers precisely a
forum for such 'Naturphanomen', in particular the violent body, which Muller
describes as the 'Rebellion des Korpers gegen die Ideen, genauer: gegen die
Wirkung von Ideen, von der Idee der Geschichte, auf menschliche Kerper.'
[MUller 1982 76]
The self-correction in the last sentence here points to a difference that might be
significant, inasmuch the body pitted against ideas is a conceptual opposition,
whereas the body pitted against the effects of ideas is a (more) practical
opposition. MUller does not elaborate on what he means by this reference to the
'effect' of ideas. Does it refer to the themes referred to above of the succession of
victims, or the broader 'submergence' of the body in history? The shift from
thematic terrain to formal devices seems to precipitate a move to more
philosophical or at least theoretical concerns centring on the turn against
representation and the concept. These formal or philosophical issues can lead art
into a self-reflexive cul-de-sac. Precisely one of the problems I associated with
minimalism and the related refusal of reference in the last chapter is that it
precludes the treatment of all but the most existential themes and issues. But just
as MUller is unconvinced by the capitulation of Botho StrauB's 'increasingly
invisible history', he also refuses to be distracted from thematic treatment.
Moreover in my view the corporeal aspect cannot be said to work entirely at
variance with the ideas and themes in MUller's theatre, and indicates that a more
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grounded and this essentially philosophical opposition between bodies and ideas
must be discarded for an understanding of their interaction. I can discern two
levels on which this interaction takes place; firstly, the recognition that the body
and the conceptual are not separate. The irruptions of the body in MUller's
works cannot only be understood in the purely philosophical terms of anti-
conceptuality or the vitalist turn against representation and the word, but rather
as enacting a complaint against that which has been carried out on the body in
the name if ideas: 'Solang es Ideen gibt, gibt es Wunden. Ideen bringen den
Kerper Wunden bei.' [Muller 198697] Even if ideas (and perhaps ideology) are
ultimately at the root of physical actions the recognition here is that the physical
domain is not something to be unproblematically valorised. Secondly, this
interaction between body and ideas happens at a formal level within his work,
and in my view goes to the heart of MUller's formal theatrical method. This
deploys what I have already suggested, with reference to Rainer Nagele, is a
'mutual interpenetration' of corporeal and the cognitive which indicates that
learning is more than a simply cognitive process. [See N~gele 1987 113] The
formal nature of this interaction might suggest an increasingly esoteric and
difficult mode of art, but I hope to show that this does not preclude the more
practical dimension that Muller's reference to 'Wirkung' seems to be hinting at.
In what follows I will elaborate two aspects of this arguably more 'practical'
terrain, the first focussing on the producers of art, and the second on its
recipients.
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Enforced experiment
A crucial aspect of Muller's method does seem to be accurately described by
Derrida's idea of an 'unrepeatable' artistic act: that is its enforced
experimentation. The violence which peppers Muller's texts makes them
extremely difficult to produce, and even harder to do so seriously. Performers
have commented on the difficulty of enacting Muller's work [see Girshausen
1978 68], and the challenge to production is if anything compounded by Muller's
many instructions to producers in the notes to his texts. Muller's remarks
suggest that his work as something for those involved in making it, an idea that
goes some way to refuting art's reduction to a perfect product [see Girshausen
1978 76], an object for passive consumption. In particular this difficulty for
performers seems to be generated by Muller's treatment of identity and
subjectivity, to which I will return below. More generally it is Muller's opinion
that there can and should be no perfect production of his work, in view of his
conception of literature as a fluid process of trial and error: 'Der Schreibgestus ist
der des Forschers, nicht der des Gelehrten, der Forschunsergebnisse interpretiert,
oder des Lehrers, der sie weitergibt.' [Muller 1989 35-6) In this respect, his work
fulfils Brecht's formal and technical mandate, which Muller himself cites: 'Theater
theatert alles ein, also mu15 man standig dem Theater etwas in den Rachen
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schieben, was das Theater nicht verdauen kann.' [MUller1990 47] (This'theatert
alles ein' is echoed in Welsch's idea of art that turns against its ability to present
everything.) Girshausen notes Muller's intention, 'Texte nicht spielbar zu
machen, damit der Widerspruch ins BewulStsein tritt und in der Arbeit standig
prasent ist.' [Girshausen 1978 66] This enforced 'Streben nach Originalitat'
[Georg Simmel, cited in Martens 1971 72] promotes experiment, which Andreas
Keller associates with risk and experience: Iein Risiko, ein Abenteuer, eine
Erfahrung'. [Keller 1994109] (Keller's use of terms here might go against that of
Benjamin and others opposition between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, but the focus on
the momentary and unrepeatable experience seems to be the same.)
Of course this unrepeatable experience is not without its philosophical aspect: I
have cited Derrida above on the anti-representational force of such 'immanent'
and unrepeatable theatre, but Gilles Deleuze is arguably an even more fruitful
interlocutor for Heiner Muller. In Difference and Repetition (1968), he employs the
term 'repetition' in the opposite way to Derrida, such that a 'theatre of repetition'
is opposed to a theatre of representation, 'just as movement is opposed to the
concept and to representation which refers back to the concept.' [Deleuze 1994
10] The double-edged nature of this compulsion to repeat and to act comes of
course from Nietzsche's paradoxical concept of 'eternal return', which for him
lends all the more weight to our actions. Other characteristics of Heiner MOller's
work are reflected in Deleuze's - essentially Artaudian - theatre of repetition: the
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idea of a 'language that speaks before words' and 'masks before faces', with
spectres and phantoms before characters'. But my references to themes above
speak against the ideas of a 'direct link' between theatre and nature and history
and the notion of a theatre of 'pure forces'. [All quotes Deleuze 1994 10J
Moreover, in my view the more formal focus on the experience of the
participants introduces more located, marginal and cognitive implications of
Muller's theatre.
Obstructed reception
The second locus of the marginal and cognitive implications of MUller's work is
the recipient. I have already mentioned the shadow of metaphysics that falls
over Antonin Artaud writings on theatre and the aesthetic. But alongside his
references to the 'Idea' which hangs somewhere beyond individual psychology
Artaud refers to a seemingly more grounded consciousness: '[t]here is no cruelty
without consciousness, without the application of consciousness.' [Artaud 1993
80] And whilst Artaud writes of theatre as needing 'first of all to appeal to the
senses' and first 'tak[ing] care to satisfy the senses' [Artaud 1993 27, 28], the
physical does not occur as an immanent moment, but is intended to unsettle the
'dead' or 'obvious' ideas which have become habitual and second nature, or
those ideas that bolster the individual psychology. It is in the same vein that
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Karl Heinz Bohrer refers to the shocking effect of loud noises, which Idie
Grenzen des Bewufstseins sprengt'. [Bohrer 1978170] Such references to habits
and the limits of consciousness return to the cognitive terrain which I argued in
the last chapter might be taken to 'ground' Handke and to a lesser extent
Beckett's work.
Contrary to Derrida's 'full presence', the sensory aspect of Muller's formal
method seems to be at least in part a means to disunity. His pieces work to resist
the processes of abstraction or intellection in the recipient, which for Frederick
Burwick and Paul Douglas, are the primary adaptive responses which limit the
Iabsolute originality and unforeseeability' of experience. [Burwick & Douglas
19924] The common ground withSimmel's 'Streben nach Originalitat' is evident
here, albeit read in a cognitive rather than purely formal sense. And as far as my
discussion is concerned, these ideas of originality and unforeseeability indicate
that Muller's theatre is not simply a return to the physical, but also a meditation
on issues of meaning, reference and cognitive preconditions to understanding.
In the first place, we should certainly take Muller's confession that literature is
alien to him with a pinch of salt. [See MUller 1986 93] In contrast to Artaud's
invective against the 'word', MUller's plays are characterised by their verbal
richness, indicating a more complex interaction with Western linguistic and
cultural heritage, as well as a refusal of a simplistic preference for the corporeal.
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Significantly for Muller the writer, words are the go-between between ideas and
the body: they are behind the pain caused by deeds, as Titus in Anatomie Titus
complains: 'Tribunen/Reden mit ihren Zungen Manner tot'. [Maller 2002 131]
And in view of the still very 'literary' quality of Muller's dramas, it is apparent
that characteristics of sheer presence and physicality do not convincingly
describe them. After all, his own comments notwithstanding, MUller's theatre is
never simply 'physical' or 'sensory'. It is never a primitivist reduction to the
experience of rudimentary elements of sense data, sounds rather than meaning,
that Elizabeth Wright calls the Iexperience of the splitting of perception'. (Wright
1989 131] Rather, Muller's radical avant-garde works operate at the level of
reference, register, and identity, albeit confused and disordered, as he stipulates
in the IAnmerkung' to Mauser: 'die Reaktionen des Publikums [werden] durch
Asynchronitat von Text und Spiel, Nichtidentitat von Sprecher und Spieler
[kontrolliert].' [Muller 2001 259] Implicit in Artaud's rejection of theatre as
psychology is the critique of theatre as narrative, and as with Handke and
Beckett's work, narrative coherence is a casualty of Muller's formal method.
Sometimes the disorder is inherent in the written texts, as in Die Hamletmaschine
and Verkommenes Ufor, sometimes it is brought out in the production, for
example, in Werner Gerber's production of Bildbeschreibung in the Literaturhaus
in Berlin, where the text was both read out and a recording of it played over a
PA, with additional music: 'Gelesen von Werner Gerber gegen ein Tonband'.
[Promotional leaflet (my emphasis)] Similarly, this aim of confused Signification
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motivates Muller's suggested production strategy of overlapping action on stage
in Leben Gundling. [Muller 1988 409] (For Nietzsche this kind of obstruction of
understanding has always been crucial to opera: 'alle ihre Meister lassen es sich
angelegen sein, zu verhuten, dass man ihre Personen verstehe', [Nietzsche 1973
V 2112])
So rather than Artaud's scepticism towards any and all conceptual meaning,
Muller seems to valorise works which frustrate the audience's expectation of a
'single' or 'unified' meaning. As Girshausen writes of Die Hamletmaschine, 'Der
Text weigert sich der Interpretation nach hermeneutischem Muster.' [Girshausen
1978 109] In this respect, Sarah Kane's reflections on the audience and critical
responses to her debut play, Blasted, are interesting. As much as the onstage
violence, she notes that
the element that most outrages those who seek to impose censorship is
form. Beckett, Barker, Pinter, Bond - they have all been criticized not so
much for the content of their work, but because they use non-naturalistic
forms that elude simplistic interpretation. [... ] I more or less abandoned
the audience to craft their own response to the imagery by denying them
the safety of familiar form. [Quoted in Sierz 2001102]
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This denial of familiar form and the probematisation of meaning, which seems to
be an instance of Adorno negated meaning as distinct from plain
meaninglessness ('nicht Undeutlichkeit an sieh, negierte Deutlichkeit' [Adorno
1970 438]), motivates Muller's preference for Kafka's parables over those of
Brecht:
wei! sie Gesten ohne Bezugssystem beschreibt/ darstellt, nicht orientiert
auf eine Bewegung (Praxis), auf eine Bedeutung nicht reduzierbar, eher
fremd als verfremdend, ohne Moral. [... ] Die Blindheit von Kafkas
Erfahrung ist der Ausweis ihrer Authentizitat, [Muller 1989 30-1]
This notion of blindness as authenticity is another expression of Michael Hardt's
'negative metaphysics', which I have characterized elsewhere as resting on
'poetics of silence'. This sense of truth as ungraspable recurs elsewhere in
Muller's writings, for example in the notes to Mauser Maller writes of the fleeting
quality of any truth: 'die Authentizitat des ersten Blicks auf ein Unbekanntes'.
[SeeVafsen 1990 194] This sounds very much like Handke's Nachbild, though the
momentary nature of this authenticity suggests a truth that is extinguished as
soon as it is conceptually or rationally grasped. The common ground, again,
with Benjamin and others' opposition of Erfohrung/ Erlebnis is clear, and the
implication is that any understanding is falsification, whether truth is corrupted
by the culturally predetermined norms which govern perception, or whether
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positive truth is not possible because of the necessary mediating moment of
reflection. Similarly, the description of Kafka's work as 'eher fremd als
verfremdend' suggests that it refuses any kind of recuperation into thematically
useful meaning. So does this reading of Kafka argue against the idea of Muller's
own formal method as offering a more tangible reconnection with the issues of
aestheticisation? In my view this reading of Kafka is uncharacteristic for Muller,
and contradicts with the concerns about the 'invisibility of History' that in my
view are more central to his work. Crucially in my view the emphasis on the
physical as well as psychological inMUller's theatre navigates a line somewhere
between the idea of truth as inherently inaccessible (and true by virtue of that
inaccessibility) and the suggestion that the theatrical body is a somehow
inherently anti-ideological and immanent Realpriisenz.
So how might the refusal of unified mean, of abstraction, contribute to an
understanding of History, or at least engage with our experience of aestheticised
reality? Does Muller's art reconnect with cultural preconceptions via content, as
Handke's arguably does through partial reference to beliefs and culturally
charged ideas, or via form, that is to say via the different mode of reception? Is his
shock-effect compatible with an ultimately cognitive aim? Can it renew our
understanding of anything in anyway? On seeing Sarah Kane's Blasted, one of a
number of recent British and Irish plays that has deployed corporal violence in a
similar way to those of Heiner Muller, Aleks Sierz's initial reaction was that it
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was a play that 'makes you feel but it doesn't make you think'. [Sierz 2001 99]
On reflection, Sierz revises this opinion, writing: 'it does make you think, but
only after you've got over the shock of seeing it'. [Sierz 2001 991 In my view this
idea of cognitive overload suggests a more fruitful interplay between the
physical and the cognitive which does not resort to simplistic claims of the
immanent value of the physical and which might arguably offer more of a
challenge to instances of ideological manipulation than the body as value-in-
itself. In places the challenge to ideological manipulation seems to be couched in
terms of cognitive 'freedom', which is what attracted MUller to Robert Wilson's
work: 'Was mich interessiert bei Wilson, nach der Arbeit mit ihm, ist, daISer den
Bestandteilen, den Elementen von Theater die Freiheit l~t.' [MUller 1986 153]
Muller calls this a 'demokratisches Theaterkonzept' [MUller 1986 1531, which
might suggest that the audience have some degree of interpretive control.
Moreover, in view of Wilson's characteristic slowed-down action, as in the
completely wordless, seven-hour-Iong Deafman Glance, this might return us to
theatre as anaesthetic. But in contrast, MUller expresses the aim 'moglichst viele
Punkte gleichzeitig bringen, so daB die Leute in eine Wahlzwang kommen [... ]
Es geht, glaube ich, nur noch mit Oberschwemmungen'. [MUller 1986 201 The
contrast between this 'Oberschwemmungen' and the emptying out of sensory
signals in Welsch's anaesthetic is evident, and explains MUller's fondness for the
strategy of multiple action on stage as noted above. And the paradoxical idea of
'Wahlzwang' suggests that Muller's aim is not necessarily to foster freedom and
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democracy, in spite of his comments about working with Robert Wilson. If
anything, the excess of signs refuses the audience the time and space for any
freedom of choice, and more likely imposes a(n albeit momentary) cognitive
paralysis. In this respect, Muller's work might be said to militate against art's
traditional function as promoting contemplation, not unlike Walter Benjamin's
reading of Dada in the Kunstwerk essay, which I referred to in chapter two: 'Auf
die merkantile Verwertbarkeit ihrer Kunstwerke legten die Dadaisten viel
weniger Gewicht als auf ihre Unverwertbarkeit als Gegenstande kontemplativer
Versenkung.' [Benjamin 1974 463] The contrast with the promotion of a
contemplative mood that I have identified in anaesthetic art is apparent. For
Benjamin, Dada anticipates the technical (as well as technological) advances
made in film, namely its montage and speed of presentation. Whereas the static
representation on the canvas of a painting allows contemplation and free
association, the speed and disjunctive representation on the canvas of the film
screen denies the viewer this space: 'Kaum hat er sie ins Auge gefcillt, so hat sie
sich schon verandert.' [Benjamin 1974 464] (It is worth noting that Walter
Benjamin also emphasises the sensory quality of Dada's method: 'Es stieB dem
Betrachter zu. Und es stand damit im Begriff, die taktile Qualitat, die der Kunst
in den groisen Umbauepochen der Geschichte die unentbehrlichste ist, fUr die
Gegenwart zuruckzugewinnen.' [Benjamin 1974463-4])
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In this way, the deployment of sensory excess and significatory disorder in
Muller's theatre is not so much about freedom to interpret, as about freedom from
culturally imposed norms and from manipulated or 'pre-digested'
consciousness. This is an essentially Brechtian position: in 'Der Autor als
Produzent' Benjamin contrasts the way Brecht forces the audience to think and
make decisions to neue Sachlichkeit's theatre as 'einen Gegenstand
kontemplativen Behagens, aus einem Produktionsmittel in einen Konsumartikel' .
[Benjamin 1971109] In Muller's terms, such disorder sets theatre apart from art
which he calls 'Konsumismus' [MUller 1986 153], a kind of imposition of
ideologically saturated experience which is arguably at the heart of Welsch's
category of aestheticisation. The contrast between this experience which is
'authentic' by virtue of its raw, unpolished and still sensory nature, by virtue of
its indeterminacy, and the presentation of the polished and pre-digested
phenomena of aestheticisation is clear. This echoes my reservations about the
politics of Welsch's project of reinstating an aesthetic of contemplation in the
anaesthetic.
This disorder is a way of making theatre immune to the 'obvious ideas' that
plagued Artaud. Andreas Keller writes of the attempt to counteract the
'Besetzung der Phantasie mit Klischees' [Keller 1994 99], and Maller himself
speaks of allowing 'Freiraume fur Phantasie', [MUller 1986 174] Although this
imaginative freedom might be taken to reinstate the sovereignty of reason as
386
Kant's traditional terminus of the aesthetic experience, the above notion of
'Wahlzwang' suggests a less tidy contest between mind and its cultural material.
And whilst clearly a quality of consciousness, this deployment of significatory
disorder is also arguably not entirely incompatible with MUller's remarks on
theatre as physical, and rather suggests a theatre that operates precisely in the
interstices between the physical and the intellectual. I have already suggested
that Burwick and Douglas's idea of the physical as offering resistance to the
mental processes of abstraction and intellection undermines any simple
opposition of the corporeal and cognitive. The excess of 'signifiers' over
Isignifieds' by which Muller aims to generate a confusion of meaning, which
Keller calls an 'Uberfulle theatralischer Zeichen' [Keller 1994 71], might arguably
be received as an experience of sensory excess. For Hans-Thies Lehmann, events
on stage are threatening due to the incompleteness of intellectual meaning
[Lehmann 1999 380-1], and it is in this sense that he refers to Muller's pieces as
'psycho-physische Attacke'. [Lehmann 1999 390] Moreover, I would draw a
parallel between the disconcerting effect of incomplete meaning, an excess of
inputs, and the shock effect of graphic corporeal violence, each generating a
similar surplus of experience which cannot be integrated rationally. Perhaps
Muller is aiming for the momentary experience of the 'Danger' that is central to
Artaud's concept of 'Cruelty'. [Artaud 199331] For Gilles Deleuze, in spite of his
comments regarding the' directness' of theatre noted above, the interaction of the
head and heart is central to a future theatre, which he centres on his
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characteristically enigmatic concept of repetition: 'The head is the organ of
exchange, but the heart is the amorous organ of repetition. (It is true that
repetition also concerns the head, but precisely because it is its terror or
paradox.), [Deleuze 1994 2]2 Again this sounds like an anti-conceptual mutual
exclusion of separate realms of thinking and emotion, but Deleuze recognition
that repetition 'also concerns the head' suggests some kind of interaction
between mind and body. Even where understanding jails, this failure gives rise
to a cognitive effect that Muller does not want to relinquish. This informs the
standard reading of Muller as one of several recent playwrights who, in Rainer
Nagele's words, synthesise Artaud's 'violence, excess, irrationalism, and
absurdity' and Brecht's Icool, distanced, ascetic, political and rational' theatre.
[Nagele 1987 112]3 In the 'Nachwort' to Anatomie Titus, Muller links the
2 For Gregg Lambert, Deleuze's essentially Nietzschean concept of repetition is
'primarily to be understood by its force'. [Lambert 2002 xiii] Typical of Deleuze's
vitalist tendencies, it militates against the dualist notion of truth as the product of
an abstract understanding. Such abstraction is replicated in the idea of art as
'presupposing a reality' [Deleuze 1989 135], Deleuze's objection to which makes
clear the common ground with the general tum against representation in Beckett
and particularly Handke, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as
Muller's dismantling of any clear and uncomplicated reference in some of the
more impressionistic pieces.
3 But the point of Nagele'S essay is to point out that violence and cruelty are
central to Brecht's Lehrsrucke, with elements that 'cannot be integrated' being
pivotal for turning the passive audience into active participant. [Nagele 1987114]
388
gruesomely corporeal to the cognitive, 'DISMEMBERREMEMBER'. [Muller 2002
193] Elsewhere he emphasises the specifically cognitive benefit of the experience
of fear and shock, which for him is one of learning: 'Es hat noch nie eine gr{)i5ere
Gruppe von Menschen etwas gelemt ohne Schrecken, ohne Schock.' [MUller1990
231 Similarly, he remarks: 'Die Angst ist ja etwas ungeheuer Padagogisches, [... J
Sie ist konstruktiv.' [Muller 1986179]
As far as this pedagogical aspect of MUller is concerned, the difficulty with
Deleuze's formulations is that he writes of theatre's 'shock to thought,
communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral
system directly'. [Deleuze 1989 156, my emphasis] This idea of a direct link
between the theatrical event and the nervous system accords with Deleuze's
essentially anti-dualist concept of the force of repetition, but as well as neglecting
the thematic concerns that are evident in MUller's work it seems to cut out any
possibility of learning, indeed, it seems to cut out the subject that might be the
sticking point where this learning might happen. In the same way Deleuze refers
to this experience as an 'automatic' movement, but my point is that this sensory
or corporeal irruption precisely disconnects our automatised perception of and
A comparable combination of the corporeal and cognitive is evident in Peter
Weiss' MaratjSad.e play. Although much of what I have said above regarding the
challenge to production and meaning of MUller's works militates precisely
against the more rigorous formal unity of Weiss' play.
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responses to things. It is in that respect ultimately indirect, part of a sublime-
type cognitive dialectic. This notion of automatised perception returns of course
to Shklovsky's ideas on aesthetics. And even though this is about cognitive
habits of perception, I have already registered the references to the sensory nature
of this renewal of language and perception, as in Shklovsky's 'roughening' of
language and Nietzsche's reference to metaphors that have lost their sensual
power. [See also Waugh 1992 1551 Of course Nietzsche's root and branch
critique of metaphysics is not present inShklovsky. For Nietzsche, metaphysics'
tendency to abstraction is precipitated by and promotes a closedness to the
sensory element of life: 'Wachs in den Ohren [... ] beinahe Bedingung des
Philosophirens'. [Nietzsche 1973V 2305] And precisely the point of Nietzsche's
characterisation of metaphysics as a second order effect is that it makes no sense
to speak of eradicating the world of illusion to get to the truth beneath it. Truth
can only be generated positively, by forging of new connections and associations
[see Nietzsche 1973 V 2 98], as is echoed in Dada's ideas on art some half a
century later. Shklovsky in his essay is less clear about what the 'ultimate' aim
art is, but for both he and Nietzsche the familiar is the enemy of all experience:
'Das Bekannte ist das Gewohnte, und das Bekannte ist am Schwersten zu
erkennen, das heist als Problem, das heillt als fremd, als fern, als "ausser uns" zu
sehn.' [Nietzsche 1973 V 2 276] So does MUller want to 'know' or does he want
to 'experience'? Does his Ierster Blick auf ein Unbekanntes' renew our
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perception of an external object? One way of answering this might be by looking
at Muller's treatment of the subject.
Contested subjectivity
Subjectivity and identity have been a persistent theme in my discussions of the
status of aesthetics and are touchstone issues in MUller's work. Unlike Stanton
Garner, for whom the return to the physical body is a return to a more secure
truth founded in one's own experience ('The only truths we can return to are the
ever-changing truths of our own experience' [Garner 1990 155]), MUller seems to
want to get away from the moment of secure psychological identity as well as
any identity of meaning. This is evident in the above idea that the difficulties for
performers of his pieces centre on the issue of identity. The dismantling of
subjectivity is realized in his treatment of character, as in Die Hamletmaschine, in
the text itself, and as in his comments elsewhere on the distribution of roles, such
as in the comments at the end of Wolokolamsker Chaussee 1: Russisc1re Eroffmmg,
where he writes 'Die Schauspieler sollen altemieren konnen.' [MUller 2002 97]
Elsewhere the dissolution of individual subjectivity is explicitly thematised. In
Der Auftrag, for instance, Sasportas refers to a landscape, 'die keine andre Arbeit
hat als auf das Verschwinden des Menschen zu warren.' [MUlier 2002 33) This
might cast a more affirmative light to the dead bodies which inhabit MUller's
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work: the sense of mortality is not entirely negative, but suggests that corporeal
death functions as a metaphor for transformation, a relinquishing of subjectivity:
'Ich spurte MEIN Blut aus MEINEN Adem treten/Und MEINEN Leib
verwandeln in die Landschaft MEINES Todes'. [Muller 200283]
In this respect both Deleuze and Artaud's ideas are once again instructive. In his
many borrowings from Nietzsche, Deleuze does not focus on the infamous death
of God, but the 'dissolution of the self' in favour of 'the most natural will of
Nature in itself'. [Deleuze 199411] So when Deleuze writes of repetition as to be
made 'the supreme object of will and of freedom' [Deleuze 1994 6], this is not the
will of the individual, but that of an all-encompassing nature. But I would take
issue with Deleuze's Spinozan concept of nature here: far from of man as
belonging to nature and experiencing, in Welsch/ Adorno's terms, his 'eigene
Naturhaftigkeit', this internal division in man is more likely indicative of man's
difference from the rest of nature. Schelling'S idea of man as 'always a fragment'
[see Bowie 2003 116] is pertinent here. But Deleuze's more useful point is that
repetition is precisely opposed to individual memory and habit, which are
dismissed as 'psychological moments [which] are of little consequence'c jfzeleuze
19947] The common ground is apparent here with Artaud, who wants to 'rescue
theatre from its human, psychological prostration'. [Artaud 1993 69]
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Of course, I have already asked whether this relinquishing of subjectivity is
plausible, particularly in view of my underlying view that the subjective,
cognitive moment in art needs to be recognized and exploited. Andrew Bowie
points out the contradictory nature of the Dionysian call to lose the self,
inasmuch as the self is still there to do the losing. [Bowie 1990 27] When
discussing this contested nature of subjectivity in chapter two I cited Manfred
Frank's caution about entirely dismissing the constitutive moment of
subjectivity, noting that Frank also calls for a more nuanced use of the diagnostic
potential of post-structuralism's critique of the subject. One aspect of this would
seem to recognise the culturally located nature of experience - which
hermeneutics need hardly be taught - which in tum might point towards a
cognitively sophisticated idea of the societal and cultural significance of the
indeterminate aesthetic experience. I should reiterate however that this need not
be a strictly philosophical position on the nature and plausibility of a self-
identical self of the kind that post-structuralist takes issue with. Rather the
momentary dissolution of self which some (and particularly 'excessive') aesthetic
experiences afford might suggest a means of breaking such patterns of
perception and thinking. Taken metaphorically, this idea of relinquishing
subjectivity might be a compelling way of conceptualizing the defamiliarising
tendency in Muller's method. It might even be in this sense that Artaud
expresses his aversion to psychology as 'bringing the unknown down to a level
with the known, which is to say with the everyday and pedestrian'. [Artaud 1993
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58] Heiner Muller echoes this in his conception of the learning function of
theatre less as a question of what is learnt than of what is unleamt: more
specifically, it is a process of forgetting of the self. In an interview with
Wolfgang Heise Muller cites Beckett on the need for self-alienation: '[eder sollte
sich von sich seIber entfemen, sonst ffillt der Schrecken weg, der zum Erkennen
notig ist.' [Muller 1990 55]
Of course this begs the question of where the capacity for such a departure from
norms and habits might come from. For Kant this spontaneity is purely a
product of the rational faculties, evidenced in the self-generation of an idea of
self that 'cannot itself be part of sensuousness'. [Bowie 2003 21] But my point is
that this forgetting of the self is a metaphor for letting go of those cultural
predeterminations which are as constitutive of our identity as Kant's
spontaneously reaffirmed transcendental unity. Moreover, the broadly 'sensory'
element of Muller's art is the means of forging (or forcing - akin to the paradox
of Muller's 'Wahlzwang') a certain kind of spontaneity. In Kant's terms, it would
be paradoxical to suggest that the body should be a means to overcoming the
self, but if the self and the habits that sustain it are in some way the enemies of
spontaneity, might not the body be viewed as a key locus of resistance to cultural
norms? I have already pointed out the sensory element in Shklovsky's notion of
'roughening' language or 'making the stone stony'. Richard Sheppard echoes this
idea with his reference to the corporeal or sensory method of Dada's new type of
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art. [See Sheppard 1978 335] Certainly in MUller's terms, if the atrophied
consciousness which accompanies aestheticisation is the enemy, the body seems
to be central to in any future freedom, to the necessary process of self-alienation.
In the 'Anhang' to Anatomie Titus again corporeal functions like blood pressure
and temperature are conceived as a 'Kompaisnadel' [MUller2002193], guiding us
through an unknown landscape beyond subjectivity.
The sensory versus aestheticisation
The connection might also be made with Welsch's ideas on aestheticisation.
Muller's themes do not seem to engage directly with Welsch's diverse diagnosis
of contemporary culture as predominated by surface effects, harmonization of
experience and sensory excess, aside from his acerbic sideswipe at the
'Parade/Der Zombies perforiert von Werbespots' at the end of Yerkammenes Ufor.
[Muller 2002 81] But his formal method might address problems specifically
associated with the mode of reception that aestheticisation encourages, and
moreover in a way that returns my underlying concerns of the sensory and
cognitive nature of the aesthetic experience. Like a more direct version of
Handke's misperception, theatre that deploys an almost physically tangible
'Ereignis' might be understood to break through our predispositions and
preconceptions, or at least offer an alternative to the predigested, aestheticised
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'pseudo-experience'. Aleks Sierz describes this 'theatre of sensation', for him the
dominant style of theatre in the last decade, as one which 'jolts both actors and
spectators out of conventional responses, touching nerves and provoking alarm'.
[Sierz 2001 41
This kind of violent theatre might just add to sensory overdose of
aestheticisation. Provocative and' shocking' drama is always open to the charge
of sensationalism, as Harry Eyres writes in response to the theatre of sensation
which Sierz documents: 'Sensationalism is predicated on insensitivity. The idea
that dulled audience response must be jerked into life by whatever violent means
are necessary.' [Cited in Sierz 2001 242] For Karl Holl, writing already in 1926,
excessive violence as a response to increasing desensitization is self-defeating:
'Die ganze Zeit bietet das Bild eines Narkotikers, der immer starkere Dosen eines
Reizmittels bedarf, urn die erschlaffenden Sinne, die abgestumpften Nerven
erneut aufzupeitschen.' [Cited in Martens 1971100] Welsch seems to be referring
to the same mechanism when he states that 'Asthetisierung [... ] erfolgt als
Anasthetisierung', [Welsch 1990 14] For Harry Gibson, this kind of sensation is
essentially voyeuristic, 'the excess of the wild folk becomes a spectacle for the
tame folk' [cited in Sierz 2001243], an issue which returns to the central problem
of passivity in our reception which I have identified as a central characteristic of
aestheticised perception. Eyres goes further and, in a way that returns to the
terms of my discussion of such art's questionable humanity above, claims that
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this over-stimulation leads to a further loss of humanity. [SeeSierz 2001 242] But
whilst one need not go as far as Artaud's claims of pacifism, my remarks above
about Muller's differentiated treatment of violence and victims suggest that his
work cannot be so easily lumped together with this new sensationalism.
Alternatively, crude physicality might be taken as a 'de-aestheticisation' of art
which acts against the increasing presence of elements traditionally associated
with art, such as beautification and formal coherence, in everyday life. This
would coincide with Welsch's understanding of some modernist art as turning
against I all die schonen und etablierten Angebote des Asthetischen'. [Welsch
1990 37] Muller certainly conceives of the corporeal as challenge to IaIle
bisherige KuItur', as suggested in his Shakespeare address, 'Shakespeare eine
Differenz' (1988):
Prospero ist der untote Hamlet: immerhin zerbricht er seinen Stab, Replik
auf Calibans, des neueren Shakespearelesers, aktuellen Vorwurf an aIle
bisherige Kultur:
YOU TAUGHT ME LANGUAGE AND MY PROFIT
ON'T
IS I KNOW HOW TO CURSE. [MUller1989108]
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This idea of art as a turn against the legacy of culture and language raises the
question of the relationship of MUller's work to the modernist experience of an
irreparable crisis of language. MUller is of course separated from Hofmannsthal
and other's concerns by over half a century, and is part of a quite different
tradition of cultural critique, informed by sociological changes in post-war
Europe as much as by the intra-aesthetic concerns about representation et cetera.
That said I have referred to the parallel between this tum to the sensory and
some aspects of Dada, and a central tenet of Dada was the idea that art needed to
abandon the neo-classical pretensions that high culture is in some way a source
of or allows access to eternal values. I noted Richard Sheppard's view that
Dada's shock tactics comprised art's first progress beyond the crisis of
representation and language without resorting to the elitism and nostalgia for a
lost wholeness which marks the modernism of Rilke and Yeats. [Sheppard 1978
330] Certainly Dada's anti-elitist counter-cultural happenings conceived of a
new relationship between art and surrounding reality, of which an essential
element was the primitivist aspect and the culture of the body. [See Sheppard
2000 182-5] It is not straightforward how such effects might be allied to a kind of
thematic consciousness-raising, and the question remains whether MOller's
momentary extreme forfeits a treatment of the more complex ideological issues
which underlie aestheticisation, perhaps offering nothing more than just a
paradoxically uncomfortable respite from this manipulation. The momentary
nature of our experience of this kind of art is incontestable: life goes on once we
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leave the theatre. But I would argue that, by resisting the role of art as a
compensatory reality or truth and by undermining any contemplation, MOller's
uncompromisingly avant-garde theatre operates to undermine some of the means
that are deployed in aestheticisation, and as such, the ideologies that they
convey.
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Conclusion
My aim in this thesis has been to present and assess Wolfgang Welsch's
contribution to aesthetics. This has comprised a treatment of his ideas on
aisthesis as a possible framework for widening the scope and significance of the
discipline of aesthetics as a whole, his idea of the sensory effects and
philosophical or ideological implications of contemporary aestheticisation, which
in Welsch's view underpins the particular relevance of the aesthetic for
describing contemporary experience, his focus on the sublime as a crucial
category for modernist art and postmodern philosophy, and finally his (also
essentially sublime) conception of a new focus for aesthetics, the anaesthetic.
The final section of my thesis has been concerned with an application of his ideas
and the issues that arose in my discussion to actual examples of art which I have
characterised as operating at the limits of perception.
As far as the more general features of Welsch's formulations are concerned, it is
apparent his wide focus sometimes detracts from the clarity and focus of his
ideas for aesthetics. So, for instance, whilst his interest in the sublime pinpoints a
crucial category for aesthetics, he does not fully discuss how this might coincide
with his idea of the aesthetic as sensory, nor indeed with his own category of the
anaesthetic. He also writes approvingly of both Adorno and Lyotard's aesthetics
as SUblime, even though one is arguably characterised by its self-reflexivity and
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pervasive negativity, the other by the 'happy positivism' of formless, plural and
infinite experiment. Neither in my view is without problems. Welsch's
suggestion (after Adorno) that the sublime precipitates a kind of return to nature
seems to be singularly inappropriate, particularly in view of Welsch's ideas on an
increasingly artificial and alterable life-world, to say nothing of man's
increasingly problematic relationship to nature. But central to my discussion of
the sublime was the recognition that the concept's nebulous nature, thriving on
oppositions whilst suggesting their dialectical relation. Perhaps an insufficiently
dialectical approach is Welsch's main failing in his treatment of the sublime,
insofar as he opts for such concepts as heterogeneity, experiment and justice, but
seems to dissolve precisely the tensions which might make these categories
valuable. In particular my concern has been to suggest that ideas of immanence
of plurality do not do justice to the modernist aesthetic that Adorno refers to in
his own sparing reference to the sublime, nor the kinds of art that might be
classified under Welsch's own concept of the anaesthetic artwork. A more
antagonistic view of modernist aesthetics - of which its increasing conceptuality
and cognitive nature are key points for me - also seems to be presupposed in
Welsch's own ideas of emphasising the dialectical nature of the aesthetic
experience (aesthetic/anaesthetic), and my point is that this focus on the
cognitive and dialectical nature of the modernist aesthetic as a limit experience
might usefully be theorised in terms of the sublime.
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Arguably more problematic is the tension in Welsch's ideas on the anaesthetic
between its conceptualisation as an absence of sensory experience (for whatever
reason) and its use as a term for the latent and unthematised norms which make
perception possible at all. This contributes to and is compounded by the
problem that he generates several distinct models of how art might interact with
its context. This is consistent with his arguments elsewhere for the
heterogeneous and plural nature of the aesthetic, but the difficulty is that with
the changing definitions of both aesthetic (sensory, excess, norms of artistic
representation) and anaesthetic (imperceptible, anti-fiction, necessary non-
perception, perceptual selection) he fails to articulate the potential
incompatibilities between them which even the dialectical nature of the
aesthetic/ anaesthetic cannot quite resolve. This is particularly problematic as the
positivism of his remarks on the heterogeneous and 'horizontal' nature of the
aesthetic seems to be at odds with the 'vertical' sense which characterises his
preference for the anaesthetic as a respite from the fiction of the aestheticised
world, and as somehow crucial to the oppositional force of the aesthetic. Rather
than a specifically post-modernist mode of art, this imperceptible seems to
suggest a cul-de-sac of modernism. Rather than the re-admission of the receiving
subject into the significance of the aesthetic, this seems to return to the position of
relegating the recipient as untrustworthy, not to say, with Marcuse 'the
devaluation of the entire realm of subjectivity'. [Marcuse 1978 3]
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That said I do use Welsch's terms to explore ways in which the two aspects of the
anaesthetic might be combined to fruitfully describe art that operates at the limits
of perception. This discussion touched on Peter Handke's strategy of re-
engaging the recipient - a crucial instance of what Erika Fischer-Lichte has
referred to as the 'Entdeckung des Zuschauers' in twentieth century drama. [See
Fischer-Lichte 1997] In both Das Miindel and Quodlibet Handke's theatre was
seen to deploy a more modulated misperception, which retains reference to
cultural norms and preconditions, in such a way that may be said to reunite the
two halves of Welsch's ideas on anaesthetics. The dismantling of norms of the
audience's reception, not only by Handke's thematisation of perception and
cognrtion, but the denial of a determinate let alone convincing new reality was
seen to be the opposite of packaged understandings and tweaked subjectivity of
aestheticised world. In this respect it might be said to create what Marcuse calls
a 'counter-consciousness'. [Marcuse 1978 9] This idea of art as a more modulated
problematised perception might be taken as a means to cutting into what Welsch
calls '~sthetische Gewohnheiten'. [Welsch 1990 37] Handke's half-reference and
playing with cultural buzz words suggests both representation of social or
cultural reality and its subversion.
A similar dismantling of norms and expectations might be achieved by what 1
have characterized as the opposite of the imperceptible, namely art which
deploys sensory and significatory excess. This echoes Welsch's focus on the
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sensory aspect of aesthetics, but also keeps faith with my concern to draw out the
cognitive implications of the aesthetic experience. I trace the history of this kind
of art in terms of the resurgence of materialism and the sense overturning the
submergence of the body in history, Nietzsche's quasi-philosophical comments
about the vital source of life, and the more recent variants of this refutation of the
dialectic, such as what Jameson calls 'the hunger for the sheer event' or Derrida's
valorisation of art as 'full presence', as well as Artaud's crude preference for the
corporeal over the verbal or conceptual. But ultimately the doubt remains
whether the sensory or material ever be said to be there 'in its own right'. At
very least the deployment of sensory excess is already a formal method, and
moreover one which does not entirely absolve itself of metaphysical
connotations. Artaud was seen to refer to 'certain predominant powers, certain
ideas governing everything' [Artaud 1993 60] which his Theatre of Cruelty is
designed to give us a sense of. I also argued that the disjunction between the
sensory and the verbal is never so clear cut in MUller's still highly 'literary' work,
always still a strategy for obstructing meaning and denying theatricality.
proposed that its 'formal' nature does not mean that MUller's verbally excessive
works have no ramifications for the wider concerns of Welsch ideas on
aestheticisation. For participants MUller's theatre enforces experimentation -
itself a riposte to the idea of art as something for the consumer. And for the
recipients the defamiliarising shock tactic of MUller's verbal'Oberschwemmung',
and the paradoxical combination of force and freedom that it precipitates (his
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'Wahlzwang'), suggest a mode of perception that is crucially opposed to the
'tweaked receptivity' of the aestheticised world. Muller goes as far as to write of
shock as pedagogical - and this process intersects with Welsch's ideas on the
cultural preconditions of perception insofar as it is less as a question of what is
learnt than of what is unlearnt. More specifically, and in a way that intersects
with a crucial focus of philosophical aesthetics more generally and my concerns
in particular, this unlearning is conceptualized in terms of a process of (albeit
metaphorical) forgetting of the self.
This reflection on the crucial function of subjectivity is of course not the only
overlap with the traditional terrain of philosophical aesthetics. MUller's idea of
freedom and indeterminacy being precipitated by a paradoxical imposition
sounds like an updated version of Kant's sublime, but crucially freedom is not
conceived as a positive product of the transcendental mind, but a process of
dismantling the more culturally bound preconceptions that stake out our
understanding of self in the world. This suggests a crucial interaction of
representation and consciousness that in my view offers an alternative to the
refutation of the self in Kant's disinterest. A cognitive experience at the limits of
perception or meaning, which cannot be said to be sheerly 'non-conceptual' and
which allows a more convincing interaction with non-art perception, a central
plank of Welsch's focus on the sensory in the first place.
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This touches on a key strand of my thesis which is tangential to my discussion of
Welsch's ideas, but ultimately gets its impetus from them. I am referring to my
distinction between the idea of the aesthetic as primarily of significance for its
contribution to the essentially philosophical issues of grounding knowledge and
value and the more marginal reading of the experience of the limits of our
understanding and cognition as in some way fruitful for what it can tell us about
less 'transcendental' concerns, such as our own preconceptions or habits of
thinking. These two positions draw conclusions in quite opposite directions, to
the point of hostility: the former, transcendental, reading of the aesthetic tends
not to be interested in art as a particular intervention, even going so far as to say
that these are deleterious to art's philosophical claims. This underlies the
refutation of the significance of the subjective recipient that I traced in chapter
one. Alternatively, those who assert a more marginal and located notion of art as
a dimension for changing consciousness can see the transcendental implications
as a distraction from real concerns, as in Marcuse's critique of difficult art
discussed in chapter three, or as in Daniel Bell's apocalypse which blinds us to
the mundane. But are these positions necessarily mutually exclusive? I have
already registered that departures from habitual ways of seeing depends on the
capacity for thinking the new. Might a more located, hermeneutically
sophisticated significance of aesthetic indeterminacy be rendered without
reducing it to its external ideological determinants? Programma tical ideology
critique certainly suffers from its procedure of reducing art to what it means in
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other terms - denuding art often of what is most entrancing in it. At the same
time, I have suggested in my discussions above that the demand that it be the
locus of the unsayable or the incommunicable also leaves the artwork very little
room in which to manoeuvre - Welsch's sublime anaesthetic is a case in point
and the fact that he offers only one example of it is probably indicative of the
problem. From my discussions of possible practical examples of art at the limits
of perception it seems plausible to argue that non-perception is a more fruitful
mode of critical art when it is engaged with actual experience and cultural
content. Kant's transcendental capacity for freedom is a curious freedom if it has
nothing from which it must tear itself away time and again. As Schiller writes,
'[wjas man beim Philosophieren notwendig voneinander trennen muB, ist darum
nicht immer auch in der Wirklichkeit getrennt.' [Schiller 1966 393) And as far as
Welsch's are formulations are concerned, my view is that the more modulated
and cognitively sophisticated playing with sense perception offers the scope for a
more plausible interaction with both the content and the mode of the
aestheticised world, a better sense of the fragile and dialectical nature of the
aesthetic experience, and a more sophisticated understanding of the still crucial
sensory element in aesthetics.
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